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India and China make a perfect comparison pair in the area of IT industry, with 
each having its unique strength and potential for cooperation and synergy. Due to 
heavy involvement of Indian IT firms in software outsourcing arrangement by 
MNEs, the IP or patent resources are not important. This is especially true when 
compared with Chinese IT firms, which have much larger patenting volume 
(compared with other manufacturing sectors). Film industry in India and China 
has grown despite piracy. In other words, it prospered with little or no copyright 
protection. More importantly, piracy in China and India did not kill the content 
industry, film and music alike, but probably helped in building the customer base 
and cultivating future demand, which might not be true for a small economy with 
a sophisticated audience such as Hong Kong. India can look at China to find IT 
means for delivery and payment of cinematographic content. India and China 
make a perfect comparison pair in the pharmaceutical industry as well. This time 
around, China can learn much from India. Although there is an increase in the 
number of patented drugs in the pharmaceutical industry in China, patents have 
made relatively low contribution to the industrial value, and IP held by Chinese 
Special thanks to two of the first author’s PhD students at Renmin University of China, Zhang 
Haoran and Liu Jianchen, and Professor He Jun, Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua 
University, for their help in collecting and analyzing relevant materials.
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firms is less competitive compared with that of foreign companies. In contrast, 
major Indian generic companies continue to invest sizeable shares of their sales 
turnover in R&D, which was manifest in their patenting behavior. They were 
more active in filing patent applications in foreign jurisdictions, but significantly 
less so in domestic patenting. The Indian automobile industry’s absorption of 
global best practices has been slower than its Chinese counterpart. Strategies of 
firms in the Chinese auto industry provided a boost to technological learning 
more quickly and broadly than in India, especially in the electric vehicle sector. 
India can benefit from learning from China. IP has a relatively limited role in the 
development of the automobile industry in India and China.
Keywords
Film · IT · Pharmaceutical · Sharing economy · Automobile · Plant varieties · IP 
· Innovation · India · China
1  Background
In October 2014, ARCIALA held a workshop on “The Actual Role of IP in the 
Technological and Business Innovation in India and China” with an aim of bridging 
the monolithic elephant and dragon. This workshop was the first of its kind, though 
small in scale, and led to the publication of the book Innovation and IPRs in China 
and India—Myths, Realities and Opportunities in 2016.1 It was felt that the topic is 
worth further exploration.
As a follow-up ARCIALA co-hosted a 2-day workshop with Renmin University 
of China, Jindal Global University (New Delhi, India), and the German Max Planck 
Institute for Innovation and Competition on “Innovation, Economic Development 
and IP in India and China” on September 27 and 28, 2016, with expanded ambit and 
refreshed focus. This workshop was more of a preparatory nature, as it was about 
searching for a research framework, topics, questions, and approaches.
The workshop strived to examine the development of industries which are reflec-
tive of the innovation and economic development of the two giant economies or of 
vital importance to them. During that examination, it was asked why certain indus-
tries have developed in one country and not in the other and what role state innova-
tion policy and/or IP policy has played. Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, 
co-relational, or simply irrelevant? What can India and China learn from each other, 
and is there any possibility of synergy, especially given that China is aging rapidly 
while half of the population of India is under 25?2
1 Kung-Chung Liu/Uday S. Racherla (ed.), Innovation and IPR in China and India—Myth, Realities 
and Opportunities, Springer 2016.
2 According to Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_India), more than 50% 
of India’s population are below the age of 25 and more than 65% are below the age of 35. It is 
expected that, in 2020, the average age of an Indian will be 29 years, compared to 37 for China and 
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Six topics for this workshop were chosen: Innovation and IPR Policy, Open 
Innovation: Peer Production and the Sharing Economy, Film Industry, Software 
Industry, Pharmaceutical Industry and Developments in the Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Food Security. The width and depth of this study went beyond the 
domain of legal academics. Therefore, economists and management professors 
were invited to speak as well.
After the workshop, it was recognized that a solid empirical study on one specific 
industry in India and China should be first conducted as a pilot project, which can 
serve as a model for other study groups on different industries. The information 
technology (IT) industry was chosen3 given its vital importance to innovation and 
economic development in China and India. This pilot project was funded by the 
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and set out to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
 (1) Why have IT services, business process outsourcing (BPO)/business process 
management (BPM), and the software industry developed in India and not in 
China?
 (2) Why has the hardware industry developed in China and not in India?
 (3) What role has state innovation policy played? Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, 
co-relational or simply irrelevant?
 (4) What role has national IT infrastructure played?
 (5) What role has IT sui generis legislation played?
 (6) What role has IP (national policy, laws, rights, and adjudicated cases) played? 
Is it causal, facilitating, crippling, co-relational, or simply irrelevant?
 (7) What can India and China learn from each other?
In addition, we have convened another six study groups to continue our research 
topics of the 2016 workshop with recalibration: (1) IP codification and innovation 
governance, (2) film industry, (3) pharmaceutical industry, (4) plant varieties and 
food industry, (5) automobile industry, and (6) peer production and the sharing 
economy.
On December 18–19, 2017, we held a sequel conference on Innovation, Economic 
Development and IP in India and China in Renmin University of China in Beijing. 
The seven study groups got together and discussed their initial findings. Two high- 
ranking judiciary members from India were invited and could not come due to inter-
nal rules. Their presence would have greatly enhanced our endeavor.
48 for Japan.
3 We have chosen to focus on IT industry, rather than on information communication technology 
(ICT) industry, as India and China do not make a good pair for comparison. ICT includes (tele)
communication, which is highly regulated in China and not open to competition, and innovation 
can only happen under constraints. In contrast, (tele)communication is less regulated in India. 
However, the present book has cited many studies that have targeted ICT and has to make neces-
sary adjustments to make its statement focus on IT.
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2  Methodology
The project is an interdisciplinary research, in which legal, economic, and manage-
ment acadmics corroborate and cross-fertilize. Equally important, this project is a 
cross-country study, in which we compare and contrast China and India. Last but 
not least, this is an undertaking to explore the relationship between innovation, eco-
nomic development, and intellectual property in the actual context of India and 
China in six specific industries.
3  Summary of the Findings of the Seven Study Groups
3.1  IP Codification and Innovation Governance
IP laws as they now are stand generally quite in isolation from each other and lack 
overarching guiding principles to lead coherent legislation, interpretation, and 
application of individual IP provisions when dealing with similar or even the same 
topics, such as exhaustion, fair use, compulsory license of IP rights, damages, etc.4 
Therefore, some national states have made efforts to codify IP laws either into one 
combined piece of law or into their respective Civil Law code, whether in existence 
or under construction. Admittedly, these countries are only a minority. Yet, they 
point out the challenging questions of why some of the same legal issues are dealt 
with differently across different IP laws within one country. Is it because of igno-
rance of other IP laws? Is it because of lobbying and under-table exchange of inter-
ests between lobbyists? Is it because of unspeakable foreign pressure? Can 
codification help alleviate the inconsistency or even arm-twisting of IP laws?
In addition, codification of IP laws has a China-specific meaning. China, although 
a latecomer in the realm of IP, has skyrocketing IP numbers in the last decade with 
all kinds of state funding and promotion schemes, to the extent that people start to 
fear for the alienation of IP laws and rights, the remaining space for free and fair 
competition, and the ramifications of comprehensive state intervention for the rule 
of law in China. Chapter 2 argues passionately for the codification of IP laws into 
the future Civil Law code of China, which could even offer some lessons for com-
mon law jurisdictions such as India.
4 In Japan, however, the Trademark Act applies many articles of the Patent Act by analogy. For 
example, Article 13 provides:”(1)The provisions of Paragraphs (1) to (4) of Article 43, 43–2(2) and 
(3) of the Patent Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to an application for trademark registration… (2)
The provisions of Articles 33 and paragraphs (4) to (7) of Article 34 (Right to obtain a patent) of 
the Patent Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to the rights deriving from an application for trademark 
registration.” Article 35 further provides: “Article 73 (co-ownership), 76 (Lapse of patent rights in 
absence of heir), 97(1) (waiver), and 98(1)(i) and 98(2) (Effect of registration) of the Patent Act 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to trademark rights. In this case, the term “transfer (excluding those 
by general succession including inheritance)” in Article 98 (1)(i) of the Patent Act shall be deemed 
to be replaced with “division and transfer (excluding those by general succession including 
inheritance).”
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Chapter 3 looks into the most fundamental, yet often neglected, innovation infra-
structure of India and China, namely, the constitution and its governance and power 
structure and distribution, and tries to identify its impact on their respective national 
innovation. This chapter rightly considers the wider setting, especially the shared 
value and power structure, which is  highly relevant to the National Innovation 
System (NIS). India and China believe in socialism for modernization and have put 
socialism into the preamble of their constitutions but follow different schools of 
socialism, Fabianism for India and Marxism and Leninism for China.
Broadly speaking, the different versions of socialism substantially influence their 
ways of pursuing social revolution and social justice, which have different impacts 
on the social foundation of national innovation capacity. Following its non-violent 
strategy of civil disobedience for the independence movement, the social revolution 
after independence in India was also through non-violent means, mainly through 
universal adult suffrage. In pursuing social justice, India has institutionalized a 
credible set of checks and balances through electoral democracy plus independent 
judicial review, which on the other hand can slow down the process of innovation to 
a less optimal level.
However, China has followed Leninism, with violent revolution for social eman-
cipation. The radical social transformation has helped China build a wider setting 
for innovation such as strong awareness of social equality, access to health and 
education, and rapid development of physical infrastructure. China’s centralized 
power and policy-oriented administration make government responsive to and flex-
ible in promoting innovation but at the costs of insecurity and uncertainty caused by 
the low level of rule-based institutionalization. Although India has lagged in most 
key economic indicators compared to China, the gradual social change has saved 
India from dramatic political turbulence and from uncontrolled economic and social 
transformation as well.
3.2  IT Industry
India and China make a perfect comparison pair in the area of IT industry, with each 
having its unique strength and potential for cooperation and synergy.
3.2.1  Current Status
China
 1. IT Services and BPO/BPM
The estimated revenue of both IT services (mobile apps, e-commerce, online 
gaming, cloud computing) and BPO/BPM for 2014 was US$117  billion.5 That 
5 EU SME Centre/China-Britain Business Council, Sector Report, The ICT Market in China, 2015, 
available at: http://ccilc.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/eu_sme_centre_report_-_the_ict_market_
in_china_update_-_july_2015.pdf
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 figure is estimated to have more than doubled in 2018, reaching US$276.3 billion. 
The main players are Tencent, Baidu, Alibaba, Netease, and JD.com, with market 
value estimated to have reached US$ 1454.4 billion in 2018.6
 2. Software7
According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China 
(MIIT), the software industry can be divided into six segments, namely software 
products, system integration, operation services, embedded software, IT consulting, 
and IC design. Total revenue reached around US$ 815.8 billion in the first 11 months 
of 2018 (up to November) and about US$ 890 billion for the whole of 2018. Main 
players include Kingdee, ZTE, Neusoft, Founder Group, and Haier.
 3. Hardware8
China’s hardware industry (also known as electronic information manufacturing 
industry) mainly includes computer manufacturing, communication equipment 
(like mobile phone) manufacturing, electronic components manufacturing, and 
electron device manufacturing. Total revenue of the industry is about US$ 2.1 tril-
lion in 2018. According to Canalys, China’s client PC (including desktops, note-
books, two-in-ones and tablets) shipments will reach 88.6  million units and are 
expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.3% to reach 
101.1 million units in 2019. Main players include Lenovo, Founder Group, Haier, 
Tsinghua Tongfang, and Xiaomi.
 4. IT as a Whole9
The Chinese IT industry has developed at a high speed, and its structure was 
becoming more and more reasonable in 2017. Its main business income was over 
US$ 2.8 trillion (including communication industry), marking an 11% increase on 
a year-on-year basis. The total revenue of the software industry was about 
US$800 billion and increased 13.9% compared with 2016. The total revenue of the 
6 China Academy of Information Communication Technology: A Report on the Development 
Trend and Business Index of Chinese Internet Industry, available at: http://www.caict.ac.cn/kxyj/
qwfb/bps/201807/P020180710555374944625.pdf
7 MIIT, The Economic Operation Situation of Chinese Software Industry in 2018 (January to 
November), available at: http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146312/n1146904/n1648374/c6564586/con-
tent.html
8 MIIT, A Research Report on the Comprehensive Development Index of Chinese Electronic 
Information Manufacturing Industry, available at: http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/
n3054355/n3057511/n3057518/c6512738/content.html, and http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/
n1146352/n3054355/n3057511/n3057518/c6529823/content.html
9 Digital China Union: Development Report of Chinese IT Industry for 2017, published at Chinese 
IT Leaders Summit Meeting (March 2018), pp. 17–18 (statistics of the whole Chinese IT industry 
for 2018 will not be available until March 2019).
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electronic information manufacturing industry, around US$ 1.96 trillion, occupied 
a larger portion of the whole Chinese IT industry, about 71.1%. Within the elec-
tronic information manufacturing industry, the total revenue of electronic compo-
nents and electron devices grew at the highest speed and increased 17.8% and 
18.2%, respectively.
India
India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF10) classifies IT (or IT-enabled service indus-
try (ITeS)) into four main components: IT services, BPO/BPM, software products 
and engineering services, and hardware. The 2018 Indian IT and ITeS Industry 
Report published by IBEF shows the following figures11:
 1. IT Services
Market size: US$ 86 billion during 2018. Over 81% of revenue comes from the 
export market. BFSI (banking, financial services, and insurance) continues to be the 
major vertical segment of the IT sector. IT services made up around 51.7% of 
the Indian IT sector revenues in 2018.
 2. BPM
Market size: US$ 32 billion during 2018. Around 87% of revenue comes from 
the export market. The BPM industry market size is to reach US$ 54 billion by 
2025. The BPM segment made up around 19.2% of the Indian IT sector revenues in 
2018.
 3. Software Products and Engineering Services
Market size: US$ 33 billion during 2018. Over 83.9% of revenue comes from 
exports.
The software products and engineering services segment grew 10.5% in 2017. It 
made up around 19.8% of the Indian IT sector revenues in 2018.
 4. Hardware
Market size: US$ 15.4 billion in 2018. The domestic market accounts for a sig-
nificant share. The segment made up around 9.3% of the Indian IT sector revenues 
in 2018.
10 IBEF is a Trust established by the Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Government of India. IBEF’s primary objective is to promote and create international 
awareness of the Made in India label in markets overseas and to facilitate dissemination of knowl-
edge of Indian products and services.
11 Available at https://www.ibef.org/download/it-ites-dec-2018.pdf
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 5. IT as a Whole
Revenue reached US$ 167 billion and exports stood at US$ 126 billion in 2017–
2018. Export revenue from the digital segment forms about 20% of the industry’s 
total export revenue, which is expected to grow 7–9% year-on-year to US$ 135–
137 billion in 2019. IT service exports are projected to add US$ 10 billion in 2019 
to reach US$ 126 billion. Moreover, revenue from the digital segment is expected to 
form 38% of the total industry revenue by 2025. The IT industry employs nearly 
3.97 million people. The computer software and hardware sector attracted cumula-
tive foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows worth US$ 32.23 billion between April 
2000 and June 2018, which ranks second. India has extended tax holidays to the IT 
sector for software technology parks of India (STPI) and special economic zones 
(SEZs). Furthermore, the country is providing procedural ease and single window 
clearance for setting up facilities.
3.2.2  Major Findings
Chapters 4 and 5 have come to the following major findings.
Typical differences among IT companies in the two countries include:
 1. Indian companies enjoy high international market penetration (high-end interna-
tional markets in the IT service sector), while Chinese companies control low- 
and mid-end international markets in the manufacturing sectors.
 2. Close connections between manufacturing and service sectors in China, which 
are lacking in India, may determine the potential competitiveness of companies 
in the industries.
 3. China and India have followed different development paths in IT evolution. In 
China’s case, it is forward integration, as it has combined the domestic and inter-
national markets. In India’s case, it is backward integration, as it started from 
international markets and developed back to the domestic market.
 4. Due to heavy involvement of Indian firms in IT software outsourcing arrange-
ment by MNEs, the IP or patent resources are not important. This is especially 
true when compared with Chinese firms, which have much larger patenting vol-
ume (compared with other manufacturing sectors) in IT.
Reasons for the abovementioned differences probably lie in the following:
 1. The Indian IT industry, both the hardware and software subsectors, would not 
have thrived without the strong government policy support, ranging from open-
ing up for foreign investment well before the government officially adopted the 
policy of economic reforms in the early 1990s, duty-free import of computer 
systems for software export purposes, 100% foreign-owned enterprises for soft-
K.-C. Liu and U. S. Racherla
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ware exports operations were permitted, and the establishment of the software 
technology parks with government support.12
 2. In India, national-level patent strategies in promoting public welfare-based liti-
gation for Indian firms in the international community, maintaining a preventive 
patent database, etc. have protected Indian firms from patent snatching by non- 
Indian entities. Indian firms can also respond quickly and effectively to IP 
infringement claims by foreign companies through a highly protective IP system 
locally. In this regard, China seems to lag behind India, as China’s National IP 
Strategy emphasizes more the creation and exploitation of IP rights by private 
sectors.
 3. India’s R&D spending remained sluggish. Indian firms are weaker in self-owned 
IP assets in IT industries, in both hardware and software. In fact, based on the 
high volume of outsourcing arrangements by Indian firms, self-owned IP assets 
are not important for Indian companies in IT industries, particularly in the soft-
ware sector. In general, the Indian IT industry has not contributed to indigenous 
technology development.
3.3  Film Industry
Film industry in India and China has grown despite piracy, and India can look at 
China to find IT means for delivery and payment of cinematographic content.
3.3.1  Current Status
China
After 40 years of market liberalization, China now has a booming film industry, 
despite high piracy. The number of produced feature films increased 10 times from 
around 40 in 1997 to 402 in 2007, and annual production ranked third worldwide 
after India and the USA. In 2015, the top ten private distribution companies made 
up 84.9% of the market in domestic films distribution, contributing RMB 22.98 bil-
lion in box office revenue and 52.1% of the total box office revenue in 2015. China’s 
cinema is approaching a mega-industry. The number of cinema screens increased to 
41,179 in 2016, which was for the first time more than those in the USA. All kinds 
of macro reforms have greatly improved the productivity and market adaptability of 
Chinese film production. Noteworthy is that China enacted in 2016 the Film Industry 
12 In 2000, India enacted the Information Technology Act (IT Act), which can mislead people into 
thinking this law is to promote IT technology. Rather, the IT Act is limited to providing legal rec-
ognition for transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other means of 
electronic communication, commonly referred to as “electronic commerce.” For an analysis of the 
relationship between the IT Act and Indian Copyright Act, see Raman Mittal, Actual Knowledge 
for Secondary Liability of Internet Intermediaries for Third-party Content Means Knowledge 
Based on A Court Order under Indian Information Technology Act in Kung-Chung Liu (edited) 
Annotated Leading Copyright Cases in Major Asian Jurisdictions, City University of Hong Kong 
Press, forthcoming 2019.
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Promotion Law to confirm and update the ongoing development directions of 
Chinese cinema in the form of law.13
Equally interesting is the film industry in the Special Administrative Region of 
China, Hong Kong, once the “Hollywood of the Far East” with 400 annual films, 
surpassing India, and 119 cinemas in 1993. Hong Kong’s film industry experienced 
sharp decline in the last two decades with the number of cinemas dropping to only 
47 (the second lowest per 100,000 persons/screen ratio compared to other major 
Asian cities) in 2015. It is now regaining its box office revenue, which increased to 
HK$1947  million in 2016 and HK$1853  million in 2017. However, the receipt 
increase is attributable to foreign, not domestic, films. In fact, foreign films contrib-
ute nearly 80% of the total revenue.
India
The Indian film industry is the world’s largest in terms of films produced and tickets 
sold, third-largest in terms of box office size, and fastest-growing overall. Globally, 
Indian cinema enjoys popularity among the Indian diaspora, as well as among non- 
Indian populations in certain parts of Asia and Africa, and forms a component of 
India’s global soft power. It is undeniable that a culture of piracy is prevalent 
throughout India. Pirated DVDs are openly sold in markets in Indian cities, while 
illegal file-sharing and downloading are common.
In 2012, India introduced an unwaivable right for authors of works, in particular 
authors of songs included in cinematograph films or sound recordings, to receive 
equal royalties accruing from exploitation of their works. It is important to note that 
there is no affirmative right to receive royalties in the Act. While the copyright can be 
assigned, the right to receive royalties cannot be assigned by the author to any person 
other than to the author’s heirs or a copyright society for collection and distribution 
of royalties. The 2012 amendments were devised as reactionary measures to the 
denial of royalties and mismanagement of copyright societies in India by music 
labels. However, to date, copyright societies have refused to comply with the dictates 
of the amendments by all sorts of legal gambit (for more details, see Chap. 9).
Screening of Indian Films in China and Chinese Films in India
So far, Chinese movies have not made much headway into the Indian market. Indian 
movies as foreign movies are subject to a quota system (some follow the pattern of 
buyout of screening rights, others follow the profit-sharing arrangement) in China 
and were not much in demand. India and China signed an agreement on movie co- 
production in 2014 that would indirectly boost the screening of Indian and Chinese 
films in the two countries. The breakthrough only came in 2017 with the film 
“Dangal,” which has a record box office of RMB 1.299 billion. In 2018, Indian 
13 Article 29 of the Law imposes on cinemas a high quota of showing Chinese films no less than 2/3 
of the total show time. The United Kingdom enacted the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 designed 
to stimulate the declining British film industry and to counter Hollywood’s perceived economic and 
cultural dominance. It introduced a requirement for British cinemas to show a quota of British films, 
for a duration of 10 years. The act is generally not considered a success and was eventually repealed 
by the Films Act 1960; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinematograph_Films_Act_1927
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movies have become the second most popular foreign movies in China, only next to 
Hollywood.14
Major Findings
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Film industries thrive in both India and China despite high piracy rates. In other 
words, film industries prospered with little or no copyright protection. More 
importantly, piracy did not kill the content industry in China and India, film and 
music alike, but probably helped in building the customer base and cultivating 
future demand, which might not be true for a small economy with a sophisticated 
audience such as Hong Kong. So long there is demand and appetite for movies, 
new ways of paying for movies will be schemed up, be it direct fee payment by 
buying tickets online, Internet service/bandwidth subscription, or indirect with 
ad sponsorship. The stronger demand there is for movies, the faster the emer-
gence of new technical means for delivering content and fee-charging, as the 
Chinese film industry has shown how it can easily ride on the ubiquitous smart-
phones and smart TVs for this purpose.
 2. Major Internet giants in China such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (the so-called 
BAT) have been swarming into the film industry, bringing with them big data, 
technology, funding, platforms, and fundamental changes to audiovisual ser-
vices, transforming their business models from providing illegal content to legal 
but free (ad-sponsored) content and to legal and paid premium content. As a 
result, they not only provide instantaneous access to quality films and make 
enforcement of copyright against piracy easy but also fundamentally change 
consumers’ behavior and habits in digital content consumption and help set up 
an industrial code or self-regulation for the digital film market. More and more, 
copyright law is playing a significant role in the furtherance of cinema industri-
alization. China is the future India in terms of copyright protection. In that 
regards, China’s IT industry could very well lend a helping hand.
 3. It is amazing to find out how the Chinese private film industry, including private 
film studios and private distribution chains, has managed to boom despite state 
ideology and a state-monopolized film production and distribution system within 
a short span of 40 years. The desire to create, share, and enjoy content, the foun-
dation of freedom of expression, is simply unstoppable, even in the era of politi-
cal left-leaning.
 4. The Hong Kong story of how the director-centric production system, due mostly 
to the kung fu genre, has resulted in “guerrilla filmmaking,” “script-butchering,” 
and diluting the storyline, and how scriptwriters remain weak and unprotected 
caused by the lack of the collective bargaining right, is very illuminating for the 
film industry in any other economy. So is the overall poor infrastructure of the 
industry, particularly in terms of education, production, and distribution, which 
led also to the industry’s decline. Moreover, different from other major 
14 http://www.sohu.com/a/280668438_757761
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 film- producing jurisdictions which grant the right of exploitation to the producer 
exclusively, such as Italy, France, Germany, China, Korea (per law), USA, and 
Japan (per practice), in Hong Kong a film is principally co-owned by the pro-
ducer and the principal director. However, joint ownership is prone to conflicts – 
between the interests of the producer and principal director, conflicts of applicable 
laws when the joint owners are from different jurisdictions – and disadvanta-
geous for exploitation.
3.4  Pharmaceutical Industry
The importance of the pharmaceutical industry for India and China is beyond 
description. As it happens, the two “fellow sufferers15” make a perfect comparison 
pair in the pharmaceutical industry as well. This time around, China can learn much 
from India.
3.4.1  Current Status
India
In India, domestic generic companies have been far ahead of the affiliates of foreign 
companies for the past three decades, ever since the generic companies were able to 
establish themselves as major players in the industry. The growth in sales registered 
by the leading generic producers in the early 1990s led to a complete transformation 
of the composition of market leaders. In 1994–1995, five of the ten top firms in 
terms of sales were the associates of foreign firms. But two decades later, nine of the 
top ten sellers were generic firms. Generic producers are the most profitable among 
all the leading sectors of the Indian industry. On average, they have registered 
double- digit profits since 2011, which could be much higher after including the data 
for the global operations.
The Indian pharmaceutical sector attracted US$ 15.59  billion worth of FDI 
between 2000 and 2017. In Q2 2018, the Indian pharmaceutical sector posted pri-
vate equity and venture capital investments of US$ 396 million. Also, in 2017, India 
witnessed 46 mergers and acquisitions worth US$ 1.47 billion. Over the past two 
decades, India’s total trade in pharmaceutical products increased from less than US$ 
2 billion to more than US$ 27 billion. This expansion came on the back of strong 
export performance, increased from just over US$ 1 billion in 1996 to over US$ 
20 billion in 2016. India’s place in the global market as supplier of cheap generics 
is confirmed by the pharmaceutical industry’s growing presence in the market for 
formulations. Since the beginning of the current decade, exports of formulations 
have steadily increased, while bulk drug exports have stagnated. Between 2005 and 
2016, bulk drug imports have increased more than threefold. China has emerged as 
the largest supplier of bulk drugs, supplying nearly two-thirds of Indian total 
imports.
15 Both have a long history of traditional medicines and yet are both “lagging” behind in the devel-
opment of patented new drugs.
K.-C. Liu and U. S. Racherla
13
Market penetration of generic drugs increased rapidly after the enactment of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984. By the early years of the new millennium, generic 
drugs comprised more than 47% of the prescriptions filled for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, up from 19% in 1984. The Office of Generic Drugs of the US FDA reports that 
currently, 9 out of 10 prescriptions filled are for generic drugs. The USA is the sin-
gle largest market for Indian formulations, taking up 39% market share. This market 
expanded from less than $300 million in 2005 to over $5.2 billion in 2016.
China
In 2010 China’s pharmaceutical industry achieved sales of US$ 41.1 billion, making 
it the third largest in sales worldwide. In 2016, the business income of large-scale 
industrial enterprises in China’s pharmaceutical industry reached RMB 2.96 tril-
lion, an increase of 9.92% over the previous year. In 2015, China’s biopharmaceuti-
cal manufacturing revenue from product sales was RMB 186.4 billion, and the total 
profit was RMB 31.0 billion, up 14.8% and 21.6%, respectively, over the previous 
year. China is the second largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients 
(APIs) and the largest producer of penicillin and P-Lactam drugs and vitamins, 
accounting for 30% of the world’s total output. The trade volume in pharmaceutical 
and health products in China in 2017 was US$116.76 billion, including US$60.8 bil-
lion in exports and US$55.88 billion in imports. It enjoyed a US$4.9 billion trade 
surplus, a 34.60% drop compared with the previous year.
More than 97% of the domestically produced drugs are generics. Most pharma-
ceutical companies in China mainly focus on producing generics with relatively low 
technical requirements and mature technologies. Serious overcapacity exists. The 
utilization rate of production capacity of tablets, capsules, powder injection, and 
water injection were less than 45%, 40%, 27%, and 50%, respectively. In China, 
pharma companies are small in scale, a substantial percentage of them are in deficit 
(15% in 2009), and market concentration is low (the aggregate market share of the 
ten biggest companies (CR10) was 15.10% in 2004). As a result, pharmaceutical 
companies have an R&D intensity of merely 1.77% on average, while the top ten 
pharmaceutical companies in the USA and India have an R&D intensity of 35.3% 
and 15.9%, respectively. In 2011, the cost of purchasing drugs by residents accounted 
for 50%–62% of the total health expenditure in China, much higher than the world 
average of 20%–30%. In 2010, drugs revenue accounted for 42.1% of the total rev-
enue of government-run medical institutions in China.
Among the pharmaceutical products currently manufactured in China, less than 
3% have IP rights. The market of patented drugs is only RMB 12 billion, less than 
1% of the domestic pharmaceutical market. The treatment of most infectious dis-
eases such as chronic hepatitis B, AIDS, and other diseases depends on imported 
patented drugs, which are expensive. Almost all of the clinical standard medicines 
used in these areas of chronic diseases are patented drugs or patent-expired drugs. 
Nearly 90% of the patented drugs come from foreign enterprises.
However, annual patent application for polymorphic drugs in China has increased 
significantly in the last three decades. From 1985 to 2005, 2116 applications were 
from China, 651 were from the USA, and 432 were from Germany, India, and 
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Switzerland. From 2005 to 2014, the total number of patent applications from 
China was 3009, an average of 301 applications each year, with the average annual 
growth rate at 147.9%.
Major Findings
Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 13 have come to the following major findings:
 1. The powerful constitutional obligations of the Indian state to improve public 
health and to guarantee every person and citizen of India the right to life and 
personal liberty while promoting its innovation ecosystem and safeguarding the 
legitimate business interests of inventors have been shaping the evolution of the 
Indian patent regime since India’s independence in 1947, and all the way up to 
today, despite being listed either as a “Priority Foreign Country” or included on 
the “Priority Watch List” by the US Trade Representative (USTR) since 1989. 
Therefore, India is well known as a patent maverick. The refusal to grant product 
patents and the shortening of the period of patent protection for pharmaceutical 
process (5–7 years as against 14 years for other fields of technology in India’s 
pre-TRIPS patent regime) allowed the generic pharmaceutical industry to grow 
starting from the 1970s. In contrast, China, despite having a constitutional man-
date for the state to protect people’s health,16 has been a naïve patent taker, not 
the least in the pharma industry, and never questioned the patent regime advo-
cated by the international IP establishment.
 2. After being updated to be TRIPS compliant in 2005, the Indian Patents Act con-
tinuously utilizes the leeway left by the TRIPS Agreement, including preventing 
evergreening of patented drugs, awarding compulsory license, retaining the pre- 
grant opposition, and introducing the post-grant opposition, to better suit its 
national interests and developmental needs. It is therefore expected that India’s 
pharma industry is poised to further outperform its Chinese counterpart.
 3. India’s experiences in legislation and judicial practice to promote the develop-
ment of its domestic pharmaceutical industry deserve serious attention from 
China. The ingenious government legal maneuvering can serve as a good exam-
ple for China to adjust its tactics in international IP negotiation and long-held 
blind faith in IP.  Learning from India, China should start to provide its legal 
professionals with knowledge of global IP rules.
 4. Although there is an increase in the number of patented drugs in the pharmaceu-
tical industry in China, patents have made relatively low contribution to the 
industrial value, and IP held by Chinese firms is less competitive compared with 
that of foreign companies. In contrast, although major Indian companies are all 
producers of generic medicines, they continued to invest sizeable shares of their 
16 Article 21(1) of the PRC Constitution mandates that “The state develops medical and health 
services, promotes modern medicine and traditional Chinese medicine, encourages and supports 
the setting up of various medical and health facilities by the rural economic collectives, state enter-
prises and institutions and neighbourhood organizations, and promotes health and sanitation activi-
ties of a mass character, all for the protection of the people’s health.”
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sales turnover in R&D, up from 1.5% at the end of the 1990s, to 2% in 2000–
2001, and to nearly 7% in 2015–2016. This aspect of the functioning was mani-
fest in their patenting behavior. They were more active in filing patent applications 
in foreign jurisdictions, but significantly less so in domestic patenting.
3.5  Plant Varieties and Food Security
Food security is of high importance for the two most populous countries of India 
and China. To ensure food security, India enacted the National Food Security Act 
(NFSA) in September 2013, while the National People’s Congress of China is now 
working on passing a bill on Food Security Law. Genetically engineered or modi-
fied crop plants are relevant for food security in India and China, as high-yielding 
crops can help overcome life-threatening food crises, achieve food surplus and feed 
their masses. India, with 11.4 million hectares (6%), ranks 5th, and China, with 
2.8 million hectares (1%), ranks eighth among the 24 countries which planted bio-
tech crops in 2017.17 During the first 21  years of commercialization of biotech 
crops, from  1996 to 2016, India has gained US$21.1  billion  sales and China 
US$19.6 billion.18
3.5.1  Current Status
India
India is the highest exporter of rice in the world. India was the ninth largest exporter 
of agricultural products in 2017, and the sector constitutes a share of 13% of total 
exports of the country.
With the incorporation of gene technology, India has evolved from an importer 
to an exporter of cotton, and at present, India’s average yield is around 500 kg of lint 
per hectare. India is now the biggest producer of cotton. The cotton production in 
India for 2017–2018 is around 365 lakh (100,000) bales (1 bale  =  170  kg) and 
exports between 65 and 70 lakh bales. However, due to demand and consumption 
by local mills, India stands as the fourth largest exporter of cotton, behind the USA, 
Australia, and Brazil. As it stands, there are no food crops approved for use in India 
using GM technology. The Indian regulatory authority, the Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC), has approved Bt brinjal (eggplant) as being biosafe 
in 2017. However, its commercialization was not approved by the Ministry of 
Environment, Forests and Climate Change.
The IP framework for genetically engineered crops is prescriptive in its scope, 
and the recent judgments preclude protection for technologies for the development 
of genetically engineered plants under the existing provisions of the Patents Act, 
1970. This would perhaps serve to disincentive players who have developed propri-
etary technologies from bringing their latest inventions for use by farmers in India.
17 The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech App (ISAAA), Global Status of 
Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops in 2017, 5.
18 Ibid., 8.
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China
In recent years, scandals involving illegal production and distribution of GM rice 
and its products have been consecutively exposed, which has led to mistrust among 
the public. As a response, the Food Safety Law was revised in 2015 to require that 
the production and distribution of GM food shall be clearly labeled. As far as GM 
foods are concerned, there are only regulations on transgenic agricultural products 
in general and labeling requirements provided by the Food Safety Law in particular. 
The lack of detailed legislation reflects China’s evasive attitude toward this issue.
China has achieved remarkable results for the protection of new plant varieties 
since it promulgated and implemented the Regulations for the Protection of New 
Plant Varieties in 1997. In the revision of the Seeds Law in 2015, a section on the 
protection of new plant varieties was added. By 2016, the number of applications 
for new plant variety rights in China already ranked first in the world. From 1999 to 
June 2018, China approved a total of some 12,221 breeders’ rights, of which 10,863 
are for agriculture and 1,358 are for forestry (188 were obtained by foreign appli-
cants from 9 countries, accounting for 13.84% of the total forestry breeders’ rights). 
Chinese breeders mainly apply for breeders’ rights in China and rarely pay attention 
to applying for breeders’ rights abroad.
Major Findings
Chapters 14, 15, 16, and 17 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Genes, proteins, promoters, enhancers, and chemicals in plants cannot get spe-
cific protection under the plant variety law and need to be protected under the 
patent regime. A recombinant DNA construct, which is neither a plant nor part 
thereof, nor a variety, can be protected under the patent regime and not under the 
plant variety law. Rights under the plant variety law and the rights granted under 
the patent law operate in completely different spheres. In India and China, what 
is protected under the patent law cannot be protected under the plant variety law 
and vice versa.
 2. While India is still grappling with poverty, famine, shortage in food supply, and 
massive hikes in prices of basic foodstuffs, China has overcome these issues 
since 2007 at the latest by self-supply19. However, both countries have witnessed 
scandalous planting of GM plants and are in need of a robust regulatory frame-
work to oversee the development of the genetic industry in agriculture.
3.6  Automobile Industry
Both India and China are catching up in the automobile industry in the last two 
decades. Comparatively speaking, the Indian automobile industry’s absorption of 
global best practices has been slower than its Chinese counterpart. Strategies of 
firms in the Chinese auto industry provided a boost to technological learning more 
19 National Development and Reform Commission, Food Supply Abundant and Market Demand 
Effectively Satisfied in China (in Chinese), China Economic and Trade Herald, 2018, Issue 22, 63.
K.-C. Liu and U. S. Racherla
17
quickly and broadly than in India, especially in the electric vehicle (EV) sector. 
India can benefit from learning from China.
3.6.1  Current Status
China
China has become the world’s largest automotive producer and consumer, and the 
previous dominant strategy of the assemblage of imported foreign designs only has 
already given way to the strategy of indigenous innovation. No doubt, the indige-
nous car-makers are far from being global technology leaders, yet they are gradually 
becoming competitive in the global automobile market with the rise of EVs. China 
overtook the USA as the world’s largest producer and consumer of EVs in 2015. 
EVs are to some extent an innovation with technological discontinuities, as motors 
and batteries are employed to replace the engines and gearboxes of the fossil fuel 
vehicles (FFVs). EVs are better able to interface with computer-based technologies, 
such as AI, the mobile Internet, and cloud computing. This has induced an explosive 
development of ICT technology applications on the car platform, creating an oppor-
tunity for China to pursue catch-up development.
The influx of new local entrants has fundamentally changed the rules of the game 
in China’s car industry. Since 2001, as the new entrants gradually obtained regula-
tory approval, the entire production scale and the amounts of new products launched 
annually in China’s car industry have skyrocketed, due to the leveraging effects 
created by new firms.
From 1999 to 2017, multinationals have submitted a total number of 87,089 pat-
ent applications in China, while new local entrants filed 66,043 and backbone state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and joint ventures (JVs) filed 32,227. Multinationals 
have the highest ratio of inventions, at 79.53% (69,265), and a low ratio of utility 
models, merely 3.06%. The respective ratios for new local entrants are 32.84% and 
50.24% and for backbone SOEs and JVs 20.55% and 57.72%. The group of back-
bone SOEs and JVs exhibit obvious weakness in patent applications, as 58% of their 
patents fall in the category of utility model. The patent grant rate for the backbone 
SOEs and JVs is just 35.35%, markedly below that of multinationals and new local 
entrants, which are 57.01% and 50.28%, respectively. Most patent applications of 
multinationals are submitted by entities from their home countries, which indicates 
that their collaboration with JV partners in China remains highly irrelevant to their 
patent applications.
India
The automobile industry is one of the most important drivers of economic growth in 
India and one with high participation in global value chains. The automobiles pro-
duced in the country uniquely cater to the demands of low- and middle-income 
groups of the population. In 2017, India became the world’s fourth largest automo-
bile market, and the demand for Indian vehicles continues to grow in the domestic 
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and international markets. India was the sixth largest producer of automobiles glob-
ally, with an average annual production of about 29 million vehicles in 2017–2018, 
of which about four million were exported. India is the largest tractor manufacturer, 
second largest two-wheeler manufacturer, second largest bus manufacturer, fifth 
largest heavy truck manufacturer, and eighth largest commercial vehicle manufac-
turer. The contribution of this sector to GDP has increased from 2.77% in 1992–
1993 to about 7.1% and accounts for about 49% of manufacturing GDP (2015–2016). 
It employs more than 29 million people (directly and indirectly). The turnover of the 
automobile industry is approximately US$ 67 billion (2016–2017) and that of the 
component industry is US$ 43.5 billion (2015–2016). The Indian industry accounted 
for 4.92% of vehicle production globally in 2017 (5.38% of production in the cars 
segment and 3.48% of production in the commercial vehicles segment). India con-
tinues to be a net importer of auto components, with its trade deficit for auto com-
ponents increasing from US$ 210  million in 2004–2005 to US$ 4.4  billion in 
2009–2010 and US$ 13.8 billion in 2015–2016.
As of today, the government encourages foreign investment and allows 100% 
FDI in the sector via the automatic route. The industry is fully de-licensed and free 
imports of automotive components are allowed. The Automotive Mission Plan 
2016–2026 envisions that the Indian automotive industry will be among top three in 
the world in engineering, manufacture, and export of vehicles and auto compo-
nents by 2026, growing in value to over 12% of India’s GDP and generating an 
additional 65 million jobs.
Major Findings
Chapters 18 and 19 have come to the following major findings:
 1. Government policy has played a pivotal role in the development of automobile 
industries in India and China. In China, the sectoral system of automobiles was 
mainly supported by two institutional pillars. The first pillar was strict regulation 
of entry permission, according to which all car products formally launched into 
the Chinese domestic market for sale must have prior permission from the MIIT 
to be listed in a regularly updated product catalogue. “Catalog-based regulation,” 
a rigid legacy of the planned system, continues even after the transition to indig-
enous innovation. The second pillar is the “trading market for technology 
(TMFT)” policy since the 1980s. This strategy literally involves the trading of 
market access for technology with the multinationals possessing advanced tech-
nology, as acquisition of intangible IP assets on technologies would be less pro-
ductive without the benefit of associated operational learning and expertise.
It was not until China’s introduction of “the 1994 automobile industry policy” 
that car-making has been recognized as a national pillar industry. China’s devel-
opmental strategy has transitioned to focusing on indigenous innovation by the 
National Medium- and Long-term Science and Technology Development  Outline 
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(2006–2020), which allows a group of new, local, innovative firms to enter the 
industry. Later on, the Chinese government has tabled a range of battery research 
and production projects and promulgated policies to encourage investment in the 
development and industrialization of EVs while subsidizing investments in 
infrastructure, especially a network of rechargeable devices.
The sum of subsidies provided by central and regional governments usually 
reaches 50% of the purchase price of EVs. It is only after 2013, witnessing how 
the new administration of Xi continues to stress indigenous innovation, that the 
backbone SOEs have begun to take innovation seriously.
Policy makers in China have decided to shift the policies again: the restric-
tions on foreign investment in China’s EV industry have been removed in 2018; 
fully liberalized entry into the entire auto industry will be allowed in 5 years; the 
subsidy for purchasing EVs will be totally abolished by 2020 and has already 
been gradually reduced since 2017. The long-existing policy preferences for JVs 
will fade away.
In India, the growth of the automobile sector has been on the back of strong 
government support, which has helped it carve a unique path among the manu-
facturing sectors of India. Indian policy had favored the development of the com-
mercial vehicles industry (light and heavy vehicles for public transport) as 
opposed to the development of passenger vehicles – considered luxury goods. 
By the early 1980s, the government had realized the need to develop the passen-
ger vehicle segment and took decisions to allow FDI in automotive assembly in 
two major waves in 1983 and in 1993. This FDI was mainly “market seeking” in 
nature. Government policies such as import barriers and local content require-
ments contributed to the influx of FDI. Liberal policies of the 1990s led to the 
entry of new competitors and spillover benefits, especially on the technology 
side, and to increased expenditure on R&D.  The setting up of the National 
Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure Project under the Automotive 
Mission Plan 2006-16 enabled the industry to achieve parity with global stan-
dards. Local content requirements or indigenization of up to 70% forced OEMs 
and their suppliers to make significant capital investments and created a chain of 
world-class component suppliers.
 2. IP has played a relatively limited role in the development of the automobile 
industry in India and China. Unlike a science-based industry, the car-making 
industry is manufacturing-intensive and scale-intensive. Its key knowledge is 
embedded in manufacturing or design experience and does not appear in explicit 
forms such as utility/invention patents. Although patents are becoming increas-
ingly important, a vast majority of “know-how” or “know-whom” kind of knowl-
edge in this industry cannot be mastered through the acquisition of patents or 
patent licenses. Indeed, the technical trade or R&D collaboration of many core 
businesses is through engineering services, design transfer (usually including 
engineering services), and component supplies. Hence, capacity building in this 
industry is a long-term process and may take many decades for latecomers.
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This is true for India and China. For example, without absorptive capacity for 
assessing and assimilating technologies, the backbone SOE Beijing Auto bought 
most of the IPs of SAAB in 2009; however, many of SAAB’s high-value IPs had 
already been peeled off before the deal, as previously they had been traded for 
several rounds on the market. New entrants underwent a wide range of technical 
cooperation with international professional technology firms after the 1990s, 
played a more dominant role and were better able to identify technologies at the 
systemic level and explore more frontier issues.
In India, the number of patents granted to the seven leading Indian manufacturers 
between the period of January 1990 and July 2018 has increased, but not signifi-
cantly. Tata’s patents have increased the most, more than 5 times, but its absolute 
number has jumped from only 10 between 2001 and 2010 to 57 between 2011 
and 2018.
3.7  The Culture of Sharing and the Sharing Economy
Both India and China consume goods and services in astronomic numbers and 
might face the threat of undersupply of goods and services and environmental crisis 
when they are supplied and consumed to heart’s content of the Chinese and Indian 
people, as it would “burn up, heat up, eat up, plow up, choke up, and smoke up the 
planet.20” The sharing economy as a new economy that creates sufficient supply 
through an effective mechanism for search and matching holds great promises for 
India and China. By sharing economy we refer to all business models facilitated by 
collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of 
goods or services often provided by private individuals, leading to the sharing of 
resources for their optimum utilization.
3.8  Current Status
China
With the maturing of Internet technology, mobile payment, logistics infrastructure, 
and huge demographic dividends, China’s sharing economy has been leaping for-
ward rapidly in recent years. In 2015 the size of the main sectors of China’s sharing 
market amounted to about RMB 1,697.8  billion; the figure jumped to RMB 
3,452 billion in 2016, an annual increase of 103% and accounting for GDP 4.6%. In 
2016, over 600 million people participated in sharing economy activities in China. 
The number of participants in the service sector was approximately 60 million, with 
approximately 5.85 million employees serving on platforms. The sharing economy 
is expected to account for 10% of GDP by 2020 and 20% by 2025.
20 Thomas Friedman, A Green New Deal revisited, New York Times, International edition, Jan. 11, 
2019, 11.
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India
The Internet users in India are projected to increase from 331.77 million in 2017 to 
511.89 million in 2022. The vast majority (>95%) are mobile phone Internet users, 
and the young generations of Indians that have a preference to create, trade, swop, 
access, and share goods, services, and resources as opposed to owning them, build-
ing the powerful undercurrents for the sharing economy in India. Thus, in today’s 
India, a variety of new businesses have sprung across a wide range of industries, 
such as transportation (e.g., Uber, Ola, ZipGo, BlaBlaCar, Smartmumbaikar.com, 
Didi Kuaidi), accommodation (Airbnb, Couchsurfing), work space sharing 
(WeWork, Regus, CoWrks, Awfis), retail commerce (e-Bay, Flipkart, Myntra, 
Jabong, Snapdeal), business loans (Biz2Credit), designer clothing (Rent It Bae), 
everyday clothing (Swishlist), and furniture and appliances (Fabrento, Rentickle, 
and Furlenco).21
Interestingly, even rural India has become the cradle of the sharing economy in a 
unique way.22 Thus, Mahindra & Mahindra, one of the auto giants of India, created 
a sharing platform, Trringo, which allows farmers to rent equipments made by 
Mahindra (and even by its competitors) through placing a call. As a result, Mahindra 
has been able to increase its customer base, build brand awareness, and, drive rural 
prosperity by empowering farmers. Thus, sharing economy has been rapidly grow-
ing in India, particularly as the Gen Z consumers are discovering that it serves their 
goals and interests more effectively compared to owning the depreciating, underuti-
lized assets.
In summary, sharing economy has been boosting the innovative entrepreneurship 
of bold new ideas in India, leading to – creation of disruptive businesses, optimal 
resource utilization, creation of new jobs, skill development, plus flexibility to oper-
ate at one’s own convenience. Nevertheless, while India’s GDP is expected to grow 
at 7.3% in 2018–2019,23 accurate estimates of the contribution of sharing economy 
to the GDP of India or its growth are not yet readily available.
Major Findings
Chapters 20 and 21, more complementary in nature than providing comparable data 
on India and China, have come to the following major findings:
 1. The sharing economy in India has not taken up the pace of China, probably due 
to lack of knowledge sharing, which is an integral part of the sharing economy. 
There are gender-based restrictions to knowledge as well as caste-based restric-
tions to knowledge. The National Intellectual Property Rights Policy and the 
Startup India Action Plan in 2016 have a bearing on shaping incentives for inno-
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 2. The emergence of various business models and a series of legal risks and chal-
lenges that have restricted or are restricting the development of China’s sharing 
economy, such as duplicated investment and vicious competition; opportunistic 
behavior, including the infringement of consumer rights and the distortion of 
reputation evaluation systems; and negative externality issues, could serve as 
good lessons for India.
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Abstract
To codify IP laws into the Civil Law is the way to go for the modernization of the 
Civil Law in China. China, a mega economy rising swiftly in the last couple of 
decades and a latecomer to the rule of law, should grasp the moment, ride on the 
tide of history, surpass its forefathers, break away from the mould and pave the 
way to modernizing the Civil Law. Furthermore, by codifying IP laws into the 
Civil Law, China will be laying a solid legal foundation for the long-term strat-
egy of innovation-driven development and for the rule of law in China.
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1  Introduction
In March 2017, China promulgated the “General Provisions of the Civil Law”. 
Thereafter, China has been pushing actively to table the various Special Provisions 
of the Civil Law in 2020, which will be incorporated into the Civil Law Code as one 
complete piece of legislation. With regard to the issues of whether intellectual 
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property (IP) laws should be added into the Civil Law Code and if so, how, contro-
versies exist. While some Civil Law academics are naysayers due to misunderstand-
ing of IP laws, some IP scholars remain passive because of the conceived specialty 
of IP rights. Although the legislation program of the National People’s Congress 
seems to have dropped the idea of incorporating IP laws into the Civil Law Code, 
this chapter advocates that IP rights, which are objectively of private right nature, 
are a new form of real right1 that has gone through the Industrial Revolution, been 
ushered into the knowledge economy and fundamentally changed the property 
structure of human society. IP rights have become a new member of the property 
system. Following the objective needs of technological, economic and societal 
development, and judging the development trend of legislation of the Civil Law 
from a global perspective, codification of IP laws into the Civil Law is the grand 
trend for modernizing the Civil Law of China. As a mega economy that has risen 
swiftly in the last couple of decades and a latecomer to the rule of law, China should 
grasp the moment, ride on the tide of history, surpass its forefathers, break away 
from the mould and pave the way to the modernization of the Civil Law. Furthermore, 
China should codify IP laws into the Civil Law and lay a well-established legal 
foundation for the long-term strategy of innovation-driven development in China.
In the following six sections, this chapter will discuss how the establishment of 
IP rights has revolutionized property (1), the doctrinal and practical values of codi-
fying IP laws into the Civil Law (2), choice of models for the fusion between IP 
laws and the Civil Law (3), the relationship between IP laws, the General Provisions 
of the Civil Law and its respective chapters (4), technical issues for fusing IP laws 
into the Civil Law (5), and finally why the issue of reuniting IP laws with the Civil 
Law is closely related to the securing of the rule of law in China (6).
2  The Establishment of IP Rights Has Revolutionized 
Property
That the results of knowledge and technology have become the objects of property 
rights manifests a revolution in the history of property.2 According to traditional 
jurisprudence or economic theory, possession or labour is the foundation of prop-
erty. The production pattern in an agricultural society means that the various useful 
material objects and the interests brought by labour are the most natural property. 
Gold is property in an ancient agricultural society, but not the “golden touch” that 
1 Article 2 of the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provides the definitions 
for “property” and “real right”: “(1) This Law shall apply to the civil relationships generated from 
the ownership and utilization of properties. (2) The term “property” as mentioned in this Law 
includes real estates (immovable property) and movable property. In case other laws also stipulate 
certain rights to be the objects of real right, those provisions shall be followed. (3) The term “real 
right” as mentioned in this Law refers to the exclusive right of direct control enjoyed by the holder 
according to law over a specific property, including ownership, usufructuary right and real rights 
for security.
2 Liu Chuntian, Analysis of IP Rights (in Chinese), Social Sciences in China, 2003, No. 4.
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transforms minerals into gold. In other words, knowledge and technology hidden 
behind the material property and labour lack the conditions to become property. 
This is consistent with the property system and property theory of agricultural soci-
ety that have been developed and perfected over thousands of years.
The progress of technology gave birth to the industrial civilization. Commercially, 
knowledge and technology hidden behind materials and labour have come to the fore, 
and the golden touch has become property and the object of market exchange. Legally, 
this phenomenon has unleashed a brand new form of property—IP rights. With the 
maturing of knowledge and technology transaction and the perfection of the IP system 
as a property system, people realize that it was neither the “things”, which are the 
objects of traditional property, nor the act of “labour” that led to the emergence of the 
new forms of property such as IP rights; rather, it was the other human behaviour of 
creation, which has been hidden behind labour and yet decided the rise and fall and 
the specific form of labour. Creation is the source of all knowledge and technology. 
Without creation, there will be no knowledge and technology, and no labour. In the era 
when there was only labour, knowledge and technology were nothing but specific 
forms of labour. The emergence of IP rights, which take creative results as their hall-
mark and value those results by market standards, has triggered civilized societies to 
readjust the property system that has been formed over a long history.
That IP rights have become the de facto “first property right” is an indicator of a 
major revolution in the history of property.3
The birth of IP rights also ushers in new inquiries about property, its essence 
and source. According to economic theory, any property must possess “quality” 
and “quantity”, with the former being its essence and the latter being the yardstick 
for measurement. Judging from the “quality” perspective of property, “things” as 
objects of property are derived from their usefulness, which, after deducting the 
natural attributes of material, depends entirely on the knowledge and technology 
that exploit the “things”. Labour in abstract as a carrier of values, i.e. one of the 
sources of property, has its true essence in how much energy (power) it can gener-
ate. Concrete labour derives its usefulness entirely from its dominance over the 
knowledge and technology of labour, which decides the actual form of labour. If 
there is no knowledge and technology to control human mental and physical activ-
ities, such activities cannot be labour, and are instead wasteful consumption of 
natural energy with no value, usage value or social meaning. Therefore, what 
really makes up the core and soul of property is the dominance of human mental 
and physical capability by knowledge and technology, in addition to natural fac-
tors and regardless of its exterior appearance.
Looking at the “quantity” perspective of property, excluding natural factors, what 
decides the value of a material property in the knowledge economy era is not the 
amount of labour, but rather IP rights. Knowledge, technology and commercial indi-
cators play a decisive role in the value composition of modern society. Trade in 
goods, trade in services and trade in IP rights under the governance of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) include almost all the property forms of the modern 
3 Liu Chuntian, That IP Rights are  the First Property Right is the Discovery of the Civil Law 
Jurisprudence (in Chinese), Intellectual Property Rights, 2015, No. 10.
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world. While the object of trade in IP rights is exclusively knowledge and technol-
ogy, trade in services such as financial, technological and commercial service derives 
most of its value also from knowledge and technology. Trade in goods under the 
dominance of the real right is no exception, as goods become the objects of trade 
mainly due to knowledge, technology and commercial indicators, after deducting the 
natural factors. Contemporary material products can hardly be marketed without the 
help of IP rights. The knowledge economy is now revolutionizing the traditional 
understanding of “major” and “subsidiary” values. Traditional wealth treats physical 
materials and the amount of human labour as the source or subject of product value 
and treats knowledge and technology only as “technically added value”. Nowadays, 
the more expensive man-made products are, the higher the percentage that IP rights 
take up in the value composition and the lower the contribution labour can make. 
From aircraft to limousines, TVs, computers, smart phones, French perfumes, luxury 
bags and wine, Italian fashion clothing, Chinese Maotai and the like, the product 
value all comes from IP rights. Study shows that although China produces 90% of the 
mobile phones in the world, its contribution is mainly manufacturing labour, which 
is low in the global value chain, and can earn a profit margin of less than 5%. In 
contrast, Qualcomm, Apple, Samsung, etc., which provide the core knowledge and 
technology, walk away with 90% of the profit. On the state level, those countries 
which have the strongest capability in terms of knowledge and technology and the 
most well-known trademarks must also be the richest and most competitive.
In the knowledge economy, knowledge and technology are the real source of 
value for material products, whereas objects and labour are the by-product of knowl-
edge and technology. Along with the swift and powerful advancement of digital 
technology, the trend of the property system is that IP rights have jumped to become 
ahead of, superior to and more important than material property and are the most 
important and crucial property form. Decades ago, it was the tycoons of cars, steel 
and railroads whose wealth could match that of a nation. Nowadays, companies 
with knowledge and technology as their core property, such as Apple, Microsoft, 
Google, Samsung, etc., are the new leaders in wealth. IP rights are fast swirling up, 
replacing the traditional rights over things and becoming the basic, core, decisive 
and dominant power of the property system and the de facto “first property rights”. 
This is a logical development and a practical one too.
3  Doctrinal and Practical Value of Codifying IP Laws 
into the Civil Law
The codification of IP laws into the Civil Law has both doctrinal and practical value.
3.1  The Civil Law Principally Guides IP Laws
The codification of IP laws into the Civil Law allows not only the spirits, principles 
and system of the latter to be systematically projected into the individual IP laws but 
also the latter’s strength to permeate into the implementation of IP laws. Such 
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codification has both declaratory meaning and substantive value. Human history has 
been one of constant liberation and gaining of more freedom. Real rights provide 
basic protection for human rights. The history of property has evolved through 
stages of monopoly by public power, regulation and private autonomy as society 
progresses. The precursor of IP rights, be it technological franchises or publishing 
privileges, all derived from regulatory property rights. The private right nature of IP 
rights does not depend on any one person’s subjective view, but is rather the inevi-
table result of technological, economic, societal and legal developments, as well as 
the objective demand of market economy. The practice of history has proven that 
the establishment of private rights that accompany the market economy can stimu-
late human creativity; effectively push forward technological, economic and social 
advancement; and thereby create and accumulate more wealth for the elevation of 
the living standards of mankind.
That IP rights are private rights has developed into the consensus of the interna-
tional community in the last decades. Codifying IP laws into the Civil Law is cer-
tainly one development trend of the codification movement of the civil law 
jurisdictions. The so-called codification is the systemization of laws. Systemization 
is at the same time a thinking tool, a path for legal actions and the goal of laws. 
Systemization of laws is the product of alliance between the Civil Law traditions of 
civil law countries, science and rational thinking. The underlying cause for the sys-
temization of laws is the objective demand for legal reform which stems from tech-
nological, economic and social progress and the public. Codifying IP laws into the 
Civil Law can avoid needless repetition and the parallel existence of the so-called IP 
Code that might even conflict with the Civil Law.
For historical reasons, the establishment of IP laws in the PRC has developed 
outside the system of the Civil Law legislation, with no framework to abide by, no 
system to inherit from, no theories to follow and no practice to reference, and has 
grown single-handedly, separately and individually on the barren land of unitary 
public ownership, a planned regime and a backward agricultural economy. At the 
beginning, crossing the river by touching stones on the riverbed, people paid more 
attention to the superficial difference between the IP system and the traditional 
property system; and there was no understanding of the commonality between the 
two systems and their respective essence on the logical abstract level and no under-
standing of IP laws on the theoretical abstract level either.
The IP legislation was based on the procedural need of having to ascertain rights, 
followed the traditional thinking and models of the relevant government agencies and 
was completed based on drafts by different government agencies. The drafters were 
mostly government officials and technocrats long trained in the planned economy, and 
few were legal experts. Those drafters lacked the awareness of private rights and leg-
islative experience for localization. Among individual IP laws, there was insufficient 
mutual echoing and connection, not to mention the guidance over and integration of 
IP laws by the spirits, goals and principles of the Civil Law. This negatively affected 
the coordination between individual IP laws and the systems of the Civil Law 
that were developed in parallel, which led to inherent difficulties for legal practices. 
For example, the Trademark Law, the Patent Law and the Copyright Law all had 
disregarded the provisions of the Civil Law and set up their own systems of civil 
subjects, which were not abolished until 2001. There were also various provisions 
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contradicting the principles of the Civil Law. Comforting, though, was the fact that 
the 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law include IP as one of the civil rights4 and 
provide the abstract reasoning framework and systematic demarcation, which helped 
to clarify the private right nature of IP rights from a macro perspective, and set the 
direction for the later smooth operation and perfection of individual IP laws.
Therefore, some opine that under the governance of the General Principles of the 
Civil Law, the individual laws of things, copyright, trademark, patent, contracts, fam-
ily and inheritance constitute a Civil Law system which is a de facto Civil Law Code 
of Chinese style. According to them, the General Principles of the Civil Law are the 
framework, and all other laws just mentioned are the details; they appear to be loose, 
yet clearly structured, with a focused spirit despite a loose appearance. However, dur-
ing the course of establishing IP laws, the tendency of “de-privatizing rights” and 
“de-Civil Law- ization” manifested itself due to the influence of power and interests, 
which hindered the integration of IP laws with the Civil Law and the systemization of 
IP laws, causing difficulties for social life and the judiciary. The judiciary has to con-
stantly issue large amounts of “interpretations” in writing to connect, coordinate and 
integrate these contradictions, conflicts and problems,5 which is in essence connecting 
IP systems with the basic principles and systems of the Civil Law, towards their incor-
poration with the Civil Law and systemization. Such interpretations are filling the 
vacuum left behind by the legislation. However, it is inappropriate for the adjudicating 
judges to undertake this legislation-like task, which runs the risk of being biased and 
over-generalized. Such a patchwork of constant piecemeal fixings in the absence of 
legislation and systemic thinking is not legislation after all and eventually can hardly 
establish a stable, systematic and statutory relationship between IP system, the 
General Principles of the Civil Law and other Special Provisions of the Civil Law. As 
a result, new problems and conflicts will arise in the long run.
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, during the Civil Law codification 
movement in the PRC under the influence of the General Principles of the Civil 
Law, the legislature had in mind to set up an “IP chapter” in the Civil Law. 
Unfortunately, constrained by insufficient knowledge, and lack of doctrinal guid-
ance, a vision and an ideal, the forest was missed because of the trees, and the pro-
posed “IP chapter” was not satisfactory, as it only had few articles, paid much 
4 Section 3 (Intellectual Property Rights) of Chap. 5 (Civil Rights) of the General Principles only 
mentions the overarching term of IP rights in its title and enumerates thee specific kinds of IP 
rights, namely, copyright, patent and trademark. Article 94 provides: “Citizens and legal persons 
shall enjoy rights of authorship (copyrights) and shall be entitled to sign their names as authors, 
issue and publish their works and obtain remuneration in accordance with the law”. Article 95 
stipulates: “The patent rights lawfully obtained by citizens and legal persons shall be protected by 
law”. Article 96 foresees: “The rights to exclusive use of trademarks obtained by legal persons, 
individual businesses and individual partnerships shall be protected by law”. Article 97 provides: 
“Citizens who make discoveries shall be entitled to the rights of discovery. A discoverer shall have 
the right to apply for and receive certificates of discovery, bonuses or other awards. Citizens who 
make inventions or other achievements in scientific and technological researches shall have the 
right to apply for and receive certificates of honour, bonuses or other awards”.
5 Li Chen, From the Need of the Judiciary for IP to the Codification of the Chinese Civil Law (in 
Chinese), National Judges College Law Journal 2016, No. 12.
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attention to technicalities, fixated on the seeming difference between the objects of 
IP rights and those of the traditional property rights and lacked the awareness of the 
essence of IP rights and their deep and internal linkage with the Civil Law. This led 
to a twofold misunderstanding by the Civil Law community and the society at large: 
On the one hand, IP rights were ill-suited for incorporating into the Civil Law. On 
the other, the IP community disagreed with the incorporation of IP rights into the 
Civil Law. Fifteen years have since elapsed, and the above-mentioned problems of 
knowledge, vision and ideal have been clarified. Therefore, when the enactment of 
the Civil Law was again initiated, IP scholars have now more of a unified view that 
IP laws should be incorporated into the Civil Law.6
The General Provisions of the Civil Law of the PRC have combined the histori-
cal practices, referenced the basic spirits and paradigms of foreign laws and interna-
tional treaties and again, as some kind of the Basic Law, confirm again the essential 
nature of IP rights, which has a profound meaning. However, it is by far not enough, 
as what is needed is the genuine integration of IP rights into the Civil Law. If the 
Civil Law can set up general rules for IP rights, the appearance and spirits will be 
unified. Under the guidance of the General Provisions of the Civil Law, individual 
IP laws can be better interconnected,7 and current fundamental conflicts can be 
solved more pragmatically, which will have great benefits for the service economy, 
social practices, legal research, civil education of citizens’ legal awareness, the con-
nection with the international community and the economic and social effects of 
systemization.
3.2  Feedback from IP Theories and Systems to the Civil Law
The more diverse all matters on earth are, be they technology or society, city or 
state, the more elements need to be added and consolidated into the current founda-
tion, and the more functions desire to be achieved. The lower the costs and the better 
the effects, the more order and systemization will be needed. The perfection of any 
and every system is conditional and relative. Any perfect system will be disrupted 
when its supporting conditions have changed. In a near perfect system, any addition 
of new elements and functions will pose a challenge. The system designer must 
deconstruct, even overhaul the incumbent system, adopt revolutionary reform and 
rebuild new systems according to the demand of changed conditions. Any substan-
tive progress is not just an isolated, incidental and simple physical adding-up of the 
changes to the existent matters and life systems. All new knowledge, technology 
and ways of life are not extraterritorial visitors, but are derived from the existing 
knowledge, technology and ways of life. Any new system is an inheritance from, a 
breakthrough to and a qualitative jump over the old system.
6 The Chinese IP Law Society under the presidency of the first author of the present chapter has 
proposed “IP Chapters for the Civil Law Code” in 2017, which has 7 chapters and 96 articles.
7 Li Shishi, The General Provisions of the Civil Law is the Basic Law for Establishing and 
Perfecting Civil Legal System (in Chinese), The People’s Congress of China (half-monthly), 2017, 
No. 7.
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The fusion of IP laws into the Civil Law Code has its milestone significance not 
in the simple addition of a new property law member into the existent Civil Law 
Code, but in the fusion of such a brand new subsystem, which is a historical tran-
scendence over a series of Civil Codes typified by the French Civil Code since the 
nineteenth century. The substance, system functions, business models, unique prop-
erty functions and the declared theory and logic about the origin of property, meth-
odology and explanation capacity of IP rights can provide feedback to the Civil 
Law,8 bringing it to the new era of the knowledge economy. One simple example is 
the moral rights of an author, which do not perish with his death immediately, but 
remain in force for a certain period post mortem,9 even indefinitely in some jurisdic-
tions.10 This can have some feedback for the Civil Law, which categorically pro-
vides for the immediate cessation of moral rights (or personality rights) the moment 
the author deceases.
How IP laws have adapted to new technologies, economies and new ways of life 
can infuse new life blood into the traditional Civil Law. The systems and spiritual 
core of IP rights developed through the last couple of hundred years, and their 
theoretical leadership through the history of property can enhance the system and 
theory of the Civil Law.
4  Choice of Models for the Fusion Between IP Laws 
and the Civil Law
The 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law already list IP rights on the same level 
as real rights and creditors’ rights. Systemization is the fundamental quest for Civil 
Law legislation in contemporary countries with codified laws. The movement of 
codifying Civil Law typified by the French Civil Code and the German Civil Code 
has real rights and creditor’s rights as its two pillars.11 In the early IP law system, 
national states enacted patent law, trademark law and copyright law separately. 
There are at least three models in which national states have dealt with the issue of 
systemization of IP laws and put IP laws into the property law system under the 
Civil Law.12
8 Li Chen, On the Necessity for the Chinese Civil Law to Set Up IP Chapter (in Chinese), Journal 
of Soochow University (Law edition), 2015, No. 4.
9 For example, 70 years post mortem in Germany.
10 For example, the French, Chinese, Japanese and Taiwanese copyright law.
11 Ma Junju/Zhang Xiang, The Ethics and Technique in the Construction of Personality in the Civil 
Law (in Chinese), Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law), 
2005, No. 2.
12 Cao Xinming, Choice of Connection Models between IP rights and the Civil LawFrom the 
Perspective of Codifying the IP Code (in Chinese), Studies in Law and Business, 2005, No. 1.
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The first model is to compile an “IP Code” which collects all the IP laws,13 such 
as the French IP Code of 1992,14 the IP Code of the Philippines of 199715 and 
Vietnamese Law on IP.16 The second model is to incorporate all IP laws into the 
Civil Code, such as the 2003 Model Civil Code for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)17 and the 2006 Russian Civil Code.18
The third model is to extract the common features of IP rights to form an IP 
Chapter in the Civil Law Code, in parallel to other chapters for real rights, creditors’ 
rights law, torts, etc., which uplinks with the General Provisions of the Civil Law 
and downlinks with all individual IP laws. The Civil Codes of Armenia,19 Belarus,20 
Kazakhstan,21 Kyrgyzstan,22 Uzbekistan23 and Mongolia have adopted this model.24
The shortcoming of the first model is that with the appearance of an independent 
system, these IP Codes are simple compilation of individual IP laws and can only 
function under the guidance of its respective Civil Law Code; without their respective 
Civil Law Code, these IP Codes cannot be enforced by themselves. The problem with 
13 Wu Handong, IP Laws in the Codification Movement of the Civil Law (in Chinese), China Legal 
Science, 2016, No. 4.
14 According to Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Intellectual_Property_Code), the 
French Intellectual Property Code is a corpus of law relating to intellectual and industrial property. 
It was formalised by Law No 92-597 of 1 July 1992, replacing earlier laws relating to industrial 
property and artistic and literary property. The code is frequently modified: two major modifica-
tions are known as the DADVSI law and the HADOPI law.
15 Republic Act No. 8293 June 6, 1997. An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and 
Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other 
Purposes.
16 Order No. 28/2005/L-CTN of December 12, 2005, on the promulgation of Law on Intellectual 
Property. See Wu Handong, IP System in the International Reform Trend and the Bigger Picture of 
Chinese Development (in Chinese), Chinese Journal of Law, 2009, No. 2.
17 CIS is a regional intergovernmental organization of post-Soviet republics in Eurasia formed fol-
lowing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It now has nine members, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
18 Part IV, Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
19 Division 10, Civil Code of the Republic of Armenia.
20 Section 5, Civil Code of the Republic of Belarus.
21 Section 5 of Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Article 3 of the Copyright Law explains 
its relationship with the Civil Code: “Legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on copyright and 
allied rights consists of the Civil Code, of this Law and other legal acts issued in accordance with 
this Law”.
22 Section 5, Civil Code of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.
23 Section 4, Civil Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Khaydarali Yunusov, The Development 
of Legal Systems of Central Asian States, available as ssoar-studeuropene-2014-2-yunusov_khay-
darali-The_Development_of_Legal_Systems.pdf.
24 Mongolia merges IP rights with other property rights to form a unified property right concept. 
Article 83.1 of the Mongolian Civil Code provides: “Anybody may acquire assets that are material 
wealth, and intellectual values, that are non-material wealth, as well as rights, earned by means not 
prohibited by law or conflicting with commonly accepted behavioural moral norms. In this case the 
abovementioned wealth is considered an asset”. See also Wu Handong, IP Rights into the Civil 
Law Code and IP Chapter (in Chinese), Law and Social Development, 2015 No. 4.
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the second model is that the fast developing IP laws cannot be squeezed into the Civil 
Law, resulting in the rise of the third model. Taking stock of the current situations in 
China, the third model is more feasible for the development of the Chinese Civil Law. 
With the rise in importance of IP rights and the fall of the traditional property rights, 
IP rights will eventually take over a dominant role in the civil property rights system.
When a new member with the same genes enters a mature or even ancient system, 
incumbent members will probably feel some anxiety or interim maladjustment, 
which will later be overcome by long-lasting harmony. The famous German jurist 
Thibaut has said in his work “On the Necessity of a General Civil Law for Germany”: 
“Only the Civil Law, which as a whole is rooted solely in the human heart, sensibility 
and rationality, very seldom succumbs to the environment; even this unity (unified 
Civil Law—added by the authors) sometimes causes certain minor inconveniences 
here and there, [and] the numerous benefits brought by this unity will hugely offset 
these inconveniences. We need only to consider individual parts of the Civil Law! 
Many of their contents are only the so-called pure legal mathematics (eine Art reiner 
juristischer Mathematik), such as the theory of property rights, rights to inheritance, 
mortgage, and contracts, and what belongs to the general part of the jurisprudence, 
over which no local speciality can exert any significant influence”.25 Thibaut’s ideas 
about a unified Civil Law should lend some inspiration to those who worry about 
special features of IP rights affecting the systemic viewpoints of the Civil Law Code.
5  Relationship Between IP Laws, the General Provisions 
of the Civil Law and Its Respective Chapters
Chinese IP laws have their direct source in the Civil Law. The Civil Law in general as 
the legal system governing the relationship between private rights has built a unitary 
private law blueprint for the economic and social life of a modern state. The Civil Law, 
both its exterior structure and internal essence, is all encompassing and yet fine. The 
General Provisions govern the Special Provisions as principal does subordinate in a 
hierarchical relationship. Looking from the structure of the Civil Law, the General 
Provisions of the Civil Law are the head and foundation of the Civil Law, whereas the 
special chapters of IP rights, real rights, creditors’ rights law, etc. are subordinate, on an 
inferior level, and are the body and limbs of the Civil Law. The legal spirits, guiding 
principles, legal principles, regulatory addressees, civil rights, right subjects, private 
autonomy, juridical acts, agency, extinctive prescription, torts, legal liability, litigation 
process, etc., all of which are basic systems established by the General Provisions of the 
Civil Law, are to be applied to special chapters of the Civil Law, without exception.
In practice, once separated from the nutrition and the systemic support of the 
General Provisions of the Civil Law, real rights law and IP laws alike cannot be 
25 Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, Über die Notwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichen Rechts 
in Deutschland (On the Necessity of a General Civil Law for Germany), 1814, pp. 53–54, available 
at: http://dlib-pr.mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/bigpage/%22272169_00000057.gif%22. 
According to https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anton-Friedrich-Justus-Thibaut, Thibaut is 
remembered chiefly because of his call for the codification of German Civil Law, reflecting the rise 
of German nationalism after the Napoleonic wars.
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enforced by themselves. IP rights and IP laws are on the same logical level as real 
rights law, and both are basic civil property rights and basic law of civil property.26 
Just like the real rights law, IP laws are fundamental civil property law, and their 
relationship with the Civil Law is part of a whole.27
6  Technical Issues for Fusing IP Laws into the Civil Law
Whether and how to incorporate IP laws within the Chinese Civil Law Code have 
been quite controversial during the latter’s construction. The General Provisions 
provide definition of IP rights,28 and there is certain room to accommodate IP rights 
in the special chapters. However, currently, scholars from the Civil Law circle who 
are against the incorporation of IP laws into the Civil Law have the upper hand. 
They are of the opinion that IP laws are an open system in flux under the influence 
of technological developments and when incorporated into the relatively stable and 
systemic Civil Law might harm the stability of the Civil Law.
However, this line of thinking has mixed up three different layers of issues: one 
about the phenomenon of the fast progressing science and technology, another about 
the relative stability of the relationship between interests and the last one about the 
stability of rules that regulate the relationship between interests. As a matter of fact, 
the traditional real right is facing similar situations. Material products that were 
unheard of in the past are constantly popping up in our daily life, such as smart 
phones, gadgets, electric cars, etc. It is just that people are used to conducting logical 
abstraction of material products and can abstract “property” from any new products 
and then logically classify them as the object of real rights. In the same vein, under 
the drive of technology, technological products get innovated beyond imagination 
but are still within the ambit of “knowledge and technology” and remain the objects 
of IP rights. Under market conditions, the relationship of property interests triggered 
by the emergence of new products, new knowledge and new technologies does not 
undergo qualitative change and can be adjusted under a relatively stable legal regime. 
Therefore, the above-mentioned worries are nothing but a misunderstanding.
The Civil Law Code is a system of rules, a knowledge system with strict logic. It 
is at the same time an open system. Take automobiles for example. They are the 
perfect example of a system which evolves with the progress of time and remains 
constantly open. Automobiles had reached near perfection in terms of comfort in the 
26 Liu Chuntian, That IP Rights is the First Property Right are the Discovery of the Civil Law 
Jurisprudence (in Chinese), Intellectual Property Rights, 2015, No. 10.
27 Ma Yide, Relationship Between IP Laws and the Civil Law—Using Public Order and Good 
Morals (in Chinese), Intellectual Property Rights, 2015, No. 10.
28 Article 123 of the General Provisions of the Civil Law has made progress as compared with the 
General Principles of the Civil Law, in its dealing with IP to the extent that it uses the overarching 
term of IP and that it recognizes a whole range of IP rights. It provides: “(1) Civil subjects enjoy 
intellectual property rights according to law. (2) Intellectual property rights are the exclusive rights 
of the persons on the following objects according to law: (1) works; (2) invention, utility model and 
design; (3) trademark; (4) geographical indications; (5) trade secrets; (6) integrated circuit layout 
design; (7) new plant varieties; (8) other objects prescribed by law”.
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1930s but continuously confronted new challenges and absorbed new technology 
and devices such as safety belts, power steering, air bags, infinitely variable speeds, 
antiskid tires, anti-lock braking systems, anti-theft devices, etc. into one unitary 
system.29 The same goes with telephones, computers, etc. Meanwhile, whoever 
refuses to integrate with new and indispensable technology will voluntarily fall 
behind and withdraw from the market. Codification is a tool, which is neither inher-
ently there, nor standing still. Codification must be practice-oriented, future- facing 
and evolving with time. Whether IP rights are civil rights and should be incorpo-
rated into the Civil Law Code must be decided by the objective demand of the 
technology and economic development, the nature of things and objective laws. 
Although IP rights are young as compared with other traditional real rights and 
creditors’ rights, our understanding, thought, induction and refinement of IP rights 
are not yet mature, and technological progress poses constant new challenges; all 
these do not change the legal nature of IP rights, namely, as a typified basic property 
right, nor can these negate the objective fact that IP rights are on the same legal 
hierarchy as real rights and creditors’ rights. Consequently, there must be a place in 
the Civil Law Code for IP laws.30
With technology and institutional innovation increasingly determining the eco-
nomic development and becoming the major means for wealth generation, IP rights 
are more and more the core of competitiveness, and not unknown or insignificant 
anymore. IP rights are the giants for wealth creation, the leading actor of human 
economic life. Therefore, Civil Law legislators should improve their understanding 
of property rights and list IP rights as the first property right.
Technology determines everything. The progress of technology will drive the 
development of society. Civil Law must reflect and serve the change of times. Civil 
Law originates from Roman law and has undergone a long formation process with 
numerous changes, and its core has advanced with the times. If the forefathers in 
Europe were trapped by history and adhered rigidly to Roman law, there would be 
no French Civil Code. Had they adhered rigidly to the French Civil Code, there 
would be no German Civil Code. The French Civil Code and the German Civil 
Code represent different technological and economic eras of their own. If we were 
obsessed with the German Civil Code and would not destroy its “perfection” by 
adding IP laws into it, that would be against the logic and progressive spirit that run 
through Roman law and the German Civil Code. The twenty-first century is distinc-
tively different from the intersection of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the 
Internet has broken with history and disrupted the classic “perfection” of the 
German Civil Code. The calling of the day is to build a new perfection on top of the 
old establishment. Chinese people should move ahead with the times and contribute 
a Civil Law Code of the knowledge economy to mankind, with IP rights standing 
out as the shining feature of the Civil Law Code.
29 For details, see Chap. 18 of the present volume.
30 Liu Chuntian, That IP Rights are the First Property Right is the Discovery of the Civil Law juris-
prudence (in Chinese), Intellectual Property Rights, 2015, No. 10.
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7  IP Laws and the Rule of Law in China
To the surprise of many outside observers of China is the fact that the issue of 
reuniting IP laws with the Civil Law is closely related to the securing of the rule of 
law in China. Breaking away from the rigid ideology of collectivism is the precon-
dition for establishing IP rights and laws in China, which is oftentimes not that self-
evident. There have been many countercurrents to pull them back to the old control 
regimes.31 One feature of the Chinese IP regime is the ubiquitous administrative 
intervention into the creation, management, commercialization and even enforce-
ment of all kinds of IP rights. The situation has deteriorated after the introduction 
and implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy between 2008 
and 2020.32 The visible hands of the central, provincial and county governments are 
everywhere. Governments of all levels have become active players in IP industries, 
rather than the gatekeepers of the IP regime.
We believe that only by again affirming IP rights as private rights that govern-
ments cannot play with or take away just like that, and by returning IP laws into the 
Civil Law, can the driver of the knowledge economy and the foundation of the rule 
of law, namely, individual creativity and a private sphere free from state interven-
tion, be protected and the role of the government be reasonably limited.33
31 One example as mentioned earlier is that the Trademark Law, the Patent Law and the Copyright 
Law all had disregarded the provisions of the Civil Law and set up their own systems of civil sub-
jects which lasted until 2001. Another is the above-mentioned tendency of “de-privatizing rights” 
and “de-Civil Lawization”.
32 For a detailed analysis of the National Intellectual Property Strategy and many of its downsides, 
see Kung-Chung Liu/Chuntian Liu/Ji Huang, IPRs in China—Market-Oriented Innovation or 
Policy-Induced Rent-Seeking? in Kung-Chung Liu/Uday S. Racherla (ed.), Innovation and IPR in 
China and India—Myth, Realities and Opportunities, Springer 2016, 161–179.
33 For a similar opinion, see IP School, Renmin University of China, Report on Development of 
Intellectual Property in China 2015, Tsinghua University Press 2016, 71, 239.
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India and China have attracted research interest due to their potential to catch up 
to developed nations. The framework of the National Innovation System (NIS) is 
a popular theory to explain the role of the state in supporting knowledge creation 
and learning capacity for the catching-up stage. Various comparative studies on 
sectoral innovation or geography of innovation in India and China have been 
conducted, mainly by economists. This chapter tries to bring the non-quantified 
factor-constitutional governance into the discussion from three aspects of the 
political philosophy for achieving social revolution and social justice, power dis-
tribution from three dimensions of vertical, horizontal, and state versus citizen, 
which have not been favored by economists, due to their lack of rigorousness. At 
the end, the chapter applies the factors to the analysis of their influence on the 
economic development path and on the innovation strategy in India and China.
Keywords
India · China · Constitutional governance · National innovation · Comparison
1  Introduction
The attention to national innovation capacity was first captured by economists. The 
concept of national innovation capacity is usually traced back to Joseph Schumpeter 
in the early twentieth century. However, the National Innovation System (NIS) as a 
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separate concept was raised in the 1980s and further developed by economists, 
under the influence of the social psychological pragmatist school of Chicago and 
the ideas of George Mead and John Dewey.1 The pragmatist version of economic 
development that “the most important resource in the economy is knowledge and 
the most important process is learning”2 is very close to the pragmatist theory in 
spirit. Today NIS is a very popular concept among academia and policymakers.
India and China are two developing countries which have attracted strong 
research interest in their innovation capacity due to their rapid economic growth and 
large domestic commercial markets. Several research efforts have been made under 
the NIS framework, either by comparing India to China on the general topic of 
innovation, such as “innovation capacity and economic development”3 and “transi-
tion from production to innovation,”4 or by conducting the comparison on more 
specific innovation such as sectoral innovation in the telecom industry5 or on “geog-
raphy of innovation.”6
Bengt-Åke Lundvall, one of the founding scholars of the NIS, reminds us that the 
focus on the “wider setting” including “the shared value in society and the power 
structure” may be especially important for the analysis of NIS in developing or less 
developed countries.7 However, in the current comparative studies on innovation in 
India and China, economists prefer the quantitative analysis due to its rigorousness. 
Attention to the comparative studies of innovation in India and China has been 
given to input factors such as R&D input and higher education or structural condi-
tions such as GDP per capita, transportation infrastructure, agglomeration, and 
migration flows. Even if some research has mentioned the “social filter” factors, 
such as “social and business networks,” “social stratification,” and “levels of 
modernity,” it has still focused on the quantitative factors such as education rate, 
employment rate, or rural-urban migration rate.8 While there are very few 
1 Bengt-Åke Lundvall, National Innovation Systems—Analytical Concept and Development Tool, 
second version of the paper presented at the DRUID conference in Copenhagen, June 28–29, 2005, 
available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24081600_National_Innovation_Systems-
Analytical_Concept_and_Development_Tool. Footnote 7, p. 11. This school focuses on interactive, 
reflective, and dialectical learning and problem-solving with recent influential publications of this 
school such as Pragmatist Democracy by Christopher K. Ansell, Oxford University Press, 2011.
2 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 11.
3 Peilei Fan, Innovation Capacity and Economic Development: China and India, Research Paper, 
UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU), No. 2008/31, ISBN 978-92-9230-077-7.
4 Tilman Altenburg, Hubert Schmitz, and Andreas Stamm, Breakthrough? China’s and India’s 
Transition from Production to Innovation, 36 World Development, No. 2, pp. 325–344, 2008.
5 Sunil Mani, The Dragon v. the Elephant, Comparative Analysis of Innovation Capacity in the 
Telecom Industry of China and India, 40 Economic and Political Weekly, No. 39, Sep. 24–30, 
2005, pp. 4271–4283.
6 Riccardo Crescenzi, Andres Rodriguez-Pose, and Michael Storper, The Territorial Dynamics of 
Innovation in China and India, 12 Journal of Economic Geography, 5, 2012, pp. 1055–1085.
7 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 31.
8 Crescenzi et al., supra note 6, pp. 14–15.
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comparative studies on governance and development in India and China9 or on “the 
role of sociopolitical factors in inclusive growth”10 in India and China, there has 
been little or even no attention to developing the discourse around innovation.
When asked to reflect on the relationship between “the shared value in society 
and the power structure” and national innovation, two questions appear to be criti-
cal: (1) To what extent can constitutional governance be considered in developing 
the NIS conceptual framework and for comparison of cross-national NIS? (2) Could 
some qualitative description of India and China, which have so many similarities 
but also possess critical differences in terms of different constitutional governance 
for modernization, be meaningful in the conceptual framework of NIS?
This chapter considers the “wider setting,” especially the “shared value” and 
“power structure” mentioned by Lundvall, is highly relevant to the concept of NIS. 
However, this is far from the methodology and factors favored by economists. It 
picks up on factors economists disregard due to the difficulty in quantifying them, 
such as the political philosophy of constitutional governance for social mobility and 
social justice, the government accountability and innovation policy through hori-
zontal and vertical power structure, and also the confidence in rights protection 
through the mechanism of constitutional enforcement. My goal in this chapter is to 
foster further academic interest to enrich the literature in the field of NIS and gov-
ernance, although it is very limited, even superficial, compared to the big research 
topics raised in the above two questions.
2  Brief Introduction to the National Innovation System
Before moving to the discussion of the “shared value” and “power structure” 
emphasized by Lundvall for the analysis of innovation in developing countries, we 
begin with a brief introduction to the concept of NIS.  Inspired by Schumpeter, 
scholars such as Christopher Freeman have further developed the theory of techno-
logical innovation.11Robert Solow has also made substantial efforts to quantify the 
impact of technology on economic growth.12 In the 1980s, the concept of NIS was 
developed as a separate concept, especially in research about the role of the state in 
9 Pranab Bardhan, Indian and China: Governance Issues and Development, 68 The Journal of Asian 
Studies, No. 2, May 2009.
10 C H Hanumantha Rao, India and China: A Comparison of the Role of Sociopolitical Factors in 
Inclusive Growth, 46 Economic and Political Weekly, No. 16 (April 16–22, 2011), pp. 24–28.
11 Jan Fagerberg, Morten Fosaas, Martin Bell, and Ben Martin, Chris Freeman’s Contribution to 
Innovation Studies, EXPLORE Workshop, 2010, http://www.janfagerberg.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/08/Chris-Freeman%E2%80%99s-contribution-to-innovation-studies-1.pdf, 
pp. 4–5.
12 Nathan Rosenberg, Innovation and Economic Development, https://www.oecd.org/cfe/
tourism/34267902.pdf, OECD 2004, p. 1.
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the catching-up process which challenged the Washington Consensus.13 Special 
credit was given to Christopher Freeman’s book Technology policy and economic 
performance: lessons from Japan in 1987 for the promotion of NIS.14
The early attention to NIS “refers to the fact that historical and local context 
affects where the limits of innovation systems are set.”15 Later, scholars such as 
Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Nelson, R. R, and Charles Edquist further developed the con-
cept of NIS.16 Thus, research inquiry was extended to focus areas such as “social 
systems of innovation,” “sectoral system of innovation,” “national business system,” 
etc. in the last decade.17
Compared to previous theories, NIS’s three critical contributions have been 
emphasized. First, it moves the emphasis for achieving international competitive-
ness from traditional cost factors and incentives such as cheap labor, devaluation, 
and tax cuts to innovation.
Second, innovation is defined broadly, including both radical and incremental 
innovation, even including the diffusion, absorption, and use of innovation.18 Some 
have divided it into two types, “science-based” (“promoting R&D, utilizing and 
creating access to explicit codified knowledge”) or “experience-based” (“learning 
by doing, using and interacting”).19 Some others have placed it into the category of 
“production capability” (“adapting existing knowledge and minor innovation”) or 
“innovation capability” (new technology for hardware or new soft knowledge for 
organizing firms).20
Third, it brings state back and develops analysis around “how different countries 
differ in terms of institutional setups supporting innovation and learning,”21 instead 
of just focusing on the firm-level innovation. It also focuses on the interaction 
between users and producers, the interaction among firms, and the wide institutional 
and social arrangements for innovation.
In summary, “the innovative capacity depends on the density and quality of 
relationships among enterprises and the relationship between enterprises and 
support institutions.”22 Or we can conclude that “innovation is regarded as socially 
and spatially embedded interactive learning process that cannot be understood 
independently of its region-specific institutional and cultural context.”23
13 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 3. (Washington Consensus is a phrase referring to economic policies 
recommended by international institutes such as the Institute for International Economics, 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc. in the 1980s. Some also frame the Washington 




17 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 6.
18 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 12.
19 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 9.
20 Altenburg et al., supra note 4, p. 327.
21 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 8.
22 Altenburg et al., supra note 4, p. 327.
23 Altenburg et al., supra note 4, p. 328.
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There are also some critical assessments of the NIS concept. For example, it has 
been pointed out by many scholars that the understanding of the dynamics of 
innovation systems is still weak,24 such as “how the structures of interaction develop 
and change over time.”25 Some others suggest that understanding of the dynamics of 
interactive learning “calls for other disciplines than economics.”26 Another critical 
comment is on its “scientification approach,” with too much focus on rigorousness 
of the research.27 There have also been suggestions to move the research from an 
aggregate national level to more specific ones such as regional and sectoral levels, 
which have been taken by many economists.
This chapter tries to bring the perspective of constitutional law into the NIS 
research. Constitutional governance is at the apex of power distribution, which is 
the foundation for understanding the power structure and institutional support. 
However, it will be limited to explaining the dynamics of interaction between busi-
ness units and institutional support in a nuanced way.
3  Different Political Philosophy for Social Revolution 
and Social Justice
Political philosophy sets the foundation and tone for the design and function of 
constitutional governance. India and China are two countries that believe socialism 
is the right path for the modernization of underdeveloped and post-colonized nations 
with large poor and illiterate populations. Both have put socialism into the preamble 
of their constitution, but follow different schools of socialism, Fabianism for India 
and Marxism and Leninism for China.28 The different versions of socialism substan-
tially influence their ways of pursuing social revolution and social justice, which are 
believed to have different impacts on the social foundation of national innovation 
capacity in each context.
3.1  Social Revolution: Violent Revolution vs. Democratic 
Governance
Both India and China are ancient civilizations with long histories. Interestingly, 
their long cultural traditions carry both nutrients and burdens for their moderniza-
tion. Cultural inequality is one of the critical barriers for social equality and social 
mobility. Social mobility is further critical for industrial entrepreneurship, since 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 5. (In arguing for this point, he referred to Reijo Miettinen’s comment 
on the NIS in a publication in 2002.)
27 Ibid.
28 K.  V. Viswanathaiah, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Concept of Democratic Socialism, 26 The Indian 
Journal of Political Science, No. 4, October–December 1965, pp. 91–99.
Constitutional Governance in India and China and Its Impact on National Innovation
44
“[industrial] entrepreneurship can develop only in a society in which cultural norms 
permit variability in the choice of paths of life.”29
Both India and China have made efforts for social revolution in the new nation- 
building but in different ways. In the struggle for independence, India followed 
Gandhi’s non-violent civil disobedience, while China followed Mao Zedong’s revo-
lutionary violence with “ideological commitment to the fundamental alteration of 
the class relationship,” especially in rural areas.30 This commitment to fundamental 
alteration of the class relationship was continued in the first three decades of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and was even strengthened during the Cultural 
Revolution under the leadership of Mao. Unlike the leadership of China, Gandhi, 
Nehru, and other founding leaders of India employed non-violence for social 
revolution, while they disagreed on industrialization for development.31 Further, 
members of the Constitutional Assembly believe that direct election is the pillar for 
social revolution.32
The Assembly has adopted the principle of adult franchise (said) with an abundant faith in 
the common man and the ultimate success of democratic rule, and the full belief that the 
introduction of democratic government on the basis of adult suffrage will bring enlighten-
ment and promote the well-being, the standard of life, the comfort, and the decent living of 
the common man.33
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, Indian-born economist and philosopher, also argued in 
his book Development as Freedom that social opportunities such as access to pri-
mary education and basic health care are not only “important for the conduct of 
private life” but also important for “effective participation in economic and political 
life.”34 China has improved life expectancy and literacy as well as reduced infant 
mortality within a short period.35 Despite its poorer status compared to India, from 
1949 to1953 China was able to raise the life expectancy to 40.3, while the life 
expectancy in India remained 32.1 in 1951, almost no change from that of 1947.36 
In the mid-1970s, life expectancy in China reached 63.6 for men and 66.3 for 
women, compared to an average of only 49.4  in India despite the great political 
29 Phiroze B. Medhora, Entrepreneurship in India, 80 Political Science Quarterly, No. 4 Dec. 1965, 
p. 564. (He quoted from the research of Bert Hoselitz.)
30 Jason Unruhe, Contrast India & China: What a Difference Revolution Makes!, July 20, 2010, 
Jason Unruhe. Com, https://maoistrebelnews.com/2010/07/20/contrast-india-china-what-a- 
difference-revolution-makes/
31 Kazuya Ishii, The Socioeconomic Thoughts of Mahatma Gandhi: As An Origin of Alternative 
Development, Review of Social Economy, Vol. LIX, No. 3, September 2001, p. 301.
32 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 58.
33 Ibid.
34 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 39.




turmoil and many natural disasters in China.37 By 1980–1981, China’s infant 
mortality rate fell to 56 per 1000 live births, while the Indian level remained at a 
high 122.38 There is also a big gap in improving literacy in India and China. For 
example, in 1964, Chinese illiteracy dropped to 52.4%39 while it was 63.77% in 
1981 in India. The gap is still expanding. By the end of 2014, India’s adult illiteracy 
rate was 29.5%,40 while China’s has dropped to 4.1%.41 Although many factors 
contributed to the rise of China, some scholars believe that “it was the ‘head start’ 
provided by the socialist revolution—in better health, education, infrastructure 
development and social egalitarianism—that laid the basis for this later advance.”42 
Sen also argued that economic liberalization in India has not achieved an outcome 
similar to China and that this is due to lack of social preparedness, evidenced by the 
fact that half of its adult population was illiterate in 1991.43
The Chinese revolution was not achieved without costs, such as civil war and the 
death of millions in famine, even after the establishment of the PRC. The social 
disruption and violence caused by the Cultural Revolution dragged Chinese society 
into a devastating trauma.44 Starting in 1978, the political focus has shifted to eco-
nomic development. Benefiting from social liberation and decentralized power, 
within a short period of time, China became the world’s factory, transforming China 
“from one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, into among the most polar-
ized,” with new stratification, a dangerously high Gini index, a high suicide rate 
among farmers, and a host of social conflicts and protests.45
Although India has lagged in most key economic and demographic indicators 
compared to China, the gradual social change has saved India from dramatic politi-
cal turbulence and from wild  economic and social transformation as well. 
Meanwhile, India has made evident progress toward social equality among classes 
and castes through its constitutional arrangements. Untouchability was abolished by 
the Constitution and is not visible in daily life. Through seats reservation for educa-
tion, government jobs, and elected positions as an affirmative action in the 
Constitution, the status of many people from low castes and underprivileged tribes 
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Shanghai Institute of Education Studies, Contextualized Analysis on Chinese Human Resources 
(in Chinese), Shanghai Institute of Education Studies, June 12, 2010, http://www.cnsaes.org/
homepage/Upfile/2010612/2010061205505377.pdf. (The age basis for adult illiteracy here was 
13, which was lifted to 15 after 2008.)
40 Department of School Education and Literacy, Ministry of Human Resources Development 
(MHRD), Education Statistics At A Glance, 2016, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/
statistics/ESG2016_0.pdf
41 Data from the UNDP China Office, p. A1, http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/zh/home/
mdgoverview/overview/mdg2.html
42 Unruhe, supra note 30.
43 Sen, supra note 34, p. 42 .
44 Unruhe, supra note 30.
45 Ibid.
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was raised. Low caste has even become a selling point for getting votes such as in 
elections for Lok Sabha (meaning the “Council of States”)46 and president.47
However, concerns about social inequality in India still exist. For example, one 
scholar argues that “it did not put an end to the institutional aspects of class exploi-
tation and caste oppression.”48 Another scholar even asserted that the Nehruvianism 
version of the emancipation project “was simply rendering oppression invisible.”49 
The caste politics in more than the last two decades “has largely confined itself to 
the ambition of gaining access to power rather than any substantial agenda of social 
transformation.”50 It has even become a big puzzle of Indian democracy as to “why 
the poor, so assertive when election time comes, often do not punish politicians who 
are ineffective at resolving the endemic problems of poverty, disease and illiteracy.”51
3.2  Pursuing Social Justice: Transcendental Institutionalism 
vs. Realization-Focused Comparison
Amartya Sen in his thought-provoking book The Idea of Justice divides “the two 
basic and divergent lines of reasoning about justice among leading philosophers”52 
into “transcendental institutionalism” which “concentrated on identifying just insti-
tutional arrangements for a society”53 and “realization-focused comparison,” which 
“took a variety of comparative approaches that were concerned with social realiza-
tions (resulting from actual institutions, actual behaviors and other influences).”54 In 
terms of institutional arrangement, the reasoning of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) is more from the perspective of comparison and realization under the theory 
developed by Amartya Sen in his thought-provoking book The Idea of Justice and 
tries to argue that the current choice is fit even if it is not perfect.
This point can be substantiated by the long preamble of the Chinese Constitution 
both in its 195455 and 1982 versions,56 which contains a long historical review of the 
political struggles and experiments China experienced from the Opium War to the 
Revolution of 1911 and to the birth of the PRC in 1949. It doesn’t provide principles 
46 Is Narendra Modi really an OBC? Rediff, May 10, 2014, http://www.rediff.com/news/column/
ls-election-sheela-says-is-narendra-modi-really-an-obc/20140510.htm
47 Rahul Bedi, India set to elect president from lowest Dalit caste, Telegraph, July 17, 2017, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/17/india-set-elect-president-lowest-dalit-caste/.
48 Unruhe, supra note 30.
49 Pratap Bhanu Metha, The Burden of Democracy, Penguin Books, India 2003, p. 71.
50 Metha, supra note 49, p. 74.
51 Bardhan, supra note 9, p. 351.
52 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Penguin Books, 2009, p. 5.
53 Ibid.
54 Sen, supra note 52, p. 7.
55 China Constitution 1954, http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1954/1954bilingual.htm
56 China Constitution 1982, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm
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for an ideal society but instead argues why this is fit for China by comparison to 
other alternatives which have been tried.
Some Chinese scholars argue that the current Chinese system is of three 
integrations, that is, culturally Confucianism, politically socialism, and economically 
liberalism, which is the new consensus of reform sustained by the public reasoning.57 
That is reflected in the constitutional governance of the party state, which places 
political power with the party and administrative power with the state. Following 
Confucianism and Leninism, power distribution in China is very centralized with 
the party state and parliamentary sovereignty, which would not be acceptable from 
the perspective of transcendental institutionalism. It also looks odd to combine fun-
damental rights with duties in the Chinese Constitution from the eyes of philoso-
phers believing in liberal democracy. In terms of the strategy of enhancing justice or 
reducing injustice, the CPC identifies the improvement of material living condi-
tions, including the right to a decent standard of living, health, education, housing, 
and so on as priorities, and places more focus on collective rights than individual 
rights, as it is more urgent to remove injustice.58
Compared to China, India more closely follows the model of transcendental 
institutionalism. The preamble of the Indian Constitution is very short, but lists four 
clear principles as the foundation for building the ideal society of justice, liberty, 
equality, and fraternity.59 India’s Constitution borrowed the best systems of 
transcendental institutionalism, namely, the parliamentary government from the UK 
system, the judicial review and fundamental rights from the USA, and the federal 
structure from the Canadian Constitution.60 India’s Constitution values civil and 
political rights more than economic and social rights, evidenced by placing the for-
mer as fundamental rights under judicial review in Part III and the latter as the guid-
ing principles of state policy in Part IV.61 “For years, social rights, like the right to 
food, or the right to shelter, were considered subordinate to civil-political rights, 
like the right to free speech and/or the right to political participation.”62 Unlike the 
Chinese way of integrating traditional philosophy with borrowed political philoso-
phy from Western countries, Indian people have not tried to integrate them at the 
political level.63 For family and social life, Indians still follow traditional personal 
57 Zhou Lian, The Debate in Contemporary Chinese Political Thought, in Fred Dallmayr and Zhao 
Tingyang (ed.) Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives, Knowledge 
World, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 34–36 Also from Gan Yang, The Road to China: Thirty Years and 
Sixty Years (in Chinese), Dushu 6, 2004, p. 5.
58 Henri Feron, The Chinese Model of Human Rights, 3 China Legal Science (2015), p. 95.
59 India Constitution (1950), http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.
Rom8Fsss(3).pdf
60 Krishan Keshav. Constitution Law-I, Delhi, Singhal Law Publication, 2016, p. 10.
61 Gautam Bhatia, Directive Principles of State Policy, in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla, and 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 645.
62 Madhav Khosla, The Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press, Sixth Impression, 2014, 
p. 126.
63 Hanna Learner, The Indian Founding: A Comparative Perspective, in Choudhry et al. (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, 2016, p. 61.
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law (religion or traditional philosophy),64 while in political life the people’s passion 
is given to the ideal of liberal democracy.
To conclude, in China the dramatic class disruption prepared its people to 
embrace social arrangements such as access to primary education and basic health 
care in the pre-reform era, which further prepared for the capacities of economic 
and political participation. The centralized power and realization-focused compari-
son approach to justice give China flexibility to promote policy innovation for eco-
nomic development as well as building infrastructure for economic facilities. The 
challenges in China are how to develop principle-based governance with logical 
reasoning to reduce the people’s economic insecurity, which is critical for national 
innovation in the next step. In contrast, India has a very different path, with faith in 
the philosophy of evolutionary social change through ideal political arrangement. 
Constitutional democracy, including universal adult suffrage and judicial 
independence, has laid a good foundation for the rule of law as a principle of 
governance, whereas the function of the governance is limited by the big gap 
between ideal institutional arrangement and the huge social disparity.
4  Power Distribution: Government Accountability vs. 
Policy Innovation
One of the contributions of NIS is to bring the state back in exploring the catching- up 
process through innovation. How to identify the right intervention by the state? And 
how does the state implement the right intervention with the right timing and in the 
right way? The answers lie in the constitutional power distribution and its interaction 
with the social reality. In this part, I am going to introduce the difference in power 
distribution between India and China, including vertical power distribution of the 
central-local relationship, the horizontal power structure in terms of accountability 
and policy innovation, and the boundary between citizens’ rights and state power. It 
is expected that the analysis will help provide some clues to understand the 
difference in the breadth of support for NIS in India and China.
4.1  Vertical Power Distribution: Accountability vs. Local 
Innovation
People usually define China as a centralized state, and India as a federal one. Upon 
closer examination, we may find the picture of the central-local relationship in both 
countries are much more complicated.
From the constitutional perspective, India is better framed as a quasi-federalist, 
or a federalist state with more central power. One of the critical perspectives is to 
look at its legislative power distribution. The seventh schedule of the Constitution 
gives the union parliament residual power while the states have a fixed list of 
64 Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law, Allahabad law Agency, 2017 Reprint, pp. 11–26.
W. Zhang
49
legislative powers. There is also a long list of powers jointly shared by the union and 
states. In addition, if the union government believes that some power is better exer-
cised by them, they can pass a constitutional amendment to shift the power from the 
state to the union government.65 For example, primary education has been changed 
from the exclusive power of the states to joint power of the states and union govern-
ment.66 “In situations where there is a union and state law conflict, Article 254 of the 
Indian Constitution prioritizes the former and renders the latter, to the extent of 
incompatibility or repugnancy, void.”67 For executive power, there is a presidential 
rule under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, according to which the president 
can declare failure of the constitutional machinery of a state, and the union govern-
ment can exercise the executive power of the state during this emergency period. 
This power has been limited through judicial review in the case of S.R. Bommai 
after 1994.68
Even if the Constitution grants more power to the union government, it doesn’t 
mean that the union government actually enjoys centralized and consolidated power 
over states in its daily function. In order to understand the functional practice, we 
also need to look at other factors, such as religious diversity, linguistic diversity, 
cultural diversity, multiparty politics, etc. India is very different from a traditional 
national state because it was built “in a social and political context in which the 
multinational dimension interacts with more linguistic and religious diversity.69 
Before independence, there were more than 500 princely states, which maintained 
high-level autonomy through agreement with British India. After independence and 
partition, more than 400 of them were put under the modern state of India. India has 
more than 1000 parties at state, regional, and national levels which compete for 
power at different levels. These parties have diversified ideology such as Marxism, 
secularism with liberal democracy, Hindutva, support for low castes, etc. In many 
cases, the ruling parties at different levels are not the same, which makes the cen-
tralization of power very challenging. Even for building the streamlined tax system, 
the indirect tax reform such as the Goods and Services Tax reform just managed to 
pass on July 1, 2017 in India.70 At the grassroots level, in the 1990s, through the 
65 Khosla, Supra note 62, p. 47.
66 Schedule 7, List III-Concurrent List, Entry 25 says “Education including technical education, 
medical education, and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63,64,65 and 66 of List I; 
vocational and technical training of labor.” Entry 25 of List III was introduced through the 42nd 
Amendment in 1976. From the Constitution of India Bare Act 2017, Universal law Publishing, 
p. 238.
67 Khosla, supra note 62, p. 50.
68 Khosla, supra note 62, pp. 64–65.
69 Alfred Stepan, Juan J.  Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other 
Multinational Democracies, John Hopkins University Press, 2011, pp. 39–40.
70 VS Krishnan, GST is one of the boldest reforms in post-Independence India, Indian Express, 
August 4, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/gst-bill-passed-entry-52- 
abolished-2952243/
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73rd and 74th amendments, three tiers of local government (panchayats) through 
direct elections were able to be established.71
In India, people value diversity more than scaling up exciting innovations. For 
example, the state of Kerala has been introduced by scholars and policymakers as a 
model of equitable development with high literacy and low disparity. However, 
many years later, India has only one “Kerala.” The challenge involved in scaling up 
might lie in not only the willingness of the people but also its feasibility elsewhere 
in India.
However, in the Chinese context, Article 3 of the Constitution (1982) clearly sets 
forth the principle of democratic centralism for vertical power and horizontal power 
distribution. Meanwhile, China has created different levels of autonomy to deal 
with the return of previously colonized territorialities such as the high-level autono-
mous system named Special Administrative Region (SAR) for Macau and Hong 
Kong and to accommodate ethnic minorities with a middle-level autonomous sys-
tem such as the autonomous administration system. The majority of provinces and 
municipalities are part of the centralized system, with a low level of political auton-
omy. In addition, China started experimenting with direct vote for village commit-
tees at the grassroots level starting from the late 1980s, which has become a 
nationally institutionalized system.72
It is further worth noting that Paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution 
(1982) sets out an interesting principle to deal with the relationship between central 
and local governments on policy experimentation and innovation, even for prov-
inces with low levels of legal and political autonomy. It says “The division of func-
tions and powers between the central and local State organs is guided by the 
principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local 
authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.”73 This means 
that even the provinces with low-level political autonomy still have big space for 
policy innovation. Scholars have framed this model as “fragmented 
authoritarianism”74 or “market-preserving federalism.” 75 On the ground, the center 
gives local authorities space to test new ideas. If they fail, it is limited to the local. 
71 Dilip Mookherjee, “Governmental Accountability” in Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu 
Mehta (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, Oxford University Press India, 2010, 
p. 479.
72 For more information, please refer to Chen Zhen, Dilemma, Balance and Remedy for Election at 
Village Committee from the Perspective of Self-governance at Grass-root Level, research for the 
2016 National Civil Affaires Forum, http://mzzt.mca.gov.cn/article/2016mzlt/mzsyfztz
flt/201610/20161000886907.shtml
73 For the full text for Article 3, please refer to the link http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm
74 Haifeng Huang, Signal Left Turn to Right: Central Rhetoric and Local Reform in China, 66 
Political Research Quarterly, No. 2 (June 2013), p. 294. Also from Kenneth G. Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Process, Princeton University 
Process, 1988.
75 Huang, as supra note. Also from Cao Yuanzheng, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, From 
Federalism, Chinese Style of Privatization, Economics of Transition, No. 7, 1999, pp. 103–121.
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If it is successful then the central government can scale it up to the national level. In 
order to manage the pace, the rhetoric of the central government is usually conser-
vative, but the local government can initiate unauthorized policy experiments based 
on their assessment of political risk.76 Scholars found that this experiment-based 
policymaking model provides a more powerful explanation than static factors for 
China’s economic transformation.77
This mechanism of centralization of direction plus local autonomy has also 
evolved in terms of promoting geography of innovation. Before 2000, China has 
heavily used the top-down model of promoting geographical development, which is 
diffused in a hierarchical way.78 By comparing it with India, scholars have found 
that the agglomeration forces which lead to innovation have little spillover effect in 
China, since the innovation owes much to planned economy or aggressive policy 
intervention rather than being developed through natural social filters.79 For exam-
ple, in the mid-2000s, the geography of patenting in China was much more concen-
trated, with 46% of patenting in Guangdong province, while in India it was more 
evenly distributed among the six cities of Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, 
Mumbai, and Pune.80
However, starting from 2010, there are some new signals toward the innovation 
direction. One is that the central direction toward local autonomy has been expanded 
toward both economic development and social development. The other is that the 
central government has shifted from directing local authorities’ policy innovation to 
multi-stakeholder, multiform innovation. On September 29, 2010, in the 23rd 
Workshop of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee, President Hu Jintao clearly set the tone that China should try the utmost 
to invigorate the innovation power of civil society.81 On March 5, 2011, in the 
Central Government Report to the National People’s Congress (NPC), Premier Wen 
Jiabao mentioned in an unprecedented way that “China would mobilize and orga-
nize the public to join social management, and promote the positive role of civil 
society organizations and better governance.”82 Almost from 2010, private tech 
business such as Sina, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent quickly grew. Cities started 
competition for high-tech companies. In 2017, driven by private business, the geo-
graphical distribution of patenting has been more expansive and evenly distributed 
76 Huang, supra note 74, p. 302.
77 Sabastian Heilmann, From Local Experiments to National Policy, The Origins of China’s 
Distinctive Policy Process, 59 China Journal, Jan. 2008, p. 29.
78 Crescenzi et al., supra note 6, p. 25.
79 Crescenzi et al., supra note 6, pp. 21–24.
80 Ibid.
81 Hu Jintao Hosted the Twenty-Third Workshop for the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee, Xinhua News, Sep. 29, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
09/29/c_13535934.htm
82 Wen Jiabao: Strengthening the Capacity of Government in Social Management and Better 
Governance, Sina News, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-05/104722057821.shtml
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compared to that of the mid-2000s: nearly all provinces patented, the top three 
changing to Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, with the percentage of Guangdong 
dropping from 46% to 24%.83
4.2  Horizontal Power Distribution: Accountability vs. Policy 
Innovation
India developed the longest and most detailed constitution in the world through 
three years of deliberation, which establishes a functional separation of powers with 
formal political settings. Learning from reflection on Nazi Germany, India doesn’t 
follow parliamentary sovereignty, but instead adopted the model of parliamentary 
government believing it to be effective and accountable.84 The Indian Constitution 
establishes universal adult suffrage. In addition, India learned from the USA to have 
an independent judiciary to check the tyranny of the majority. In India, among the 
three powers of executive, legislative, and judiciary, the judiciary is the most trusted 
one among the public. Through enforcing fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution in Part III and the judicial activism by developing a “basic structure 
doctrine,”85 India’s Supreme Court is playing an omnipotent role in enforcing the 
Constitution. The Indian apex court even enjoys more power than its counterpart in 
the USA.86 For example, in India, Supreme Court and high court judges are 
appointed through a collegium, not subject to the real check of legislative and 
executive powers.87 Furthermore, “The [Supreme] Court devised ways of monitoring 
and disciplining the runaway exercises of constitution-amending powers, initially 
solely entrusted to Parliament and the Executive, via the invention of the doctrine of 
the basic structure and essential features of the Constitution.”88 The Indian Supreme 
Court is not confined to the conventional narratives of separation of powers but 
believes adjudicatory leadership or judicial supremacy.89 The adjudicatory leader-
ship shapes India as a rule-based country, making governance function more like a 
forum of principle. The legal formalism and the check and balance in India lay a 
solid foundation for economic security, which is important for fostering 
entrepreneurship.
83 Zhou Hui, Zhang Jianlin, 2017 China Patenting Report with Top Three of Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Jiangsu, 21st Economic Report, April 27, 2018, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2018-04-27/
doc-ifztkpin8971574.shtml
84 Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Permit Constitutional Review, 30 Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization (2014), p. 595.
85 Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest 
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 San Diego International Law Journal, Fall 2010.
86 Upendra Baxi, Law, Politics, and Constitutional Hegemony: the Supreme Court, Jurisprudence 
and Demoprudence, Choudhry et  al. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, 
Oxford University Press, 2016, New Delhi, p. 106.
87 Mate, Supra note 85, pp. 204–206.
88 Baxi, Supra note 86, p. 101.
89 Baxi, Supra note 86, p. 106.
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However, short-run competitive populism in elections makes mobilization for 
votes more important than deliberation on how to reduce social injustice through 
collective efforts. For example, investment-related physical infrastructure and 
access to qualified education are usually not popular in election campaigns.90 
Neither is it easy to carry out policy experimentation in India under legal formalism 
and competitive populism.91 In fact, the gap between elites’ transcendental institu-
tionalism and the social reality has also caused some odd phenomena, such as the 
persistent low ranking in contract enforcement for doing business in India by the 
World Bank.92 In contrast, Chinese contract enforcement has been among the top 
ten for many years.93 Equally unbelievable is the large number of delayed cases in 
India, 26.9 million in total as of May 19, 2018, including 2.25 million cases delayed 
over 10 years.94
India has a dual track of politicians and bureaucrats. In order to promote social 
equality, the Indian Constitution foresees seat reservation as the affirmative action 
through which scheduled tribes (ST), scheduled castes (SC), and other backward 
classes (OBC) can be assigned reserved seats for elected positions and nonelected 
positions as bureaucrats in public sector and educational settings. The multiparty 
electoral democracy makes politicians very sensitive to constituents’ concerns. But 
ethically, bureaucrats are expected to be apolitical.95 There is also constitutional 
protection for bureaucrats’ job security. The apolitical ethics and the secured nature 
of bureaucratic jobs raise the question of how to transcend politician-based account-
ability to bureaucrat-based accountability.
The Chinese political system is an interesting combination of Confucianism and 
Leninism, a minority amidst the global prevalence of electoral democracy,96 in 
which governance is divided between the CPC with political power and the state 
with administrative power.97 Horizontal state power distribution follows the so- 
called democratic centralism or parliamentary sovereignty. The National Peoples’ 
Congress has the supreme power to supervise all other powers including the 
90 Bardhan, supra note 9, p. 349.
91 Ibid.
92 N.L.  Rajah, Courting the rankings, Hindu, Feb. 6, 2018, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
op-ed/courting-the-rankings/article22661678.ece
93 On ease of doing business in China, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/
enforcing-contracts/china
94 Data are from the daily updated NJDG database, http://164.100.78.168/njdg_public/main.php
95 For more information about the ethics of bureaucrats in India, please refer to Arudra Burra, The 
Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist Movement: Neutrality, Politics and Continuity, 48 
Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, No. 4, November 2010, pp. 404–432.
96 Zheng Yong Nian, Chapter 2, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Identity, 
Culture and Politics, in the book The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: 
Culture, Reproduction and Transformation, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Landon and 
New York, 2010, p.200.
97 Larry Cata Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: on Constitutional Values and the 
Legitimacy of the Chinese Party-State Rule of Law System, 30 Boston University International 
Law Journal, 2012 Summer, p. 343.
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executive, judiciary, and military. The judiciary is a law-applying body, which has 
no power to check the legislative but has some power to check the executive through 
administrative litigations filed by citizens. The mechanism for the CPC as the ruling 
party to work with other democratic parties and stakeholders is called a “multi-party 
political consultation” system. Markets and civil society are slowly being released 
from the control of government after 1978.
Some scholars have summarized the Chinese political system as “democracy at 
the bottom and meritocracy at the top.”98 Above the town level, functionaries are 
selected among bureaucrats through supposed merit-based criteria, while at the 
grassroots level functionaries are elected through votes. That means bureaucrats and 
politicians are not separated clearly in the Chinese context but go through the same 
track. Compared to electoral democracy, functionaries selected through meritocracy 
will not have the issues of going through beginners’ lessons or of tyranny of the 
majority, but have the challenge to build a sustainable meritocracy in a country with 
a huge population and diversity.
The different structure of the political system has a profound impact on 
government accountability and policy entrepreneurship. Both India and China claim 
to have a form of accountable government: India for having democratic institutional 
settings and China for identifying itself as serving the people’s interests. However, 
government accountability functions in a very different way in each. In China, gov-
ernment accountability is mainly through internalization and self-reflection. Checks 
from external stakeholders such as other political parties, the judiciary, media, and 
civil society are very weak. The CPC, as the only ruling party since the establish-
ment of the PRC, has tried to keep legitimacy and competency to rule the country 
by frequent self-disciplining and absorptive adaption. In turn, the CPC tries to inter-
nalize this reflection on their members to align personal interest with party interest 
and public interest. The CPC’s accountability to the people is more outcome-based 
than procedure- or participation-based. In India, government accountability is 
mainly through external channels such as opposition parties, judiciary, media, and 
civil society, which are effective in checking politicians but may be less effective in 
checking bureaucrats.
4.3  Constitutional Enforcement: Citizens’ Rights vs. State 
Power
In addition to allocating power vertically and horizontally for the function of the 
state, it is also important to look at how the constitution enforces citizens’ rights. 
The Indian Constitution and Chinese Constitution both enumerate a long list of 
98 Daniel Bell, extracts from Chapter 4, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and The Limits of 
Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2015 p. 168.
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rights including civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights 
for their citizens. Whereas most of the rights are similar in wording, there are some 
evident differences in terms of their enforcement mechanism and relationship with 
duties.
India’s Constitution differentiates rights into two groups based on the enforcement 
mechanism. It places most of the civil and political rights under fundamental rights 
in Part III with the right to constitutional remedies through the Supreme Court while 
placing most economic, social, and cultural rights under Part IV “Directive 
Principles of State Policy.”99 Some scholars have even criticized that the “Constitution 
incorporated civil-political rights with great gusto but stood silent on social 
rights.”100 Some rights such as access to education for children at the ages of 6–14 
have become a fundamental right through judicial activism. Through expansive 
judiciary interpretation of the “right to life” under Article 21, more and more eco-
nomic and social rights such as the right to clean air, right to health, etc. are being 
recognized.101 India’s Constitution is very right-based. For example, in order to 
improve the access to primary education, the Supreme Court of India has made 
access to education for school children (6–14  years) a fundamental right first. 
Parliament has also passed the Right to Education Act to endorse this right through 
legislative power. Even for compulsory education, the duty is for the state to provide 
education, while parents and school children have only the right but no duty to 
receive education.
In China, Chapter 2 of the Constitution concerns “fundamental rights and duties.” 
It does not differentiate civil and political rights from economic, social, and cultural 
rights in terms of enforcement. The Constitution is enforced by the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC). Article 62 prescribes that 
the NPC shall “supervise the enforcement of the Constitution.” Article 67 empowers 
the NPCSC to “interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement.” Although 
the judiciary cannot check the legislature under the parliamentary sovereignty, the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has experimented to make some constitutional rights 
justiciable, such as the right to education in the Qi Yuling case in 2001.102 However, 
the SPC repealed it later in 2009 for being controversial.103 In addition, the enforce-
ment of constitutional rights in China is more toward collectivism and always with 
an eye on duty. In Chapter 2 of the Chinese Constitution, on top of the general 
99 Bhatia, supra note 61, p. 645.
100 Khosla, supra note 62, p. 126.
101 Vidhan Maheshwari, Article 21 of The Constitution of India—The Expanding Horizons, http://
www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/art222.htm
102 Tong Zhiwei, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the Supreme People’s Court’s Reply to Qi 
Yuling Case, 43 Suffolk U. L. Review (2010), pp. 669–680.
103 Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 East Asia Law 
Review, 2011, pp. 112–115, and 106–112.
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fundamental rights, two specific rights, namely, the right to education104 and right to 
work,105 are closely followed by duties.
While India is more rule-based China is more policy-oriented, such as 
experimentation- based policymaking106 with the “focus on finding innovative policy 
instruments rather than defining policy objectives,”107 especially after the era of 
reform and opening up era. In China, law is very general and leaves broad of leeway 
to policymakers, where legal issues are easily taken as political ones decided by the 
CPC. The governance function in China is more like a forum of policy, where in 
many circumstances experimentalism and policy orientation create space for entre-
preneurship, such as the special economic zones in the 1980s, and recent pilot free 
trade zones.108 However, low priority for the rule of law also creates economic inse-
curity for the middle-class and business owners. The limited capacity in dealing 
with conflicts and diversities causes a law-stability paradox in legal reform and 
social transformation.109 “[D]ecentralization of power combined with central con-
trol over personnel and promotion plays in Chinese governance”110 which enables 
China to “have more decisive policy initiative and execution than in India.”111 But 
“China is still far from establishing a comprehensive rule-based system and 
institutionalizing a credible set of checks and balances,”112 which will lead to “low 
capacity for conflict management [and] make it more brittle in the face of a crisis 
than the messy-looking system in India.”113
India’s system has “more institutionalized outlets,” which enables the enforcement 
of fundamental rights against government through an independent judiciary. 
However, its inability to deliver social service and take collective action despite 
populist hindrance cannot be overcome in a short period.114 “[The] over-politicized 
104 Article 46 provides that “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the duty as well as the 
right to receive education,” http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/09/content_ 
1372846.htm
105 Article 42 provides that “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right as well as 
the duty to work” (http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/09/content_1372846.
htm).
106 Sebastian Heilmann, From Local Experimentation to National Policy : The Origins of China’s 
Distinctive Policy Process, The China Journal No. 59, Jan. 2008, pp.1–30.
107 Heilmann, p. 3.
108 Such as the Pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai and the Hainan Pilot Free Trade Zone. For more 
information, please refer to http://en.china-shftz.gov.cn/ and Xinhua News report, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/13/c_137109244.htm
109 Benjamin Liebman, “Legal Reform: China’s Law-Stability Paradox,” Dadlus, Spring 2014, Vol. 
143, No. 2, pp. 96–109 (2014), Online access http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/
DAED_a_00275#.U1B7ZldWiO8, p. 96.
110 Bardhan, supra note 9, p. 356.
111 Bardhan, supra note 9, p. 353.
112 Bardhan, supra note 9, p. 356.




administration and decision-making processes, and its clogged courts and corrupt 
police and patronage politics that make a mockery of the rule of law for the common 
people all will continue to hobble the process of economic growth and alleviation of 
its still massive poverty.”115
5  The Impact of Constitutional Governance on Economic 
Development Path and Innovation Strategy
In this part, the impact of constitutional governance on economic development path 
and case studies of innovation capacities in India and China will be discussed.
5.1  Impact on Economic Development Path
Both China and India have regarded the centralized planned economy of the former 
Soviet Union as their role model for economic development from the late 1940s. 
China has tried to combine the party state with a planned economy and most unfor-
tunately learned tragic lessons when millions of people starved to death. From 1978 
onward, China started its groundbreaking economic reform, which combined the 
party state with a market economy. India has tried to combine democracy and a 
planned economy. The logic behind this is that India needs political freedom to 
break the societal inequality and believes that a centralized planned economy has 
helped boost economic development for its starving people by the millions.116 The 
end of the emergency period in 1976–1977117 led to multiple parties competing for 
power in India. However, India still followed the planned economy together with 
multiparty elections until 1991. Even today, the role of the state in India’s market 
economy continues to be very distinctive, different from the ones in liberal 
democracies or those in China and other East Asian countries.
In theory, there are different frameworks to understand the developmental stages 
of innovation. Some conceptualize a three-stage framework, namely, the stage of 
115 Ibid.
116 Viswanathaiah, supra note 28, p. 94.
117 According to Article 352 of the Indian Constitution, the Indian president has the power to 
announce that the country is in a state of internal emergency. During the emergency, fundamental 
rights shall be suspended. When Indira Gandhi served as prime minister, she felt the threat of 
internal disturbance and imposed emergency on the whole country, which was conducted through 
President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. The emergency period started from June 26, 1975, and lasted for 
21 months. During the period, all fundamental rights of citizens were suspended. This was also 
called the darkest period of Indian democracy. For more information, please refer to India 
Emergency Era, The Times of India, June 25, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
indian-emergency-era/photostory/47812701.cms. Also see Amrith Lal, 40  years on, those 
21 Months of Emergency, The Indian Express, July 20, 2015, https://indianexpress.com/article/
explained/40-years-on-those-21-months-of-emergency/
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individual entrepreneurship (Shumpeter Mark I),118 the stage of big corporations as 
the main driver of innovation and economic growth (Mark II), and the stage where 
“a broader set of actors and institutions [shape] the innovation process” (Mark 
III).119 Some others divide economic development into a factor-driven stage, 
efficiency- driven stage and innovation-driven stage, and further distinguish neces-
sity entrepreneurship from opportunity entrepreneurship, and also test their respec-
tive impact on economic development.120 Necessity entrepreneurship means there is 
very limited access to wage jobs, and entrepreneurship is the way to make a living. 
“The relationship between necessity entrepreneurship and economic development is 
usually negative in low-income countries, while the relationship in high-income 
countries is most likely positive.”121 Economic studies have also shown that “oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship has a big impact on economic development, whereas neces-
sity entrepreneurship has no effect.”122
China’s economic model has been framed by many scholars as state capitalism, 
which is the combination of a market economy and strong government. The state 
has a strong hand in directing economic development and also heavily intervenes in 
markets and other issues related to NIS such as education, and geography of innova-
tion. The three stages experienced by China are very much in line with the Western 
model of development, which is from factor driven, to efficiency driven and then to 
innovation driven.
In order to move to the efficiency-driven stage, “countries must increase their 
production efficiency and educate the workforce to be able to adapt in the subse-
quent technological development stage,”123 which is “marked by decreasing self- 
employment.”124 To move to the third stage, the economy will “shift from large 
corporations to entrepreneurial firms, marked by decreasing the share of manufac-
turing in the economy.”125
118 Scholarship attributes the theory development of entrepreneurship to the economist Joseph 
Schumpeter. His two theories on entrepreneurship sometimes were called Mark I and Mark II. In 
Mark I, “Schumpeter argued that the innovation and technological change of a nation come from 
the entrepreneurs, or wild spirits.” In Mark II, “he asserted that the actors that drive innovation and 
the economy are big companies which have the resources and capital to invest in research and 
development. Both arguments might be complementary today.” Introduction to Joseph Schumpeter, 
https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/JosephSchumpeter.pdf
119 Lundvall, supra note 1, p. 7. (Mark III was not from Schumpeter, but it was used to show the 
theoretical trend of entrepreneurship developed by Schumpeter.)
120 Zoltan J. Acs, Sameeksha Desai, and Jolanda Hessels, Entrepreneurship, economic development 
and institutions, 31 Small Business Economics, No. 3, Special Issue: Entrepreneurship, economic 
development, and institutions, Oct. 2008, pp. 219–234. (Opportunity entrepreneurship refers to 
“starting a business to exploit a perceived business opportunity,” while necessity entrepreneurship 
refers to “starting a business because you were pushed into it” (p. 222).)
121 Acs et al., supra note 121, p. 222.
122 Acs et  al., supra note, 121, p.  219. Also from Zoltan J.  Acs and A.  Varga, Enterprises, 
Agglomeration, and Technology Change, 24 Small Business Economics, No. 3, 2005, 
pp. 323–334.





China and India have experimented with different paths of economic development. 
“China has experienced explosive growth in its industrial sector, whereas India’s 
growth has been fueled by the expansion of service-producing industries.”126 One of 
the consequences from lack of large-scale manufacturing in India is that India’s 
economic development path is the distinctive role of the service sector, which has 
resulted in big employment in the informal sector.127 For example, by 2008–2009, in 
India, the service sector contributed 57% of GDP, agriculture 17% (55% in 1950–
1951128), and the manufacturing sector the remaining 26%.129 Data show that India 
has been on a fast track of moving people out of low-productivity agriculture into 
the manufacturing and service sectors.130 However, workers released from agriculture 
have not been employed in large-scale manufacturing or the formal service sector 
but are mostly in the self-employment sector. In India, even during the period of the 
heavily planned economy, “The growth of entrepreneurship was autonomous, 
brought about without state initiative.”131 It seems that even today, India is still 
dominated by individual entrepreneurship, which is more necessity entrepreneurship 
than opportunity entrepreneurship.
Why did India and China take different economic paths? From the perspective of 
constitutional governance, many factors can be brought into the discussion.
First is how to deal with cost factors such as land, labor, and tax which are critical 
for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) at the initial development stage. Let’s 
take the example of land. In India, land reform has been critical for the social and 
economic liberation of farmers in rural areas. Nehru has fought several battles over 
land reform with the judiciary, who as gatekeeper for the constitutional democracy 
has substantially checked the ambition of Nehru.132 The land reform was only half 
implemented, which created barriers for developing a large-scale manufacturing 
sector in terms of land supply and stable labor supply. In contrast, in China, through 
bloody revolution and the Cultural Revolution, farmers were completely “liber-
ated.” Through several steps, land ownership is finally in the form of state owner-
ship in urban areas and collective ownership in rural ones, which made access to 
land much easier.
Second, NIS scholars believe that “a key to transform technical innovation into 
economic results is training and organizational change.”133 Lack of educated labor 
126 Barry Bosworth and Susan M. Collins, Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and India, 
NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 12,943, February 2007, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w12943.pdf, p. 2.
127 Barry Eichengreen and Poonam Gupta, The Service Sector as Indian’s Road to Economic 
Growth, NBER Working Paper Series, Feb. 2011, available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16757.
pdf, p. 1.
128 Eichengreen and Gupta, supra note 126, p. 3.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Medhora, supra note 31, p. 580.
132 Mate, supra note 85, pp. 179–181.
133 Lundvall supra note 1, p. 8.
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is challenging for developing large-scale employment in manufacturing and also 
undermines the transformation of technical innovation into economic results in 
India. Primary education was initially within the power of state government, 
whereas higher education was in the hands of the union government. Nehru’s ambi-
tion for developing science and technology through developing advanced higher 
education at the union level neglected primary education at the state level, which 
makes access to primary education very problematic in India even today, with nearly 
one third of adults illiterate, while China prepares educated labor for manufacturing 
through more aggressive compulsory education policy.
Third, labor mobility is important for employment and the learning capacity of 
ordinary citizens. Even if the social equality in India is slowly developing, still 
largely influenced by religion and traditional culture. Indian family life is under the 
personal law, which is mainly based on religion, such as Hindu Law, Muslim Law, 
Christian Law, Jewish Law, and Parsi Law. Therefore, marriage, adoption, and 
inheritance and related social life are subject to religion and traditional culture. That 
means that, although the Constitution tries to remove the barrier of social inequality, 
the personal law allows and even strengthens the role of religion and caste culture 
to differentiate personal status. This permeation of personal law in daily life under-
mines the constitutional ambition to remove caste-based discrimination and thus 
hinders labor mobility for large-scale employment and the learning capacity of ordi-
nary citizens.
Last, access to global markets is also influenced by a country’s constitutional 
governance. As a comparatively mature and liberal democracy with less aggressive 
government, India gets more trust from developed countries than China can get, 
which makes India’s access to global markets much easier, especially in providing 
service. For example, lack of government censorship and more freedom of technical 
connection with the world could be the reasons that India is more competitive in 
software service, which better connects India with the global market. China, how-
ever, will continue to face the dilemma of promoting globalization while restricting 
the information connection with the world. In addition, the low level of institution-
alization of checks and balances in China will cast doubt on and cause uncertainty 
for its political establishment and its capacity in dealing with unexpected dramatic 
social changes, which is negative for sustainable innovation in the globalized 
context.
5.2  Case Study on ICT of the Impact on Innovation Strategy
There are some similarities between India and China in their catching-up process. 
“The large and growing internal market and the enormous capital accumulation 
resulting from long periods of fast growth give government and firms exceptional 
power to purchase, negotiate and trade….”134 Also, India and China share some 
similarities for innovation strategy, such as embedding themselves in the “global 
134 Altenburg et al., supra note 4, p. 328.
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value chain” and connecting with “global professional work.” 135 However, they 
vary significantly in terms of how to use their bargaining power in the catching-up 
process. The innovation strategy in the information and communication technology 
(ICT) sector serves as an example for analysis.
ICT has been a hot topic for comparative studies of innovation in India and 
China. This sector involves some key stakeholders such as communication equip-
ment manufacturers, service providers, and consumers. It also involves the stan-
dards setting of 3G, 4G, and 5G. The ICT sector started developing in the early 
1990s in India and China, right after economic liberalization.136 Despite similar 
opportunities and challenges of developing 3G in India and China, they took very 
different strategies for developing the 3G standard, “with China heavily investing in 
a homegrown standard TD-SCDMA and India preferring the international 
standard.”137 The homegrown standard in China was not initiated by the govern-
ment, but was a joint initiative by the Chinese Academy of Telecommunication 
Technology (with funding from government) and a US firm named Cwill in 1995, 
which was later joined by Siemens.138 From 2003 onward, the Chinese government 
realized its strategic importance for national innovation capacity and started invest-
ing in its commercialization by providing research subsidies and loans and also 
asking the state-run mobile service provider China Mobile to adopt the homegrown 
standard.139 A similar strategy has been used for the upgrading of 3G to 4G 
(TD-LTE)140 and now for standard setting of 5G (Polar).141 In addition, domestic 
equipment manufacturers such as Huawei and Datang benefited greatly from the 
homegrown standard setting. Some even believes that “The TD-SCDMA is not a 
standard policy, but a subsidy policy to nurture domestic companies into international 
135 Ibid.
136 China started the Open up and Reform policy from 1978. However, it was at the 14th Congress 
of CPC in 1992 that the goal of economic reform was formally set to build a market economy with 
socialist character. Due to its debt crisis, India started the economic reform mainly by ending 
license permits and decreasing government intervention in business from 1991, pushed by Finance 
Minister Manmohan Singh. See Hu Jiayong, The Development and Framework of Market 
Economy with Socialist Character in China, People. Com, Sep. 2, 2016, http://theory.people.com.
cn/n1/2016/0902/c148980-28685995.html, and Aprameya Rao and Kishor Kadam, 25 Years of 
Liberalization: A Glimpse of India’s Growth in 14 Charts, The Firstpost, July 7, 2016, https://
www.firstpost.com/business/25-years-of-liberalisation-a-glimpse-of-indias-growth-in-14-
charts-2877654.html
137 Chun Liu and Krishna Jayakar, Globalization, Indigenous Innovation and National Strategy: 
Comparing China and India’s Wireless Standardization, paper presented at TRIC 2013, pp. 17–18.
138 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, p. 6.
139 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, pp. 6–8.
140 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, p. 9.
141 Xiang Ligang, What 5G Means to China (in Chinese), China Economic Weekly No. 20, 2018, 
reposted by Ifeng Finance on May 22, 2018 at http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20180522/16301597_0.
shtml
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champions.”142 By 2018, Huawei became the no. 1 communication equipment 
manufacturer in the world.143
In contrast, India adopted the international standard, which is a reasonable 
decision from the perspective of service providers and consumers. However, it 
doesn’t mean India has not thought of having its own homegrown technology. In a 
comparative study of the telecom industry in India and China in 2005, Sunil Mani 
attributed the lower development of ICT in India to the fact that India followed a 
rigid policy of domestic development of technology such as “establishing a stand-
alone public laboratory which was charged with the responsibility of developing a 
family of digital switching equipment and then transferring this generated 
technology to domestic public and private sector telecom equipment 
manufacturers,”144 while China went from the stage of depending on multinational 
enterprises’ technology to encouraging in-house R&D in state-owned enterprises 
and private firms for technology competition.145
Later research by Chun Liu and Krishna Jayakar explored the reasons of no 
homegrown standard in India in greater depth. First, it was very challenging to coor-
dinate the commercialization of the less favorable homegrown standard in India. 
After the economic liberalization, the two remaining state-owned companies were 
not competitive, while private service providers were diversified and too 
competitive.146 In many areas, there were 11–16 service operators competing for 
service.147 In China, the reform of state-owned service providers has been through 
managed competition, with a smaller number, three to five, of state-owned 
companies. This has made commercialization much easier. Second, India didn’t 
have big equipment manufacturers to take advantage of the homegrown standard in 
the early 2000s.148 Finally, Indians generally don’t trust government. The 2G 
spectrum license scandal in 2009149 drew more public suspicion toward government 
in telecommunication management.150 This has made the adventurous option of 
developing homegrown standards even more impossible.
142 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, p. 17.
143 Xiang, supra note 142.
144 Sunil Mani, The Dragon v. the Elephant, Comparative Analysis of Innovation Capacity in the 
Telecom Industry of China and India, 40 Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 39, Sep. 
24–30, 2005, pp. 4271–4283, p. 4281.
145 Ibid.
146 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, pp. 15–16.
147 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, p. 16.
148 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, pp. 14–15.
149 “The 2G spectrum scam involved politicians and government officials in India illegally 
undercharging mobile telephony companies for frequency allocation licenses, which they would 
then use to create 2G subscriptions for cell phones.” For more information, please refer to What is 
the 2G spectrum scam? India Today, October 19, 2012, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/
what-is-the-2g-scam-all-about-102224-2012-10-19.
150 Liu and Jayakar, supra note 138, p. 11.
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This example demonstrates that contextualized factors, including “problem 
identification, policy objective, implementation philosophies, points of intervention, 
policy for data and informational needs, political and institutional contexts, key 
events and public policies,”151 will decide different strategies for China and India. 
Specific to this case, the reform of state-owned enterprises, the R&D strategy, the 
role of government, and the interaction with the global value chain became deciding 
factors for strategic differences in the ICT innovation strategy in India and China.
6  Conclusion
Innovation is not just about technical and organizational change at the firm level but 
also about the socially and spatially interactive learning process between firms and 
the wider institutional support. As Lundvall emphasized in his research, “shared 
value” and the “power structure” should be factored into in research on NIS, since 
they constitute important barriers to competence building for innovation in develop-
ing countries. This chapter has tried to explore these factors in a non-quantified but 
analytical way.
Broadly speaking, following its non-violent strategy of civil disobedience for the 
independence movement, the social revolution after independence in India is also 
through non-violent means, mainly through universal adult suffrage. In pursuing 
social justice, India adheres to the idea of transcendental institutionalism and has 
institutionalized a credible set of checks and balances through electoral democracy 
plus independent judicial review.
China has followed Leninism, with violent revolution for social emancipation. 
The radical social transformation has helped China build a wider setting for innova-
tion such as strong awareness of social equality, access to health and education, and 
rapid development of physical infrastructure. For the idea of justice, China is more 
in line with the idea of realization-based comparison. Its centralized power and 
policy-oriented administration make government responsive and flexible in promot-
ing innovation, but at the costs of insecurity and uncertainty caused by the low level 
of rule-based institutionalization.
The design of vertical and horizontal power distribution as well as the boundary 
setting between state and citizens in India and China is very much in line with their 
respective political philosophies. In India, the horizontal power with strong checks 
helps it to build a rule-based governance. Elections also serve as the means to hold 
politicians accountable and sanction them when necessary. However, the dual tracks 
of politicians and bureaucrats, reservations and quotas as fundamental rights in edu-
cation and employment, and the disparity among institutional settings and social 
151 Daniel A Mazmanian, Michael E Kraft, The Three Epochs of Environmental Movement, in 
Daniel A. Mazmanian and Michael E. Kraft (ed.) Toward Sustainable Communities: Transition 
and Transformations in Environmental Policy, Published on University Press Scholarship Online, 
2009, DOI:https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262134927.001.0001, p. 12.
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disparity make government accountability and policy entrepreneurship problematic. 
The quasi-federal system gives the union government comprehensive power to 
coordinate with states or even to dominate states. However, the diversity of lan-
guages, political parties, and cultures as well as the freedom of religion in India 
limits the chances of scaling up entrepreneurial policies.
China uses the decentralization of power for local entrepreneurship and the 
central control of personnel promotion for the constitutional principle of democratic 
centralism. The state plays a more aggressive role in resource allocation and mobi-
lization for innovation. In the geography of innovation, China has a top-down devel-
opment model, creating a hierarchy of subnational innovation, thereby limiting the 
spillover effect. Fortunately, in the last several years, the boom of private businesses 
has helped make geographical distribution of innovation more equitable.
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Abstract
By summarizing research literature in both international sources and Chinese 
local journals on the information technology (IT) industries, and comparing the 
progress and development between China and India, this chapter provides a pic-
ture of the development patterns and their similarities and differences in the IT 
industries in the two countries. There are two kinds of IT industries, namely, hard-
ware-based IT (primarily manufacturing and strongly protected by IP, especially 
patents) and software-based IT (primarily service, either separate or combined 
with manufacturing sectors, partially protected by the patent system), while 
Chinese firms are well developed in the first, Indian firms specialize in the second. 
In addition, the industrial culture (training system and language used, etc.) and 
organizational structure embedded in the industries provide unique advantages to 
Indian firms, making them internationally competitive but less so in the domestic 
market. In contrast, Chinese companies are developing faster in the domestic mar-
ket and comparatively weak internationally. Throughout the chapter, a 2×2 situa-
tion is analyzed to contrast differences in terms of manufacturing vs. service, and 
of upstream sectors (industrial market) vs. downstream sectors (consumer mar-
ket), with particular focus on IT software industries and on finding explanations 
for different IP functions in the two countries: IP functions in IT industry may be 
comparable with the pharmaceutical industry in China; however, this function is 
totally different from the situation in the pharmaceutical sector in India.
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1  Introduction
China established a new republic and India became independent during the 1940s. 
Both countries are the most populous in the world; they implemented significant 
economic reforms during the 1970s and 1980s and achieved great success. According 
to the World Bank,1 China’s economic development measured by GDP was 
US$59.2 billion in 1960 and US$1.09 trillion in 2015, while the Indian GDP was 
US$37.7 billion in 1960 and US$0.21 trillion in 2015, representing 18.4 times and 
5.6 times growth, respectively. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
annual report2 on global competitiveness between 2016 and 2017, China was ranked 
at the 28th position for three consecutive years, while India’s position improved from 
the 55th in 2015 to the 39th in 2016. In terms of commodity and service export ratio 
to GDP from 1992 to 2013, China’s ratio grew from 19.5% to 20.6%,3 while India’s 
grew from 9% to 28.1%. Service exports have increased significantly in India.
There are strong connections and similarities between China and India on many 
fronts, such as historical exchange, geographical proximity, and similar population 
size and economic development level. However, on the other hand, there are also 
dissimilarities and strong competition between the two countries, commonly known 
as competition between the “Dragon and Elephant,” especially in their IT industries. 
This chapter aims to answer the following two research questions:
 1. What are the differences between China and India in the development of their IT 
industries and also in terms of IP?
 2. What are the explanations for such differences between the two countries in their 
IT industries, particularly in the IT software sectors?
2  Economic Development Patterns and Characteristics 
in General
2.1  Development Patterns
Shi (2010)4 summarized the economic development patterns of China and India as 
follows:
• Most industrial countries develop through the following stages: agricultural → 
light industries (or consumer industries) → heavy industries → high-tech  industries 
→ IT-oriented industries. China is developing through the traditional route but with 
1 State Statistical Bureau, International Statistical Yearbook 2015 (Chinese version) [DB/OL].
2 https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1
3 Chen, P., 2007. Study on Clusters of Information Technology Sectors in Bangalore in India (in 
Chinese). Commercial Report, 11, pp. 125–128.
4 Shi, Y., 2010. Nature of Indian Pattern and Its Impact on Chinese Economic Development (in 
Chinese). Economic Development in SEZ (Special Economic Zone), 03, pp. 86–87.
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faster speed than other industrialized countries, while India is developing from an 
agricultural economy directly to service-oriented industrial status.
• The market mechanism under the Chinese system emphasizes stronger govern-
ment orientation, leading to larger-scale infrastructure rollout and manufacturing 
industries as leading sectors. China has a high domestic saving rate and phenom-
enal foreign reserves through international trade.
• The market mechanism under Indian system could be described as domestic- 
consumer- oriented rather than investment-oriented, driven by local market 
demand rather than by exports, a fairly weak manufacturing sector, a dominant 
service sector, and a stronger software exports. It is therefore a dual economy, in 
which both tech-intensive high-tech and labor-intensive low-tech sectors exist, 
especially in IT industries.
2.2  Economic Development Characteristics
The economic development characteristics in the two countries can be summarized 
in the following table (Table 1).
In terms of growth pattern, according to Chen (2014)5, India’s economy has 
structural factors conducive to high growth, which has been surging during the past 
10 years. Therefore, India too is on a fast growth trajectory. Conversely, China’s 
development route is approaching a turning point – i.e., transforming from the exist-
ing quantitative-scale-based fast growth to qualitative-innovation-based growth, the 
success of which is dependent upon economic, social, and political factors.
Regarding IT industries, both countries have achieved tremendous progress, with 
Indian companies outperforming their Chinese counterparts by a fairly large vol-
ume. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD),6 in China computer and IT service exports experienced an increase of 
32 times, from US$0.46 billion in 2001 to US$15.4 billion in 2013, while Indian 
computer and IT service exports experienced an increase of 82 times, from 
US$5.9 billion in 2001 to US$495.2 billion in 2013.
2.3  Identifying and Explaining Similarities and Differences
Pye et al. (2006)7 did a multi-angle comparative study, which indicates that the simi-
larities between the two countries are more significant than the differences. However, 
Zhao (2008)8 indicates that it is difficult to fully assess the real differences and 
5 Chen Y.  TMT Industry-Trans-Boundary Integration of Traditional Industries: Accelerated 
Economic Transformation, Rising Cross-Border Integration Model. Shanghai: Qilu Securities 
Research Institute, 2014.
6 UNCTAD conference database [DB/OL] http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/, 2016.
7 Pye L W, et al., 2006. Asia’s Giants: Comparing China and India. Foreign Affairs, (5), pp. 177.
8 Zhao, J., 2008. Rational Thinking on Comparative Study on Economic Development between 
China and India (in Chinese). Journal of South East Asia Research, (3), pp. 32–36.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































judge which progress pattern is better from an economic development research per-
spective, and it appears that a more meaningful way for both countries to better 
achieve their goals is to learn from each other. In addition, regarding important driv-
ing forces, there are other studies emphasizing the differences between the two 
economies. Huang and Khanna (2003)9 reported that the Chinese economy has pri-
marily developed through foreign direct investment (FDI), rather than through 
domestic private investment, which is very different from the Indian case. The 
Indian economy developed primarily through local companies’ market power. 
Besides, the local banking system is more efficient in India. Therefore, local entre-
preneurs can develop with the help of an efficient banking system and related capital 
markets. This market-based strength might be so competitive that India may outper-
form the Chinese economy. Research by Farrell et  al. (2004)10 indicates that the 
Chinese economy is driven primarily by the manufacturing sector, with support 
from a higher rate of bank savings, larger-scale investment in fundamental facilities, 
and FDI, while India is lagging behind China in economic reform, national savings, 
and FDI, as well as facilities construction; however, India can attract foreign capital 
in the long run, based on its free and loosely controlled private business sector.
Quan (2006)11 and Li (2006)12 opine that the Indian economy may follow a 
greener type of development route, without too much government intervention, 
based on local intellectual and financial resources, and software-backed service 
industries; conversely, the growth of the Chinese economy is expected to happen 
under more direct and significant government intervention and a manufacturing- 
industry- backed system, which might be less dynamic and competitive in a micro- 
level business world. Shi (2007)13 points out that the economic growth path of India 
is consumption-based, in which the government has less control, while China’s eco-
nomic growth involves a more investment-based and stronger government-oriented 
development path.
To explain the differences between the two countries,14 a number of studies strive 
to provide some clues. For example, differences might be attributed to industrial 
restructuring and its evolution and be explained in terms of historical change and 
economic policy tools used in the two countries, which have strong influence on 
their economic reforms (Rahman and Andreu 2006)15. Difference in the governance 
9 Huang Y. and Khanna T., 2003. Can India Overtake China. Foreign Policy, (137), pp. 74.
10 Farrell D. et  al., 2004. China and India, pp. The race to growth. The McKinsey Quarterly, 
pp. 110–11.
11 Quan H., 2006. Comparative Study on Economic Development Mode between China and India – 
“World Factory” and “World Office” (in Chinese) Scientific Decision (12), pp. 34–36.
12 Li, M., 2006. The Different Development Path – Comparative Study between China and India (in 
Chinese). Journal of HU BEI Inst. Of Engineering, 26(4), pp. 28–31.
13 Shi, L., 2007. The Dragon and Elephant – Comparative Study on Pattern of Economic Growth 
between China and India (in Chinese). China Statistic Journal, (1), pp. 22–23.
14 Chen, J.D and Chen, J. Z., 2005. Comparative Study on Pattern of Economic Development and 
Transformation between China and India (in Chinese). South Asian Research Quarterly, (2), 
pp. 7–15.
15 Rahman R.D and Andreu J.M., 2006. China and India: Towards Global Economic Supremacy? 
Academic Foundation.
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environment and conditions in the initial stage of development can also be impor-
tant (Hua 2006)16, primarily shown through market mechanism transformation, eco-
nomic openness, and ways of economic growth. Differences in the choice of 
economic development paradigms (Shen and Sheng 2009)17, in the social systems 
and ways of related economic reforms (Zhang and Gu 2009; Yang 2011)18,19, and in 
timing of the economic reform and international environment can also be decisive 
(Zhou 2016)20.
In sum, the dichotomy of software vs. hardware21 can provide key concepts for 
understanding the differences in the two countries:22
• “Software” problems in China: less efficient market mechanisms during eco-
nomic reform, including less efficient market regulation, a less efficient financial 
system, weak social integrity, and so on. Stronger government intervention, less 
space for private companies, and less efficient governance of fair market 
operation
• “Hardware” problems in India: less developed infrastructure, insufficient trans-
portation highways, less developed urban facilities, etc.
3  IT Industries: Two Kinds of Technical and Business 
Sectors
Before discussing IT industry, there are a number of conceptual or definition issues 
to be addressed first. Such conceptual work is mainly related to the understanding 
of the technological nature (manufacturing or service related) and business nature 
16 Hua, M., 2006. Comparative Study on Pattern of Economic Development between China and 
India – Similar Principle but Different Methodologies (in Chinese). Journal of FU DAN Academic 
(Social Science Edition), (6), pp. 36–50.
17 Shen, K.Y. and Sheng, W., 2009. China and India: Thinking of Economic Reform and 
Development (in Chinese). Guang Dong Social Science, 1, pp. 19–25.
18 Yang, Y. S., 2011. How to Explain Differences in Economic Growth between China and India – 
Review from Perspective of Systematic Change (in Chinese). Economic Theories and Economic 
Management, (5), pp. 82–89.
19 Yang, Y. S., 2011. How to Explain Differences in Economic Growth between China and India – 
Review from Perspective of Systematic Change (in Chinese). Economic Theories and Economic 
Management, (5), pp. 82–89.
20 Zhou, X., 2016. Comparative Study on Pattern of Development between China d India (in 
Chinese) Commercial Report, (27), 206.
21 Please notice that so-called software and hardware are not the same terminology used in IT sec-
tors, but rather more general as terms for indicating social relationship-based working communi-
ties as “software,” and for indicating embedded technology and engineering capitals/equipment or 
working facilities as “hardware,” and may also more generally for indicating tangible output-based 
facilities, such as transportation highway, or industrial fixed assets.
22 Zhang, Y.T. and Yang, W.W., 2012. Study on Nature of Industrial Structure in Indian Economy 
(in Chinese). South Asian Research Quarterly, 2, pp. 50–56, 111.
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(local or outsourcing market), which may further explain IP functions in the 
industries.
According to Yu and Yuan (2012)23, there are different ways of classifying IT 
industry, for example, North American Industrial Classification System, NAICS 
(2012) and OECD (2007). Of great importance is the classification of the industries 
in the manufacturing and services sectors (Table 2).
In fact, the IT service sector includes software development, information system 
integration, integrated circuit design, etc.; and it can also be classified based on 
organizational structures, such as IT consultancy, system integrators, vertical inte-
gration organizations, contracted software developers, management service, busi-
ness outsourcing firms, etc. (Wang et al. 2014).
Generally speaking, for an analytical framework on IT industries, there is clearly 
a 2 × 2 pattern which could be applied to this study.
The First “2”: Manufacturing vs. Service
There are clearly manufacturing sectors under the IT industry-producing equip-
ment or devices, i.e., hardware, which are needed for IT services. On the other hand, 
there are clearly also service sectors under the IT industry which connect certain 
networks or software to customers in either the industrial or consumer market.
The Second “2”: Industrial vs. Consumer Market
For IT hardware industry, particularly service/software development sector, there 
are also two other layers, one for industrial buyers in intra- or interindustrial service 
23 Yu, C.H and Yuan, Q.J., 2012. Classification and Evolution of Information Technology and 
Communication in International Standard Industrial Classification System (in Chinese). Statistics 
and Decisions, 06, pp. 12–15.
Table 2 OECD classification of IT industry
Sub-sectors Code Sub-sectors
Manufacturing 3000 Office machines, accounting, and computing devices
3130 Insulating circuits and cables
3210 Electronic tubes, kinescopes, and other electronic components
3220 Televisions, radios, radio transmitters, line telephone and telegraph 
equipment, etc.
3230 Television receivers, radio receivers, video and audio recording and 
playing devices and other equipment
3312 Measuring, monitoring, testing, and navigating devices and their 
accessories, other than industrial manufacturing devices
3313 Industrial manufacturing equipment
Service 5150 Wholesale of machines, mechanical equipment, and materials
6420 Telecommunication
7123 Renting of office machines and other related devices
72 Computers and related activities
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or connections, such as software of Enterprise Resource Planning II (ERP II),24 or 
accounting software, and another layer for the consumer market, which could range 
from individual communication networks to software for education and computer 
games.
It should be noted that in the case of comparing Chinese IT industry with Indian 
IT industries in terms of global value chain, domestic and international markets 
need to be further specified, as companies in the two countries can perform highly 
differently in domestic and international markets in both 2 × 2 situations.
4  Comparing the Two Countries
According to a report by the WEF in 2010, in the ranking list in worldwide IT sec-
tors during 2004 and 2005, India fared slightly better than China, with two positions 
ahead: China’s position was upgraded from its previous 51 to 41, while India was 
upgraded from 43 to 39. This ranking is composed of three parts, IT environment 
(further divided into another three, market environment, government policy orienta-
tion, and infrastructure), IT current stature, and IT adoption rate (again split into a 
further three, individual, commerce, and government).
In addition, financial data of IT service companies of China and India can be 
collected to contrast the two countries (Table 3).
In the international market, Indian firms are more competitive than their Chinese 
counterparts. This is reflected in the collaborative partners of IT software companies 
in each country. According to study by Wang and others (2014),25 Chinese IT ser-
vice firms collaborated more with local IT manufacturing firms or hardware compa-
nies (about 62% of the investigated companies), while Indian firms only accounted 
for 2.9% among the investigated firms; furthermore, in terms of overseas collabora-
tions, Indian firms closely collaborated with larger multinational software compa-
nies such as Oracle and SAP, while Chinese firms were highly linked with larger IT 
hardware multinational enterprises, such as Motorola, Panasonic, and Microsoft, 
which clearly explains the software-oriented nature of Indian companies and hard-
24 ERP II is a concept initiated by an American consulting company – Gartner Group – based on 
ERP. According to the company, this concept is to support and optimize companies’ internal and 
external relation, particularly their operation and accounting procedure, in order to create better 
value for customers and shareholders. The ERP II is a system combined with operation and strate-
gic planning in particular sectors, during which computer software is used as supporting tool and 
embedded elements for the system.
25 Wang et al. (2014) did an IT service networking study and found that Chinese and Indian firms 
collaborated with different types of partners, e.g., while Chinese firms collaborated more with their 
domestic partners, Indian IT service firms more actively collaborated with a wider range of part-
ners, particularly overseas partners. The larger ratio of collaboration with local manufacturing 
companies in Chinese firms’ case is also highly meaningful, showing that Indian firms are much 
less connected with IT hardware companies in both domestic and overseas firms. See Wang, Jian/
Kouassi, Dazi Conet Theodore/Liu, Huixia/Wu, Zhongsheng/Wu, Qiong, Analysis on Network of 
IT Service Innovation System: A Comparative Study between China and India, <Science and 
Technology Progress and Policy> (In Chinese), Vol 31, No. 4, 2014.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ware-oriented nature of Chinese firms. Fairly larger typical multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) in the IT software sector invested in India, especially in R&D centers, 
such as IBM with 6 billion US dollar in 3 years, Intel with more than 1 billion US 
dollar, Cisco with 1.1 billion US dollar, Microsoft with 1.7 billion US dollar, etc.26
Chinese companies have been falling behind their Indian counterparts by far in 
terms of international segmentation, sector profit margins, and particularly on 
macro-level international trade surplus since late 1990s. While Indian companies’ 
software export ratio was only 4% in 1998, this increased to 22% in 2011, and the 
profit gains on IT service by Indian firms were even 90% greater than the total ser-
vice export from India.
Based on the 2 × 2 investigation framework, an explanation model is designed to 
summarize the major differences between Chinese and Indian IT companies, as 
shown in Fig. 1.
The Y axis represents the development character of the IT industries in manufac-
turing as well as in service. This may involve two types of sub-sectors, namely, IT 
service and software only and IT hardware manufacturing only. Further investiga-
tion may focus on areas where IT hardware and software merge together, such as the 
popular field of AI (artificial intelligence). Here we would rather focus only on 
separate fields. The X axis, on the other hand, represents the range of the product 
market, which includes industrial market and the consumer market. Clearly, Chinese 
IT firms are more competitive than Indian firms in hardware manufacturing, but 
focus more on the consumer market, with comparatively thinner profit margins, 
while Indian firms are more competitive than Chinese firms in software industrial 
sectors, and particularly in industrial and consumer markets, and have higher or 
larger profit margin. However, companies in both countries may have difficulties in 
26 Saeed Khan, Recession and India Impact of Recession on Indian IT Industry [EB/OL], http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1506961, 2010-04-16.
Higher value-added
Chinese firms are strong, with low 
margin/larger volume international 
market & local market operations 
found in consumer IT HW
Indian firms significantly competitive in SW sector, with higher margins in 
international market; however, local market operations are highly limited, 
whereas Chinese IT SW firms are competitive in local market
Chinese firms highly competitive, with
low margin/limited international but
larger local operations found in 


















Fig. 1 Different position of Chinese and Indian IT companies. (Note: HW hardware, SW 
software)
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competing in higher-value-added sections in both the IT hardware and software sec-
tors with companies in more economically advanced countries such as North 
American and Western European countries.
Indian companies are highly competitive in the software sector in the interna-
tional market and in mostly higher-value-added market segments, while Chinese 
software firms are competitive only in the domestic market. On the other hand, 
Chinese manufacturing companies are highly competitive in the international mar-
ket on IT hardware products and in mostly mid- and lower-end market segments. 
However, connections from low- and mid-end manufacturing IT devices and equip-
ment sectors to mid- and high-end service sectors in China do exist, implying fur-
ther developmental strength to improve both sectors. It is the same situation in 
China’s electric vehicle market, with many multinational corporations dominating 
the high-end market segments, such as Volkswagen, Toyota, Tesla, and BMW (see 
Chap. 17). However, in the case of Indian companies, there are clear disconnections 
between local manufacturing companies and IT software and service companies, 
which are also emphasized by Biswajit Dhar and Reji Joseph in Chap. 5. There are 
disconnections between manufacturing and design capabilities in India as well. 
Therefore, Chinese companies may combine increasingly updated manufacturing 
with relevant service sectors, while Indian companies may have to develop different 
paths and related markets for connecting software with hardware production in 
domestic manufacturing industries.
4.1  Government Policies on IT Industries
Although governments of both countries have IT industry policies, their individual 
choices are different.
4.1.1  China
China is more focused on applications of IT technologies in industries, especially 
telecommunications, and considers the software sector to be affiliated to those 
application fields. Another feature of Chinese economic development is the rollout 
of high-tech zones or parks. Since 1991, the so-called High-Tech Industrial 
Development Zones have made great progress. The number of High-Tech Industrial 
Development Zones approved by the State Council reached 156 in 2017, while the 
National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zones built by the High-Tech 
Industrial Development Zones has increased to 17. The total GDP value of the 
High-Tech Industrial Development Zones was reported as RMB 8.77 trillion yuan, 
accounting for 11.8% of China’s GDP and for 18.6% of the total export of trade and 
services. Some 126,000 overseas returnees, 67,000 permanent residents, and 18,000 
foreign experts have been reported to be working in those zones.27
Among 54 of the first group of such high-tech zones approved during the mid- 
1990s, the Xi’an High-Tech Industries Development Zone has been one of the most 
27 http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/12/397289.shtm
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successful, especially in terms of mechanical, electronic, and software sectors, and 
naturally, together with other related zones for comprehensive innovation reforms, 
such as Free Trade Pilot Zones. According to the evaluation by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology in 2016, the Xi’an High-Tech Industries Development 
Zone is in the third place in high-tech knowledge creation and technological innova-
tion and the fourth in sustainable development in China.28
Regarding software industries in Xi’an, more than 50,000 enterprises have been 
registered. In 2017, the total operating income reached RMB 1.45 trillion yuan, with 
a total foreign trade value of more than RMB 200 billion yuan. Nowadays, the soft-
ware park (entitled New Software Town) in Xi’an acts as one of the four pillar indus-
tries (viz., information, advanced manufacturing, biomedicine and modern service 
industry) and is in fact the leader of the “Star Software Towns.”29
Furthermore, the strength of the Xi’an Software Park is in the joint development 
of the software and information services industry with the cultural creativity indus-
try of Xi’an High-Tech Zone. In 2017, the total income of the Xi’an High-Tech 
Industries Development Zone in software and information services has reached 
RMB 240 billion yuan, with an average growth rate of 20%. The exports realized a 
total amount of 1.446 billion US dollars, with annual average growth of 41%.
The development of Xi’an High-Tech Zone and Software Park has mainly ben-
efited from the continual supply of talented software programmers. By 2017, there 
were 180,000 people working in the software and information services industry, 
with an annual addition of more than 10,000, among which over 65% are fresh col-
lege graduates.30
4.1.2  India
India is more focused on software as a priority or leading sector for other IT sectors, 
which may be easier to connect further with traditional industries. On the other 
hand, a study by Xu et al. (2010)31 indicates that there is a “satellite” style of high- 
tech surrounding cities in India. Such selectively developed “satellite economies” 
(such as Bangalore, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Hyderabad) might be too narrow for 
deepening national economic development. On the other hand, this knowledge- 
intensive and service-industry-oriented development mode may possess structural 
advantages for the international market, yet may suffer from less active local market 
demand.
28 www.xinhuanet.com/chanye/2016-08-10/c_1119366106.htm
29 Star Software Town is a special name for those software parks in China with better performance. 
According to authors’ visit and interview with Xi’an High-Tech Zone Software Park in 2018. Also 
refer to https://baike.baidu.com/item/西安软件新城/7707267
30 https://baike.baidu.com/item/西安高新区软件园/16916451?fr=aladdin, also http://tech.hexun.
com/2014-10-29/169824715.html
31 Xu, J.W. et al., 2010. Advantages, Innovations, and Breakthrough in Value Chain – Cases from 
Software Industries in Ireland and India (in Chinese). Economic Geography, 02, pp. 193–199.
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Comparatively speaking, Indian policy on IT industries has been much more 
encouraging domestic IT firms than Chinese policy, which can be shown in the fol-
lowing aspects (Hao and Song 2004):32
 – Larger tax deduction: according to related policy of the Indian Ministry of 
Information Industries in 2003, companies with 100% software exports would 
have 100% tax deduction or zero tax for any company as long as it exported 
exclusively software till 2010.
 – Larger benefit for overseas companies: foreign software companies can invest in 
India with 100% shares if they have software export operations.
 – Larger import tax deduction: 216 different products related to IT industries could 
be imported without tax.
These aggressive policies toward the IT industry (particularly on the software 
sector) might be attributable to accumulated experiences of Indian firms in the inter-
national market, due to India’s earlier entry (about 1997) into the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) (6 years earlier than China).33
4.2  Comparative Advantages of Chinese IT Companies
By using a logistic model on an S curve (technology life cycle theories), based on 
US Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO) data (competitive patent volume), Liu, 
F.C. et al. (2014)34 conducted a comparative study in relation to G7 countries and 
with China, for nine sub-industries in IT: three sectors in mature stage, namely, (1) 
mobile communication and remote information processing, (2) integrated circuits, 
and (3) intelligent robot; three sectors in growing stage, namely, (4) radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) and sensor network, (5) wideband and home use network, and 
(6) computer software; and three other sectors, namely, (7) digital TV and broad-
casting, (8) panel display, and (9) personal computer (PC).
The research provides important findings on technology characters in those nine 
sub-industries by evaluating patent saturation level: both USA and China are in a 
comprehensive progress modes on most of the nine sub-industries in IT sectors. 
However, the development stages are different; the USA is developing in a fast 
growing pace in almost all sectors, particularly in six of those nine sub-industries, 
32 Hao/Sumin/Song/Lin, 2004, A comparative study of China’s and India’s IT industry policies and 
commitments. International Business  – Journal of Foreign Economic and Trade University (in 
Chinese), No. 4, 2004.
33 ITA is a multilateral agreement under World Trade Organization (WTO), effective since 1997. 
The agreement involves more than 200 different products classified into six categories (viz., com-
puter, telecommunication products, semiconductor, devices for manufacturing semiconductors, 
software, and scientific instruments). China became the 43rd member of the ITA on April 24, 2003.
34 Liu, F.C. et al., 2014. Comparative Study on Technology Development Trajectory among G7 
countries and China – Patent Analysis with USTPO data. (in Chinese), China Soft Science, 09, 
pp. 22–33.
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i.e., (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7), while China is developing in a fast growing pace 
in sub-industries (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), and (9) (refer to the footnotes). This shows 
that China is on a growing development route on typical sectors in IT industries.
What are the comparative advantages of the Chinese IT companies? According 
to a study by Li and Zhong (2013)35, which surveyed 15 countries:36
• Both China and India belong to the second group among the 15 sample countries, 
including Canada, Japan, and Singapore, with better capability for industrial 
growth. In terms of overall capacity measure (mainly the value-added production 
in IT against the total value-added production in second or third industries,37 
trade contribution, and human resource structures), China has a slightly higher 
capacity than India (there is only about 1% difference), while in terms of IT 
investment strength (investment to total national income), India has a better score 
than China (there is a about 29% difference).
• In terms of mobile phone popularity rate, security on Internet servers, Internet 
popularity rate, etc., China’s scores are much lower than India (about 50% 
lower). However, if measured by annual mobile phone communication time per 
person, China is much higher than India, which indicates that the consumption 
capacity is larger in China and may also imply higher potential of the IT market 
in China. Patenting volume in IT is much larger in China, when compared with 
other manufacturing sectors, even with pharmaceutical industries.
Research by Zuo and Chou (2003)38 answers why Chinese companies are not 
performing as well as Indian companies, although the infrastructure for IT industry 
is much more well established in China than in India due to larger demand in the 
Chinese domestic markets (both industrial and consumer) for the computer software 
industry:
• On average, the firm size in the Chinese software industry is smaller than that of 
Indian companies. Most Chinese software companies are start-ups. Even larger 
software companies are not so efficient if compared with Indian companies.
• In terms of production output efficiency, productivity in Indian firms was higher 
on average (US$10,000 more per person than the level in Chinese firms).
• Human resources: staff turnover is higher (10%) in Indian firms than in Chinese 
firms. However, low-end labor power cost is higher in Chinese firms than in 
35 Li, H.C. and Zhong, W.R., 2013. Evaluation of Development Capabilities in IT Industries in 
China (in Chinese). Science and Technology Management, 06, pp. 119–125.
36 According to Li and Zhong (2013), the evaluation framework is primarily composed of three 
groups of indicators, namely, IT facilities and operation, ICT production performance, and poten-
tiality of ICT further progress.
37 According to rather traditional industrial classification, the second industries involve manufac-
turing sectors, while the third industries are related to service sectors, both of which may be rele-
vant to IT industries.
38 Zuo, D.X. and Chou, X.Y., 2003. Export Strategies in Indian Software Industries and their 
Implications to Chinese Firms (in Chinese). Managerial Operation and Management, 04, 
pp. 50–52.
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Indian firms. Since there is greater blue-collar labor supply in India, Indian firms 
can continue to compete in the world market over a longer period of time.
4.3  Comparative Advantages of Indian IT Companies
4.3.1  Strengths
Indian software companies are indeed much stronger in the international market. 
Based on three measures from the World Bank on export scale, quality, and cost, 
India’s software industry ranks higher than China. With R&D centers from a num-
ber of famous international IT companies located in the country, India is only sec-
ond to the USA as a software supplier, with 16.7% of the world market share.
In addition, a number of local software companies in India, including TCS, 
Infosys, and Wipro, have already developed as global firms. Most outsourcing ser-
vice companies in India have achieved Capability Maturity Model for Software39 
(CMM5)40 certification, and in a globally operated market, 65% of the CMM5- 
certified companies are located in India. Significant progress of India’s software 
industry can be shown also by the following facts, according to the Nationwide 
Association of Software Service Companies:
 – The Indian software industry’s annual growth rate reached almost 50% during 
the 1990s, much faster than the world average (15%); export volume increased 
from US$4  million in 1980 to US$49.6  billion in 2010, penetrating 91 
countries.
 – almost all large MNEs have service demand for Indian firms, typically more than 
400 Fortune 500 MNEs order related software products from Indian firms each 
year.
 – Production and export volume rank within the top 5 in the world, and one of the 
top 5 software companies in the world is an Indian company.
As is mentioned later in Chap. 5, the outcomes of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in R&D are significant in Indian IT industry. Hundreds of companies have invested 
in FDI in R&D in India, certainly it will bring opportunities for Indian domestic IT 
industry, however, with stronger IP power dominated by overseas firms.
The service sector in the IT industry in India is especially important. By applying 
trade (import and export) data on computer and information services in China and 
India, between 2005 and 2013, Guo and Zhang (2015)41 conducted a series of studies 
39 CMM (SW-CMM) is a measurement model for degree of operation functions of software orga-
nizations (usually such functions include definition range, operational effectiveness, etc.). The key 
role of CMM is to monitor software development as a procedure, controlling its quality through 
such procedure-based examination. In this way, the quality control via procedure could be more 
scientific and standardized.
40 CMM5 indicates five key functions of the system, namely, optimizing, defect prevention, tech-
nology reformation management, and process reformation management.
41 Guo X., Zhang X., 2015. Comparing the Competitive Power of China-India’s Computer and 
Information Services Trade. Business Economics, 11, 92–94.
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combining RCA (Reveal Comparative Advantage), TC (Trade Competitive, 
expressed as trade volume (trade exports + trade imports)/GDP (TIS (Tes + Tis)/
GDP), an international openness index, and MS (market share), as a synthetic form 
of competitiveness evaluation framework to compare China and India. The study 
provides important conclusions: China is far behind India in the computer and IT 
services industries in both a single competitive index and synthetic competitive mea-
sures. Innovation strength in Indian companies can typically be listed as follows:
Besides advantages in language, cost, and readiness-to-serve (as India is 8–12 h 
ahead of the time in the USA, software problems occur in the US market can be 
quickly solved overnight by software companies operating in India), another impor-
tant reason for the faster development of the Indian software industry is the higher 
concentration of the industry. Higher market concentration provides larger compa-
nies with better positioning to control the market and achieve higher margin. In 
contrast, with a lower concentration level, Chinese companies face a narrow domes-
tic market and weakness in the international market.
Pillar industries usually enjoy higher production efficiency and higher growth, 
and such industries will have stronger externality effects on other industries. The 
software industry in India is a sector that already enables other sectors to develop, 
such as telecommunications, education, and others.42
According to a theory by Humphrey and Schmitz (2000),43 the value-added value 
chain in IT industry includes, from lower- toward higher-value-added sections, (1) 
coding, programming, testing, operating, and maintaining, (2) software project 
operating, (3) software package operating, (4) system operating, (5) IT consultancy 
and strategy design, (6) customer demand analysis, and (7) product design. Based 
on the real effect of the development of IT industry in global segmentation, (6) and 
(7) can be highly value-added and are usually controlled by MNEs in North America 
or Europe. Indian firms started from coding/programming via OEM for MNEs and 
developed increasingly as world-level outsourcing suppliers. However, they are still 
in section (2) and moving to section (3) (Zhou 2012).44
4.3.2  Reasons Attributed to Stronger Competitiveness
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of studies on the reasons, positive or negative, for the 
state of the IP industry in China. However, several major reasons have been attrib-
uted for the stronger competitiveness of India’s IT software industry, as follows 
(Huang 2011):45
42 However, the software industry in China is less effective in that role (Wang and Su 2000).
43 Humphrey, J.; Schmitz, H; Governance and Upgrading: Linking Industrial Cluster and Global 
Value Chain [J] IDS Working Paper 120, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2000.
44 Zhou, Daqi, Indian IT development strategies in the post-financial crises era, <World Economic 
Research>, No. 2, 2012.
45 Huang, Li, Yan, Analysis of the role of India software information industry in economic develop-
ment. “South Asia Quarterly” (In Chinese), Vol 147, 2011, No. 4.
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 – Stronger market and policy resources (including local firms and institutions, 
such as IT software export associations) for exports, and correspondingly, stron-
ger demand from international companies via their outsourcing. As discussed in 
Sect. 5.2.3, Chap. 5, the electronics industry benefitted from proactive govern-
ment policies ever since the mid-1980s: the New Electronics Policy (NEP), 
Computer Software Export, and Software Development and Training have facili-
tated the development of the software industry. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
those policy resources played an essential role in Indian software industry.
 – Stronger skilled workforce and just-in-time training system (6 publicly owned 
and nationwide universities and 25 regional colleges on IT for technicians and 
engineers as qualified human resources for the IT software sector in general). In 
fact, other efficient professional training programs and schools in India may play 
even more important roles, not to mention many other training programs arranged 
by larger IT companies themselves. For example, the largest private computer 
training network company, APTECH, owns more than 1000 online training cen-
ters nationwide in India and has maintained an average annual growth of 50% 
(Zhang and Zhang 2014).46 Boundary labor supply could be found in Indian IT 
software sectors. For example, in 2000, Indian employees in this sector were 
only estimated at 284,000, which increased to 2.3 million in 2010, with indirect 
employment of 8.2  million people. According to a report by Electronics and 
Computer Software Export Promotion Council (ESC),47 during 2012–2013, the 
IT service and ITeS (Information Technology Enabled Services) hired more than 
2.97 million specialists and indirectly hired more than 9 million employees.
 – The higher quality of this IT software workforce is also mentioned by Chinese 
researchers in explaining the strength of Indian firms (Lin, 2006).48 According to 
Lin, these might be implied by a number of important facts: as of 2002, almost 
all larger software companies had achieved ISO9000 quality certificates, and 
among the 54 global software companies with CMM5 certificates, 27 were in 
India. Software packages contracted from Indian firms are usually highly trusted 
internationally, due to Indian firms’ 95% satisfactory, on-time completion rate, 
with international qualification.
 – A better and stronger environment for excellent IT software companies to grow 
and develop into world-level enterprises as solution providers to integrate IT 
software into larger international platforms. Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys 
Technologies Ltd., and Wipro Technologies are good examples.
 – A stronger international financing mechanism for Indian IT software companies 
via primarily three channels: overseas direct investment in the IT software sector 
in India, overseas financial investment in India via stock markets, and direct 
financing by Indian companies in overseas markets.
46 Zhang, Tinghai; Zhang, Qingliang, The experience of IT vocational education in India and Its 
Enlightenment to China. China Higher Education (in Chinese), No. 12, 2014.
47 ESC, India’s Overall Exports Scenario[EB/OL](2014-10-29), available at http://www.escindia.
in/index.php/export-scenario/indias-overall-exports.html
48 Lin, Changjie, Software and IT services outsourcing industry and India modernization mode. 
South Asia Research (in Chinese), No. 2, 2006.
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 – A higher level of well-developed IT software science parks in India, which is 
similar to what has been developed in China. The authors in Chap. 5 also men-
tion that the setting up of Software Technology Parks (STPs) have facilitated the 
growth of information technology enabled services (ITES) sector. In our view, 
those science parks are definitely strong supports to boom this industry.
4.3.3  Challenges
The Indian software outsourcing business is dominated by the four biggest IT soft-
ware outsourcing companies (TATA, Infosys, Wipro, and Satyam) (JU 2011),49 with 
almost 60% of buyers from North America. In this case, Indian companies might be 
overly exposed to the international market in the event of big losses, such as the 
2008 financial crisis.50 According to Huang et al. (2014),51 since the outsourcing 
market is fully based on the international market, Indian IT software firms face risks 
and possible obstacles in the future on the following points:
 – Highly limited domestic market demand for the software service industry. 
Although India is the country with the second biggest population in the world, 
and its continuously growing working population has spurred domestic demand 
for many industries – the rising demand for automobiles is one such example 
(see Chap. 18). The lower level of information use and exchange in domestic 
industries limit local market development for the software service. It is estimated 
that contribution of Indian information service to local market was only less than 
60% of total supplies, while India has larger demand for hardware due to lower 
level of IT facilities in India (Huang et al. 2014).
 – Demand for information service is missing, which led to less intermedia product 
input to connecting hardware and software sectors in India. According to 
 macro- level input-output data in India, the intermedia demand in information 
service sector is the lowest if compared with the USA, Japan, and China.
 – Less information facilities support for the IT software industry in India. For 
example, Internet connection users per 100 inhabitants was 12.6 in India com-
pared with 42.3 in China and 81.0 in the USA. Other facility shortage problems 
lie in electricity supplies and less capacity in hardware or device productions for 
IT devices.
49 JU, Zllian, Analysis and forecast of IT outsourcing industry in China and India. China Market 
(in Chinese), Volume 45.
50 In China, the majority of outsourcing software suppliers were rather small, and 60% of buyers 
were from Japan (Japanese software outsourcing volume accounted for only 10% of global vol-
ume, JU 2011). Chinese software companies are primarily driven by the local market.
51 Huang, Yeqing; Quan, Heng; Li, Xiaoyan, Sustainable development in IT service outsourcing 
sector in India – from industrial value chain perspective. World Economic Research, No. 5, 2014.
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5  IP Factors in China and India
5.1  National-Level Patent Strategies
The “Indian Miracle”52 would not have occurred without the support of strong IP 
strategies. There are national-level patent strategies in India, for example, promot-
ing public-welfare-based litigation for Indian firms in the international community, 
and maintaining a preventive patent database etc., which protected Indian firms 
from patent snatching by non-Indian entities (Yi 2014). With such effective strategic 
preparation in terms of IP function, India can also respond quickly and effectively 
to IP infringement claims from foreign companies through a highly protective IP 
system locally. For example, in the case of Bayer suing a local company – Natco 
Pharma – in India (Yi 2014),53 a compulsory license against Bayer was granted and 
upheld by the Indian Supreme Court.
In terms of national-level patent strategies on the part of the public sector, China 
seems to lag behind India, as China’s National IP Strategy (2008–2020) emphasizes 
more the creation and exploitation of IP rights by private sectors.
5.2  Firm-Level IP Strategies
A research by Wang et al. (2014) has also revealed that Indian IT service firms 
invest less in R&D (only 3.7% of their business revenue) than Chinese firms (7.2% 
of total revenue) in their operations, which can be clearly attributed to the nature of 
outsourcing- dominated operations in Indian firms.
There are bigger differences in IT R&D and IP assets (patents, in particular) in 
companies in the two countries. Indian firms are weaker in self-owned IP assets in 
IT industries, in both hardware and software. In fact, based on the high volume of 
outsourcing arrangements by Indian firms, self-owned IP assets are not important 
for Indian companies in IT industries, particularly in the software sector. This is 
especially true if compared with Chinese firms. However, Indian firms are stronger 
and more efficient in operation of foreign patent resources via outsourcing arrange-
ments. Although IP and especially patent resources are increasingly addressed by 
most IT companies in China, especially by large leading firms, competing directly 
with IT companies in North America and European MNEs, there is still a clear lag.
Indian firms’ patenting in China is very limited, if compared with local Chinese 
IT firms. According to Li and Lu (2017),54 up to April 2014, there were only 2337 
52 During the mid-2000s, Indian economy was growing at a growth rate of 8 percent per year, and 
its exports of goods and services have more than doubled in three consecutive years. Economists 
tend to dub such rapid growth as Indian Miracle; see Bhagwati, Jagdish N. (EDT)/Calomiris, 
Charles W. Sustaining India’s Growth Miracle, 2018. Columbia Business School.
53 Yi, Jigang, 2014. Patent public policy – take India’s first patent compulsory license as an example 
(in Chinese). Journal of Hua Zhong University.
54 Li, Yongjing/Lu, Xinrui, India of BRICs: viewing India’s investment in China through patent 
applications in China. Science, Technology, and Industries (in Chinese), Volume 17, No. 11, 2017.
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patent applications filed by Indian companies with the Chinese National Intellectual 
Property Administration (patent office); among them, 2124 were invention patents. 
Six sectors, namely, pharmaceuticals, chemical material and manufacturing, special 
equipment manufacturing, computer and electronic device manufacturing, electri-
cal and mechanical engineering, and instrument manufacturing, were the largest in 
patenting volume by Indian firms.
6  Conclusion
China and India have followed different development paths in IT evolution. In 
China’s case, it is defined as forward integration, as it has combined the domestic 
market with international market. In India’s case, it is defined as backward integra-
tion, as it started from international markets and developed back to the domestic 
market. Also, based on heavy involvement of Indian firms in IT software outsourc-
ing arrangement by MNEs, the IP or patent resources are not important, unlike the 
Chinese firms’ case. However, since both countries are developing rapidly follow-
ing their own chosen economic developmental paths, IP resources and the function 
of IP capital will play an important role in the near future.
Typical differences among IT companies in the two countries include (1) Indian 
companies enjoy high international market penetration (high-end international mar-
kets) in the IT service sector, while Chinese companies control low- and mid-end 
international markets in the manufacturing sectors; (2) there are close connections 
between manufacturing and service sectors in China, which are lacking in India and 
may further determine the potential competitiveness of companies in the industries 
in India. Due to limitations of advanced technologies of companies in both coun-
tries, India and China lack competitiveness in higher-value-added areas in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors in IT industries.
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This chapter provides an account of the development of the information technol-
ogy (IT) and information technology-enabled services (ITES) in India. The IT 
sector was developed from the early 1960s, wherein only the government-owned 
companies were allowed to operate in this sector. In the later decades, the indus-
try was opened to the private sector, both Indian and foreign. There is, however, 
no evidence that this open-door policy helped the IT industry to develop.
In contrast, the ITES sector received a major boost when Indian private com-
panies took advantage of the increasing demand for these services towards the 
end of the previous millennium. Subsequently, the ITES have expanded phenom-
enally, establishing India as one of the ITES powerhouses of the world. Although 
India’s ITES sector was an unqualified success, there is not much evidence that 
this sector, or its hardware counterpart, contributed to indigenous technology 
development. India’s R&D spending remained sluggish, which remains a major 
source of concern.
A major uncertainty faced by the R&D system arose from India’s patent 
regime. The amendment of India’s patent law undertaken in the year 2000 to 
bring it in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement excludes “computer pro-
gramme per se” from patenting. Initially, there was lack of clarity about the inter-
pretation of the phrase. Later, the Controller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks, the authority responsible for implementing Patents Act, 1970, and 
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the Judiciary have both provided a degree of clarity as to what “computer 
programme per se” really means.
Keywords
Information technology · Information technology-enabled services · Electronics 
· Software · Outsourcing · Patents · R&D
1  Introduction
Since the end of the previous millennium, India has been able to establish itself as a 
major player in the information technology-enabled services (ITES). In 1999–2000, 
India’s exports of software services1 were just less than US$ 3 billion, which had 
expanded to nearly US$ 100 billion by 2016–2017.2 WTO informs us3 that in 2015, 
India’s exports of computer services were nearly 16% of global exports.
While the ITES segment of the Information Technology (IT) sector has per-
formed exceptionally well, the other component of the industry, the Indian com-
puter electronics industry, has not been able to establish itself as a distinct entity, 
despite its emergence in the early 1960s. The IT sector is, therefore a tale of two 
contrasting halves in terms of their performances.
This contrast notwithstanding, there is a common thread that runs through the 
performances of the two segments of the IT industry, and this is the role of policy. 
While the computer electronics industry was sought to be established through a 
series of policy initiatives, the ITES sector, too, depended on government’s policy 
support, even though the trigger for its growth was provided by the market forces, 
in particular the global market conditions at the turn of the millennium. Given the 
overwhelming presence of “policy” determining the growth of the IT industry, it 
seems hardly surprising that neither segment of the industry was driven by continu-
ous process of innovations. Thus, the dynamics of the Indian IT industry has been 
remarkably different from those of the global hubs of the industry, where the inno-
vation systems together with intellectual property regimes have played decisive 
roles in driving their growth.
This chapter has three parts: the first discusses the evolution and the subse-
quent developments in the computer electronics industry, the second discusses the 
performance of the ITES sector, and the third discusses the approach towards 
patenting of computer-related innovations (CRIs). The discussion in the final part 
reflects the ambivalence of the policy makers in deciding on the patent regime 
appropriate for CRIs.
1 Software service includes IT services exports and exports on account of Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO). RBI (2010).
2 RBI (2017).
3 Authors’ calculations from WTO Statistics Database; figures for computer services do not include 
data for BPO activities.
B. Dhar and R. K. Joseph
95
2  The Computer Electronics Industry in India
2.1  Triggering the Development of the Industry
The seeds of the Indian electronics industry were sown by the Electronics Committee 
set up in 1963. The Committee, better known as the “Bhabha Committee”,4 gave a 
10-year (1966–1975) roadmap for building domestic capacities for the manufacture 
of computers and components. Its recommendations for the components sub-sector 
were that domestic manufacturing should focus on producing in large quantities in 
order to reap the economies of scale and that adequate research and development 
support was made available to the manufacturing units in order to keep them abreast 
with the advances in technology in this highly dynamic industry. Immediately after 
the Bhabha Committee submitted its report, the government constituted another 
Electronics Committee under the chairmanship of Vikram Sarabhai, the doyen of 
the Indian space programme. The Sarabhai Committee was tasked to take account 
of the most urgent needs of the electronics industry, to keep track of the research 
being done in design and development and to give guidance and direction, where 
necessary, identify sectors where indigenous production could be built up, and pro-
mote the speedy building up of such capacity.5
Armed with the recommendations of the two Committees, the government initi-
ated the process of building a self-reliant electronics industry in the country. The 
Department of Electronics (DoE) was established in 1970 and in the following year, 
the Electronics Commission was set up to lay down policies and to guide the future 
development of the electronics industry in India. The thrust of the policies adopted 
since the early 1970s was to promote a state-led electronics sector, with the involve-
ment of both the Central government as well as the state governments.
Bhabha Committee’s emphasis on the development of an indigenous computer 
industry and the endorsement of this view by the Sarabhai Committee, led to the 
establishment of computer production facilities in the public sector. The Electronics 
Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) was already in existence since 1967 under the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and was entrusted to commercialise elec-
tronic systems developed at the Atomic Research Centre under the Department. By 
1971, ECIL became a computer manufacturing enterprise that was fully supported 
by the DoE.6
The 1970s was marked by government’s resolute pursuit of developing local 
expertise in the computer industry. This endeavour had two distinct phases. In the 
first phase which lasted until the middle of the decade, the clear emphasis was on 
giving the ECIL the status of the dominant firm in the emerging domestic industry. 
This strategy was strongly endorsed by the Minicomputer Panel, a study group set 
up by the Electronics Commission in 1974,7 which concluded that ECIL would be 
4 Agarwal (1985), p. 283.
5 Agarwal (1985), p. 283.
6 The following account is taken from, Rajaraman (2012).
7 Brunner (1991), p. 1742.
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able to meet domestic demand for minicomputers, both in terms of production and 
technology. Having satisfied itself that small computer systems could be designed 
and assembled in India on the basis of imported components and peripherals, the 
government initiated a variety of policies to support the fledgling industry.8
However, the government’s schema of putting ECIL as the lead firm in the Indian 
industry had, at best, mixed results. Rajaraman points out the company had two sets 
of weaknesses9: the company “worked more like a cottage industry” and its sales 
efforts being poor, and the company was unable to find ready markets for its prod-
ucts. ECIL mostly served a captive market that included government departments 
and agencies like the atomic energy establishments and universities funded by the 
government. According to Brunner, “by about 1976, it had become obvious that 
ECIL was not able to meet domestic computer demand with competitive prices and 
technology”. These two factors combined together, increased the gap between the 
demand and supply of computers in the country.10
These were compelling reasons for the government to open the doors for 
increased private sector participation in the computer industry. The turnaround on 
the part of the government came in 1978 with the announcement of the Minicomputer 
Policy, which opened up the hitherto restricted area of computers to private sector 
companies. The government relaxed the norms for obtaining industrial licences, 
which facilitated the entry of three private sector enterprises in the industry.11 Before 
the turn of the decade, a fourth company had also started operations (Table 1).12
2.2  Facilitating the Growth of the Electronics Industry 
in the 1980s
In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to encouraging the private sector to play a pivotal 
role through a number of key innovation-boosting initiatives.
The New Electronics Policy (NEP) unveiled in January 1984 had four main 
objectives: (i) facilitating technology transfer in the electronics industry, (ii) import 
of computers for government departments, (iii) establishing “science cities”/science 
parks to encourage expatriate Indian technicians to return to the country, and (iv) 
setting up free trade Export Processing Zones.
8 Grieco (1982).
9 Rajaraman (2012), p. 25.
10 Brunner (1991), p. 1742.
11 These companies were Hindustan Computers Limited (HCL), a joint venture between a private 
Indian firm and the Uttar Pradesh state government; DCM Dataproducts (DCM), a subsidiary of 
Delhi Cloth Mills and Operations Research Group (ORG), a subsidiary of Sarabhai Enterprises. 
See, Grieco (1982), p. 614.
12 The fourth Indian enterprise was the International Data Machines (IDM, founded by former IBM 
employees with the assistance of IBM),which marketed and serviced a microsystem designed and 
assembled by the Indian firm National Radio and Electronics Company, a subsidiary of Tata 
Enterprises.
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A New Computer Policy (NCP) was announced in 1984 for removing the insti-
tutional barriers to “transforming the industry into a ‘virtuous circle’ of competitive 
prices/costs-higher demand-higher scale of production-higher efficiency- 
competitive prices/costs”. It marked a departure from the erstwhile policy that 
restricted entry of companies that were part of “monopoly houses”13 and those that 
were covered by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA). Imports of technol-
ogy and capital goods were liberalised, and although domestic manufactures were 
initially given import protection from competitors of similar products, they were 
progressively exposed to international competition.
The NEP and NCP introduced policies markedly different from the policies in 
the 1970s; the key departure was the freedom given to the private sector to drive the 
industry. Simultaneously, existing public sector organisations were strengthened, 
and new institutions like the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing 
(C-DAC) Technology Development Council and Centre for Development of 
Telematics (C-DoT) were established to expand the domestic capabilities in the 
electronics sector.
2.3  Technology Imports and Domestic R&D Behaviour
The leverage of foreign firms in the Indian electronics industry declined in the 
1970s. The share of these firms in domestic production declined from 10% to 3% 
between 1972 and 1977. However, the participation of foreign firms increased in the 
later 1970s through strategic alliances and collaborations, which increased from 
16 in 1977 to 210 in 1985. Technology was increasingly sourced from four major 
countries: the USA, Japan, West Germany and the UK.
The data for the Indian electronics industry during the liberalisation phase (the 
1980s) shows low bargaining power of Indian firms (no definite trends, the cases 
involving both lump sum payment and royalty), royalty rates close to 5% and 
increase in the proportion of cases with higher lump sum payments (the share of 
cases with lump sum payments exceeding Rs. 5 million were 6% in 1982 and 29% 
in 1991). It resulted in the increase of cost of technology per collaboration and more 
foreign exchange outflows.
2.3.1  Domestic R&D Behaviour: C-DAC and Param Supercomputer
As regards domestic R&D, organisations like Technology Development Council, 
C-DoT, C-DoM and C-DAC were responsible for technology development on 
behalf of DoE. Agencies like Defence Research and Design Organisation (DRDO) 
and Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) also undertook R&D 
activities in electronics. But R&D sponsored by the government was “not linked to 
13 In 1969, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act was enacted to control the growth 
of “monopoly houses”. The Indian corporate sector was then dominated by the so-called monopoly 
houses or business groups. The expressed intent of the legislation was to curb concentration of 
corporate power.
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the manufacturing system in the country, and hence the outcome of the R&D activi-
ties of these organisations remained mostly unutilised”.
Denial of supercomputers to India by the USA and Japan led to the development 
of indigenous supercomputers, which remains as the most successful R&D foray by 
an Indian enterprise. The countries of Western alliance had established a strict 
regime for the export of electronic items citing “dual uses”, i.e. those that could be 
employed both for civilian and defence-related purposes. Exports of these items 
were regulated by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
(CoCoM). Indeed, this Cold War mechanism affected India, a traditional ally of the 
Soviet Union.
The DoE established the C-DAC with an initial investment of Rs. 300 million to 
build high-performance computers. The project was successfully completed in 
1991, and the Param supercomputer was unveiled. From its very first generation, 
Param supercomputer was ranked among the best machines in the world.14
2.4  Electronics Industry in the Period of Economic Reforms
Since 1991, the key reforms benefiting the electronics sector were elimination of 
tariffs on IT products, abolition of industrial licencing system15 and dropping of 
entry barriers for FDI.
In 1991, the telecom sector was fully opened for FDI. Five leading multinational 
companies (MNCs) set up their manufacturing facilities in India – Alcatel, Lucent 
Technologies, Ericsson, Siemens and Fujitsu. When the de-licencing of telecom 
services was notified in 1999, the demand for telecom equipment moved in favour 
of cellular mobile and internet services. This shift away from fixed switches benefit-
ted the global players.16
Impact of opening up of this sector for FDI had only a limited impact. The study 
conducted by Rao and Dhar showed that the “realistic FDI” in the electronics sector 
were quite small, including office, accounting and computing machinery; radio, 
television and communication equipment; and medical, precision optical instru-
ments and watches.17 Francis concludes that the Information Technology Agreement 
of 1997 (ITA-1) did not help in attracting FDI into this sector. Ernst points out that 
during 2010 and 2013, FDI inflows into the electronics sector was “extremely low”: 
it ranked 24 out of 26 sectors in terms of cumulative FDI during this period.18
However, Mrinalini et al. points out that software and IT is the second leading 
sector in terms of FDI inflows. Out of the total FDI inflow of US$350.47bn during 
2003–2009, 13.8% was into the software and IT sector. In terms of FDI in R&D, 
14 Rajaraman, History of Computing in India (1955–2010), 2012, p. 37; Karunakaran, God, Man 
and Machine, 2009.
15 Industrial licences for the consumer electronics were done away with in 1996 (Ernst 2014).
16 Francis (2016).
17 Rao and Dhar, The Tenuous Relationship between Make in India and FDI Inflows 2016, p. 3.
18 Ernst (2014).
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this sector received more than half of the inflow. Out of the FDI in R&D, more than 
50% was into this sector (Table 2).19
Outcomes of FDI in R&D are significant. Mrinalini et al. (2013) find that out of 
706 firms, companies investing in FDI in R&D in India, only 74 have obtained 
Indian patents, taking up 0.5% of their global patents. Of these firms, 54 were in 
software and IT sector (Table 3).
It is found from the above table that FDI in R&D firms in India have negligible 
share of patents in India as compared to their global patent profile. Mrinalini et al. 
(2013), however, have not gone into the factors contributing to this phenomenon.
2.5  Manufacturing
Government of India estimated that in India, demand for electronic products in 
2008–2009 was about US$45 billion, while domestic production was only about 
US$20  billion. Projections for the year 2020 showed that the demand would be 
US$400 billion, while domestic supply would be only US$100 billion, indicating a 
substantial demand-supply gap. In electronics hardware production, India’s share 
was only 1.3% of the global production in 2011, with imports accounting for 
64% of India’s consumption of electronic products and 51% of electronic 
components.20
19 Mrinalini et al. Foreign Direct Investment in R&D in India, 2013, p. 769.
20 Ernst, Upgrading India’s Electronics Manufacturing Industry, 2014, p. 2.
Table 2 Details of FDI inflow during the period 2003–2009
FDI inflow (US$bn) FDI in R&D (US$bn)
Total $ 350.5 $ 29.2
In software and IT $ 48.3 $ 14.7
Share of total inflows 13.8% 50.4%
Source: Computed and compiled by authors based on Mrinalini et al. (2013)
Table 3 Details of patents obtained by MNCs having R&D centres in India
Number 
of firms
Number of Indian 
patents granted for 
MNCs with R&D 
centres in India
Global patents 
granted for MNCs 
with R&D centres 
in India
Indian patents as 
percentage of 
global patents
FDI in R&D 
firms
74 1166 214,686 0.5%




54 749 129,385 0.6%
Software and 
IT (share of 
total)
72.9% 64.2% 60.3%
Source: Compiled by Authors based on Mrinalini et al. (2013)
B. Dhar and R. K. Joseph
101
Ernst argues that India’s production base for components was declining. For 
example, printed circuit boards (PCBs) accounted for 90% of the cost of strategi-
cally important telecom equipment production, and two-thirds of its PCB require-
ments were met through imports. India’s share in world PCB production was only 
0.7%. While the liberalisation of telecom services boosted demand for electronic 
products, it did not result in an increased opportunity for domestic manufactures but 
came as an opportunity for foreign companies.21
Ernst identified three major challenges facing India: (i) lack of a vibrant domes-
tic component industry22; (ii) disconnect between manufacturing and design capa-
bilities; and (iii) a broken innovation system.
Elaborating on the second challenge, Ernst pointed out that India had acquired 
capabilities in integrated circuit (IC) designs, but most of the IC design work done 
in India was for MNCs, which were transferred to their manufacturing location in 
other countries, especially in China. IC design capabilities in India were not linked 
to manufacturing in India. Moreover, investment in R&D in India was at a very low 
level, below 1% of GDP. Larger foreign companies were reluctant to invest in full- 
scale manufacturing R&D in India. The foreign original equipment manufacturers 
typically conducted only the final assembly here.
The table below summarises the key facets of major non-government companies 
operating in India’s IT and ITES sectors (Table 4).23
The main area of concern, in our view, is that the R&D spending of the industry 
still remains at a relatively low level. R&D spending increased nearly sevenfold 
between 2004–2005 and 2012–2013 but fell away quite appreciably in the last 
2 years of the period covered in the above table. These numbers were also reflected 
in the data on patenting activity in the sector, which we will discuss in a later 
section.
2.6  Strategic Role of Standards
The 2012 National Policy of India on Electronics deals with the development of 
Indian standards for technical quality and safety of electronic products. Ernst argued 
that technical standards are as important as patents for an economy. Technical stan-
dards contribute to productivity growth as it promotes diffusion of technological 
knowledge. A study conducted by the German Institute of Standardization found 
that 1% increase in stock of technical standards would contribute to 0.7–0.8% eco-
nomic growth.24
21 Ernst, Upgrading India’s Electronics Manufacturing Industry, 2014, p. 15.
22 ELCINA Country Report on the Indian Electronics Sector, 2007, p. 7 argues that substantial 
resources are yet to be allotted for semiconductor or chip manufacturing despite the modest gov-
ernment support since 1980s to cater for defence and communications.
23 Prowess database includes all non-government companies with a market capitalisation of over 
Rs. 1 billion, a PE ratio between 5 and 10, a dividend yield of over 2 per cent and a debt/equity ratio 
of less than 1.
24 K. Blind, A. Jungmittag, and A. Mangelsdorf (2011), The Economic Benefits of Standardization, 
German Institute for Standardization, quoted by Ernst (2014).
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Standards are so vital a strategy in industrialisation for latecomers that Ernst 
called it their “lifeblood”. Defining standards is a knowledge-intensive activity 
which involves cooperation between industry, government, academia and non- 
governmental organisations representing larger interests of society. However, late-
comers are often takers of standards rather than creators of standards, which adds to 
the vulnerability of their efforts to industrialise.
India’s standardisation system is beset with a number of problems, stemming, in 
particular, from the presence of several standards development organisations (SDO), 
whose objectives, mandates and spheres of authority were often overlapping. For 
instance, the Quality Council of India is mandated to establish and operate national 
accreditation structure for bodies which confirm compliance of standards, while the 
National Accreditation Board for Testing Calibration Laboratories (NABL) pro-
vides accreditation to testing laboratories in accordance with ISO/IEC 17025. 
Besides, the National Accreditation Board for Certification Bodies (NABCB) rec-
ognises those bodies applying for accreditation based on the criteria set by 
NABCB. There are also a number of SDOs in the electronics sector – the Electronics 
and Information Technology Division Council of the Bureau of Indian Standards 
and Telecommunications Engineering Centre, the Global ICT Standardisation 
Forum for India.
3  India’s Information Technology-Enabled Services
A convenient way of identifying the ITES is to refer to the classification provided 
by the General Agreement of Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization.25 
According to this classification, the category of Computer and Related Services 
includes the following services: (i) consultancy services related to the installation of 
computer hardware; (ii) software implementation services; (iii) data processing ser-
vices; (iv) database services; and (v) other related services. The following discus-
sion would relate to the above-mentioned services.
3.1  Evolution of the ITES Industry in India
The ITES industry in India, currently one of the largest earners of foreign exchange, 
developed in three distinct phases. The industry emerged in the 1960s, and its export 
prospects were recognised as early as the early 1970s.26 The government adopted suit-
able policies to develop the export potential of this sector, the most important of which 
was to allow duty-free import of computer systems for software export purposes. One 
hundred percent foreign-owned enterprises were permitted, for software exports oper-
ations, in Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ).27
25 WTO (2001), Services Sectoral Classification List: Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/120, 
10 July 2001.
26 Sharma (2015), Chapter 6.
27 Department of Electronics (1972).
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The second phase follows the announcement of the New Electronics Policy and 
the New Computer Policy, both in 1984. In this phase, the most important develop-
ment was the establishment of the software technology parks with government sup-
port that acted as the springboard for the consolidation of the software sector.
The third phase was ushered in by the Y2K problem (more on this in 2.5.). The 
ability of the Indian ITES sector to respond to the challenges posed by the Y2K 
heralded its presence in the global market.
3.2  The Beginnings of a Global ITES Hub
Although the Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) was the first enterprise to enter the 
industry in 1968,28 the beginnings of this industry was made when pioneering pro-
fessionals identified data conversion as the area in which jobs could be undertaken 
in India at a much cheaper cost, stemming from the low wage bill.29 By the middle 
of the 1970s, the industry started taking a distinct shape. TCS collaborated with an 
American firm, Burroughs, resulting in the formation of the Tata-Burroughs. The 
early pioneers, too, had their own enterprise, the Patni Computer Systems (PCS). 
The SEEPZ, which began functioning in 1973–1974, led to the establishment of 
several ITES companies.30
By the 1970s, the demand was large enough for the entry of new companies like 
Infosys, which took over the reins of the industry in the subsequent period. However, 
much of their jobs were provided by foreign entities (mostly from the USA) as 
introduction of computers in India faced intense opposition. The buoyancy of the 
ITES industry was reflected in the steady increase of software exports from the mid- 
1970s. From only Rs 8.50 million in 1975, software exports increased to Rs. 44 mil-
lion in 1981. Within the next 5 years, software exports had jumped nearly fourfold 
to Rs 420 million.31
3.3  Consolidation of the Industry Since the Mid-1980s
As discussed earlier, the electronics industry went through rapid changes from the 
mid-1980s triggered by proactive government policies. The first of these was the 
slackening of government controls over the industry, which took place through the 
New Electronics Policy (NEP) of 1984. This was the precursor of the liberal eco-
nomic policies adopted in the 1990s.32 Complementing the NEP was another impor-
tant development that changed the future course of the software sector quite 
considerably. The Foreign Trade Policy for 1984–1985 contained a specific clause 
28 Patibandla et al. (2000).
29 Sharma (2015), Chapter 6.
30 Sharma (2015), Chapter 6.
31 Lakha (1990), p. 50.
32 Girdner (1987).
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that said: “software exports shall also be permitted through satellite-based data links 
with overseas computers”.33 The significance of this policy change was felt soon 
after. In 1985, Texas Instruments (TI) became the first major firm to establish its 
presence in Bangalore where it set up a dedicated satellite link to connect with its 
offices in the United Kingdom and the USA.
The Policy on Computer Software Export, Software Development and Training 
announced in 1986 facilitated the development of the software industry. This policy 
underlined five key objectives: (i) software exports to achieve a quantum leap and 
obtain a sizeable share of the global software market; (ii) to target an integrated 
development of software for national and export markets; (iii) simplification of pro-
cedures in order to accelerate the growth in the industry; (iv) establishment of a firm 
base within the national software industry; and (v) increased utilisation of comput-
ers in decision-making and enhancing efficiency.34
The key strategy of the policy was “flood in, flood out”, which meant that Indian 
firms were to be provided with advanced software and technology to enhance the 
international competitiveness of Indian exporters.35 To meet this strategy, licencing 
requirements were removed on software imports, and the import duty was reduced 
to 60% under the 1986 policy. This was further reduced to 25% for computers and 
software used by software producers in 1990. Additional measures for promotion of 
software exports include a 100% tax exemption to profits from software exports.36 
Also, the specialised electronics Exports Processing Zones (EPZ) and other multi- 
industrial EPZs were set up in Bombay, Noida, Kandla, Calcutta, Madras and 
Kochi.37 All these measures resulted in a major boost to India’s exports of 
software.
3.4  Software Technology Parks and IT Clusters
A proactive government took another major decision to facilitate the growth of the 
ITES sector in 1990 through the setting up of Software Technology Parks (STPs), 
allowing several software units to operate using shared communication links. The 
STPs provided the necessary infrastructure, including uninterrupted power supply 
to software companies. Most importantly, the STPs established satellite communi-
cation links that the software companies could use to develop software on the com-
puters of their overseas clients from access terminals located in their respective 
premises in STPs. As the initial investment required to set up a software company 
was low, the STPs allowed many small entrepreneurs to enter the lucrative software 
export market. The first of the STPs were established in Bangalore 1990. Six more 
33 Sharma (2015), p. 163.
34 Lakha (1990), p. 49.
35 Parthasarathy (2004), Dedrick and Kraemer (1993).
36 Dedrick and Kraemer (1993).
37 Lakha (1990).
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STPs were set up under an umbrella organisation, the Software Technology Parks of 
India (STPI) controlled by the Department of Electronics.38
The advantages of locating units in STPs include single-window clearance sys-
tem, tax holiday with no value addition requirements, and duty-free imports. In 
2000, an STP was set up in Silicon Valley in the USA to facilitate exports by small 
and medium enterprises of India into the USA.39
3.5  India as an ITES Leader in the New Millennium
Two extraneous factors provided massive stimuli to the ITES sector in the new mil-
lennium. The first was the “millennium bug”, the more common, Y2K problem. The 
new millennium posed an unexpected problem for the software as the programmes 
were not enabled to read the date in the new millennium. The second problem was 
to accommodate the emergence of the Euro as the currency of the single European 
Market. Accommodating the two changes involved labour-intensive processes, but 
the countries that had developed the programmes did not have the necessary man-
power to fix the bug. The jobs had to be outsourced, and this provided an opportu-
nity to the Indian software companies. Many of these companies secured their 
businesses by not only fixing the Y2K bug but also by providing subsequent 
improvements in the software, at no extra cost to the customers.40
The windfall made by the Indian companies can be gauged from the fact that 
between 1998–1999 and 2000–2001, software exports from India increased nearly 
2.5 times in dollar terms. As a result, many software service companies entered the 
Fortune 500 list in the following years.
Over the past decade, the ITES industry had acquired a distinct character of its 
own by expanding at an unprecedented pace. Its presence in the global markets was 
particularly noteworthy. If the millennium had ended with the ITES industry export-
ing US$ 6 billion, over the next decade, exports of this sector had expanded more 
than tenfold. India was given the epitaph “office of the world”.
3.6  Current Status
ITES accounts for 90% of the IT industry in India, with hardware making up for the 
remaining 10% (Table 5).
India has more than 5000 ITES companies, with a maturity of more than 25 years. 
According to the A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index (2014), India had 
topped the list of countries for “global off-shoring destination”.41 The industry also 
moved from mere “body-shopping” (on-site service in export market) service pro-
38 Rajaraman (2012), p. 39.
39 Kumar and Joseph (2004).
40 Rajaraman (2012), p. 46.
41 Malik and Velan (2016).
B. Dhar and R. K. Joseph
107
vider to producing “niche product market segments” by mid-1990s. Still, lower 
wages and lack of spending in R&D kept the industry’s productivity at a low level 
fuelled by excessive focus on low-end services.42 To move up the value chain, the 
industry needs to invest in R&D and provide effective intellectual property 
protection.43
3.7  R&D, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights
R&D, innovation and intellectual property rights (IPRs) are areas in which most 
studies on ITES industry are not adequately focused. Among the few studies that do 
consider these areas, Kumar and Joseph argued that the weak India’s copyright 
regime facilitated proliferation of software piracy, which in turn acted as disincen-
tive for firms to develop software products.44 The study does not make it clear as to 
whether piracy resulted from deficiencies in law or on account of lax enforcement.
Basant and Mani analysed the patenting behaviour of foreign R&D centres and 
concluded that “India has fair amount of innovation capability in the ICT software 
and in some cases in hardware too”.45 They based their conclusion on the patenting 
activities of foreign companies located in India. The ICT firms had a share of 86% 
of the total 1969 patents which were granted to the 59 firms during the period 
between 2006 and 2010. Basant and Mani excluded “electronics and medical 
42 Mukherjee (2016).
43 Patibandla et al. (2000).
44 Kumar and Joseph (2004).
45 Basant and Mani (2012), p. 19.
Table 5 Indian IT industry in 2015 (US $ billion)
Information technology and business process 











World 650 186 1884 2720 1075 2795
Indian IT 
industry
68.64 26.4 23.76 118.8 13.2 132
(52)a (20)a (19)a (90)a (10)a (100)a









55.64 23.4 19.76 98.8 0.2 99
Note: aFigures in brackets are % share in India’s total (IT-BPM + Hardware)
Source: Compiled by authors from NASSCOM (2016)
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devices” from the category of ICT. If these firms are included in the category of ICT 
firms, the share of ICT firms in total number of patents granted increases to 95%. 
This indicates that foreign R&D activities are concentrated in ICT.
R&D operations in India accounted for 46% of total patents granted by multina-
tional companies (MNCs) such as Symantec. MNCs are keen to operate R&D cen-
tres in India as the cost of R&D professionals in India is much lower; wage advantage 
drives investment into R&D in India. Basant and Mani also surveyed R&D centres 
operated by foreign firms in India and found (a) utilising human resources in India 
was the most important motive for foreign investment. Another important motive 
was development of new technologies for world market rather than for adapting 
their products to Indian market, (b) basic research and new product development is 
the relatively more important type of R&D activity, and (c) focus of R&D in India 
was on research that can be used immediately, long-term research had low 
priority.46
Another important observation made by Basant and Mani, is that “while India 
focuses on pharmaceuticals and chemistry related technologies, China has an 
important share of electronics and telecommunications, areas that are more ame-
nable to design innovations”.47 This means that intellectual property protected under 
designs law could be an indicator for innovations in the ITES sector, especially in 
the hardware sector. None of the studies reviewed here considered design innova-
tions. Annual Report 2014–2015 of the Office of Controller General of Patents, 
Designs, Trademarks and Geographical Indications (CG Office) reports that while 
the share of Indian applicants in patents is only 28%, their share in design applica-
tions is 70%. This probably indicates that India has strengths in design 
innovations.
4  Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions in India
Prior to the second amendment of Patents Act, 1970, that was undertaken for mak-
ing it compatible with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), there were no explicit exclusions in the statute for inven-
tions in the field of CRI.48 “Invention” was defined under Section 2.1(j) of the Act 
as “any new and useful (i) art, process, method or manner of manufacture; (ii) 
machine, apparatus or other article; (iii) substance produced by manufacture. CRIs 
could be patented like inventions in all areas which could be patented upon fulfil-
ment of the novelty and usefulness criteria.49 Inventions relating to “methods” or 
“processes” were limited to “manner of manufacture”. For a “method” to be consid-
ered patentable, it had to undergo the scrutiny of whether or not it is a “manner of 
46 Basant and Mani.
47 Basant and Mani (2012), p. 17.
48 The term has been used by the CG Office while providing the guidelines for the examination of 
patents.
49 CG Office 2013 Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 4.
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manufacture”. Subject matters relating to mental acts, mathematical methods, busi-
ness methods, algorithms and computer programmes were not covered by the cate-
gory, “manner of manufacture”, and were hence not considered as inventions under 
the statute and were therefore not patentable.
This unambiguous application of India’s patent law to CRIs has changed signifi-
cantly since the adoption of the second amendment of Patents Act, 1970. While the 
regime for patenting computer hardware followed the standards set by the TRIPS 
Agreement, India adopted its own patenting standards as regards computer pro-
grammes. The Patent (Second Amendment) Bill introduced in 1999 proposed in its 
amendment of Section 3 of the Patents Act dealing with exclusions from patentabil-
ity, a new Section 3(k), which reads that “a mathematical or business method or a 
computer program or algorithms” were not inventions and hence not patentable. 
Thus, while the Patents Act was silent about patentability of computer programmes 
or software, the amendment Bill disallowed patenting of all mathematical or busi-
ness methods, computer programmes and algorithms.
However, the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) of the Indian Parliament to 
which the Bill was referred to took a different view of the proposed Section 3(k). In 
its recommendations, the JPC rejected the complete exclusion of computer pro-
grammes from being patented, and it did so by inserting the words “per se”.
4.1  Yardsticks Followed by the CG Office to Deal with  
Section 3(k)
Applicability of the provisions of Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, has been 
detailed by the Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure (“Patent Manual”) and the 
Guidelines for the Examination of Computer Related Inventions (“Guidelines”).
4.1.1  The 2013 Guidelines
Since 2013, the CG Office has been issuing Guidelines that have dwelled on the 
approaches patent examiners could adopt on this vexed issue. The first set of 
Guidelines pointed out that applications relating to CRIs could be included under 
the following three categories: (i) method/process, (ii) apparatus/system, and (iii) 
computer programme product.50
According to the Guidelines, claims relating to mathematical method or business 
method or computer programme per se or algorithm or mental act are claimed in 
“method/process” format. The Guidelines stated that patent examiners have a very 
critical role in ascertaining whether the invention belongs to one of such categories 
and hence falls under excluded subject matter. This view implies that an element of 
ambiguity is involved in the patenting of methods and processes.
The Guidelines allude to the fact that claims involving apparatus/system requires 
the examiners to properly construe whether the claimed subject matter relates to any 
apparatus which is novel, inventive, having industrial applicability or is just 
50 CG Office 2013. Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 12–16.
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formatted to appear so. The apparatus claim should clearly define the inventive 
constructional/hardware features. The claim for an apparatus may incorporate a 
“process limitation” for an apparatus, where “limitation” means defining the spe-
cific application and not the general application.
Claims relating to computer programmes product that are nothing but computer 
programme per se simply expressed on a computer readable storage medium and 
are as such not allowable. However, the Guidelines argue that the scope of the exclu-
sion of computer programmes from the ambit of Patents Act, 1970, or, in other 
words, the remit of exclusion defined by the phrase “computer programme per se” 
needs careful consideration by patent examiners.
The question, according to the Guidelines, is whether a computer programme 
loaded on a general-purpose computer or related devices can be patented. While the 
spirit of law should lead to an answer in the negative, in an application for patent for 
a new hardware system, the possibility of a computer programme forming part of 
the claims cannot be ruled out. In this case, too, the examiner has to carefully con-
sider as to how integrated is the novel hardware with the computer programme. A 
further consideration for the examiners is whether the machine is programme spe-
cific or the programme is machine specific.
The Guidelines suggested that patentability of computer programmes should be 
assessed in combination with the features of the relevant hardware; the hardware 
must be something more than general-purpose machine. In cases where the novelty 
resides in the device, the machine or the apparatus and if such devices are claimed 
in combination with the novel or known computer programmes to make their func-
tionality definitive, the claims relating to these devices may be considered patent-
able, but only if the invention can pass the triple test of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial applicability.51
4.1.2  The 2015 Guidelines
If the Guidelines issued in 2013 had given indications of the possibilities of com-
puter programmes to be patented through creative interpretations that could be used 
to work around the phrase “computer programme per se”, the following set of 
Guidelines issued in 2015 pushed the possibilities further.52 The 2015 Guidelines 
clarified that in order to be patentable, CRIs must have (i) novel hardware, (ii) novel 
hardware with a novel computer programmes or (iii) novel computer programmes 
with a known hardware which can go beyond the normal interaction with such hard-
ware and can affect a change in the functionality and/or performance of the existing 
hardware. Based on the above criteria, the 2015 Guidelines stated that computer 
programmes, when running on or loaded into a computer, going beyond the “nor-
mal” physical interactions between the software and the hardware on which it is run, 
and is capable of bringing further technical effect, may not be considered as exclu-
sion under these provisions.
51 CG Office 2013. Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 19–21.
52 CG Office 2015. Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 13.
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The 2015 Guidelines suggested that while examining CRI applications, the 
examiner must confirm that the claims have the requisite technical advancement. An 
indicative list of questions was provided using which the examiner could determine 
the technical advancement of the CRIs. These were53:
 (i) Whether the claimed technical feature had a technical contribution on a pro-
cess which was carried on outside the computer
 (ii) Whether the claimed technical feature operated at the level of the architecture 
of the computer
 (iii) Whether the technical contribution was in the nature of change in the hardware 
or the functionality of hardware
 (iv) Whether the claimed technical contribution resulted in the computer operating 
in a new way
 (v) Whether the programme made the computer a better computer, i.e. running 
more efficiently and effectively, in case of a computer programme linked with 
hardware
 (vi) Whether the change in the hardware or the functionality of hardware amounted 
to technical advancement
If answer to any of the above questions was in affirmative, the Guidelines sug-
gested that the invention may not be considered as exclusion under Section 3(k) of 
the Patents Act, 1970.
4.1.3  The 2017 Guidelines
The latest set of Guidelines, issued in March 2017, while providing further clarity 
to the patentability of computer programmes, raised questions regarding the scope 
of exclusion of Section 3(k).
The Guidelines pointed to the fact that patents on computer programmes are 
often claimed in the form of method claims or system claims with some “means” 
indicating the functions of flow charts or process steps. Algorithm-related claims 
are much wider than the computer-programme claims as a single algorithm can be 
implemented through different programmes in different computer languages. If 
claims in any form, including methods or processes, or apparatus, systems or 
devices, or computer programme product or computer readable medium, belong to 
the excluded categories, they cannot be patentable.54
As regards the exclusion of “computer programme per se”, the Guidelines sug-
gest that it is important to ascertain from the nature of the claimed CRI whether the 
invention is of a technical nature involving technical advancement as compared to 
the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both.
The 2017 Guidelines clarify that patent claims which are directed towards com-
puter programmes per se are excluded from patentability, such as (i) claims directed 
at computer programmes/set of instructions/routines and/or subroutines and (ii) 
53 CG Office 2015. Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 13–14.
54 CG Office 2017. Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). p. 13–14.
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claims directed at “computer programme products”/“Storage Medium having instr
uctions”/“Database”/“Computer Memory with instruction” stored in a computer 
readable medium.
Although Section 3(k) excludes algorithms from patentability, the Guidelines 
point out that computer programmes are often claimed in the form of algorithms as 
method claims or system claims with some “means” indicating the functions of flow 
charts or process steps. A suggestion is therefore made that while establishing pat-
entability, the focus should be on the underlying substance of the invention and not 
on the particular form in which it is claimed.
According to the new Guidelines, mere presence of a mathematical formula in a 
claim, to clearly specify the scope of protection being sought in an invention, does 
not make it a claim involving a “mathematical method”. However, such exclusion 
may not apply to inventions that include mathematical formulae and resulting in 
systems for encoding, reducing noise in communications/electrical/electronic sys-
tems or encrypting/decrypting electronic communications.
The above discussion indicates that over the past decade and a half since the 
adoption of the second amendment of the Patents Act, 1970, the CG Office has tried 
to provide a degree of clarity over the critical issue of patenting computer software. 
The efforts of the CG Office have been complemented in recent years by the Courts 
that have adjudicated the cases involving FRAND (fair, reasonable and non- 
discriminatory) licences between the telecom companies. Brief accounts of the two 
judgements which referred to the patenting of computer programmes are given 
below.
4.2  Court Decisions on Patenting of Computer Programmes
Over the past few years, the High Court of Delhi has passed its orders in two cases, 
both of which were petitioned by the global telecom giant, Ericsson, against the 
violation of its patents registered in India.
In the first case involving Ericsson and Intex Technologies, the Court, in its 
interim judgement,55 provided a new interpretation of the exclusions provided 
under Sections 3(k). In the dispute, Intex Technologies argued that Ericsson’s pat-
ents were computer programmes and were hence not patentable. The Court 
observed that the novelty and inventive step of the disputed Ericsson patent lay in 
an encoder specifically developed and designed by the company. In order to per-
form its functions, the encoder required several hardware components. The fact 
that while performing these functions certain predetermined guidelines are fol-
lowed does not mean that the claimed invention is a mere algorithm or computer 
55 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson V.  Intex Technologies (India) Ltd., IA No. 6735/2014  in CS 
(OS) No. 1045/2014, judgement delivered on 13 March 2015, p. 133.34.
B. Dhar and R. K. Joseph
113
programme per se. The Court added that Ericsson mentioned the term “algorithm” 
in the complete specification, which was a “search algorithm” used for determining 
the best mode of transmitting the signals. Mere reference to the use of a “proce-
dure” or a “method” or an “algorithm” in an apparatus, which comprised of various 
network or hardware elements so as to bring about a technical effect or to perform 
a technical process did not reduce the claimed invention an algorithm or computer 
programme per se or even a mathematical method or formula as contemplated 
under Section 3(k) of Patents Act, 1970.
In the second case in which Ericsson similarly litigated Lava International Ltd. 
over violation of its patents by the latter, the High Court of Delhi ruled that Lava’s 
assertions that an encoder used in Ericsson’s technology was a mere mathematical 
method or an algorithm is misleading. Encoder and decoder are practical realisa-
tions of a speech coding and decoding method with a physical effect and as such 
were much more than just an algorithm. Mere mention of an algorithm or a mathe-
matical formula in a patent document should not be inferred to mean that the inven-
tion is nothing but an algorithm.56
These decisions by the Court, together with the progressively refined interpreta-
tions given by the CG Office, will ensure that Section 3(k) is implemented in its 
letter and spirit. More importantly, the inventor would be encouraged to file for 
patents in India, especially on software innovations.
The trends in patent grants in computer hardware and computer programmes in 
India are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The trends capture the essence of patenting 
standards that exist in the two domains. Table  6 shows that the patent grants in 
56 Telefonktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Lava International Ltd. 2016. CS (OS) 764/2015, judgement 
pronounced on 10 June, 2016. p. 52.
Table 6 Patents granted in India on computer/electronics
Years
Total number of 
patents granted
Patents granted in 
computer/electronics
Share of computer/electronics 
in total granted patents (%)
2006–2007 7539 237 3.1
2007–2008 15,316 1357 8.9
2008–2009 16,061 1913 11.9
2009–2010 6168 1195 19.4
2010–2011 7509 892 11.9
2011–2012 4381 584 13.3
2012–2013 4126 510 12.4
2013–2014 4226 690 16.3
2014–2015 5978 835 14.0
2015–2016 6326 810 12.8
Source: Annual Reports, CG Office, Government of India
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computer hardware have been within a range in most of the years for which data are 
presented. This is possibly a reflection of the fact that patentability standards offered 
by India’s patents regime to innovators in hardware are relatively more predictable 
than in the case of computer programmes.
Patent grants on computer programmes, including software (Table 7), show an 
interesting trend. In the previous decade, when there was lack of clarity regarding 
the interpretation of the contentious phrase, “computer programme per se” in 
Section 3(k) of Patents Act, 1970, software patents were being granted. However, in 
the subsequent period, which is the period that saw considerable efforts being made 
to interpret the contentious phrase by the CG Office and the Courts, only one com-
puter programme has been patented.
5  By Way of Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to provide an account of the development of the IT 
and ITES in India. The first part of the study that focused on the development of the 
industry until the 1990s traced the origins of the two sectors. The IT sector devel-
oped under government controls, wherein only the government-owned companies 
were allowed to expand in this sector. In contrast, the ITES sector was mostly devel-
oped through private initiatives, the non-resident Indians, in particular.
By the 1980s, it became clear that the model for the growth of the IT sector 
adopted by the government through its own entities was a non-starter. The policy 
framework for the expansion of the industry was completely changed with the gov-
ernment inviting foreign players to take the lead. In fact, the IT sector became the 
first sector, which was opened for foreign investment well before the government 
officially adopted the policy of economic reforms in early 1990s.
During the period of economic reforms, the government chose the path of rapid 
opening of the sector. India was one of the few developing countries that endorsed 
the Information Technology Agreement in 1997, whose objective was to eliminate 
tariffs on IT products.
There is no evidence that this open-door policy helped the IT industry to develop. 
In contrast, the ITES sector received a major boost when Indian companies were 
able to take advantage of the increasing demand for these services towards the end 
of the previous millennium. Subsequently, the ITES has expanded phenomenally, 
establishing India as one of the ITES powerhouses of the world.
Although India’s ITES sector was an unqualified success, there is not much evi-
dence that this sector, or its hardware counterpart, showed any dynamism in the 
realm of technology development. India’s R&D spending remained sluggish, a 
major source of concern.
One uncertainty faced by the R&D system was India’s patent regime. In the sec-
ond amendment of the Patents Act, 1970, undertaken to make India’s patent law 
conform to the TRIPS Agreement, “computer programme per se” was excluded 
from patenting. There was complete lack of clarity as to the interpretation of the 
phrase. However, in the more recent years, both the Controller General of Patents, 
India’s Information Technology Industry: A Tale of Two Halves
116
Designs and Trademarks and the Courts are providing a degree of conceptual clarity 
as to what “computer programme per se” really means.
Our study has shown that India’s IT and ITES sectors face considerable chal-
lenges as the government has taken a series of step to enhance the level of integra-
tion of the Indian economy with its partners. Our analysis has shown that there are 
significant deficiencies in the two sectors, especially in their abilities to put forward 
efficient innovation systems, which would have to be addressed for them to compete 
meaningfully in the global markets.
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The development history of the Chinese film industry can generally be divided 
into three stages: early cinema, policy-controlled cinema, and contemporary cin-
ema. The Chinese cinema is an instructive story. On the one hand, it had been 
under the radar of the copyright law for 95 years, and its main constraints were 
underdeveloped technology, private capital deficiency, wartime disruption, and 
ideological and political concerns. On the other, contemporary Chinese film 
copyright has been greatly influenced by both the author’s right system and the 
copyright system. Despite high piracy and weak enforcement, it managed to 
complete a dramatic shift from a policy-controlled to market-driven and even 
copyright-based industry within just decades. This chapter will place the film 
industry under the lens of copyright, policy, and market in the context of China.
Keywords
Film industry · Marketization · Industrialization · Film policy · Film copyright
1  Early Cinema (1896–1930)
The early cinema in China consisted of two periods – the last 15 years of the Qing 
Dynasty and the golden age of the silent films. Shortly after Louis Lumière broth-
ers’ first commercial public screening in Paris back in 1895, motion pictures made 
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their first public appearance in Shanghai in 1896.1 Ten years later, the first Chinese 
film was produced by a Chinese photo studio, which recorded selected parts of the 
Beijing opera “The Battle of Ding Jun Mountain” in 1905.2 Although the early mov-
ies were greatly constrained by the undeveloped economy and cinematographic 
technology, the public showed great interest in this new media, which combined 
traditional arts with entertainment.3 This alarmed the Qing government.4 As the first 
regulation on films in China, the provisions of the 1911 Shanghai Cinema Regulation 
focused on cinema administration, such as cinema permits, screen time, and seat 
arrangement, rather than corrective measures in connection with the content of the 
films.5 With the Revolution of 1911 putting an end to Chinese feudalism, China 
stepped into the period of the Republic of China in 1912.6 While European countries 
were heavily involved in World War I (1914–1918), the Chinese cinema together 
with industry and commerce under national capitalism was able to catch up and 
develop. Shanghai became the center of the early Chinese cinema.7
Early filmmaking in China primarily began with recording traditional Chinese 
operas.8 The first-generation Chinese directors actively involved themselves in 
experimenting with short fiction films adapted from modern plays.9 These efforts 
not only accumulated the filmmaking skills and private capital for further develop-
ment but also cultivated professionals and strengthened the ability of motion pic-
tures to elevate from faithfully recording spectacular attractions to visualizing 
expressive narrations.10 Motion pictures possessed the potential to reflect social 
reality and convey messages through cinematographic language to the audiences in 
a less preaching and yet very influential way.11 However, this led to divergences 
among filmmakers in defining the primary function of films as either leisure 
entertainment or moral cultivation. For example, as two representatives of the first 
generation of Chinese directors, while Zheng Zhengqiu deeply believed in “serious 
feature plays” that could “express critical opinions for social revolution and public 
1 Zhang (2004), 14.
2 Cheng et al. (1998), 13–14.
3 Lu and Shu (1998), 6.
4 At the 70th birthday ceremony of Empress Dowager Cixi in 1904, a film projector exploded 
during screening. Cixi therefore treated film as unsafe and ominous and banned film screening in 
the prohibited palace after that. Cheng et al. (1998), 10.
5 The Cinema Regulation was adopted by the Shanghai Municipal Public Office in 1911, before the 
end of the Qing Dynasty, followed by Shanghai City Hall during the early period of the Republic 
of China. Cheng et al. (1998), 11.
6 The Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912 and originally based in mainland China. It 
was governed by the Beiyang Government (northern warlords of China) from 1912 to 1926 and by 
the Kuomintang (KMT) Government from 1927 to 1949.
7 Lu and Shu (1998), 6. Wang (2001), 218.
8 Lu and Shu (1998), 2; Zhang (2004), 15–16.
9 The short fiction films emerged and developed from 1913 to 1922. Lu and Shu (1998), 6–10.
10 Lu and Shu (1998), 8. Zhang (2004), 16–37.
11 Wang (2001), 205.
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education,” Zhang Shichuan was solely motivated by box office considerations and 
emphasized pure entertainment.12
The Chinese cinema entered its first golden age in the mid-1920s, when silent 
films reigned.13 However, this golden age did not last long. The shortage of private 
capital weakened filmmakers’ ability to explore new themes or genres that were yet 
to be accepted by the market. As a result, three types of commercial films – the his-
tory drama, martial arts movies, and movies of immortals and demons – flooded the 
market from 1926 to 1930.14 Movies were filled with violent, sexual, and vulgar 
content, cheap dream-making, visual sensation, and attractiveness. Destructive mar-
ket competition not only accelerated the downfall of the once thriving film industry 
but also invoked moral panic about the film content. In particular, criminal cases 
were reported to have dramatically increased after the import of a series of American 
detective films after World War I, as well as the release of domestic detective films, 
such as Yan Ruisheng,15 because detailed film scenes had allegedly become the text-
books for crimes.16 Chinese audiences even protested and called for banning foreign 
films, which often connected the image of Chinese with murderers, the intellectually 
disabled, drug addicts, or other indecent characters.17
Considering the negative impact of films on public security and social mores, as 
well as the growing nationalism and patriotism, the Education Committee in Jiangsu 
province was the first to establish a local Film Censorship Committee in 1923, 
which heralded the beginning of the film censorship system in China18 and adopted 
a single and yet unclear criterion of whether the content violated standards of moral-
ity and decency.19 Then, the Film Review Committee was established in Beijing for 
the central government in 1926 by the General Education Board,20 which expanded 
the review criteria from “immorality and indecency” to include “public security,” 
“obscenity,” “social mores,” and “disgrace on Chinese and other content that would 
prejudice other countries’ diplomatic relations with China.”21 However, as the then 
12 Zheng and Zhang found a balance between profit-making and social enlightening in their film 
“Orphan Rescues Grandfather,” which was the first film that gained both artistic and market 
success in 1923, Zhang (2004), 23–28.
13 Lu and Shu (1998), 11–16.
14 Lu and Shu (1998), 25–31; Zhang (2004), 37–47.
15 The motion picture department of Commercial Press made the first full-length feature film, “Yan 
Ruisheng,” in 1921 based on a criminal case which happened in Shanghai in 1920. The makers of 
this detective film conducted bold experiments and tried to present the original circumstances of 
the case with rather brutal scenes. Wang (2001), 206–208; Li and Hu (1996), 67–71; Cheng et al. 
(1998), 44, 58–59.
16 Wang (2001), 206.
17 Wang (2001), 206–208, 216.
18 Wang (2001), 216.
19 Wang (2001), 217.
20 The General Education Board was established in 1915, consisting of members commissioned by 
the education ministry, Beijing Police Department, university professors, and other specialists, 
Wang (2001), 212.
21 Wang (2001), 220–221.
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Beiyang Government’s reach did not extend much beyond Beijing, the actual 
coverage of the Film Review Committee was limited.22 The initial film censorship 
in China was decentralized, unofficial, non-binding, and ex post, with particular 
emphases on the moral cultivation and public education functions of film.23
While films had long been subject to control and regulations since introduction 
to China, there was no copyright law at all in China at the time when copyright 
protection was for the first time accorded to cinematographic productions in 1908 as 
literary or artistic works at the Berlin Conference of the Berne Convention.24 China 
in the 1920s generally considered copyright protection and accession to the Berne 
Convention unnecessary and even harmful to the progress of education, culture, and 
knowledge.25 When the first copyright statute was adopted in 1910, the protected 
subject matter only covered literary works, works of fine arts, photographs, etc.,26 
excluding motion pictures from copyright protection. The 1928 Copyright Act of 
the Republic of China (ROC)27 also did not include films in the non-exclusive list of 
copyrightable work categories under Article 1.28
2  Wartime Cinema (1930–1949)
Due to the Japanese invasion of China in 1930–1945 and the civil war that 
immediately followed (1945–1949), China entered a 19-year period of wartime 
cinema while transiting from silent to sound films in the 1930s,29 and the dramatic 
social unrest and national crisis turned Chinese cinema into a political and 
ideological battlefield.30 In dealing with the emergence of leftist films and the 
following large- scale “Left-wing Cinema Movement” (1932–1937),31 the KMT 
Government set up centralized, mandatory, and nationwide film censorship as a 
22 Wang (2001), 221–222.
23 Wang (2001), 218–219 and 223.
24 Article 14(1)(2) of the Berne Convention Berlin Act 1908, Ricketson and Ginsburg (2005), para 
8.31–8.41, Kamina (2016), 16–18. For the history of film protection in European countries prior to 
the Berne Convention Berlin Revision 1908, see Kamina (2016), 7–16.
25 Shanghai publishers petition against acceding to the Berne Convention, Shanghai Xin Wen Bao, 
8 December 1920, cited from Zhou and Li (1997), 151–153.
26 The Copyright Law of the Qing Dynasty, adopted in 1910, was the very first copyright act in 
Chinese history and was replaced by the Copyright Law of the Beiyang Government in 1915.
27 Copyright Act of ROC, adopted by the Nationalist Government in 1928.
28 Arguably, film scripts could be protected as literary works by then already; see Zhou and Li 
(1997), XII.
29 Lu and Shu (1998), 37–39.
30 Zhang (2004), 58; Lu and Shu (1998), 39.
31 The leftist films refer to “those anti-imperialist, anti-feudal films produced between 1933 and 
1935 by the leftist film movement engineered by the underground Communist film group under the 
leadership of the Cultural Alliances of Chinese Leftists”; and “the term should be extended to 
include films released in 1937, and the movement’s starting date be pushed back to account for film 
criticism that anticipated the emergence of leftist films,” Zhang (2004), 63 and 66.
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significant part of its overall scheme of national cultural policy and ideological 
control.32 The Film Censorship Law was adopted in 1930, and the Film Censorship 
Committee (FCC) was established in 1931 to consolidate the ideological domination 
of the Three Principles of the People – the Principle of Nationalism, Principle of 
Democracy, and Principle of People’s Livelihood.33 The film censorship applied to 
both domestic and imported films and deployed four criteria to prohibit: (1) films 
giving humiliating portrayals of the Chinese people, (2) films opposing the Three 
Principles of the People, (3) films corrupting good traditions and customs or 
impairing public order, and (4) films advocating superstition and heresy.34
At its initial stage from 1931 to 1934, the FCC conducted film censorship 
primarily from the social and moral aspects based on the third and fourth criteria. 
Many domestic films of martial arts and fantasy subjects that advocated 
“superstition”35 and some domestic and foreign films that featured “obscene 
sensuality”36 were banned or required to edit or delete certain content before screen-
ing. While the FCC’s censorship accelerated the death of the ill-timed commercial 
films, it did not engage in direct interference in film production.37 To minimize the 
“huge losses” because of banning films, in particular to the small film studios which 
already were suffering great financial hardships due to the wartime, the FCC allowed 
the release of some “problematic” films after necessary cuts and changes.38 Also, 
the FCC even showed some “sympathy for or tolerance of” certain leftist films, 
because the FCC was under the Ministry of Education, not the KMT Party, and was 
thus “less politically sensitive.”39 Later, the Central Film Censorship Committee 
(CFCC) was established in 1934 under direct supervision of the Film Industry 
Guidance Committee of the KMT Central Propaganda Committee,40 which was 
more politically oriented, to strengthen the Nationalist government’s ideology, and 
it adopted much stricter criteria to “block those ‘ideologically incorrect’ films,” 
namely, the “left-wing films.”41
After the outbreak of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China on July 7, 1937, the 
Film Censorship Law and the CFCC became ineffective in the areas occupied by 
Japan.42 Throughout the occupation, the Japanese military and its puppet 
32 Wang (1997), 60–61.
33 Wang (2006), 141.
34 Film Censorship Law, Articles 1 and 2. Wang (1997), 61, the English text cited from Wang 
(2006), 144.
35 It was reported that 70% of the domestic films banned by the FCC in the first 3 years were films 
of martial arts and fantasy subjects, Wang (1997), 63.
36 Wang 1997, 62–64; Wang (2006), 141 and 148.
37 Priest (2015), 26.
38 Zhang (2004), 70.
39 Zhang (2004), 70, and Wang (2006), 142.
40 Wang (1997), 66. Wang (2006), 144.
41 Wang (1997), 66. Wang (2006), 143–145,149.
42 Wang (2006), 150.
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governments43 adopted film censorship to mollify the Chinese awareness and 
suppress any nationalist flames of resistance44 and even became active and monopoly 
players themselves in producing and screening propaganda films in the occupied 
areas.45
3  Socialist Cinema (1949–1978)
Socialist cinema started from the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1949 and ended with the beginning of reform and opening up in 1978. Cinema 
was chosen by the Communist Party of China (CPC) as an essential part of the 
people’s revolution and a construction pillar of socialist China. In comparison to the 
early and wartime cinema, socialist cinema was centrally planned and subordinated 
to politics.46
3.1  State-Owned and Policy-Controlled Cinema
On the one hand, taking reference of the Soviet Union model,47 a national studio 
system, within which movies were exclusively produced by state-owned studios and 
based on state funding and planning, was formed and lasted for almost half a cen-
tury until its disintegration by the end of the twentieth century.48 For film distribu-
tion and exhibition, the Central Film Bureau (CFB) was put in place in 1949 to take 
charge of the nationwide distribution, display, export, and import of films and of 
supervising films before screening.49 Up to 1958, the state-owned China Film 
Corporation (CFC) monopolized the nationwide film distribution and exhibition, 
with a dual function of administrative governance and business management.50 
Although the state-run studios and the CFC operated as an industry after the pattern 
of business management, the production and distribution of films were not market 
based at all.51
On the other hand, the socialist cinema was entirely policy-controlled,52 which 
for the first three decades of the PRC was neither stable nor systematic, but capri-
cious, and followed the zigzag pattern of political campaigns, struggles between 
43 In occupied territory of China, Japan established the Wang Jingwei Government in Nanjing and 
the state of Manzhouguo in Northeast China.
44 Wang (2002), 48–49.
45 Wang (2002), 25–27, 45–48; Zhang (2004), 84.
46 Hu and Yao (1989), 7.
47 Liu (2009), 7.
48 Yin and Ling (2002), 2–3. Hu and Yao (1989), 14–15.
49 Zhang (2004), 190–191.
50 Li (2017), 6–19.
51 Hu and Yao (1989), 15.
52 Hu and Yao (1989), 8–11. Jin (2014), 73–78.
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classes and cultural turbulence.53 Too often, the overemphasis on the ideological and 
instrumental function of the movie kept compressing the artistic latitude of 
filmmakers.54 It is hardly possible for filmmakers to maintain balance between 
artistic creation and political needs.55 During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976),56 
the most aggressive film policy was adopted, which conceptualized and standardized 
the fundamental principles for filmmaking57 and the rules for film shooting58 and 
imposed them on all filmmakers,59 which clearly violated the basics of artistic 
creation and cultural goods production. As a result, Chinese cinema suffered a 
decade of “devastation.”60 It was with the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 
that film production and distribution gradually resumed.61
3.2  Film Copyright Remained Unattended
During the age of policy-controlled cinema in China, international film copyright 
made tremendous progress. Cinematographic works, including assimilated works 
expressed by a process analogous to cinematography, have been explicitly enumer-
ated as a category of “literary and artistic works” in Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention at the Brussels Revision in 1948.62 Following the international trend, 
the amendment of the Copyright Act of the ROC in 1944 for the first time recog-
nized motion pictures as a category of copyrightable works,63 granting the copyright 
owner of films the exclusive right of public performance or rehearsal for a  protection 
53 Zhang (2004), 189.
54 Yin and Ling (2002), 10.
55 Yin and Ling (2002), 19–20.
56 During the Cultural Revolution, film production and criticism were not a matter of art or business 
but a purely political concern. In particular, films that were produced in the previous 17 years were 
disapproved as “evil films,” The Development History of the Chinese Film authored by Cheng 
Jihua was labeled as the most anti-socialist book about film theory and criticism, filmmaking and 
technical professionals were dismissed, and the Beijing Film Academy was forced to close. Yin 
and Ling (2002), 84–85; Zhang YJ, 217.
57 The fundamental principles for filmmaking during this period were the “three principles of 
prominence,” that is, “give prominence to positive characters among all the characters, to heroes 
among the positive characters, and to the principal hero among the heroes,” Zhang (2004), 219; Yin 
and Ling (2002), 86–87.
58 Specific rules for film shooting had been compulsorily standardized as follows: “In frame 
composition, the hero must be located at the center and the villain at the fringes; in camera 
positioning, the hero must be shot from a low angle and the villain from a high angle; in proportions, 
the hero must appear large and the villain small; in color scheme, the hero must be bathed in warm 
colors and the villain in cold tones; in lighting, the hero must be bright and the villain dark,” Zhang 
(2004), 219; Yin and Ling (2002), 90–92.
59 Jin (2014), 88–92.
60 Zhang (2004), 217.
61 Jin (2014), 108–109.
62 Ricketson and Ginsburg (2005), para 8.31.
63 1944 Amendment of the Copyright Act of the ROC, Article 1 (1) No. 4.
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term of 10 years.64 However, this Copyright Act was not very operational due to the 
Sino-Japan war, and became obsolete upon the founding of the PRC in 1949, which 
did not protect films until the first copyright law entered into force in 1991. In a 
word, copyright concerns with motion pictures remained unattended during the 
period of policy-controlled cinema in China, and movies functioned as important 
political and ideological tools for propaganda instead of cultural or entertainment 
products.
4  Contemporary Cinema (1979–Present)
After the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC) 
in 1978 ushered China back on the course of economic reform and modernization,65 
Chinese cinema entered into a new era of contemporary cinema with three phases – 
recovery period of internal reform (1979–1990), transitional period of marketiza-
tion (1990–2000), and industrialization (2001–present).
4.1  Recovery Period of Internal Reform
From 1979 to 1990, Chinese cinema embarked on a period of internal reform. The 
national policy of economic reform and opening up brought both new opportunities 
and severe challenges to the state-run studios and centralized distribution system. 
The tension between politics, cultural policy, and films was relaxed, allowing more 
diversified and individualized artistic expression. The liberalized film policy revived 
the film market. Film directors contributed to the free and versatile advancement in 
filmmaking from various aspects, and film production reached its golden age by the 
mid-1980s.66
The reform mainly took place to fix the unreasonable purchase arrangement 
between state-owned studios and the CFC and revenue/profit sharing ratios among 
the CFC and its local branches and screening units.67 First, there were growing con-
flicts between the state-owned studios and the uniform distribution system and pric-
ing mechanism controlled by the CFC.  In fact, the CFC had always purchased 
movies from state-owned studios at a fixed price from the 1950s to 1979, regardless 
of the quality and the theatrical revenue of the individual film.68 However, with ris-
ing production costs and filming infrastructure costs, the profits that the studios 
could retain were squeezed out dramatically.69 In addition, film studios received no 
share from the revenue generated by the repeated distribution of the same film, as 
64 1944 Amendment of the Copyright Act of the ROC, Articles 1 (2) and 9(2).
65 Jin (2014), 103. Zhang (2004), 226. Yin and Ling (2002), 101.
66 Yin and Ling (2002), 101–142. Lu and Shu (1998), 170–179.
67 Tang (2009b), 5.
68 Shen (2005), 203.
69 Xu and Shi (2007), 41.
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the CFC bought out the copyright.70 Therefore, the pricing mechanism switched in 
the 1980s from a fixed buyout price to a floating price (RMB 9000 per copy times 
the number of copies distributed), and the studios retained the copyright in feature 
films themselves for repeated distribution and screening.71
Secondly, the average sharing ratio of the box office revenue between the local 
distribution branches, which were under dual supervision of both the CFC and local 
cultural departments, and the CFC was raised to 3:7 in 1979, twice as much as it was 
in the 1960s, and the profit-sharing ratio of the local distribution branches and 
screening units, which were established with the financial support of local distribu-
tion branches and local financing, with the local cultural departments was raised to 
8:2 in support of the reconstruction and enhancement of the local film projection 
infrastructures.72 Lastly, a floating price mechanism for movie tickets was allowed 
for the first time in 1985, after having been kept in the range of RMB 0.2 to 0.35 for 
35 years.73
The measures mentioned above were merely partial adjustments and were unable 
to solve the institutional defects of the planned economy. The unified cinema system 
was still of an actively administrative nature and failed to optimize the allocation of 
resources and interests.74 The 16 state-owned studios still monopolized the produc-
tion of feature films.75 It is true that, since cinema was redefined as an industry 
rather than a government sector and the state funding for film production was 
stopped in 1984, the state-owned studios were forced to raise funds for film produc-
tion on their own through bank loans and to assume sole responsibility for profits or 
losses.76 However, a sudden disintegration of the state-funded production model that 
had lasted for 30 years77 could hardly achieve a successful transition to a profit- 
oriented industry, when its deficiencies such as overstaffed structure78 remained 
unsolved, the necessary mechanism of market competition missing, and the state- 
monopolized distribution and multilayer exhibition system unchanged.
Moreover, the development of new media technology and the market competition 
with other cultural and entertainment industries exacerbated the difficulties of the 
film industry. The CFC had run at a massive loss from 1981 to 1984 on the 
70 Xu and Shi (2007), 41.
71 Ministry of Culture, (Document No. 1558), 1980. Liu (2015), 108.
72 State Council, Report on the Reform of the Film Distribution and Exhibition Management 
System, Guo Fa [1979] No. 198, 01.08.1979. Liu (2015), 109. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the 
local distribution branches received 8–15% of the distribution revenue on average in the 1960s. Liu 
(2009), 11.
73 Tang (2009b), 5. Liu (2015), 111.
74 Jin (2014), 110–111. Tang (2009b), 5–6. Liu (2015), 108–110.
75 Jin (2014), 108.
76 CCCPC, Decision Concerning the Reform of the Economic System, 20 October 1984. Liu 
(2015), 109.
77 Jin (2014), 110–111.
78 Ji (1999), 343.
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distribution of domestic films.79 In particular, the rapid rise of television, KTV, and 
the home video industry hit the movie market badly and diverted hundreds of mil-
lions of audience members.80 In response, film studios started producing entertain-
ment films in 1988 in the hope of a fast and high return on investment in face of 
huge market and financial pressure.81 In addition, special state funding was estab-
lished to promote the production of mainstream films.82
In terms of management of the film industry, a couple of administrative adjustments 
were made. In dealing with the sexual, violent, and other types of adult content in 
films, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT) issued detailed measures 
and rating criteria to classify films based on the content suitability for children under 
16 years old.83 As co-production of films with foreign investment became popular 
after the end of state-funded film production in 1984, oversight over film co-production 
was strengthened by the review and approval process.84 From 1986 onward, the CFB 
and CFC were put under the administration of the MRFT, while local branches of the 
CFC remained under the supervision of the local cultural departments until 1993.85 
However, while the film market in the 1980s was flooded with pirated videos and 
VCD of foreign films and TV series, the market management under multiple 
jurisdictions of the MRFT, Ministry of Culture, and General Administration of Press 
and Publication86 failed to rectify market disorder, which in turn triggered the 
legislation of copyright law and film regulations in the 1990s.
79 Ji (1999), 228.
80 From 1984 to 1985 alone, the number of movie viewers dropped sharply to 5.2 billion; see Jin 
(2014), 110–111.
81 Lu and Shu (1998), 192–193. Just in 1988, 60% of the films produced were commercial 
entertainment films. Jin (2014), 14.
82 MRFT and Ministry of Finance, Provisional Measures Concerning the Use and Management of 
the Special Fund for the Development of National Cinemas, 19 March 1991. Liu (2015), 110; Lu 
and Shu (1998), 180–185; Jin (2014), 115–116.
83 MRFT and CFC, Management Measures Concerning Films Unsuitable for Exhibition to 
Children, Guang Fa Ying Zi [1989] No. 824, 2 November 1989; Notification of the MRFT 
concerning the Censorship and Rating System for Certain Films, Guang Fa Ying Zi [1989] 201, 25 
March 1989. Liu (2015), 111.
84 Publicity Department of the CCCPC, MRFT and General Administration of Customs, Notification 
to Further Strengthen the Management of Film Production with Foreign Cooperation, Guang Fa 
Wai Zi [1989] No. 190, 23 March 1989, Liu (2015), 110.
85 Jin (2014), 111. This twisted administrative management regime was rooted in the competing 
interests among different administrative departments. The revenue of local film distribution and 
exhibition consisted of the biggest financial source for local cultural departments, which was then 
used to support subsidies for other cultural sectors in the region. Therefore, they refused to give the 
administrative power back to the MRFT. Ji (1999), 234.
86 Tang (2009a), 281.
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4.2  Cinema Marketization
The establishment of the so-called socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics has opened up full-scale legal and institutional reform of cinema and 
led to transition to its marketization, which inevitably has been accompanied by 
conflicts, disorder, and crisis due to the long-existing marriage between films and 
politics and the state monopoly and administrative control over filmmaking.
4.2.1  The 1990 Copyright Law Set Up Basic Copyright Framework 
for the Film Industry
Most significantly, the PRC adopted its first copyright law in 1990, and a basic 
copyright framework was thus set up for the film industry.87 Notably, the copyright 
system in China is neither a pure author’s rights system nor a copyright system, but 
of a hybrid, pragmatic, and issue-based nature. This nature is critical to the under-
standing of film copyright in China. For the subject matter, under great influence 
from the German author’s right system,88 the Chinese Copyright Law expressly 
listed “original films” as a category of works eligible for copyright protection,89 
while the producers of unoriginal “video recordings” were only granted neighbor-
ing rights protection.90 Besides, the specialties of film have been addressed by 
copyright rules. In dealing with the multiple right holders in film production, special 
rules for the authorship and ownership in film works were foreseen. For example, a 
distinction was made between film works and pre-existing works from which the 
film had been adapted, such as novels or dramatic works. To protect film producers’ 
substantial investment and to guarantee a full and active commercialization of film, 
the authors’ moral rights in pre-existing works were restricted. Article 13 
Implementing Regulations (IR) 1991 stated, where the copyright owner has autho-
rized the film adaption based on his or her work, that permission to make necessary 
alteration should be implied, in so far as such alteration does not distort or mutilate 
the original work. In addition, authors of those works that were included in a 
87 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Copyright Law of the PRC [CL 1990], 
issued on 7 September 1990, effective 1 June 1991. This Chinese Copyright Law has been revised 
twice in 2001 and 2010, respectively. For a comphensive overview of the modifications made in the 
2001 revision, see Li and Zhou (2001), 1–23. The 2010 revision was due to the failure on a WTO 
dispute between the US and China for China not protecting audiovisual works with ilicit or 
immoral content and those pending content review. WTO, China-Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Panel, WT/DS326/R (26 January 
2009). For an overview of this issue, see Zhang and Li (2015).
88 The German Copyright Act makes a distinction between original film works (§§2 I lit.6 and 2 II) 
and unoriginal moving images (§95).
89 “Cinematographic, television and video works” in Article 3 No. 5 of the CL 1990. The legal 
definition was given in the Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law of the PRC [IR 1991] 
issued by National Copyright Administration, 30 May 1991, Article 4 No. 9.
90 Article 41 I of the 2001/2010 CL, previously in Article 39 I of CL 1990.
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cinematographic work but can be exploited separately, such as a script, music, etc., 
were allowed to exercise their copyright in such works independently.91
Concerning the authorship of cinematographic works per se, the director, 
scriptwriter, lyricist, composer, cameraman, and other authors were expressly 
identified as authors of a cinematographic, television, or video work and enjoy the 
right of authorship.92 However, instead of strictly following the German author’s 
rights principle,93 the film producer, primarily the state-owned film studios, was 
designated as the initial copyright owner of film works in China,94 partly referencing 
the US work-for-hire doctrine.95 The film producer enjoyed all other copyrights 
vested in the cinematographic works, including the economic rights, which are 
subject to limitations and exceptions.96 While the economic rights of publication, 
exploitation, and remuneration in cinematographic works last for 50 years after the 
first publication,97 the remaining moral rights therein remained perpetual and 
inalienable,98 quite similar to the French approach.99
Indeed, the CL 1990 neither spelt an end of the state-monopolized film production 
and distribution system overnight nor eradicated the problem of piracy once and for 
all. Nonetheless, it was vital for the film industry, because it for the first time confirmed 
in the form of law that the film studios as the film producers should be the copyright 
owner of films they produced and enjoy the proprietary rights of exploitation and 
receiving remuneration derived from films. As a brave first step, the CL 1990 at least 
provided the essential legal basis for the film copyright owner to fight against piracy, 
administrative interference, and other giant copyright exploiters. For example, national 
television stations and broadcasting organizations used to broadcast films even before 
their public screening, and acquired very well-paid advertising revenues, but returned 
only a pitiful portion thereof to film studios, as the administrative authorities had 
treated the issue as no more than putting the money from one’s right pocket into the 
left. Article 44 CL 1990 at least provided the film studios with the specific legal basis 
to grant the broadcasting right and claim fair and reasonable royalties from national 
television stations and broadcasting organizations.100
91 Article 15(2) CL 1990.
92 Article 15(1) CL 1990.
93 The author’s rights principle (Schöpfersprinzip) was expressly recognized by §7 of German 
Copyright Act.
94 Article 15(1) CL 1990.
95 17 USC §101.
96 Article 22 CL 1990.
97 Article 21(3) CL 1990.
98 Article 20 CL 1990.
99 Article L 121-1 French IPC.
100 According to Article 44 CL 1990, a television station which broadcasts a cinematographic, 
television, or video work produced by others should obtain permission from, and pay remuneration 
to, the producer of the cinematographic, television, or video work. This was certainly a big favor 
for film studios in comparison to Articles 40(2) and 43 CL 1990, where the TV stations had 
statutory licensing in the exploitation of other types of published works for the production of a 
radio or television program and had no obligations of securing permission or paying for 
broadcasting a published sound recording for noncommercial purposes.
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4.2.2  Further Reform in Film Distribution, Import, and Production
In implementing the CL 1990, the right to distribute and export feature films was 
given back to the studios, so that studios were able to conclude distribution con-
tracts directly with local distributors, removing the intermediate link of the CFC.101 
Previously, a four-layer distribution network had been in operation from 1949 to 
1992: the CFC → provincial level→ municipal level→ county level.102 The unified 
purchase and distribution system monopolized by the CFC was finally revoked in 
1993. However, given that there was only one distribution channel within each prov-
ince at that time, the studios then had to sell feature films to 31 local distributors at 
the provincial level separately.103 The monopoly of the provincial distributors was 
abolished in 1994, as studios were allowed to sell films to local distributors at all 
levels104 in the hope that competitive distribution would reduce local access barriers 
and transaction costs. However, such measures were not as effective as expected, 
primarily because local distributors and theaters remained state-owned companies 
under the direct administrative control of the provincial distributors.
The CFC started to import ten foreign films every year from 1994 onward to 
revive the ailing domestic box office and shared net box office revenues of imported 
films with foreign film producers and the provincial and municipal distributors and 
exhibitors.105 The strategy to import ten foreign blockbusters did boost the sluggish 
film market, as they immediately became the major contributors to the domestic box 
office revenue despite the small quota. For example, Titanic alone hit RMB 360 mil-
lion, accounting for 40% of total box office revenue for the whole year of 1997, a 
record held for more than 10 years until Avatar in 2010.106 In addition to the protec-
tive measure of the import quota, the screening time of imported films was limited 
to no more than one-third of the overall screening time to protect domestic films.107
With regard to film production, efforts were made to prevent the already stagnant 
domestic film production from being completely knocked down by imported block-
busters. The reform of feature film shooting took place in the mid-1990s. In addition 
to the first expanding film production from 16 approved national studios to include 
certain state-owned film studios at the provincial level in 1995, private entities were 
allowed to be named as “joint producer” if their investment in feature film production 
accounted for more than 70%, although still without an independent filmmaking 
101 MRFT, Several Opinions to Further the Contemporary Reform of the Cinema System, Guang Fa 
Ying Zi [1993] No. 3, 5 January 1993. Tang (2009a), 282.
102 SARFT and Ministry of Culture, Implementation Rules for the Reform of the Film Distribution 
and Exhibition Regime, Guang Fa Ban Zi [2001] No. 1519, 18 December 2001. Liu (2012a), 4.
103 Weng (2009), 57.
104 MRFT, Notification on the Further Deepening Reform of the Cinema System, Guang Dian Zi 
[1994] No. 348, Weng (2009), 57. Tang (2009a), 277, Footnote 1.
105 The import quota of ten revenue-sharing films lasted from 1994 to 2000, with the internationally 
conventional sharing ratio of 35% for CFC, 17% for foreign film producers, and 48% for provincial 
and municipal distributors and exhibitors. Jin (2014), 129. Weng (2009), 57–58.
106 Jin (2014), 129–130.
107 1996 Regulation on Administration of Films, Article 45(2).
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permit.108 Then in 1997, all state-owned provincial film studios, certain qualified 
municipal film studios, TV stations, and TV series makers were allowed to apply for 
the single feature film production license.109 However, domestic film production still 
heavily relied on state subsidies.110 More than 70% of the domestic films could hardly 
recover the production costs, let alone compete with imported blockbusters. As a 
result, only about 40 feature films were produced from 1997 to 1998.111
4.2.3  A Comprehensive Prior Approval System for Films
Due to domestic social and political unrest and international pressure, the 
government re-emphasized the stability of the social and political structure112 and 
reinforced the control of films by administrative and economic means after the 1996 
National Cinema Conference in Changsha.113 Above all, the State Council issued 
the first special regulation on films in 1996  – the Regulation on Film 
Administration114 – to establish a comprehensive prior approval system for produc-
tion, distribution, exhibition, import, and export of films, including the conditions 
and process for approval and legal consequences of approval and disapproval. 
Moreover, the ex ante and ex post film censorship system and explicit criteria for 
content review were put in place.115 In particular, film scripts must be filed on record 
before shooting, the completed film submitted for content review, and the Film 
Public Screening Permit be issued upon approval by the censors.116
In addition to administrative intervention, the government also subsidized the 
9550 Project of producing 50 mainstream films in 5 years from 1996 to 2001 to 
strengthen the ideological and propaganda function of cinema.117 Again in 1998, 
special funding for the production of films on important subjects was provided for 
the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.118 Moreover, the 
mainstream ideology became a more and more important criterion for the three 
most prestigious film awards in China, namely, the “Huabiao Awards,” “Golden 
Rooster Awards,” and “Hundred Flowers Awards.”119
108 MRFT, Rules for the Reform on Feature Film Shooting Management, Guang Fa Ying Zi [1995] 
No. 001, 05 January 1995.
109 Tang (2009a), 285.
110 Tang (2009a), 285.
111 Zhang (2004), 284; Yin (2001), 27 and 31–32. Liu and Wang (2012), 5.
112 Yin and Ling (2002), 160.
113 Yin and Ling (2002), 199.
114 State Council, Regulation on Film Administration, [1996] No. 200, 19 June 1996. It was revised 
in 2001, [2001] No. 342, 25 December 2001.
115 1996 Regulation on Film Administration, chapter 3; MRFT, Rules for Film Censorship, [1997] 
No. 22, 16 January 1997.
116 1996 Regulation on Film Administration, Articles 25–28.
117 Yin and Ling (2002), 199.
118 Tang (2009a), 285.
119 Yin and Ling (2002), 153–154.
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4.3  Industrialization
4.3.1  Further Liberalization of Import and Distribution of Foreign 
Films
Since the start of the twenty-first century, the industrialization of Chinese cinema 
has made significant progress. Far-reaching reform has continued. The film import 
quota of foreign movies increased from 10 to 20 each year in 2001 when China 
acceded to the WTO. Under pressure from Hollywood, the annual quota was raised 
to 34 in 2012, 14 of which must be 3D or IMAX films. The revenue-sharing ratio of 
the American companies increased from 13% to 17.5% to 25%.120 Besides, with the 
launch of the Huaxia Film Distribution Co. in 2003, the film distribution market of 
foreign films turned from monopoly by the CFC121 to duopoly. To date, CFC and 
Huaxia remain the only two that possess SARFT-conferred licenses to distribute 
foreign films in China.
4.3.2  Nationwide Cinema Chains
A new cinema chain regime that built several movie theater chains across different 
regions was established in 2002122 to further reduce the transaction costs created by 
unnecessary intermediaries within the same region and bring competition in cross- 
region distribution.123 Further, it was finally possible in 2003 for private companies 
to operate as legitimate independent distributors, after 7 years as agents of such 
distributors.124 Private companies are currently the leading force in distributing 
domestic films. In 2015, the top ten private distribution companies had an 84.9% 
share of the market in domestic film distribution, contributing RMB 22.98 billion in 
box office revenue, 52.1% of the total box office revenue in 2015.125 The M&A and 
restructuring from 2004 to 2008 have formed nationwide cinema chains and led to 
concentration.126 The booming screening market and the intense competition have 
created a tremendous driving force for the expansion of cinema chains to cover 
small and medium cities and rural areas.127
120 China-US Memorandum of Understanding resolving the WTO film-related issues, Geneva, 25 
April 2012.
121 SARFT and Ministry of Culture, Implementation Rules for the Reform of the Film Distribution 
and Exhibition Regime, Guang Fa Ban Zi [2001] No. 1519, 18 December 2001. Weng (2009), 58; 
Liu (2012b), 8.
122 State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (“SARFT”) and Ministry of Culture, 
Implementation Rules for the Reform of the Film Distribution and Exhibition Regime, Guang Fa \
Ban Zi [2001] No. 1519, 18 December 2001.
123 Weng (2009), 58.
124 Although the 1996 Regulation on Administration of Films allowed private capital to be invested 
in the film distribution channel, it was not until 2003 that the legitimate status of the seven private 
companies was confirmed as independent distributors for the first time. Weng (2009), 59.
125 Wisdomfish, China’s Film Industry Annual Report 2015, 1.1.1 and 1.1.5.
126 Tang (2009a), 288–289. Liu (2012a), 6–7.
127 Liu (2012a), 4–5.
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In addition, a new era of digital film distribution started in 2004 when SARFT 
announced the development pillars of film digitization from 2004 to 2010 to promote 
the digitization of film production, to establish the digital distribution network, to 
improve the construction of digital cinemas, and to accelerate the localization of the 
manufacture of related equipment and software.128 In exploring the multimedia 
network of distribution via television, Internet and mobile terminals, and theatrical 
distribution, China’s cinema is approaching the age of mega- industry.129 The number 
of cinema screens increased to 41,179 in 2016, which was for the first time more 
than those in the USA.130
4.3.3  Further Liberalization of Film Production
Most importantly, the threshold for filmmaking was lowered, and investment 
sources were diversified to allow private and foreign capital.131 In particular, the 
2001 Regulation on Film Administration provided non-film studios with the Single 
Film Production Permit, so that private entities could obtain independent qualifica-
tion for filmmaking132 and soon became key players in domestic film production. In 
2002 alone, five private companies obtained 58 permits, and 32 out of the 100 
domestic films produced in that year came from private companies such as Huayi 
Brothers Media Corporation and Beijing New Pictures.133 Besides, the restrictions 
on Sino-foreign film co-production were further relaxed.134 Also, the 2006 Rules for 
Film Script (Outline) Filing and Film Administration135 simplified the script review 
and filing process, as the film script or outline merely needed to be filed for the 
record, only the completed films had to go through the review and approval process, 
and the centralized film censorship power was partly transferred to the provincial 
level. This film censorship system has been generally reconfirmed by the 2016 Film 
Industry Promotion Law.136
128 SARFT, Development Outline of Film Digitization, Guang Fa Ying Zi [2004] No. 257, 18 
March 2004.
129 Weng (2009), 59.
130 Wisdomfish, China’s Film Industry Annual Report 2016, 2.1.1. Entgroup, China Film Industry 
Report 2015–2016 (In Brief), 5.1.1.
131 Yin and Liang (2012), 5. Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Culture, Provisional Rules for 
Foreign Investment in Cinemas, [2003] No. 21, 25 November 2003; SARFT and Ministry of 
Commerce, Provisional Rules on the Entry Criteria for Operating Film Enterprises, [2004] No. 43, 
10 October 2004.
132 State Council, Regulation on Administration of Films, [2001] No. 342, 25 December 2001, 
Article 16. SARFT, Interim Provisions on the Access Qualifications for Film Production, 
Distribution and Exhibition, [2003] No. 20, 29 October 2003, Article 3.
133 Yin and Liang (2012), 7.
134 SARFT, Measures for Administration of Sino-Foreign Film Co-Production, [2003] No. 19, 10 
August 2003. For rules governing co-production between Mainland China and Hong Kong, see 1.2.
135 SARFT, Rules for Film Script (Outline) Filing and Film Administration, [2006] No. 52, 22 May 
2006.
136 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Film Industry Promotion Law, Order 
No. 54 of the President, 7 November 2016, chapter 2.
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The abovementioned macro reforms improved the productivity and market 
adaptability of Chinese film production. The number of produced feature films 
increased ten times from around 40 in 1997 to 402 in 2007, and annual production 
ranked third worldwide after the USA and India.137 However, the growth rate of film 
production has slowed down due to the saturated screening market starting in 
2008.138 While the rapid increase in film production from 2002 to 2011 indicated 
robust market demand and the optimism of investors, blind investment in films and 
unprofessional filmmaking by small- and medium-sized private enterprises (SME) 
became a serious problem. For example, SME produced 354 of 558 films (63.44%) 
in 2011, only 13.84% of which were released in movie theaters, and only one of 
which generated box office revenue above RMB 100 million.139
Therefore, the industrial reform in film production was then transformed and 
continues to focus more and more on enhancing the quality, market performance, 
and diversity of feature films, rather than on increasing the quantity. As a result, 
seven major state-owned film groups that integrated film production, distribution, 
and exhibition channels across different regions were established between 1999 and 
2008.140 After determined and dedicated efforts for a decade since 2002, private film 
studios were facilitated by the capital market and became core players in domestic 
film production.141 In 2012, large private film studios produced only 22 films, yet 
had a high theatrical release rate of 95.45%, and seven films generated box office 
revenue above RMB 100 million.142 Currently, films produced by large state-owned 
film group corporations, large private film studios, and films co-produced by domes-
tic and foreign capital are the main contributors to domestic box office revenues.
From 2002 to present, industrial standards and market order have been built up 
through the rule of laws and regulations, rather than through administrative instruc-
tions and cultural policies. In 2006, the film industry was named the number one of 
the nine critical cultural industries by the Culture Development Program of the 11th 
Five-Year National Plan (2006–2010).143 In 2009, the revitalization of the film 
industry became one of the national strategic development programs.144 In 2010, a 
new objective was set up to realize the historical transformation from a large-scale 
to a robust and competitive Chinese cinema industry.145 In the same year, the total 
137 Yin and Liang (2012), 5–6.
138 Yin and Liang (2012), 6.
139 Liu and Wang (2012), 11 and 13.
140 SARFT and Ministry of Culture, Several Opinions on Further Deepening the Reform of the 
Film Industry, Guang Fa Ying Zi [2000] No. 320, 6 June 2000. Tang (2009a), 287. In particular, the 
China Film Group Corporation (CFGC) replaced the CFC in 1999.
141 Yao and Li (2017), 19.
142 Liu and Wang (2012), 11 and 13.
143 General Office of the CCCPC and General Office of State Council, “Culture Development 
Program during the 11th Five-Year National Plan Period” (2006–2010), 13 September 2006.
144 General Office of the State Council, “Plan on the Reinvigoration of the Cultural Industry”, 26 
September 2009.
145 General Office of the State Council, Guidance Opinions for Promoting the Prosperity and 
Development of Film Industry, Guo Ban Fa [2010] No. 9, 21 January 2010.
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box office revenue of domestic cinema surpassed RMB 10  billion for the first 
time.146 In 2014, favorable economic and tax policies were issued to support further 
development of the film industry.147 Eventually, the 2016 Film Industry Promotion 
Law confirmed and updated the ongoing development directions of Chinese cinema 
in the form of law.
4.3.4  Internet Giants Are Swarming into the Film Industry
In China, the film industry and other upstream and downstream interested parties 
are adapting themselves to the digital audiovisual market by resorting to creative 
market solutions within the copyright regime. A good example is that major Internet 
giants such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (the so-called BAT) have been swarming 
into the film industry, bringing with them big data, technology, funding, platforms, 
and fundamental changes to audiovisual services, transforming their business mod-
els from providing illegal content to legal but free (ad-sponsored) content and to 
legal and paid premium content. As a result, they not only provide instantaneous 
access to quality films and make enforcement of copyright against piracy easy but 
also fundamentally change consumers’ behavior and habits in digital content con-
sumption and help to set up an industrial code or self-regulation for the digital film 
market.148
4.3.5  Film Copyright
To date, a comprehensive copyright framework in line with the international 
obligations (concerning cinematographic works and copyright protection in general) 
has been established. Moreover, copyright enforcement has been further enhanced 
by the addition of protection for rights management information149 and against the 
 circumvention of effective technological measures,150 the imposition of criminal 
liabilities for film piracy that prejudices public interests,151 and the clarification of 
146 Liu (2011), 17.
147 Ministry of Finance, the General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television and other Departments, Notice on Several Economic Policies for Supporting Film 
Development, Cai Jiao [2014] No. 56, 31 May 2014.
148 This could be an instructive example to overcome the dilemma of copyright enforcement against 
online piracy. See also Banerjee A (2019), XXX. In this way, the role of video platforms or search 
engine providers has been changed from pirates or intermediaries to stakeholders. As a result, the 
copyright enforcement measures are now taken to safeguard their own interests instead of fulfilling 
legal obligations.
149 Article 47 No. 7 CL 2001 (currently Article 48 No. 7 CL 2010): anyone who commits any of the 
following acts of infringement… (7) intentionally deleting or altering the electronic right 
management information of a work, sound recording or video recording, without the permission of 
the copyright owner or the administrative regulation.
150 Article 47 No. 6 CL 2001 (currently Article 48 No. 6 CL 2010): anyone who commits any of the 
following acts of infringement… (6) intentionally circumventing or destroying the technological 
measures taken by a right holder for protecting the copyright or copyright-related rights in his 
work, sound recording or video recording, without the permission of the copyright owner or the 
owner of the copyright-related rights, unless otherwise provided in law or in administrative 
regulations.
151 Article 47 CL 2001 in conjunction with Articles 217 No. (1) and 218 of the Criminal Law, Li 
and Zhou (2001), 167–187.
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calculation methods for damages.152 More and more, copyright law is playing a 
significant role in the furtherance of cinema industrialization. To avoid overly com-
plicated rules on film authorship and ownership, Article 15(1) CL 2010 makes some 
modifications and provides that the film producer is the initial and sole copyright 
owner who can exercise and enforce the copyright attached to the film with full 
competence, except for the right of authorship. The exclusive rights of the film 
producer expanded to include the rental right,153 the right of screening,154 and the 
right of communication to the public through the information network.155 In addition 
to the right of authorship, the 2001 Copyright Law accorded the authors of 
cinematographic works the right to receive remuneration.156 Nonetheless, physical 
and online film piracy remains one of the biggest threats to the film industry in 
China, as box office revenue constitutes “the vast majority” of the total revenue for 
the film industry.157
5  Challenges Ahead
The initial illustrative listing of copyright-protected works included 
“cinematographic, television and video works” (Article 3 No. 5 CL 1990).158 In 
addition, those which do not qualify as copyright-protected video works were 
recognized as “video recordings” and enjoyed neighboring right (Article 39(2) CL 
1990). The terms “cinematographic, television, and video works” were replaced by 
the more generalized term “cinematographic works and works created by a process 
analogous to cinematography” in 2001,159 under the condition that those works were 
“recorded on a certain medium material.”160 Yet, the filming technology per se 
should be irrelevant in determining the copyright protection eligibility of a work.161 
It is therefore proposed in the third draft of the third revision of the Chinese 
Copyright Law in 2014 to replace the distinction between “cinematographic works 
and works created by a process analogous to cinematography” and video recordings 
altogether with a general work category of “audiovisual works” and to abandon the 
152 Calculation methods of damage include actual losses, infringer’s profits, and statutory damages 
with a ceiling of RMB 500,000, Article 48 CL 2001 (currently Article 49 CL 2010).
153 Expressly in Article 10 (1) No. 7 CL 2001/2010, in accordance with Article 11 TRIPS.
154 Article 10 (10) No. 7 CL 2001/2010.
155 Article 10 (1) No. 12 CL 2001/2010, in accordance with Article 8 WIPO Copyright Convention 
(the right of making available to the public).
156 Article 15 (1) CL 2001/2010.
157 For studies on copyright enforcement against film piracy, both online and offline, and alternative 
solutions in practice, see Priest (2006) and (2014).
158 The illustrative expressions of “cinematographic, television and video works” were initially 
used in proximity of daily language, Zheng and Pendleton (1991), 76. Zheng CS (2009), 
127–128.
159 Article 3 No. 6 CL 2001/2010.
160 Article 4 No. 9 IR 1991, and Article 4 No. 11 IR 2002/2013.
161 Wang (2015), 107; Li and Xu (2003), 41.
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“recorded on a certain medium” requirement.162 However, the revision of the 
Copyright Law does not seem to be high on the agenda of the National People’s 
Congress, and no enactment can be expected in the near future. Currently, some 
court decisions have set rather high “originality” and “fixation” standards for films, 
which worries the industry and academics.163
Another challenge is how to design the rules of authorship and ownership in film 
works. There are commonly three approaches in this regard. The first treats a film as 
a pure authorial work, and the film producer is neither author nor initial copyright 
owner of the film. For example, the German Copyright Act adopts the general cre-
ator’s principle and provides no exceptions for film works.164 As a result, natural 
persons who have made intellectually creative contributions to film works should be 
(joint) authors. With respect to the protection of the film producer, the German 
Copyright Act merely provides that in cases of doubt, joint authors of the film work 
should be assumed to have granted the producer of the film the exclusive right to use 
in all manners the cinematographic work in Article 89(1) and grants the film pro-
ducer further protection of neighboring rights in video recordings in Article 94.
Alternatively, motion pictures can be considered entrepreneurial works, and the 
film producer is the sole author and copyright owner. In this regard, the “work made 
for hire” doctrine is the cornerstone in the US Copyright Act. In particular, § 201(b) 
of the US Copyright Act provides that in the case of a work made for hire, the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author 
for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in 
a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copy-
right. As a result, film producer can be recognized as the initial copyright owner of 
film and other audiovisual works in the USA.
The third approach recognizes films as “a hybrid of entrepreneurial and authorial 
works.”165 On the one hand, the British Copyright Act specifies the producer and the 
principal director as statutory joint authors for films made on or after 1 July 1994.166 
On the other, where a film is made by an employee in the course of employment, the 
employer (often the film producer) is assumed to be the first owner of the copyright 
in the film, subject to any agreement to the contrary.167 Hong Kong follows the same 
rules.
162 Article 5 No. 12, Revision Draft 2014.
163 For example, (2015) Jin Zi Min Zhong 1818 decision by the Beijing IP Court (decided on March 
30, 2018).
164 The German Copyright Act applies strictly the creator’s principle (Schöferprinzip) in Article 7 
that only a natural person who actually creates a work can be the author of the work. The creator’s 
principle applies to commissioned works and works made for hire. Dreier/Schulze, UrhG, §7 paras 
2, 4, and 7.
165 Bently and Sherman (2014), 128.
166 CDPA 1988, ss 9(2)(ab) and 10(1A).
167 CDPA 1988, s 11(2).
L. Wei and Y. Li
141
China has chosen the third approach in Article 15 CL 2010.168 Article 15(1) 
specifies the film producer as the statutory copyright owner in cinematographic 
works and at the same time expressly recognizes the scriptwriter, director, 
cameraman, lyricist, and composer as film authors. Notably, all three approaches 
provide merely legal assumption of ownership. However, a single statutory rule 
such as Article 15(1) is questionable, considering that the allocation of copyright in 
films is mostly dealt with using contractual agreement in practice. Therefore, a 
flexible legal assumption that prioritizes the contractual agreement among the 
interested parties on the ownership in films would be more desirable.169 In addition, 
despite the fact that the British hybrid approach is a compromise in compliance with 
Article 2(1) of the Term Directive,170 both German and the US rules of authorship 
and ownership in film works are consistent with their traditional copyright theories 
and the existing copyright systems. In comparison, the CL 2010 has already 
introduced both the rules for works of joint authorship in Article 13(1), like the 
German approach, and the rules for works made in the course of employment in 
Article 16, similar to the US and UK approaches. Nonetheless, an additional 
provision – Article 15 – was made to solely deal with the authorship and ownership 
issues for film works, which however would cause overlaps and even competing 
rules in practice. It would be dogmatically clearer and more precise to first resort to 
the existing rules in line with the copyright theories, and only make an exceptional 
rule should the application of the existing rules be insufficient or cause confusion. 
This is undoubtedly a higher requirement in terms of legislative wisdom and 
technique.
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The Hong Kong film industry portrayed itself as an international film powerhouse 
during its golden age. Its light was dimmed on account of the industry’s director-
centered production system, prevailing investor pressure, weak infrastructure, 
political and economic conditions, popularity of foreign films, and rampant piracy. 
The Hong Kong government established infrastructural solutions and financial 
remedies to alleviate the industry’s plight. Despite those laudable efforts, success 
has been limited. The key to restoring the film industry to its former glory lies in 
reforming the traditional Hong Kong copyright framework, including reconstruct-
ing the copyright ownership rule, providing breathing space for secondary cre-
ation, and decriminalizing individual, noncommercial online sharing.
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1  Introduction
Once celebrated for its strong cultural identity and dynamism,1 the Hong Kong film 
industry’s popularity has declined since its prime in the 1980s and the early 1990s.2 
The decline was rooted in various political, economic, and social factors. This chap-
ter shall explore the rise and fall of the Hong Kong film industry as well as Hong 
Kong’s efforts to revive its film industry and examine the inadequacies of the tradi-
tional Hong Kong copyright framework and the role of copyright law in establishing 
a better future for the Hong Kong film industry.
2  Hong Kong Film Industry: Growth and Decline
The Hong Kong film industry finds its roots in Cantonese opera.3 The earliest films – 
Stealing a Roasted Duck (1909), Right a Wrong with an Earthenware Dish (1909), 
and Zhuangzi Tests His Wife (1913) – were based on notable operatic scenes.4 Later 
on, Mandarin features from China influenced the local film industry as a result of 
the Second World War and Chinese civil war (1945–1949).5 Under British colonial 
rule, Hong Kong was deemed a safe haven of “social order and freedom,”6 thus 
attracting capital, talent, and “sophisticated production techniques from the 
Mainland.”7 This led to the development of Mandarin production powerhouses such 
as the Shaw Brothers and Motion Picture and General Investment Company Limited 
in Hong Kong.8 However, the elaborate production value of Mandarin films proved 
to be detrimental to smaller local Cantonese films,9 resulting in the gradual absence 
of the latter in the film industry. Despite this, the industry flourished in the 1950s 
and 1960s “with an average production of over 200 films a year.”10
The local film industry experienced a shift in the 1970s. After the stoppage of 
Cantonese film production in 1971–1973,11 the local film industry not only turned 
around but achieved international fame with the introduction of Cantonese kung fu 
1 Joseph M. Chan, et al., Policies for the Sustainable Development of the Hong Kong 
Film Industry 9 (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2010).
2 Id. at 17.
3 Id. at 14.
4 Yi Tang, A Bird Known By Its Note: Identity Legitimacy, Network Dynamics, and Actor 
Performance in the Hong Kong Film Industry, 1970–1997, at 15 (May 2009) (unpublished PhD 
dissertation, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology).
5 Chan, supra note 1, at 14.
6 Id.
7 Tang, supra note 4, at 16. Chan, supra note 1, at 15.
8 Id.
9 Robert Chi, Hong Kong Cinema Before 1980, in A Companion to Chinese Cinema 80 (Yingjin 
Zhang ed., 2012).
10 Chan, supra note 1, at 15.
11 Chi, supra note 9, at 80.
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films.12 The introduction of homegrown talents Bruce Lee, Sammo Hung, and 
Jackie Chan forever changed the landscape of the industry.13 It characterized kung 
fu as the “signature brand of Hong Kong films.”14 The late 1970s welcomed “New 
Wave” directors in the likes of Ann Hui, Yim Ho, Tsui Hark, Patrick Tam, Allen 
Fong, and Alex Cheung.15 This new generation of innovative directors “brought 
about a fresh, more personal approach”16 which vastly improved the quality of 
domestic films.17 It likewise catapulted the industry to international and critical 
acclaim at film festivals.18
The golden age of the industry took place in the 1980s to the early 1990s. During 
this period, it earned the moniker “Hollywood of the Far East”19 by producing an 
average of 400 films a year20 and surpassing India as the largest exporter of films in 
Asia.21 It experienced rapid commercial success in both local and overseas mar-
kets.22 It produced immensely popular movies such as The Shaolin Temple (1982), 
Project A (1983), Police Story (1985), City on Fire (1987), Rouge (1987), A Chinese 
Ghost Story (1987), The Greatest Lover (1988), Bullet in the Head (1990), Once 
Upon in China (1991), Full Contact (1992), and Chungking Express (1994). This 
period likewise saw the rise of independent production companies and domestically 
focused cinema circuits23 and the emergence of idol-actors who “established a com-
manding presence at regional box offices.”24
However, the mid-1990s witnessed the drastic decline of the industry. In its 
efforts to meet the skyrocketing demand of the market, the industry sought to 
appease its principal investors by inhibiting creativity and resorting to unpolished 
formulaic productions.25 This led to overproduced films devoid of any “sensational 
impact and visceral stimulation,”26 thus causing dwindling profits and loss of inter-
national acclaim at foreign film festivals.27
12 Chan, supra note 1, at 15.
13 Id. at 16.
14 Id.
15 Gina Marchetti, The Hong Kong New Wave, in A Companion to Chinese Cinema 96 (Yingjin 
Zhang ed., 2012).
16 Id.
17 Chan, supra note 1, at 17.
18 e.g. Id.; Marchetti, supra note 16, at 97.
19 Mainland Offers Hong Kong’s Film Industry A Chance for a Brighter Future, South China 
Morning Post, Mar. 18, 2018, available at https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/
article/2137677/mainland-offers-hong-kongs-film-industry-chance-brighter
20 Id.
21 Tang, supra note 4, at 15.
22 Chan, supra note 1, at 17. “The annual box office takings of local films soared from HK$184 
million in 1980 to HK$878 million in 1989 and reached an apex of HK$1.2 billion in 1992.”.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 18.
26 Id.
27 Mainland Offers Hong Kong’s Film Industry a Chance for a Brighter Future, supra note 19.
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The industry has yet to recover, as manifested in the fraction of films produced 
and the drop in box office receipts. Production output declined to 242 films in 1993, 
92 films in 1998, and eventually a record low of 55 films in 2005.28 In 1992, the total 
box office receipts reached HK$1552 million, with HK$1240 million contributed 
by Hong Kong films and HK$312 million contributed by foreign films.29 The reve-
nues declined to HK$1051  million in 2007, with HK$831  million from foreign 
films and HK$220 million from local films.30 After a slow recovery, the receipts 
increased to HK$1558 million in 2012 and to HK$1986 million in 201531 (Fig. 1). 
The number gradually increased to HK$1947 million in 2016 and HK$1853 million 
in 201732 (Fig. 2).
Although the total box office receipts in recent years have been higher than at the 
industry’s peak in 1992, it should be noted that the increase is attributable to receipts 
of foreign films, and not domestic films. In fact, foreign films contribute nearly 80% 
of the total revenue.33
The decline in box office receipts is further manifested in the top ten box office 
results. First Strike, a film produced by Hong Kong-based Golden Harvest movie 
28 Chan, supra note 1, at 12, 14.
29 Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 





32 HKTDC, Film & Entertainment Industry in Hong Kong (Mar. 15, 2018), available at http://
hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Hong-Kong-Industry-Profiles/
Film-Entertainment-Industry-in-Hong-Kong/hkip/en/1/1X000000/1X0018PN.htm  (last accessed 
Aug. 8, 2018) 
33 Id.
Fig. 1 Box office in Hong Kong by film category. (Data sources: Census and Statistics Department 
and Commerce and Economic Development Bureau)
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studio, ranked as the highest-grossing film in the domestic market in 1996. In the 
same year, four other Hong Kong films placed in the top ten box office list. In con-
trast, only one Hong Kong film (The Mermaid), co-produced with the Mainland, 
appeared on the 2016 top ten box office list34 (Fig. 3).
The Hong Kong film industry’s performance at international film festivals was 
likewise affected. The film industry last submitted entries to the Cannes Film 
Festival in 2009, to the Berlin International Film Festival in 2008, and to the Venice 
Film Festival in 2011.35
The decline is attributable to the core model of the Hong Kong film industry and 
several external factors. The “conservative and opportunistic outlook”36 of the 
industry inhibits innovation, thus resulting in overproduction. The lack of infra-
structure in both production37 and distribution38 aspects hinders the development of 
34 Celine Ge, It’s Fade Out for Hong Kong’s Film Industry as China Moves into the Spotlight, 
South China Morning Post, Jul. 28, 2017, available at http://www.scmp.com/business/arti-
cle/2104540/its-fade-out-hong-kongs-film-industry-china-moves-spotlight
35 Hong Kong Free Press, A Glimmer of Hope for Young Filmmakers in Hong Kong’s Fading 
Industry, available at https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/11/05/
glimmer-hope-young-filmmakers-hong-kongs-fading-industry
36 Chan, supra note 1, at 22.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, supra note 29.
Fig. 2 Number of films released and box office receipts. (Source: Hong Kong Box Office Ltd.)
Fig. 3 Top 10 box office hits in Hong Kong for 1996 and 2016. (Source: Box Office Mojo, Hong 
Kong Box Office)
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the film industry from within. Moreover, its “director-centered production system”39 
causes a drain in technical and artistic talent.40 External factors include the political 
and economic landscape after Hong Kong’s handover to China,41 strong competi-
tion from foreign films,42 and rampant piracy.43
2.1  Factors Within the Core Model of the Hong Kong Film 
Industry
The core model is characterized by a director-centered production system coupled 
with investor pressure and a weakening industry infrastructure. These factors 
resulted in the decrease in the quality of local films.
From previously well-established production houses, the film industry produc-
tion style is now that of “a cottage industry compris[ing] independent productions 
known for its filmmakers’ frantic work style.”44 The director-centered production 
system results in a form of “guerrilla filmmaking,” in which directors dive into the 
filmmaking process armed with solely a general plot or storyline.45 He or she impro-
vises throughout the process without any completed scripts.46 This process under-
mines the value and the creative integrity of scriptwriters,47 which often results in a 
39 David Desser, Triads and Changing Times: The National Allegory of Hong Kong Cinema, 1996–
2000, 26 QRFV 179, 186 (2009) (“The director-centered nature of boutique production”); Mirana 
M. Szeto & Yun-chung Chen, To Work or Not to Work: The Dilemma of Hong Kong Film Labor 
in the Age of Mainlandization, 55 JUMP CUT 1, 3–4, 12 (2013), available at https://www.
researchgate.net/profile/Yun_Chung_Chen2/publication/258967573_To_work_or_not_to_work_
t h e _ dilemma_of_Hong_Kong_film_labor_in_the_age_of_mainlandization/l inks/ 
5670d2fe08ae2b1f87acf85a/To-work-or-not-to-work-the-dilemma-of-Hong-Kong-film-labor-in-the-
age-of-mainlandization.pdf (“The ‘director subcontracting’ model features a mixed system (1970–
1990), under which “apart from controlling the basic theme and the budget limit, studios remain 
hands-off, leaving hiring and other decision making to the director.” “The flexible independent 
system (1990s) and the following cross-border production (2000s) were featured by the ‘director-
centered’ model.” “Traditionally, the director-centered production system has dominated Hong 
Kong film production, making collective creativity difficult.”); Cindy S. C. Chan, Housekeeper of 
Hong Kong Cinema: The Role of Producer in the System of Hong Kong Film Industry, 2 WIDE 
SCREEN 1, 1–2, 7–8 (2010) (“directors routinely started shooting without completed scripts and 
improvisation on the set was the norm... the directors, instead of the producers, [were] centers of 
power and creative control... In Hong Kong cinema, the producer, not positioned in [a] vertical 
relationship with the director, is no auteur or brand name.”).
40 Chan, supra note 1, at 21.
41 Vivienne Chow, Handover Hangover: Hong Kong’s Film Industry Faces an Uncertain Future, 
VARIETY (May 17, 2017), available at http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/wong-kar-wai- 
1202430867-1202430867
42 LegCo, supra note 29.
43 Id.






drain of talent. Directors, investors, and even actors participate in “script- 
butchering,”48 often diluting the storyline. Despite the establishment of the Hong 
Kong Screenwriters’ Guild (HKSWG) in 1991, scriptwriters remain weak and 
unprotected due to the absence of the right to collective bargaining.49 Famous actors 
like Chow Yun Fat have vowed never to return to Hong Kong unless the scripts are 
better.50
Additionally, many filmmakers have succumbed to investors’ pressure on deci-
sions over cast and content.51 This has proved to be detrimental to the industry, since 
it has inhibited creativity and resulted in an “over-heated and over-exploited” mar-
ket.52 The pressure to create one blockbuster hit after another has led to lackluster 
and formulaic films. As a result, the interest of the viewing public has waned, ulti-
mately affecting the demand for Hong Kong films.53
The overall poor infrastructure of the industry, particularly in terms of education, 
production, and distribution, explains the industry’s inability to keep up with their 
foreign counterparts. Hong Kong lacks educational facilities for film staff,54 which 
leads to brain drain. The production infrastructure is marked by a lack of technical 
facilities for postproduction and distribution.55 This has forced the industry to out-
source these services to foreign countries,56 thus affecting Hong Kong’s position as 
a leading film hub. With regard to distribution, the dearth of local cinemas has also 
greatly spurred the decline of the industry. Cinemas have dramatically declined in 
number from 119 in 1993 to 47 in 2015 (Fig. 4), and the number of screens available 
per 100,000 persons ranks second lowest compared to other major Asian cities 
(Fig. 5).57
2.2  External Factors
Apart from issues within the industry, external factors have likewise contributed to 
the decline. A fundamental reason is the changes arising from the political and eco-
nomic climate in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s reunification with China in 1997 
48 Szeto & Chen, supra note 39, at 12.
49 Id. at 5
50 Hong Kong Movie Industry, Martial Arts Films, Triads and Ghosts, Facts and Details, available 
at http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat7/sub42/item244.html
51 Chan, supra note 1, at 18.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Ge, supra note 34.
55 Chan, supra note 1, at 21. LegCo, supra note 29.
56 Chan, supra note 1, at 21.
57 Legislative Council Brief on Facilitating Cinema Development, LC Paper No. 
CB(4)801/16–17(05), available at https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/panels/itb/papers/
itb20170410cb4-801-5-e.pdf (last accessed Jul. 26, 2018).
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signified its access to and economic integration with the Mainland market.58 
However, the onslaught of the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the SARS epidemic 
heavily affected the Hong Kong film industry, causing an economic crisis.59
The Mainland offered to boost Hong Kong’s economy and strengthen trade rela-
tions between the two sides and entered into the Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003 with Hong Kong.60 Under CEPA, Hong Kong and the 
Mainland developed bilateral rules governing the quota limitations and co- 
productions of Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland.61
58 Chi, supra note 9, at 81.
59 Chow, supra note 41.
60 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT, available at https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/further_liberal.
html
61 Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Annex 4, 2. Communication Services.
Fig. 4 Number of cinemas, screens, and seats in Hong Kong from 1993 to 2015. (Source: 
Legislative Council Brief Facilitating Cinema Development LC Paper No. CB(4)801/16-17(05))
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Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong may be imported for 
distribution in the Mainland on a quota-free basis, after vetting and approval by the 
relevant Mainland authority.62 The benefit does not apply to every Hong Kong film. 
CEPA defines “Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong” as those 
“made by production companies which are set up or established in accordance with 
the relevant laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and which own 
more than 75% of the copyright of the motion pictures concerned.”63 It further 
requires that more than 50% of the total principal personnel involved in the particu-
lar film be Hong Kong residents.64
CEPA introduced co-productions between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
Co-produced films are considered to be “Mainland motion pictures for the purpose 
of distribution in the Mainland.”65 No limits are imposed on the “percentage of prin-




2. Chinese language motion pictures produced in Hong Kong refer to those motion pictures 
made by production companies which are set up or established in accordance with the relevant 
laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and which own more than 75% of the copy-
right of the motion pictures concerned. Hong Kong residents should constitute more than 50% of 
the total principal personnel in the motion pictures concerned.
65 Id.
3. Motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the Mainland are treated as Mainland 
motion pictures for the purpose of distribution in the Mainland. Translated versions of the motion 
pictures in languages of other Chinese ethnic groups and Chinese dialects, which are based on the 
Putonghua (Mandarin Chinese) version, are allowed to be distributed in the Mainland.
66 Id.
Fig. 5 Comparison with some major cities in Asia. (Source: Legislative Council Brief Facilitating 
Cinema Development LC Paper No. CB(4)801/16-17(05)
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one- third of the leading artistes must be from the Mainland.”67 It also requires that 
storylines and main characters to be associated with the Mainland.68
The Hong Kong film industry believed that CEPA would revitalize the film 
industry. While CEPA opened the massive Mainland Chinese market to Hong Kong- 
produced films, increased investments, and generated more jobs,69 it also inhibited 
freedom in the creative process by means of censorship. This translated to revising 
plot lines and casting actors appealing to the massive Mainland market, regardless 
of their allure to the local market.70 Ultimately, the appeal of the massive Mainland 
Chinese market drove some Hong Kong filmmakers to forfeit their artistic integrity 
and creative freedom, to the detriment of the Hong Kong film industry’s distinct 
identity.71
The ease of co-production improved the business performance of the Hong Kong 
film industry. At least 50% of Hong Kong films were co-productions with filmmak-
ers from the Mainland, and these co-produced films generated more box office 
receipts, at HK$234 million.72 However, co-production comes with the price of 
regulation by Mainland film censorship authorities.73 This effectively restricted 
expression and creativity shared through film, diminishing the distinct flavor of 
locally produced films. Consequently, the interest of local audiences waned due to 
the absence of cultural relevance and diversity in Hong Kong films.74
Another contributing factor is the influx and rising popularity of foreign films 
from Hollywood, as well as Bollywood and other neighboring countries. On account 
of Hollywood’s “newly aggressive push…in the Asian market,”75 local films had 
great difficulty in sustaining its market size.76 In 2015, 80% of box office receipts 
were held by foreign films, while only 20% were held by local films.77 This demon-
strates consumers’ loss of interest in Hong Kong films and increasing appetite for 
“fast-paced and star-studded Hollywood mega productions.”78
The decline is also attributable to piracy. The Hong Kong film industry has been 
a victim of rampant piracy. Bootlegged VCDs and DVDs collectively contributed to 
67 Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Annex 4, 2. Communication Services.
68 Id.
4. For motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the Mainland, there is no restriction 
on the percentage of principal creative personnel from Hong Kong, but at least one-third of the 
leading artists must be from the Mainland; there is no restriction on where the story takes place, 
but the plots or the leading characters must be related to the Mainland.
69 LegCo, supra note 29.
70 Hong Kong Free Press, supra note 35.
71 Id.
72 Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, supra note 29.
73 Chan, supra note 1, at 21, 22.
74 Chow, supra note 41.
75 Chi, supra note 9, at 81.
76 LegCo, supra note 29.
77 Id.
78 Chan, supra note 1, at 22.
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a loss of around HK$300 million to the industry in 1998.79 Illegal streaming and 
peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms, such as BitTorrent, are threats to the film 
 industry.80 These internet streaming services resulted in an industry loss of US$308 
million in 2012.81 Rampant piracy has allowed consumers to easily access films, 
both classic and newly released, at no cost or for a minimal fee.82 If eliminated, it 
will contribute to a 15% increase in box office receipts.83 But if left unchecked, 
piracy may deter investors, affect the quality of films produced, and cause the ulti-
mate downfall of the Hong Kong film industry.
Overall, the inherent weaknesses of the core model of the film industry and other 
external factors have gravely crippled the growth of the industry and contributed to 
the decline in the film industry and the loss of its competitive edge in the global 
market.
3  The Road to Revival of the Hong Kong Film Industry
The Hong Kong government has played a pivotal role in the revival of the Hong 
Kong film industry. While it is incumbent upon filmmakers to improve the quality 
of films and upon viewers to support local film culture, the government is in a cru-
cial position to protect and promote the local film industry. For this reason, the 
government has developed and institutionalized several policies to promote the cre-
ative industries which ultimately affect Hong Kong’s economy and cultural 
identity.84
3.1  Hong Kong Film Development Council
The Hong Kong Film Development Council (FDC) is the government’s arm geared 
toward the promotion and development of the film industry.85 Established in 2007, 
the FDC acts as an advisory body on various policies and strategies put in place for 
the sustainable development of the film industry.86 Through the FDC, industry 
stakeholders, primarily producers, directors, and film critics collectively collaborate 
with the government to revive the film industry.
79 LegCo, supra note 29.
80 Carnegie Mellon University “The Dual Impact of Movie Piracy on Box-Office Revenue: 
Cannibalization and Promotion”, Hong Kong’s Piracy Landscape 2018, Feb. 2017 http://hkisa.
film/contenthtml/Information_Material/2018/Hong-Kong-Piracy-Landscape-2018_v4.pdf
81 Hong Kong Film Industry Furious at YouTube ‘Piracy’, Asia One, Apr. 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Showbiz/Story/A1Story20120425-342040.html
82 Id.
83 Hong Kong’s Piracy Landscape 2018, supra note 80.
84 Chan, supra note 1, at 83.
85 Hong Kong Film Development Council, Home Page, available at http://www.fdc.gov.hk/en/
home/index.htm
86 Chan, supra note 1, at 82.
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3.2  Hong Kong International Film and TV Market and Hong 
Kong International Film Festival
In an effort to promote Hong Kong as a global film production and distribution hub, 
Hong Kong hosts the Hong Kong International Film and TV Market (FILMART) 
and the Hong Kong International Film Festival (HKIFF), among other industry 
highlights. Established by the Trade Development Council in 1997, FILMART pro-
motes linkages across various media and platforms for the industry.87 This film and 
TV marketing exhibition is integral to the industry’s revival since it advances Hong 
Kong’s status as a core player in the global film industry.88 Through FILMART, 
foreign filmmakers are introduced to Hong Kong as a platform to connect with the 
global market, including that of the Mainland.
While FILMART focuses on the infrastructure of the film industry, HKIFF dedi-
cates itself to promoting film culture and creativity. Set up in 1977, HKIFF is one of 
the world’s oldest film festivals.89 Through its efforts, HKIFF is now “Hong Kong’s 
largest cultural event” and is aimed at promoting “international appreciation of 
Asian, Hong Kong, and Chinese film culture.”90 HKIFF is likewise integral to the 
industry’s revival due to its dedication to promoting Hong Kong film culture to the 
world and recognizing new talents capable of further developing Hong Kong film 
culture to its fullest.
3.3  Film Development Fund
To further the growth of the industry, the government established a Film Development 
Fund (FDF) as means of financing small-to-medium productions and locally pro-
duced Cantonese films for distribution in the Mainland.91 Through FDF, the govern-
ment invested HK$300 million in 2007 and HK$200 million in 2015.92 Additionally, 
it infused HK$20 million in 2016 to aid distribution of Cantonese films in the 
Mainland.93 The Film Production Grant Scheme (2015) and First Feature Film 
Initiative (2013) were launched to further encourage production of Hong Kong 
87 Hong Kong International Film & TV Market (FILMART), Fair Report, available at http://m.
hktdc.com/resources/fair/1819/hkfilmart/s//4129/1527476733800_Fair-Report-FILMART2018-
23May-Eng.pdf
88 FILMART hosted 8000 global visitors and 800 exhibitors from 35 countries and regions, includ-
ing over 220 exhibitors from Mainland China in 2017.
89 Hong Kong International Film Festival Society, About Us, available at http://www.hkiff.org.hk/
society/#/AboutUs/historyCulture
90 Id.






films.94 The Film Production Grant Scheme awards cash subsidies to films with a 
budget of $ten million or less in order to reduce the risk of film producers and “cre-
ate nurturing opportunities for practitioners of the film industry.”95 The First Feature 
Film Initiative offers support to filmmakers without experience in commercial film-
making by creating jobs for “new on-screen talents and first-timer recruits to film 
production crews.”96 Through these endeavors, the government provides support to 
filmmakers and equips them with the financial capacity to produce quality films and 
tap into the Mainland Chinese and overseas markets.
3.4  Create Hong Kong (CreateHK) and Hong Kong Arts 
Development Council
CreateHK and the Hong Kong Arts Development Council focus on driving the cre-
ative and art industries, including film.97 CreateHK, a government agency, aims to 
“build Hong Kong into a regional creative capital” by facilitating creative develop-
ment.98 It assists in film production by coordinating between filmmakers and “over 
3,000 organisations on the use of their premises for location filming, and published 
reference materials on locations for the industry.”99 Hong Kong Arts Development 
Council endeavors “to establish Hong Kong as a dynamic and diverse cultural 
metropolis.”100 It aids art practitioners, including those in the film industry, by grant-
ing fund allocations, promoting art through policy and development, and establish-
ing cultural exchanges.101
3.5  Closer Economic Partnership Agreement
As previously discussed, the CEPA assists in uplifting the Hong Kong film industry 
by doing away with quota limitations on the distribution of Hong Kong films in the 
Mainland and by establishing co-production initiatives between Hong Kong and the 
rest of China.
94 Legislative Council Panel on Information Technology and Broadcasting, Film 




97 Hong Kong Free Press, supra note 35.
98 Create HK, About Us, available at https://www.createhk.gov.hk/en/about.htm#
99 Create HK, Services, available at https://www.createhk.gov.hk/en/service_film.htm
100 Hong Kong Arts Development Council, Cultural Exchange, available at http://www.hkadc.org.
hk/?p=435&lang=en
101 Id.
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4  The Implications of the Hong Kong Copyright 
Framework on the Film Revival
While the above efforts aiming at the revival of the film industry are laudable, they 
fail to address the issue at its core. A common thread among the government’s 
undertakings is the focus on developing infrastructural solutions and improving 
financial support. However, the means to fully propel the industry to greater heights 
lies in creating innovative, diverse, and quality Hong Kong films that celebrate the 
industry’s creativity and ingenuity. Despite the government’s efforts, the current 
mechanisms to develop state-of-the-art films continue to face legal barriers in the 
form of stringent copyright protection.
While movies can be easily pirated as intangible intellectual products, their pro-
duction and distribution require huge investment. Therefore copyright is paramount 
in the film industry. According to the statistics published by the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) in 2007 (the last year in which the MPAA col-
lected this information), the total average budget for releasing a feature film is 
US$106.6 million.102 Compared to creators of other categories of cultural products, 
copyright holders of films have a stronger demand for copyright that allows them to 
exclusively exploit their films and to recoup investment. Like other jurisdictions, 
Hong Kong also includes films in copyright law and grants the copyright owners 
exclusive rights to copy the work;103 to issue copies of the work to the public;104 to 
rent copies of the work to the public;105 to make available copies of the work to the 
public106 to perform, show, or play the work in public;107 and to broadcast the work 
or include it in a cable program service,108 among others. These rights expire at the 
end of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the death 
occurs of the last to die of the following persons: the principal director, scriptwriter, 
author of the dialogue, or the composer of music created for and used in the particu-
lar film.109 However, as we will discuss in the following sections, some Hong Kong 
copyright rules are inconsistent with the nature of the film and impede the develop-
ment of Hong Kong’s film industry.
102 MPAA, Entertainment Industry Market Statistics (2007) at 7, available at https://wikileaks.org/
sony/docs/03_03/Mktrsch/Market%20Research/MPAA%20Reports/2007%20Market%20
Statistics.pdf
103 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 23.
104 Id. section 24.
105 Id. section 25. (Section 25 The rental of copies of any of the following works to the public is an 
act restricted by the copyright in the work – (a) a computer program, (b) a sound recording, (c) a 
film, and (d) a literary, dramatic, or musical work included in a sound recording.)
106 Id. section 26.
107 Id. section 27.
108 Id. section 28.
109 Id. section 19.
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4.1  Co-authorship of Films
Hong Kong copyright law regards a film as a work jointly authored/owned by the 
producer and the principal director,110 unless the film is made by an employee in the 
course of his employment, in which case the employer will be the copyright owner 
but the producer and the principal director remain the co-authors.111 Figure 6 shows 
how this approach differs from many other major film-producing countries.
The major difference between Hong Kong and other jurisdictions is that Hong 
Kong, which follows the British tradition, allows the director to jointly exploit the 
film with the producer, while in other countries it is the producer who is solely 
entitled to exploit the film. Despite the difference of authorship rules, many coun-
tries including Italy, France, Germany, China, and Korea grant the right of exploita-
tion to the producer exclusively. Though the USA and Japan subject the film 
ownership to the work-for-hire doctrine like Hong Kong, they concentrate the 
exploitation right on a single party, often the producer, when the film is not an 
employee’s work. Under Japanese copyright law, the exploitation right belongs to 
either the production company in the case of a film made for hire (Art.15) or “the 
person that makes a creative contribution to the overall shaping of the work through 
responsibility for its production, direction, staging, filming, art direction, etc.” (Art. 
16), which most likely refers to the film producer according to the definition of 
“producer” in other countries (see Fig. 6). In the USA, if a film does not fall into the 
scope of a work made for hire, the producer will be regarded as the sole author 
because of the stringent conditions of joint authors.112
In Hong Kong, nevertheless, a film is co-owned by the producer and the principal 
director unless it constitutes an employee’s work under a contract of service or of 
apprenticeship.113 However, the film labor system in Hong Kong that changed from 
contract labor (1930–1970), then a mixed mode of contract and noncontract labor 
(1970–1990), to flexible, noncontract labor (since 1990) might reduce the number 
of films that can be considered employee works.114 Even if there is a contract, it 
might be between the director and other employees due to the long-standing direc-
110 Id. sections 12(2) and 11(2) (b).
111 Id. section 14. TSE MUI CHUN v. HKSAR – [2003] HKCU 1408 (“As to ownership of copy-
right, the ‘author’ of the work is, prima facie, the first owner of the copyright (s.13). But if the 
‘author’ has made the work as an employee in the course of his employment, the employer is the 
first owner of the copyright (s.14). Note that the employee remains the ‘author’ but the employer 
owns the copyright.”)
112 In Casa Duse v. Alex Merkin, the Second Circuit court rejected a film director’s claim to be the 
copyright owner of the film and held the producer to be the sole author (“A co-authorship claimant 
in the Second Circuit generally must show that each of the putative co-authors (1) made indepen-
dently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors.” 791 F.3d 
247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015). Some courts added a “control” criterion, requiring the putative co-authors 
to exercise control over the work as a whole and serve as its “superintendent” or “mastermind.” See 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
113 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 198.
114 Szeto & Chen, supra note 39, at 3–4.
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countries author(s) of a film copyrightowner(s)
definition of
the film “producer”
US the employera the employer
Italy the author of the scenario, the composerof the music and the artistic directorb the producer
c the person who has organized the
production of the workd
France
the author of the script, the author of the
adaptation, the author of the dialogue, the 
author of the musical compositions, and
the directore
the producerf
The natural or legal person who takes
the initiative and responsibility for 
making the workg
Germany
persons who have jointly created a work
without it being possible to separately 
exploit their individual shares in the workh
the produceri
Japan
the person that makes a creative
contribution to the overall shaping of the
work through responsibility for its
production, direction, staging, filming, art
direction, etc., other than the author of a 
novel, scenario, music, or other work that
is adapted into or reproduced in the




China the producerl the producer
Korea the producerm the producer
the person who plans and takes 








is an employee’s 
workp
the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the making of the film 
are undertakenq
Fig. 6 Comparison of the rules of authorship and ownership in a film
a17 USC § 101 “Motion picture” was introduced to US copyright law in 1912 as a category of 
made-for-hire work
bLaw for the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring Rights in Italy (2010 amended), article 44
cId. article 46
dId. article 45
eIntellectual Property Code of France (2003 amended), article L113-7
fId. article L132-24
gId. article L132-23
hAct on Copyright and Related Rights of Germany (2017 amended), article 8
iId. articles 89 and 94
jCopyright Law of Japan (2009 amended), article 15(1) and article 16
kCopyright Law of Japan (2009 amended), article 15(1) and article 16
lCopyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (2010 amended), article 15
mCopyright Act of the Republic of Korea (2009 amended), articles 75 (1) and 76
nId. article 2
oCopyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 12(2) and section 11(2) 
(b). Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 of UK (Chapter 48) (2017 amended), section 9(2)
(ab) and section 10(1A)
pCopyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 14. Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 of UK (Chapter 48) (2017 amended), section 11(2)
qCopyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 198. Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 of UK (Chapter 48) (2017 amended), section 178
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tor-centered production system,115 whereas the judges have tended to hold films to 
be co-owned by the producer and director rather than being an employee’s work 
owned by the director.116 However, joint ownership is prone to conflicts, including 
conflicts between the interests of the producer and principal director and the con-
flicts of applicable laws when the joint owners are from different jurisdictions such 
as in the case of co-production.
Further, joint ownership adds to the difficulties and costs of identifying copyright 
owners. Neither “principal director” nor “director” is defined under Hong Kong 
law.117 Departing from the definition of “producer” in other countries normally fea-
tured by responsibility (Fig. 6), the Hong Kong counterpart, defined as “the person 
by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the film are undertaken,”118 
is confusing in regard of the “necessity” of the arrangements. For example, in 
Century Communications v Mayfair Entertainment,119 a film made in China (under 
the control of the plaintiff) was held to be produced by a Hong Kong company (the 
defendant). Despite the plaintiff’s arrangements such as engaging directors and 
employing actors, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, reasoning that it was the 
defendant who initiated the filmmaking and paid for it.120 In Beggars Banquet v 
Carlton Television, the court decided that the person directly responsible for finance, 
rather than the person who paid the money, should be the producer.121 In A &M 
Records Ltd. v. Video Collection International Ltd., the person who initiated the 
process and contracted conductors, rather than the conductor who booked and paid 
for the orchestra and the studio, was considered the producer who makes necessary 
arrangements.122
As a special feature of Hong Kong film, the co-authorship, or the co-ownership 
enjoyed by the producer and director, suited the “director-centered production 
system”123 very well. The advantage of this system was especially evident in the 
115 Id. at 4.
116 Century Communications v Mayfair Entertainment, [1993] EMLR 335. Although this is a 
British case, the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance inherits it and adopts the same copyright rule as 
Britain.
117 Though Laddie, Prescott, and Vitoria’s Fourth Edition indicates that the principal director is 
“likely to be the person who has creative control of the making of the film” (para 7.41), it is not a 
Hong Kong authority.
118 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 198.
119 [1993] EMLR 335. Although this is a British case, the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance inherits 
the British tradition and also regards a film as a work of joint authorship.
120 [1993] EMLR 335.
121 [1993] EMLR 349.
122 [1995] EMLR 25l. Although this is a case of sound recording copyright, the definition of “pro-
ducer” applies to both sound recordings and films. Cap 528, § 198.
123 See supra note 39.
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kung fu genre124 and brought Hong Kong’s film industry to the golden age from the 
1980s to the early 1990s. However, a wide range of films that spawned later, from 
adventure films and comedies to dramas and musical films, rely heavily on other 
talents such as scripters and composers, not only directors.125 The privilege of direc-
tors may hold up the collaborative filmmaking process and may even drive home-
grown talent to seek greener pastures in the film industries of foreign countries.126 
Perhaps concentrating the exploitation right on a single party with a clear definition 
of ownership can reduce the cost of negotiation, clarify the scope of film copyright, 
and facilitate co-production with other regions. In fact, the Law Reform Commission 
in Hong Kong suggested that the producer should become the sole copyright owner 
of a film, although the proposal failed to be finally adopted.127
4.2  Unclear Scope of “Copy” and Insufficient Protection 
for Secondary Creation
Section 7(4) of Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance explicitly claims that “copyright 
does not subsist in a film which is, or to the extent that it is, a copy taken from a 
previous film.”128 Undoubtedly, copyright “does not subsist in a copy taken from a 
previous film” because originality is the basic requirement to attract copyright pro-
tection. Disputes arise because of the ambiguity contained in the provision “copy-
right does not subsist in a film which to the extent is a copy taken from a previous 
film.” Specifically, “to the extent is a copy” is a gray area between a verbatim, exact 
copy without any change to the previous film and a derivative, new film which gains 
copyright protection because of its originality and substantial difference from other 
works. Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance acknowledges that both copying a whole 
work and copying any substantial part of the work constitute a copy129 but fails to 
124 Many kung fu directors are turned from martial arts actors or instructors and play significant 
roles in arranging the entire filmmaking process. Sek Kei, Rolanda Chu, and Grant Foerster, A 
Brief Historical Tour of the Hong Kong Martial Arts Film, January 1, 2001, Bright Lights https://
brightlightsfilm.com/wp-content/cache/all/brief-historical-tour-hong-kong-martial-arts-film/#.
W3rD4egzY2x (“Most professional directors were not actually familiar with martial arts tech-
niques, and … required the help of martial arts directors such as Sammo Hung and Han Ying 
Chieh. With the emphasis on martial arts techniques as the new backbone of the genre, contribu-
tions from actual martial artists became increasingly significant.”).
125 F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint--Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures under the 
US Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L REV 225, 285 (2001).
126 Chan, supra note 1, at 21.
127 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report: Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright 
(Topic 22), p 22, 63 https://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rcopyright-e.pdf (“3.4 The ‘maker’ of a 
cinematography film is the owner of the copyright (section 13(4)), in this case defined as “the 
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the film are undertaken (section 
13(10)” … “7.10 The employee has no right to be identified as author. A film director is treated in 
a similar fashion if he is an employee.”).
128 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 7(4).
129 Id. section 22 (3)(a).
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define “substantiality.” Hong Kong case law, although it lacks clear guidance regard-
ing the boundary of substantial taking in the field of films,130 indicates that even a 
small amount of taking, such as taking a short musical snippet from another’s 
song,131 reproducing a smaller version of the front page of a rival newspaper,132 and 
copying a small part of a questionnaire,133 will fall into the scope of copyright 
infringement.
Following this reasoning, a film created from several clips of one or more previ-
ously existing films, a remixed film, a colorized or extended version of a film, a 
director’s cut (namely, an edited version of a film that is supposed to represent the 
director’s own approved edit134), or a digitally enhanced or restored print will likely 
be classified as “a copy” in which copyright does not subsist.135 The indiscriminate, 
bald opposition against copying crucially misunderstands the nature of films. As a 
transnational cultural product,136 a film appeals to its audience by providing a novel 
experience of a new culture. However, the new product and experience should not 
be too far away from knowledge that the audience already has. This is a sophisti-
cated balance between similarities and differences,137 between unknown cultural 
secrets and easy accessibility.138 As Abraham Drassinower notes, culture is copying, 
and copying per se is not wrong.139 It is copying that makes the connection between 
similarities and differences, which explains the continual popularity of movie series 
such as the Harry Potter series and the Marvel series.
Some may argue that this provision merely prohibits the copying of expression, 
while the idea is still in the public domain, freely available for everyone. But the 
boundary between idea and expression is as vague as the boundary between copying 
and recreation. For instance, Steven Chow, the director for Shaolin Soccer, might 
exclude others from making a similar kung fu soccer film by arguing that he created 
his own original kung fu expressions based on the idea of soccer playing, but it is 
also reasonable to regard soccer as an expression (action and speed) and kung fu as 
an idea (power, strength of will, hard work, and dignity).140 The real cultural copy-
130 Doreen Weisenhaus, Hong Kong Media Law: A Guide for Journalists and Media 
Professionals 235 (Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
131 Ladbroke (Football) v William Hill (Football) [1964] 1 WLR 272.
132 Group Ltd v Apple Daily Ltd [1999] 4 HKC 131.
133 Lam Tai Hing v Koo Chih Ling, Linda [1993] 2 HKC 1.
134 Wikipedia’s interpretation of “Director’s Cuts”, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Director%27s_cut
135 Pascal Kamina, Film Copyright in the European Union 106 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2016).
136 Laikwan Pang, Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy, and 
Cinema 10 (New York: Routledge, 2006).
137 Id. at 6.
138 Id, at 55.
139 Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copying? 1, 9 (Harvard University Press, 
2015).
140 Pang, supra note 136, at 53.
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ing practice is more complex than what is written in copyright law.141 Actually, as 
Laikwan Pang noted, the artificial dichotomy of idea/expression is designed more 
for satisfying capitalist interests than for promoting creativity and culture.142 It 
enables Hollywood to rapidly and effectively appropriate other cinematic traditions, 
to remake films, and then to exclude others from exploiting the same stories.143 But 
for the domestic industry, the blurred boundary between idea and expression, along 
with the difficulty in distinguishing copying and recreation, will obstruct the pro-
duction of movies of the same style and hinder Hong Kong films from forming a 
collective identity.144
The prohibitive effect of copyright law is even exacerbated by the lack of copy-
right exceptions providing some breathing space for secondary film creation.145 This 
is extremely crucial in the Internet age, where various kinds of user-friendly tools 
empower a large number of untrained ordinary people to engage in filmmaking 
themselves such as DIY cinema, newsreel films,146 short films,147 and microfilm.148 
As section 2 of the chapter shows, Hong Kong’s government has made great efforts 
in promoting filmmaking, both professional and amateur, whereas legal support is 
still to be desired. Encouraged by the open-ended fair use doctrine in the USA,149 
the Australian initiative incorporating parody and satire into fair dealing exception, 
the Canadian exception for noncommercial user-generated content, and the UK fair 
dealing exception for parody, caricature, and pastiche,150 Hong Kong’s Copyright 
(Amendment) Bill 2014 introduced a safety valve for “parody, satire, caricature, or 
pastiche.”151 Nevertheless, the Hong Kong bill ultimately failed to be adopted into 
law, mainly because copyright owners insisted on the existing copyright ordinance 
141 Id.
142 Id. at 51.
143 Id. at 70.
144 Id. at 98.
145 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 Colum. J.L. & Arts 429, 429 (2006).
146 Newsreels were short films shown in movie theaters, generally along with cartoons and feature 
films. Princeton University Library, https://libguides.princeton.edu/c.php?g=84226&p=540944
147 According to the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, “a short film is an original 
motion picture that has a running time of 40 min or less, including all credits” https://www.oscars.
org/sites/oscars/files/88aa_rule19_short.pdf. Many websites such as YouTube, Snoovies, 
CinemaClubby, and Vimeo encourage the creation and distribution of user-created short films.
148 Microfilm, or microcinema, “refers to a gathering of video and filmmakers, music video produc-
ers, amateurs, and semiprofessionals, to publicly project, exhibit, and share their creations among 
groups of friends and neighbors.” Jesse Drew, A Social History of Contemporary Democratic 
Media 45 (London: Routledge, 2013).
149 Though the US fair use doctrine does not explicitly list parody as an exception, many case laws 
have regarded parody as fair use. e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510  U.S. 569 (1994), 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 
(9th Cir. 2003).
150 Legislative Council Brief of Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014, at 7–9.
151 Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014 of Hong Kong, section 39A.
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with no amendment at all and users feared that the government might imprison 
users who engage in secondary creation other than “parody, satire, caricature, or 
pastiche.”152
In the past, most secondary creations were private and thus remained unregulated 
by the government or tolerated by copyright holders. However, due to the participa-
tory and hyperconnected web,153 a transformation which Henry Jenkins called 
“from home movies to public movies” occurs, and a much wider audience gets 
involved.154 The popularity of homemade movies and the big business behind them 
inevitably move those secondary creations, which were originally in the gray area, 
to the front, directly facing the challenge of copyright law. If the law insists on ille-
galizing or even criminalizing these uses, these new modes of filmmaking will be 
stifled, and the potential of mass creativity unleashed by the Internet age will be 
inhibited.
4.3  Criminal Liability for Copyright Infringement
Hong Kong copyright law imposes harsh penalties, both civil and criminal, on copy-
right infringement. As the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong has noted, copyright 
infringement “is not simply a matter of the private interests of the copyright own-
ers” but “a matter of public interest to Hong Kong generally”; hence “the remedies 
available for infringement of copyright can be extensive.”155 Civil remedies include 
compensation in the form of damages, injunction, an account of profits, and an 
order for delivery up.156 Criminal penalties include a fine of up to HK$50,000 for 
each infringing copy and imprisonment of a maximum of 4 years,157 which specifi-
cally pertain to end users who possess, copy, and distribute an infringing copy of 
certain types of work for the purpose of trade or business.158 However, if the distri-
bution is to such an extent as to prejudice the copyright owner, the distributor will 
be subject to criminal sanction irrespective of the types of copyright works and the 
152 Peter K.  Yu, The Quest For A User-Friendly Copyright Regime In Hong Kong, 32  AM.  U. 
INT’L L. REV. 284, 288 (2016).
153 Nicholas A Christakis and James H Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our 
Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives 10 (Little, Brown 2009).
154 David Thorburn & Henry Jenkins, Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of 
Transition 309 (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2004).
155 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Golden Science Technology Ltd, [1999] 4 HKC 169.
156 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), sections 107–109.
157 Copyright Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 528) (2009 amended), section 119.
158 End users engaging in the following two types of copyright infringement will attract criminal 
liability: (i) unauthorized possession of an infringing copy of copyrighted software, movies, televi-
sion dramas, and musical (sound or visual) recordings for use in business and (ii) unauthorized 
copying and distribution of an infringing copy, either an electronic or hard copy, of books, news-
papers, magazines, and periodicals for use in trade or business. Hong Kong’s Amended Copyright 
Law: Guidance Note on Prevention of End-User Piracy in Business at 2, available https://www.ipd.
gov.hk/eng/intellectual_property/copyright/booklet_piracy_in_business_e.pdf
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purpose of distribution.159 These liability rules are not simply written but also effi-
ciently enforced.160
The world’s first case imposing criminal liability upon an individual using 
BitTorrent for P2P sharing, Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR,161 occurred in Hong Kong.162 
The key issue was whether uploading files constitutes “distribution.”163 The defen-
dant used the legal loophole that “distribution” is nowhere defined in Hong Kong 
Copyright Ordinance, claiming that the prosecutor cannot prove that Chan’s act of 
uploading violates the right of distribution because there is no delivery of “physical 
copies.”164 As a response, Justice Beeton extended “distribution” to “digital dissemi-
nation,” reasoning that “‘distribution’ in its ordinary meaning, is clearly capable of 
encompassing a process in which the distributor first takes necessary steps to make 
the item available and the recipient then takes steps of his own to obtain it.” Through 
a liberal interpretation of the Copyright Ordinance, the Court decisively gave the 
law proper effect in combating piracy. The criminalization of copyright infringe-
ment has indeed become an evident character of Hong Kong copyright law. From a 
case search in Lexis HK,165 we found 42 cases addressing film copyright, among 
which 27 cases involved criminal liability of copyright infringement.166
However, rigorous liability and harsh punishment from copyright law have failed 
to fulfill the goal of eliminating piracy. According to a report from Carnegie Mellon 
University, in 2017 65.9 million BitTorrent movie and TV programs were 
159 Id.
160 e.g., HKSAR v Elegant Technology Ltd, [2004] 3 HKC 37; HKSAR v Ho Hon Chung Danel & 
ORS, [2004] 3 HKC 304; HKSAR v Re Affluence Pictures Ltd, [2008] HKCU 1807; HKSAR v SZE 
Chak Ming & ANOR, [2006] HKCU 724; HKSAR v Mega Laser Products (HK) Ltd & ORS, [1999] 
3 HKC 161.
161 CHAN NAI MING v HKSAR, [2007] 3 HKC 255.
162 Michael Filby, Big Crook in Little China: The Ramifications of the Hong Kong BitTorrent Case 
on the Criminal Test of Prejudicial Effect, 21 Int Rev. Law Comput Tech 275, 278 (2007).
163 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142.
164 One of the key defenses was that although the Copyright Ordinance stipulates the civil remedies 
for “making available of copies to the public” in section 26, for imposing criminal liability, the 
prosecutor should demonstrate that Chan’s act of uploading violates the right of distribution, but 
“distribution” is nowhere defined in the Ordinance. HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 
142
165 By using the term “All Hong Kong Cases” as the source, “atleast3(film) AND atleast3(copyright),” 
“atleast3(motion picture) AND atleast3(copyright),” and “atleast3(movie) AND atleast3(copyright)” 
as the search terms respectively three times. “Atleast” is used to search for terms occurring at least 
so many times in a document. For example, atleast3(film) requires the term “film” to appear in the 
document at least 3 times. “And” can be used to search for terms located in the same document. 
For example, “atleast3(film) AND atleast3(copyright)” requires both terms “film” and “copyright” 
to appear in the document at least 3 times. We used 3 to preliminarily screen cases irrelevant to film 
copyright.
166 We obtained 76 cases with “atleast3(film) AND atleast3(copyright)” as the search term, 12 cases 
with “atleast3(movie) AND atleast3(copyright)” as the search term, and 5 cases with 
“atleast3(motion picture) AND atleast3(copyright)” as the search term. After reading the decisions 




downloaded, and a loss of HK$ 286 million was caused to the Hong Kong box 
office.167 Online piracy of films, video clips, music, and animation is leading to a 
monthly loss of around HK$120 million to Hong Kong’s creative industries.168 
Penalties alone are insufficient to deter infringement. The deterrent effects of law 
depend upon two factors, the probability of being caught and the severity of the 
punishment.169 For most private pirates, the probability of being caught is very low 
because of the high cost of tracing anonymous pirates, each of whom merely causes 
minimal loss to the copyright owners. As Peter Yu concluded, criminal penalties 
under Hong Kong copyright law are “likely to be selectively enforced and therefore 
highly unfair.”170
The governance of piracy should take an approach integrating the reasons why 
piracy originated and became popular. Piracy promises consumers easy access to 
films, both classic and newly released, at no cost or for a minimal fee.171 However, 
audiences have to bear a long lag time between a film’s first release in theater and 
the release of pirated DVDs or the release of pirated films online and to endure the 
low quality of early-release pirated films such as camcorder captures in cinemas.172 
By contrast, authorized films promise the latest movies immediately upon cinema 
release, an awesome big-screen experience, and sometimes even film appreciation 
activities such as a face-to-face encounter with film directors or actors and post- 
screening sharing sessions.173 But consumers need to pay for the movie ticket.
Assuming the price of a movie ticket remains the same, the best way to solve 
piracy is to improve the movie theater experience. A film is not only a commodity 
but a complex system of representation and cultural experience,174 and this experi-
ence highly relies on the equipment. The experience of watching movies with fuzzy 
images on a small and cheap VCD set or in a small PC screen at home can never 
compare with the experience of watching HD movies in a cinema with state-of-the- 
art facilities.175 This is why Gabe Newell, the CEO and cofounder of Valve, pointed 
out that “piracy is a service problem.”176 Hong Kong’s government seems to recog-
nize the cinema experience approach to combating piracy, making it a policy to 
167 Hong Kong’s Piracy Landscape 2018, supra note 80.
168 Alice Shen, Online piracy clampdown in Hong Kong deprives errant websites of HK$6.5 million in 
monthly ad revenue, South China Morning Post, Mar. 22, 2018, available at https://www.scmp.com/
news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/2138287/online-piracy-clampdown-hong-kong-deprives-errant-websites
169 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 4–5 (Boston: Pearson, 6th ed., 2010).
170 Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. Louisville 
L. Rev. 693, 704 (2010).
171 “Hong Kong Film Industry Furious at YouTube ‘Piracy’,” supra note 81.
172 William Fisher, Promise to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment 
68 (Stanford University Press, 2004).
173 Legislative Council Brief on Facilitating Cinema Development, LC Paper No. 
CB(4)801/16–17(05), supra note 57, at 4.
174 Pang, supra note 136, at 64.
175 Id. at 91.
176 Greg Tito, Valve’s Gabe Newell Says Piracy Is a Service Problem, The Escapist (Nov. 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/114391-Valves-Gabe-Newell-Says-Piracy-Is-a-Service-Problem
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facilitate the construction of movie sets in commercial complexes, such as incorpo-
rating a cinema requirement in land leases to give a hardware boost.177
Criminal penalties not only have failed to combat piracy but also have become 
barriers for individual, noncommercial file-sharing activities which might be con-
sidered to occur “to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the copyright owner” 
due to the hyperconnected Internet and the unprecedented scope of distribution. 
Criminalizing file sharing violates the long-standing principle that punishment 
should fit the crime178 and will gradually breed disrespect for and distrust of the 
legal system. This partly explains the public’s fear about the government’s prosecu-
tion against users who use online-copyrighted material for secondary creation or 
mocking politicians179 even though the Copyright (Amendment) 2014 Bill clarified 
the threshold of criminal liability regarding the existing prejudicial distribution 
offenses.180 Imposing criminal penalties upon file-sharing activities which are com-
mon or even popular with the general public also has huge implications for govern-
ment finance, prison management, and jurisdictional issues.181 We therefore concur 
with many scholars and are of the opinion182 that copyright protection for individual, 
private, and noncommercial online copying and distribution should be decriminal-
ized. Without such a move, the revival of Hong Kong’s film industry will remain a 
fiction.
5  Conclusion
From its humble beginnings, the Hong Kong film industry catapulted itself to an 
international film powerhouse status. Through the years, it introduced the world to 
kung fu films of Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, and the like. However, a variety of factors 
ranging from the industry’s director-centered production system, prevailing investor 
pressure, and weak infrastructure to political and economic conditions, popularity 
of foreign films, and rampant piracy all led to its decline. In an effort to revive the 
industry, the government established infrastructural and financial reforms by means 
177 LegCo, supra note 29.
178 Yu, supra note 187, at 704.
179 Stuart Lau, Five reasons the Hong Kong copyright bill failed, South China Morning Post, Mar. 4, 2016, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1920569/five-reasons-hong-kong-copyright-bill-failed
180 Legislative Council Brief of Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014 of Hong Kong, supra note 150, 
para.9–10, at 6–7.
181 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 169, at 489–491.
182 Yu, supra note 169, at 217. Yu, supra note 185, at 701. Jojo Y.C. Mo, The Copyright (Amendment) 
Bill 2014  in Hong Kong: A Blessing or a Curse? 38 Stat. L. R. 211, 213 (2017). Christophe 
Geiger, Challenges for the Enforcement of Copyright in the Online World: Time for a New 
Approach in Research Handbook on the Cross-Border Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property 706, 718 (Paul Torremans ed., Edward Elgar Pub., 2014).
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of exhibitions, film festivals, and co-productions with the Mainland. While laud-
able, these efforts remain insufficient to fully propel the Hong Kong film industry to 
greater heights.
Restoring Hong Kong to its status as the “Hollywood of the Far East” would 
require the production of innovative, creative, and quality Hong Kong films. 
However, the traditional Hong Kong copyright framework poses a legal barrier to 
further innovation and development. The revival of the film industry relies on break-
ing down these barriers through copyright reform, such as concentrating copyright 
ownership to a single party who is clearly defined, making copyright exceptions for 
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This chapter discusses legal strategies to enforce copyright online in India, with 
a focus on the film industry. The chapter begins by acknowledging various limi-
tations of online copyright enforcement. Then, in Sect. 2, the chapter provides a 
broad overview of the landscape concerning film piracy in India. In Sect. 3, the 
chapter discusses a proposed (and unimplemented) recommendation to target 
end-users in India. In Sect. 4, the chapter discusses recent developments con-
cerning website-blocking injunctions, which is a strategy that the industry has 
consistently pursued in recent years. In Sect. 5, the chapter discusses the ad- 
supported financial model of pirate websites, referencing a study conducted in 
India. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the efficacy of non-litigious mea-
sures, such as the targeting of ad-supported piracy and negotiations with search 
engines.
Keywords




Legal concerns regarding online copyright infringement date back to the first half of 
the 1990s, when even dial-up Internet was at a nascent stage. The first Clinton 
administration—at the initiative of Vice President Al Gore—formed the Information 
Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), to articulate the US government’s vision for the 
so-called National Information Infrastructure (NII). As a part of this initiative, a 
working group submitted a report, in 1995, discussing the impact of the Internet 
(then in its infancy) on copyright law. The report presciently observed:
The NII has tremendous potential to improve and enhance our lives. It can increase access 
to a greater amount and variety of information and entertainment resources that can be 
delivered quickly and economically from and to virtually anywhere in the world in the blink 
of an eye. For instance, hundreds of channels of “television” programming, thousands of 
musical recordings, and literally millions of “magazines” and “books” can be made avail-
able to homes and businesses across the United States and around the world.1
The report acknowledged that the growth of the Internet could “upset the bal-
ance” between copyright owners and users but felt that the challenge could be 
addressed by “no more than minor clarification and limited amendment” to existing 
copyright legislation.2 The report’s main recommendations were that traditional 
rights of distribution and performance be widened to include the digital transmis-
sion of works.3 The same year, in one of the earliest law review articles on the sub-
ject, Jane Ginsberg advanced a similar view.4
Today, nearly 25 years later, the online piracy environment has changed in at 
least four major ways compared to the early dial-up Internet era, owing to faster and 
cheaper broadband connection speeds. First, piracy concerns in the dial-up Internet 
era mostly centred around the sharing of songs in the MP3 format or books in the 
PDF format, where files were no larger than a few megabytes. Today, the focus has 
shifted to the sharing of films and television programmes, often in high-resolution 
formats running into a few gigabytes per file. Second, the growth in websites offer-
ing inexpensive (often free) online storage means that vast numbers of such files can 
be uploaded and shared with ease. This contrasts with the dial-up era, when copying 
large video files onto CDs and other physical storage devices was the usual and 
practical method of distributing them. Third, from an era where users could only 
access low-quality streaming content using software like RealPlayer and Windows 
Media Player, the Internet has now progressed to a stage where high-resolution 
content can be easily shared and accessed through YouTube, Dailymotion and 
Vimeo or local variants of such websites (such as Youku in China). Fourth, Internet 
1 Information Infrastructure Task Force (1995). Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, p. 8.
2 Ibid at 14, 17.
3 Ibid at 213.
4 Ginsburg, J. 1995. Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and 
Copyright in Cyberspace. Columbia Law Review 95: 1466, 1482.
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access in developing countries and emerging economies has widened greatly, to the 
point where China ranks first and India second in terms of numbers of Internet 
users. Other economies in the top ten include Brazil, Russia and Indonesia.5 This 
has led to a significant amount of piracy occurring across borders.6
Notwithstanding the above, it can be argued that the views advanced by the IITF 
Working Group and Ginsberg still hold good today. Many copyright laws world-
wide date back to the dial-up era, simply expanding the applicability of traditional 
rights in an online environment. Yet, they are arguably sufficient to target almost 
every type of major infringing activity online (although sometimes requiring judi-
cial creativity in their application). If there is dissatisfaction with the prevalence of 
online piracy, it arguably pertains less to “law lag” (i.e. the principle that the law 
always lags behind technology7) than to issues simply beyond the scope of law. The 
hard reality is that the enormous global scale of global Internet usage and file- 
sharing means that piracy can at best be curbed in spurts. Furthermore, to quote the 
High Court of Ireland, “Among younger people, so much has the habit grown of 
downloading copyright material from the internet that a claim of entitlement seems 
to have arisen to have what is not theirs for free”.8 In this scenario, there are serious 
limits to what the law can achieve. For India’s film industry, which this chapter will 
focus on, there are three factors that especially curb the utility of online copyright 
enforcement—the prevalence of physical piracy, the hosting of pirated content in 
servers outside India, and, above all, a general deficit of infrastructure in the civil 
and criminal justice system.
With reference to the first factor, in the late 1990s, when Internet penetration in 
India was still limited, a government study identified video parlours and cable oper-
ators as the major sources for the dissemination of pirated films. The study observed 
that “[a]ll parties involved in the legitimate transaction of films—from the produc-
ers to the theatre owners”—lost “heavily because of widespread video or cable 
piracy” and that the government also lost potential tax revenues.9 Nearly a decade 
later, the government constituted a high-level committee on piracy (“Committee”) 
to examine the issue in more detail. In contrast with the older study, the Committee 
noted the rise of Internet penetration in India and predicted that piracy was “set to 
5 International Telecommunications Union (2017). Internet users by region and country, 2010–
2016. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/treemap.aspx
6 For instance, in 2015, China registered the most number of illegal downloads of the popular US 
TV show House of Cards, followed by the USA and then closely by India. See Spangler, T. (2015). 
“House of Cards” Season 3 Pirated, With China Top Country for Downloaders. Variety. http://
variety.com/2015/digital/news/house-of-cards-season-3-pirated-with-china-top-country-for- 
downloaders-1201444023/
7 Hurlbut, B. (2015). Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of Asilomar. In 
Jasanoff, S. & Kim, S. (Eds.), Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the 
Fabrication of Power (pp. 126–151). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hurlbut is generally 
critical of the concept of law lag, stating: “[T]he notion of law lag is an expression of the imaginary 
of governable technological emergence. Law inevitably lags, and must lag, if science is to be free 
to generate novelty”.
8 EMI v. Eircom (2010) I.E.H.C. 108, ¶ 5.
9 National Productivity Council. (1999). Study on Copyright Piracy in India, p. 14. http://copyright.
gov.in/documents/study%20on%20copyright%20piracy%20in%20india.pdf
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explode” with the growth of broadband Internet in India.10 But while the number of 
Internet users in India has no doubt grown exponentially since the 1990s, when 
expressed as a percentage, it still amounts to merely 30% of India’s population. 
Moreover, connection speeds in India are often slow. In fact, one study estimates 
that India’s 4G download speeds are among the slowest in the world.11 Thus, in 
contrast with developed countries, physical piracy, via sales of DVDs by street ven-
dors, is still a popular form of consumption of pirated cinema in India, greatly 
defeating the purpose of online enforcement.12
With reference to the second factor, the Indian film industry earns substantial 
revenue from the Indian diaspora, especially in developed countries. Most major 
Indian films are released in theatres in these countries. These audiences even form 
the primary target audience for some producers, due to higher ticket prices in com-
parison to India.13 However, there also exist high levels of consumption of pirated 
films within this audience.14 The Indian film industry lacks the resources to enforce 
its copyright adequately worldwide. While the Indian government has approached 
foreign governments for assistance on behalf of the film industry, little action seems 
to have emerged.15
With reference to the third factor, as Marc Galanter has observed, Indian laws are 
“notoriously incongruent” with “attitudes and concerns”16 and that “[d]elays of 
Bleak House proportions are routine in many sorts of litigation”.17 According to the 
Indian government’s own data, several million cases are pending before Indian 
courts, and there exists a severe shortage of judges.18 In the context of criminal 
copyright enforcement, the matter falls under the jurisdiction of state governments 
rather than the national governments. As a result, copyright enforcement becomes 
10 Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. (2009). Report of the Committee on Piracy, pp. 45–6.
11 Dovall, P. 2018. 4G speed in India slowest in world. Times of India. https://timesofindia.india-
times.com/business/india-business/4g-speed-in-india-slowest-in-world/articleshow/63021612.
cms
12 US Trade Representative. (2014). Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets, p.16 (listing 
bazaars in India where pirated DVDs are sold); Liang, L. & Sundaram, R., (2011). India. In 
Karganis, J. (Ed.), Media Piracy in Emerging Economies (pp.  339–398, 348–50). New  York: 
Social Science Research Council.
13 Banerjee, A. 2011. A Case for Economic Incentives to Promote “Parallel” Cinema in India. 
Media & Arts Law Review 16: 21, 23–6.
14 For example, according to one report, the hit Bollywood film Kaminey was downloaded illegally 
350,000 times within a week of its release, with a third of the downloads originating from outside 
India. Frater, P. 2009. Online Piracy in India a Global Problem. Hollywood Reporter. http://www.
hollywoodreporter.com/news/online-piracy-india-global-problem-92365
15 Banerjee, A. 2016. Copyright Piracy and the Indian Film Industry: A “Realist” Assessment. 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 34: 609, 639–40.
16 Galanter, M. (1967). The Uses of Law in Indian Studies. In Language and Areas: Studies 
Presented to George V. Bobrinskoy (pp. 37–44, 38).
17 Galanter, M. 2010. World of Our Cousins. Drexel Law Review 2: 365, 368.
18 Government of India (2012). National Court Management Systems, Policy and Action Plan.
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weak in less developed regions, with instances of corruption and inefficiency.19 
When criminal cases proceed to trial, complainants face further challenges. One 
report has observed that criminal copyright cases, “most of the time, have not 
yielded effective and deterrent results”, with problems such as accused being 
awarded bail easily, lengthy delays, loss of evidence, low conviction rates and low 
amounts of fines where convictions are awarded.20 In the context of civil litigation, 
cases tend to proceed slowly following the interim stage. As the Supreme Court of 
India has observed, “[I]n the matters of trademarks, copyrights and patents, litiga-
tion is mainly fought between the parties about the temporary injunction and that 
goes on for years and years and the result is that the suit is hardly decided finally”.21
With the above caveats, this chapter discusses online copyright enforcement in 
India. In Sect. 2, the chapter provides a broad overview of the landscape concerning 
film piracy in India. In Sect. 3, the chapter discusses a proposed (and unimple-
mented) recommendation to target end-users in India. In Sect. 4, the chapter dis-
cusses legal issues concerning website-blocking injunctions, which is a strategy that 
the industry has aggressively pursued in recent years. In Sect. 5, the chapter dis-
cusses the issue of ad-supported piracy, which may well be the next battleground for 
rights owners in India. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the efficacy of non- 
litigious measures, such as the targeting of revenue-generating ads and negotiations 
with search engine websites. Although the focus of this chapter is on the Indian film 
industry, to a great extent it will automatically subsume the Indian music industry. 
Unlike in many countries, the majority of Indian films are musicals. Most popular 
musicians in India release songs as part of film soundtracks. Thus, film consumption 
in India is frequently synonymous with music consumption, and copyright owner-
ship of films and sound recordings often lie with the same entity.22
2  The Piracy Landscape in India
The Indian film industry is the world’s largest in terms of films produced and tickets 
sold,23 third largest in terms of box-office size24 and fastest-growing overall.25 
Globally, Indian cinema enjoys popularity among the Indian diaspora, as well as 
19 Liang & Sundaram, supra note 12, at 342.
20 International Intellectual Property Alliance (2014), Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection 
and Enforcement, p. 43 http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2014/2014SPEC301INDIA.PDF
21 Vardhman v. Chawalwala (2009) 41 P.T.C. 397, ¶ 3 (S.C.).
22 See generally, Morcom A. (2007). Hindi Film Songs and the Cinema. London: Ashgate.
23 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2014). Diversity and the Film Industry: Analysis of the 2014 
UIS International Survey on Feature Film Statistics, p. 9. http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/
documents/diversity-and-the-film-industry-an-analysis-of-the-2014-uis-survey-on-feature-film-
statistics-2016-en_0.pdf
24 Motion Picture Association of America (2016). Theatrical Market Statistics, p. 7. https://www.
mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MPAA-Theatrical-Market-Statistics-2016_Final.pdf
25 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014). Global Entertainment and Media Outlook 2014-2018: India 
Summary, pp.  3-4. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/global-entertainment-media-outlook/assets/
indian-summary.pdf
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among non-Indian populations in certain parts of Asia and Africa, and forms a com-
ponent of India’s global “soft power”.26 However, the industry suffers from high 
levels of piracy. According to an industry study, piracy causes the Indian film indus-
try annual financial losses of around US$1  billion, along with around 600,000 
annual job losses.27 Even if one may dispute how such figures have been computed, 
it is undeniable that a culture of piracy is widely prevalent throughout India. Pirated 
DVDs are openly sold in markets in Indian cities, while illegal file-sharing and 
downloading are common.
There are multiple ways in which pirated copies of films are produced and dis-
tributed online in India (as in many other countries). Of these, four are noteworthy. 
First, prints of films have been leaked internally by entities within the production 
and distribution chain.28 Second, pre-release prints of films (called “screeners”) 
have been leaked via film festivals, industry insiders and even the Indian film clas-
sification board.29 Third, at the post-release stage, film pirates have used camcorders 
inside theatres to copy films and subsequently distribute them online. With advances 
in the quality of mobile phone cameras, pirates are increasingly using mobile phones 
to record films, making them difficult to detect.30 Fourth, also at the post-release 
stage, films can simply be copied from legitimate sources and shared online, whether 
from DVDs or streaming services like Netflix and Amazon Prime.
The motives for the above acts can vary. There have been instances where indi-
viduals have shared copyrighted content simply out of enthusiasm and without any 
apparent financial motive. However, a significant amount of piracy is motivated by 
financial gain. The Committee has described piracy as a “high rewards” business.31 
Some years ago, a single raid against a prominent pirate in India reportedly yielded 
pirated DVDs worth over US$ 1 million.32 Of late, online piracy yields significant 
revenues through advertising. In 2014, a report by a then British member of parlia-
ment, serving as intellectual property advisor to Prime Minister David Cameron, 
26 Thussu, D. (2013). Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood, pp. 127–154. 
Palgrave MacMillan: London.
27 US-India Business Council & Ernst & Young (2009). The Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy 
on India’s Entertainment Industry, pp. 3, 31.
28 For example, clips from Baahubali 2, a big-budget film, were leaked online before the film’s 
release by a young graphic designer who was a part of the editing team. See Roy, G. 2016. 
Baahubali 2 War Sequence Leaked, Graphic Designer Arrested. NDTV. http://movies.ndtv.com/
regional/baahubali-2-scenes-leaked-graphic-designer-arrested-1628731
29 For example, a major Bollywood film, Udta Punjab, was leaked online in entirety when the film 
was pending review with the Indian film classification board. See Datta, A.N. 2016. “Udta Punjab” 
leak: CBFC claims innocence as all fingers point at them. DNA. http://www.dnaindia.com/enter-
tainment/report-udta-punjab-leak-cbfc-claims-innocence-as-all-fingers-point-at-them-2224252
30 Pillai, S. 2016. The Piracy Nightmare. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/features/cinema/
The-piracy-nightmare/article14593263.ece
31 Report of the Committee on Piracy, supra note 10 at 14.





quoted estimates that 600 pirated websites generated over US$ 200 million through 
advertising revenues in 2013, with nearly a third of the advertisements being those 
of “household” brands.33 According to the report, most businesses were unaware of 
their advertisements appearing on such websites.34 In India, a study by the Federation 
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Strategic IP Information 
(SIPI) tracked 1143 pirate websites offering Indian films and found 73% to be sup-
ported by advertisements. Over half were found to be advertisements of well-known 
brands.35
A section of academicians and activists in India have viewed film piracy as an 
altruistic activity. For example, Lawrence Liang has declared himself to be “a 
defender of film piracy”,36 while the Alternative Law Forum (an organisation pro-
moting open access) has dismissed WIPO’s advocacy efforts against piracy.37 The 
most common justification advanced by sympathisers of piracy is that it facilitates 
access to culture. This was even an argument once advanced by defendants, accused 
of running an unlicensed DVD rental, in a copyright infringement case.38 However, 
the ad-supported financial model of pirate websites (discussed later in Sect. 5) must 
bring into question how altruistic the motives of pirates actually are. To illustrate, in 
2014, two websites offering pirated versions of a popular Bollywood film were 
tracked down to pirates based in Latvia, ostensibly with little cultural affinity 
towards India and motivated entirely by profit.39 In the FICCI-SIPI study, of the 
websites tracked, the largest number of server locations was in North America, then 
Europe and then Asia.40 Furthermore, unlike a decade ago, there are now many 
avenues for accessing licensed content in India at nominal prices, through streaming 
websites like YouTube, Netflix and Hotstar (an India-focused website run by the 
Star television network).
33 Weatherley, M. (2014). “Follow the Money”: Financial Options to Assist in the Battle Against 
Online IP Piracy. http://www.olswang.com/media/48204227/follow_the_money_financial_
options_to_assist_in_the_battle_against_online_ip_piracy.pdf
34 Ibid at 2 (stating, “[I]n the majority of instances, display advertising that appears next to infring-
ing material is not intended by the advertiser, its agency or intermediary companies involved in the 
trading of advertising”).
35 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICCI) and Industry & Strategic IP Information 
(SIPI) (2017). Badversiting. http://verisiteglobal.com/Badvertising_Report.pdf
36 Liang, L. 2014. Insights on Film Piracy. Economic and Political Weekly 47: 29, 30.
37 Alternative Law Forum. Right02Copy. http://altlawforum.org/productions/right02copy
38 Warner Bros. v. Santosh 2 M.I.P.R. 25 (2009), ¶ 15. The defendants argued (unsuccessfully) 
before the court that that they were “solving the problem of an “artificial shortage” of entertain-
ment in India.
39 Banerjee, supra note 15.
40 FICCI & SIPI, supra note 35, at 20.
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3  Targeting End-Users: A Graduated Response Proposal
Indian copyright law recognises the rights of reproduction, distribution and com-
munication to the public, as well as their applicability in an online environment.41 
There is an absence of Indian case law comprehensively discussing the liability of 
end-users for downloading infringing content. Outside India, however, there exists 
ample judicial precedent supporting liability. For example, in the USA, in a well- 
known case involving the file-sharing service Napster, it was observed:
Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs’ 
distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing copyrighted music violate 
plaintiffs’ reproduction rights. […] The district court concluded that Napster users are not 
fair users. We agree.42
In a later case, it was reiterated: “[D]ownloading copyrighted songs cannot be 
defended as fair use, whether or not the recipient plans to buy songs she likes well 
enough to spring for”.43 In a more recent case, involving movie torrent downloads, 
the Federal Court of Australia observed that “the downloading of a sliver of the film 
from a single IP address” constitutes copyright infringement, even if the size of the 
sliver is “very small”, and it infringes the right of communication to the public.44 In 
a decision of the European Court of Justice, an exemption has been provided to 
Internet users who stream content where only a temporary cached copy is created in 
the user’s hard disk.45 But while this would exempt users from liability from view-
ing pirated streams on websites like YouTube and Dailymotion, the exemption 
would seemingly not exist if a user actively downloads these videos (e.g. by using 
websites such as www.keepvid.com) or if a permanent cached copy is created in the 
user’s disk.
There is no reason why the legal position in India should be any different from 
that above. However, targeting end-users is always an unpopular and controversial 
strategy anywhere in the world. It has rarely been followed by rights owners in 
India. In recent years, some developed countries have adopted the so-called “gradu-
ated response” systems as a milder way to target end-users.46 Graduated response 
systems can be divided into the “publicly and privately arranged”, the former origi-
nating in statutes and the latter in agreements between Internet service providers 
41 Copyright Act of 1957, s. 14
42 A&M Records v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–5 (9th Cir. 2001).
43 BMG Music v. Gonzalez 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005).
44 Dallas Buyers Club v. iiNet (2015) F.C.A. 317, ¶¶ 28–30 (Fed. Ct. Aust.).
45 Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Meltwater (2014) A.C. 1438, ¶¶ 26, 27, 29, 30, 33–38, 46, 
49–52 (Case C-360/13) (Eur. Ct. Justice).
46 The countries with such a mechanism currently in place include the USA, UK, France, New 
Zealand, Ireland, South Korea and Taiwan. See Giblin, R. 2014. Evaluating Graduated Response. 
Columbia Journal of Law & Arts 37: 147.
A. Banerjee
181
(ISPs) and rights owners.47 The common feature of these schemes is that they “gen-
erally require that the ISP take some action against users suspected of infringing 
copyright, ranging from issuing warnings, to collating allegations made against sub-
scribers and reporting to copyright owners, to suspension and eventual termination 
of service”.48 Arguments in favour of graduated response systems hold that such 
schemes can act as “digital scarecrow[s]” and deter large numbers of Internet users 
from infringing copyright and that they represent a cheaper and fairer alternative to 
suing individual Internet users.49
At present, ISPs and other intermediaries in India are governed by a set of rules 
requiring them to inform users not to host or upload “any information” that 
“infringes any…copyright or other proprietary rights”.50 In case users breach this 
policy, the ISP or intermediary “has the right to immediately terminate the access or 
usage rights of” the user.51 Although uploading is a natural consequence of using 
file-sharing software, there is little evidence to suggest that, in the absence of court 
orders, ISPs have voluntarily disconnected users who upload pirated content by 
using such software. Indeed, as many subscribers may purchase high-speed Internet 
connections with the purpose of downloading pirated films, it is questionable 
whether ISPs even desire to enforce such rules. The Committee accordingly sug-
gested the institution of a “three stage strike model” where “[a]t the first stage, the 
errant subscriber could be let off with a warning appearing on his screen; at the 
second stage, a more severe punishment could be given while the third time, the 
subscriber’s services could be disrupted for a few hours or so”.52
The issue of disconnecting a user is no doubt the most contentious aspect of 
graduated response systems. The Indian constitution grants all citizens the funda-
mental right to “freedom of speech and expression”, subject only to certain “reason-
able restrictions”.53 The Supreme Court has held that this right includes a “right to…
information, knowledge and entertainment”54 and that the “content of the right…
remains the same whatever the means of communication including internet 
communication”.55 Therefore, it could be argued that the right to access information 
47 Ibid at 153.
48 Suzor, N. & Fitzgerald, B. 2001. The Legitimacy of Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright 
Law. UNSW Law Journal 34:1.
49 Yu, P. 2010. The Graduated Response. Florida Law Review 62:1374, 1381–3.
50 Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011, Notification No. G.S.R. 
314(E), s. 3(2)(d).
51 Ibid at s. 3(5).
52 Report of the Committee on Piracy, supra note 10 at 35–36.
53 Constitution of India, Article 19.
54 Secretary, Ministry of Information v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) A.I.R. S.C. 1236, ¶ 
91.
55 Shreya Singhal v. India AIR 2015 SC 1523 ¶ 86.
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and entertainment through the Internet is a fundamental right under the Indian 
Constitution.
Outside India, the High Court of Ireland has observed that while disconnection 
is a “serious sanction”, it does not completely deprive persons of Internet access, as 
they “have only to walk down to their local town centre” and use a cybercafé.56 
However, France’s highest court, the Constitutional Council, struck down as uncon-
stitutional a provision in the first version of France’s graduated response system, 
under which subscribers could be disconnected for up to 1 year and barred from 
entering into contracts with other ISPs during this period.57 The fact that the 
Committee referred to “disruption” for a few hours, rather than a lengthy “discon-
nection”, indicates that the Committee may have been hinting at bandwidth reduc-
tion rather than outright disconnection. Such a measure would perhaps be easier to 
defend as a permissible “reasonable restriction”.
It has also been argued that graduated response systems deny “end-users due 
process by subjecting them to unverified suspicion of infringing activities”, and the 
technology used to identify infringing users is also not accurate.58 In Ireland, for 
example, a technical glitch led to an ISP incorrectly sending almost 400 subscribers 
copyright infringement notifications.59 In France, the Constitutional Council held 
that by “reversing the burden of proof” and fixing “presumption of guilt” on Internet 
user, the first version of France’s graduated response system had contravened the 
French constitution.60 An easy way to overcome this problem could be to dispense 
with the penalty of disruption altogether and simply send users persuasive warn-
ings. Such a model has been attempted in the UK. However, the efficacy of such a 
model is yet to be determined. One critic has described the UK model as “toothless”.61
Even if a graduated response mechanism may be constitutionally defensible in 
India, such a measure would still be unpopular among the public, especially as 
Internet access is still restricted to a minority of India’s population and out of reach 
of economically weak sections. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assume that, 
among poorer sections of the population, several users may share an Internet con-
nection between themselves, meaning that non-infringers may be penalised. It is, 
therefore, not a surprise that the Committee’s proposal has not found legislative or 
political support. Instead, rights owners have preferred to use website-blocking 
injunctions as an anti-piracy strategy. However, the question of targeting end-users 
has again reared its head, following an order of the Delhi High Court in a recent 
website-blocking case.  The court observed that “since website blocking is a 
56 E.M.I. v. Eircom (2010) I.E.H.C. 108, ¶ 9.
57 Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009–580, June 10, 2009, J.O. 9675 
(Fr.) (“HADOPI case”), translated in Act Furthering the Diffusion and Protection of Creation on 
the Internet, Décision n° 2009–580, 4 (June 10, 2009), ¶¶ 9-10, 19, 39 available at http://www.
conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2009580DC2009_580dc.
pdf
58 Yu, supra note 49, at 1394-6.
59 E.M.I. v. Eircom (2012) I.E.H.C. 264, ¶¶ 1.1–1.3.
60 HADOPI case, supra note 57, at ¶¶ 18, 39




cumbersome exercise” and the majority of downloaders are “youngsters” who may 
be unaware of copyright law, the government should frame a policy where users are 
warned “if technologically feasible in the form of e-mails, or pop-ups or such other 
modes”, and fined in the event of not heeding the warnings62.
4  Website-Blocking Injunctions
As mentioned earlier, what most plaintiffs in civil infringement actions in India 
realistically look for is an interim injunction. Here, the Delhi High Court has been 
liberal in granting such injunctions speedily and ex parte, through the so-called 
“John Doe” orders. A John Doe order is an order restraining anonymous infringers. 
It is often referred to as an “Ashok Kumar” order in India. The first such order in 
India was passed by the Delhi High Court, in a case involving pirated live broad-
casts of the 2002 FIFA World Cup by unlicensed cable operators. The plaintiffs held 
rights to broadcast the event and had sublicensed those rights to specific cable oper-
ators in India. At the time, broadband penetration in India was very low, and stream-
ing technologies were underdeveloped worldwide. Thus, the plaintiffs were focused 
on curbing television broadcasts. The plaintiffs named a handful of cable operators 
who were already broadcasting the matches without a licence as defendants but 
added unknown “Ashok Kumar” parties as remaining defendants. The plaintiffs 
argued that the “enforcement of rights against cable operators is a virtual night-
mare” and that “if they were to wait and identify specific parties and collect evi-
dence of infringement by such specific parties, they would lose a great amount of 
time”.63 Citing decisions from the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, the plaintiffs 
argued for a John Doe order against the additional, unknown defendants. The court 
agreed with the plaintiffs’ contentions and granted the order. Justice Dalveer 
Bhandari (who would go on to be appointed to the Supreme Court of India and the 
International Court of Justice) observed:
The judicial systems of all these countries have basic similarity with our judicial system. 
Therefore, looking to the extra ordinary facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest 
of justice the courts in India would also be justified in passing ‘John Doe’ orders. …
Undoubtedly the cable operators in India have a long history of violating copyrights. … The 
cable operators are encouraged owing to the unique nature of cable piracy and the unstruc-
tured nature of the cable industry, the speed with which any trace of infringement can be 
erased by the cable operators, enforcement of rights in conservative nature is unlikely to 
effectively redress the plaintiffs’ grievance.64
In the context of online piracy, a number of rights owners have obtained broadly 
worded ex parte John Doe orders from the major High Courts (particularly Delhi) to 
compel ISPs to pre-emptively block infringing websites—a trend visible from 2011 
onwards. In what is thought to be the first of such cases, the Delhi High Court 
62 UTV v 1337X.to, Civil Suit No 724/2017, ¶ 104, Delhi High Court, 10 April 2019, https://indi-
ankanoon.org/doc/47479491/.
63 Taj Television v. Mandal (2003) F.S.R. 22, ¶ 7 (Del. H.C.).
64 Ibid ¶ ¶ 16, 17.
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granted an injunction in connection with a big-budget Bollywood film, Singham. 
Applying Justice Bhandari’s decision in an online context, the court stated:
[D]efendants, and other unnamed and undisclosed persons, are restrained from communi-
cating or making available or distributing, or duplicating, or displaying, or releasing, or 
showing, or uploading, or downloading, or exhibiting, or playing, and/or defraying the 
movie “Singham” in any manner without proper license from the plaintiff or in any other 
manner which would violate/infringe the plaintiff’s copyright in the said cinematograph 
film “Singham” through different mediums like CD, DVD, Blue-ray, VCD, Cable TV, 
DTH, Internet, MMS, Tapes, Conditional Access System or in any other like manner.65
Thus, the court passed a very broad order encompassing various actors in the 
online piracy chain, from those indulging in camcording to uploaders and download-
ers, as well as actors involved in physical piracy. This order was followed by a large 
number of similar orders in the coming months and years, using similar language.66
Unsurprisingly, ISPs did not take kindly to such orders being passed against 
them ex parte. An association of ISPs wrote to the Indian government complaining 
that various law firms had been sending ISPs legal notices annexing copies of John 
Doe orders and that the government’s Department of Telecommunications (DoT) 
notification was the correct authority to instruct a website to be blocked.67 However, 
a film company countered this by impleading the DoT as an additional party in a 
subsequent suit before the Delhi High Court. The court held that even the DoT was 
required to block “various websites (named and un-named)…primarily indulged in 
hosting, streaming or providing access to infringing and illegal” copies of the film 
in question.68
The wide ambit of such orders has met with considerable criticism. One of the 
earliest criticisms was that ISPs were blocking entire websites (such as Vimeo and 
Daily Motion) instead of specific pages within the website hosting infringing con-
tent.69 In one instance, a consumer court directed an ISP to pay compensation to a 
65 Reliance v. Jyoti Cable, Civil Suit No. 1724 of 2011 (Del. H.C., Jul. 20, 2011), http://delhihigh-
court.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=135357&yr=2011
66 See, e.g. Reliance v. Jyoti Cable, Civil Suit No. 2066 of 2011 (Del. H.C., Aug. 26, 2011), http://
delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=173116&yr=2011 (similarly worded order concern-
ing the Bollywood film Bodyguard); Reliance v. Multivision, Civil Suit No. 3207 of 2011 (Del. 
H.C., Dec. 19, 2011), http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=269404&yr=2011 (simi-
larly worded order concerning the Bollywood film Don 2). See also John Doe Orders  – Stop 
Piracy, Oct. 8, 2014, NAIK NAIK & CO., http://naiknaik.com/john-doe-orders (contains a table 
with details of John Doe orders awarded by courts, including the Bombay, Madras and Calcutta 
High Courts).
67 Letter from the Internet Service Providers Association of India to the Secretary, DoT (2011). 
http://www.ispai.in/UI/uploads/submissionAttach/dot(1).pdf
68 See, e.g. Fox v. Macpuler, Civil Suit No. 2066 of 2011, ¶ 7 (Delhi High Court, May 14, 2015), 
http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=110404&yr=2015
69 Dua, K. 2012. Confusion Reigns as Indian ISPs Block Vimeo, Torrent Websites. NDTV. http://
gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/confusion-reigns-as-indian-isps-block-vimeo-torrent-web-
sites-223340. Pawa, N.  Update: Files Sharing Sites Blocked In India Because Reliance BIG 




subscriber who could not access a website for over a month.70 High Courts have 
since attempted to rectify this flaw. In 2013, the Madras High Court stated that only 
pages specifically hosting infringing content ought to be blocked, rather than entire 
websites.71 In 2016, the Delhi High Court passed a similar order.72 The same year, 
the Bombay High Court refused to grant a John Doe order, where the plaintiff 
requested for a block on 800 websites, finding the plaintiff’s suit to be “sketchy and 
formless”.73 The judge directed the plaintiff to instead produce “a list of individual 
links to downloads”, further stating that “a technically competent officer” of the 
plaintiff must check “if not all, at least a sufficient sampling of these links so as to 
warrant the grant of an injunction”.74
However, the Delhi and Bombay High Courts both later backtracked. The Delhi 
High Court recalled its order and held that “rogue websites” indulging in “rank 
piracy” ought to be blocked outright, rather than specific pages within the website.75 
The Bombay High Court, in a subsequent order by the same judge, blocked all web-
sites submitted by the plaintiff in a list, numbering 110.76 The list of websites 
included full websites, such as www.limetorrents.cc, www.thepiratebay.org and 
www.ugtorrents.com, instead of specific pages. Recently, amidst uncertainty regard-
ing the actual legal position, the popular website www.archive.org (which hosts 
thousands of valuable historical materials in the public domain) was blocked in 
entirety by ISPs, following a John Doe order of the Madras High Court. Some users 
had apparently uploaded pirated copies of two films on the website. However, the 
plaintiffs named the website in entirety in the infringement suit, and the court 
granted the plaintiffs the relief they sought without any rider distinguishing the 
website in entirety versus the infringing pages within it.77
70 Vinay v. Airtel, Consumer Complaint 226 of 2012 (District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, 
Shimoga, Aug. 3, 2012), http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/18533120803153733968226- 
202.pdf
71 Vodafone v. R.K. Productions (2013) 54 P.T.C. 149, ¶ 4 (Mad. H.C.) (quoting an earlier order 
where the court had stated that “the interim injunction is granted only in respect of a particular 
URL where the infringing movie is kept and not in respect of the entire website”.).
72 DEITY v. Star, First Appeal Order No. 57 of 2015 (Del. H.C. March 10, 2016), http://delhihigh-
court.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=54187&yr=2016
73 Balaji Motion Pictures v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam, Civil Suit No. 694 of 2016 (Bom. H.C. July 1, 
2016), ¶ 6, http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Great-Grand-Masti-1.pdf
74 Ibid at ¶¶ 7-8.
75 DEITY v. Star, Review Petition in First Appeal Order No. 57 of 2015, ¶ 14(Del. H.C. 
July 29, 2016), available at http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/PNJ/judgement/29-07-2016/
PNJ29072016REVIEWPET1312016.pdf
76 Balaji Motion Pictures v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam, Civil Suit No. 694 of 2016 (Bom. H.C. July 8, 
2016), ¶ 4, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2944079/Great-Grand-Masti-Order-Dated-
8th-July-2016.pdf
77 Internet Archive blocked in India, thanks to Lipstick Under My Burkha & Shah Rukh Jab Harry 
Met Sejal. 2017. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/internet-archive- 
blocked-in-india-thanks-to-lipstick-under-my-burkha-and-shah-rukh-jab-harry-met-sejal- 
1029036-2017-08-10
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5  Ad-Supported Piracy
The prevalence of ad-supported piracy has been highlighted in recent studies. This 
section discusses the FICCI-SIPI study in more detail. The study is only among a 
handful conducted on the subject worldwide and perhaps the only one in India. As 
mentioned earlier, the study tracked 1143 pirate websites offering pirated copies of 
Indian films. These roughly fell into five categories—torrent and other peer-to-peer 
file-sharing websites, direct download websites, linking websites and streaming 
websites. The study found 786 different entities advertising on 835 websites. Of this 
number, 46% concerned categories such as adult dating, pornography, unregulated 
products and gambling. The remaining 56% concerned mainstream products and 
services.78 The latter spanned industries like telecommunications, automobiles, 
entertainment and retail and included ads for well-known brands like Lufthansa, 
AirAsia, Nissan, Hyundai, Religare (an Indian financial services group) and Flipkart 
(a popular Indian online retail website).79
The study blamed the appearance of such ads on the way digital advertisers func-
tion. The study reported that up to 85–90% of the digital advertising budget of 
brands was spent on search engines, social media and legitimate livestreaming plat-
forms. However, the remaining amount was funnelled by ad agencies or marketing 
teams to “ad networks that provide cheap and efficiency driven media campaigns”, 
such as Google AdSense, DoubleClick (a subsidiary of Google), PopAds, Propeller 
Ads, BlueKai, AppNexus and Lotam.80 These networks typically operate on a cost- 
per- click basis and exercise low levels of control.81 This means, for example, that an 
ad for Lufthansa placed through such networks may appear on a pirate website 
offering a copy of the newest Avengers film, rather than a news website, if the for-
mer attracts 100,000 visitors a day, while the latter attracts 10,000 a day.
In a report titled How Google Fights Piracy, Google has stated that it “takes the 
challenge of online piracy seriously” and is “a leader in rooting out and ejecting 
rogue sites” from ad networks.82 Google has claimed that it has terminated over 
11,000 AdSense accounts for copyright violations.83 However, the FICCI-SIPI 
study found that Google and DoubleClick collectively provided ad network services 
to over half the sample websites in the study, with AdSense supplying nearly 20%.84 
This may suggest that either Google has not devoted much attention to concerns of 
78 FICCI & SIPI, supra note 35, at pp. 4–5.
79 Ibid at 40–42.
80 Ibid at 6.
81 Ibid.
82 Google, How Google Fights Piracy 9 (2016). https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA/view
83 Ibid at pp. 4, 16.
84 FICCI & SIPI, supra note 35, at p. 7.
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Indian copyright owners or that the sheer scale of piracy means that AdSense 
accounts violating copyright keep proliferating rapidly. Either way, it clearly dem-
onstrates that income is generated from the piracy of Indian films. While this 
income, as demonstrated by the FICCI-SIPI study, only draws a small chunk of the 
digital advertising budget of corporations, it may be considered large in relation to 
the minimal investment made by pirate websites and the large number of viewers 
such websites may attract (thus maximising returns from a cost-per-click ad 
policy).
Yet, even if Google and reputed brands address the problem more seriously and 
choke funding for pirate websites, it is important to remember that, per the FICCI- 
SIPI study, almost half the ads were from dodgy businesses. In India, for example, 
pornography is technically illegal, while gambling is banned in virtually every 
Indian state. It is doubtful whether a pornography or gambling website would be as 
conscious of its brand reputation and prestige as a mainstream corporation would. 
For such businesses, pirate websites may actually be the best way to advertise their 
products and services to the youth. Thus, attempting to curb piracy by throttling ad 
revenues may only be a partly successful strategy.
6  Conclusion
The chapter began by drawing attention to the fact that there are limits to how the 
law can curb online piracy. Enforcement in India presents additional obstacles. In 
this context, rights owners have carved out website-blocking injunctions as a conve-
nient strategy, which has certainly yielded benefits. Nevertheless, this is still not an 
ideal remedy. In the absence of judicial authority, especially a Supreme Court deci-
sion, laying down the exact criteria for blocking websites in entirety versus specific 
infringing pages, it is still open to judges to be cautious and insist on blocking spe-
cific infringing pages only. In such a situation, a pirate can easily migrate to a dif-
ferent, unblocked page within the same website. Furthermore, even if judges block 
websites in entirety, this can still allow the blocked website to shift to a different 
website altogether. For example, a pirated music website blocked by the Calcutta 
High Court did precisely this. The court ordered the blocking of the website www.
songs.pk, with the rider that the “order of blocking should be confined to” that spe-
cific website and “should not otherwise interfere with internet service”.85 The web-
site subsequently migrated to the website www.songspk.pk.86 In the time that a 
rights owner approaches a court for a second time to block a new website, a substan-
tial amount of piracy may already have occurred.
85 Sagarika v. Dishnet, Civil Suit 23 of 2012 (Cal. H.C., Jan. 27, 2012).
86 Saxena, A. 2012. Songs.Pk Relaunched as Songspk.pk. Mediaama http://www.medianama.
com/2012/03/223-songs-pk-relaunched-as-songspk-pk-ad-networks
Contemporary Challenges of Online Copyright Enforcement in India
188
Additionally, questions should be raised about the manner in which legitimate 
websites, such as www.archive.org., were blocked. Although it is probable that 
many judges are not expert Internet users and tend to give plaintiffs the benefit of 
doubt, the blocking of legitimate websites can constitute a violation of consumer 
rights and even a violation of the right to freedom of expression.
Amidst this dilemma, rights owners can perhaps explore non-litigious strategies 
as a more efficient and less contentious measure. For instance, online piracy is 
increasingly being viewed as a money laundering and tax evasion issue, where 
pirates profiting from advertisements can use payment gateways to stay anonymous. 
In the UK, the government has established the Police Intellectual Property Crime 
Unit (PIPCU). The PIPCU performs a range of anti-piracy functions, notable among 
which are efforts to disrupt the revenue stream of pirate websites.87 Recently, fol-
lowing reports of the widespread piracy of Telugu-language films, the state of 
Telangana in India established the Telangana Intellectual Property Crime Unit 
(TIPCU), modelled on the PIPCU.88 Following Telangana, the state of Maharashtra 
(which is home to Bollywood) announced the establishment of the Maharashtra IP 
Crime Unit (MIPCU).89 By bypassing courts and working with police officials 
likely to be more knowledgeable about cybercrime and technology, the industry can 
possibly counter piracy more efficiently.
Another strategy for rights owners could be to approach the Advertising Standards 
Council of India (ASCI), a self-regulatory body monitoring misleading advertise-
ments, and alert well-known corporations to the problem of their advertisements 
appearing on pirate websites. Legally, there is no requirement regarding the medium 
through which traders can advertise their products in India, and the matter would 
not directly be under the ASCI’s ambit. But this does not preclude rights owners 
from lobbying with the ASCI to initiate discussion among advertisers. In the USA, 
a joint effort by the Association of National Advertisers, the American Association 
of Advertising Agencies and the Interactive Advertising Bureau has resulted in the 
formation of the Trustworthy Accountability Group. This initiative has, according 
to one study, significantly reduced ad revenues for pirate websites in the USA, curb-
ing revenues by over US$ 100 million.90 Possibly, the ASCI could initiate a similar 
measure.
87 Weatherley, supra note 33, at 7–9.
88 TIPCU to Tackle Online Piracy. 2016. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
andhra-pradesh/tipcu-to-tackle-online-piracy/article8771496.ece
89 Parmar, M. 2017. FICCI Frames’17. Maharashtra to form IP Crime Unit to fight online piracy. 
Indian Television. TIPCU to Tackle Online Piracy, THE HINDU, June 25, 2016, http://www.the-
hindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/tipcu-to-tackle-online-piracy/article8771496.ece





Yet another strategy for rights owners could be to tackle what is arguably the 
elephant in the room—Google and its ad networks. Recently, Google has initiated 
measures to block hate speech websites and prevent advertisements from showing 
up on these websites. This measure was taken under pressure from corporations 
displeased at their advertisements inadvertently appearing on such websites.91 
Copyright owners could enter into discussion with Google for similar technological 
measures with respect to pirated content. However, copyright infringement is 
undoubtedly viewed much less seriously than hate speech. Moreover, unlike hate 
speech, there is a greater degree of acceptance and participation among youth in the 
consumption of pirated content.
In the end, online piracy is best tackled through a series of measures. However, 
as this chapter has pointed out, rights owners must be realistic about the limitations 
of each measure and thus at best only hope to curb the extent of piracy.
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Abstract
The chapter traces the stance that Indian copyright law has adopted on the issue 
of royalty payments to authors of literary and musical works, through the years. 
It delineates the court judgments that have exerted a significant impact on the 
subject, the development of the law, and the practical realities and application of 
the law. The first part of the chapter details the structuring of music production 
deals in India. The next section explores the relevant judicial precedents and the 
issues with the copyright societies in India. The third section traces the amend-
ments introduced in 2012, thereby changing the royalties landscape, and the last 
part assesses the aftermath of these amendments.
The chapter is specific to the Indian law on the subject of royalties and the 
significance of royalties given the massive scale at which content, i.e., movies, 
television programs, and now web-based content, is produced and exploited in 
India. Music production has continued to play an important role in the realm of 
content production and distribution in India (“In its 103-year-old history, songs 
have been an integral part of Hindi movies ever since the first talkie, Alam Ara, 
released in 1931. Over the years, apart from their cultural and aesthetic signifi-
cance, songs have added tremendous business value to films. …. The industry 
believes that songs become the identity of films in India, especially due to a 
marketing culture that relies on film stars and little else.” Is Bollywood still wary 
of ‘song-less’ films? Mint (April 21, 2016).), and music production, as detailed 
in the chapter, assumed immense significance in the context of the statutory roy-
alties introduced vide the amendments to the Indian copyright law in 2012.
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1  Introduction
…. one of the plain objectives of the proposed legislation is to ensure that the authors of the 
works, in particular authors of songs included in cinematograph films or sound recordings, 
receive royalty for the commercial exploitation of such works.1
The importance of music in cinematograph films created in India cannot be over-
stated. Many films produced in India are identified by the music. A lot of the music 
that is created in connection with cinematograph films in India is actually incorpo-
rated in the films, interspersed at regular intervals throughout the progression of the 
story. Hence, music holds a special significance in the context of content, in particu-
lar, Indian cinema.
Given the immense popularity of film music in India, it is unimaginable that the 
creation of music and accompanying lyrics would not constitute a lucrative business 
for the authors of these works. However, a close scrutiny of the status quo estab-
lishes that while the musical composition and the lyrics are the intellectual work of 
the respective authors, the substantial remuneration that accrues from the exploita-
tion of the music actually flows to entities that may have procured the rights to it for 
a monetary consideration without any intimate involvement in the creative 
process.
This chapter explores the laws relating to equitable remuneration or “royalties” 
as the term is understood and used under the Indian copyright law. In particular, it 
explores the historical position on royalties, the current law on the subject, and the 
continuing complexities. At the outset, it is appropriate to clarify that the statutory 
concept of royalties was introduced in the Indian copyright law only in the year 
2012. Hence, while prior to 2012, the payment of royalties was recognized as a 
requirement and an entitlement; there was no statutory mandate on it.
2  Music Deals: Indian Context
Each piece of music amalgamates several independent works. It includes the musi-
cal works composed by a music composer and the lyrics authored by a lyricist 
unless the music constitutes the background score for the particular cinematograph 
film. The musical work and literary work are fused together in a sound recording by 
the producer of the sound recording. This sound recording is usually incorporated in 
1 Paragraph 10.20, Clause 7: Section 19: “Mode of Assignment,” Two Hundred Twenty-Seventh 
Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
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the cinematograph film. The musical work, the literary work, the sound recording, 
and the cinematograph film each constitute a separate and independent class of 
work. The definition of a “work” as detailed in the Copyright Act, 1957 (“Act”), 
disambiguates this conceptual differentiation.2
While certainly not all, but a large part of the music in India is for incorporation 
in films or other forms of content such as television programs or web series. The 
structure of music deals in the Indian film industry3 usually involves the following 
processes:
 1. The producer of the film “commissions” the music composer to create the musi-
cal composition and enters into a separate agreement for the lyrics, whereby the 
lyricist is similarly commissioned to author the lyrics.
 2. The music composer and lyricist are required to assign all their rights in the 
musical compositions and lyrics to the producer.
 3. The music composer is also delegated the responsibility of creating the sound 
recording for each song and delivering this to the producer. The rights in the 
sound recordings are assigned to the producer.
 4. The music composer is also delegated the responsibility of procuring appropriate 
assignment of rights from the various singers, musicians, who render services in 
relation to a particular song.
 5. The producer of the film assigns the rights in the songs to a music label that ulti-
mately exploits the music rights in a film.
The spectrum of rights that is assigned to the producer of the film, and subse-
quently to the music label, usually assumes the format of an “all inclusive” assign-
ment including all rights of exploitation and the entire copyright in the music. The 
music label is hence entitled to exploit the music through all modes and mediums of 
exploitation, including those that are only anticipated to be invented at a future date. 
The constant evolution and development of technology have expanded the scope of 
the modes through which music can be exploited. While earlier, the most commonly 
used medium for accessing and listening to music in India was the radio, cassettes, 
and later compact discs, in the present day the most ubiquitous medium is digital 
platforms. It is also important to bear in mind that digital platforms have supple-
mented, not supplanted radio and compact discs, which continue to be used by 
many people in India. Further, music companies also exploit the songs in audio- 
visual format, through authorizing various television and digital platforms to exhibit 
either the full-length songs or snippets from the songs.
2 Section 2(y) of the Act provides that “work” means any of the following works, namely—(i) a 
literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work; (ii) a cinematograph film; and (iii) a sound recording.
3 While this chapter refers to the “Indian film industry,” it is important to note that there is no “a” 
Indian film industry. Bollywood is undoubtedly India’s most prominent and internationally recog-
nized film industry. However, apart from Bollywood, there are several regional film industries in 
different parts of India.
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The equal right to royalties4 accruing from exploitation of literary and musical 
works arose in the context of the rampant monetization of music by producers of 
films and music companies and the concomitant exclusion of music composers and 
lyricists, from a share in this commercialization. The amendments introduced in 
2012 to the Act attempted to address three interrelated concerns of authors of liter-
ary and musical works incorporated in cinematograph films and sound recordings:
 1. Authors would be entitled to receive an equal share of royalties each time the 
works are exploited as part of a cinematograph film, except in the case of distri-
bution of the film in a cinema hall or in a sound recording not forming part of a 
cinematograph film. The royalties would be payable regardless of the medium of 
exploitation.
 2. The assignment of the copyright in the works cannot be construed to extinguish 
the author’s right to receive royalties accruing from the exploitation of such 
works. While the copyright can be assigned, the right to receive royalties cannot 
be assigned by the author to any person other than to the author’s heirs or a copy-
right society for collection and distribution of royalties.
 3. The proviso to Section 18 of the Act, introduced vide the 2012 amendments, 
sought to restrict an assignment of copyright in respect of unforeseen modes and 
mediums of exploitation5: “Provided further that no such assignment shall be 
applied to any medium or mode of exploitation of the work which did not exist 
or was not in commercial use at the time when the assignment was made, unless 
the assignment specifically referred to such medium or mode of exploitation of 
the work.” The intent behind the amendment was to ensure a guaranteed stream 
of royalties to authors upon the advent of new technological formats. “In short, 
the amendments in section 18 will protect interests of authors in the event of 
exploitation of their work by restricting assignments in unforeseen new mediums 
and henceforth author of works in films will have right to receive royalties from 
the utilization of such work in any other form except to the legal heirs or to a 
copyright society and any other contract to the contrary shall be void.6”
However, since the proviso referred to an “assignment,” contracts have employed a 
“license” from the author to such future modes and mediums.
4 Introduced vide the Proviso to Section 18 of the Copyright Act, 1957, through the amendments 
enacted in 2012. Please see infra Note 32.
5 The historical precedent to the introduction of the proviso was the withholding of “ringtone” 
related royalties to authors of literary and musical works, a format of music exploitation that gar-
nered immense popularity in India in the early 2000s; see Prashant Reddy T., The Background 
Score to the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, 5 NUJS L. Rev. 469 (2012).
6 Paragraph 9.18, Clause 6: Section 18: Assignment of Copyright, Two Hundred Twenty-Seventh 
Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
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3  Historical Perspective
3.1  Judicial Backdrop to the Amendments
An oft-used argument by producers of cinematograph films to deny royalties to 
authors related to the commissioned status of the works created by such authors. A 
work is considered to be “commissioned” under the Act if it is created at the instance 
of another person. Section 17 of the Act encapsulates the principle of “commis-
sioned” works. The relevant portion of the erstwhile provision as it read prior to the 
amendments in 2012 is reproduced below:
(b) subject to the provision of clause (a), in the case of a photograph taken, or a painting or 
portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable consideration at 
the instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the con-
trary, be the first owner of the copyright therein.7
The provision operated to vest first ownership of the identified classes of works 
in the person who extended “valuable consideration” and at whose “instance” the 
cinematograph film was made.8 Since one of the enumerated classes of works was 
cinematograph films, producers of such works argued that the entire copyright in the 
underlying works, such as musical works and literary works, incorporated in a cin-
ematograph film, was owned by the producer by virtue of the qualifying status of 
the film as a commissioned work. It is perhaps apposite to explain here that under 
the Indian copyright laws, authorship and ownership of a work are bifurcated. An 
author of a work may not be the first owner of the work in all instances. The general 
proposition is that the author is also the first owner of the work. However, this gen-
eral principle is defeated in cases of a work created in the course of employment and 
in the cases of commissioned works.9 Producers of cinematograph films used the 
“commissioned” status of the films to argue that by implication, authors were also 
7 Section 17(b) of the Act as last amended by Act No. 49 of 1999.
8 Section 17(b) of the Act as last amended by Act No. 49 of 1999.
9 See Section 17 of the Act (reproduced in part):“First owner of copyright.—Subject to the provi-
sions of this Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein: Provided 
that—(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or artistic work made by the author in the course of his 
employment by the proprietor of a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical under a contract of 
service or apprenticeship, for the purpose of publication in a newspaper, magazine or similar peri-
odical, the said proprietor shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner 
of the copyright in the work in so far as the copyright relates to the publication of the work in any 
newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, or to the reproduction of the work for the purpose of its 
being so published, but in all other respects the author shall be the first owner of the copyright in 
the work;(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), in the case of a photograph taken, or a painting 
or portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph film made, for valuable consideration at the 
instance of any person, such person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the 
first owner of the copyright therein; (c) in the case of a work made in the course of the author’s 
employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, to which clause (a) or clause (b) does 
not apply, the employer shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of 
the copyright therein.”.
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divested of their right to receive royalties, in conjunction with the copyright in their 
works, to the producer of the film who would be deemed the first owner of the film 
including all works incorporated therein. The stance employed by the producers 
was bolstered by a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Indian Performing 
Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association.10 The Indian 
Performing Right Society (IPRS)11 instituted an appeal against the order of the 
Calcutta High Court which held that the producer of a film could oust the first own-
ership of the literary or musical works incorporated in a cinematograph film, by the 
authors of such works, in cases where the film constituted a commissioned work 
under Section 17(b) of the Act:
In our opinion, therefore, when a composer of lyric or music composes for the first time for 
valuable consideration for purposes of a cinematograph film, the owner of the film at whose 
instance the composition is made, becomes the first owner of the copyright in the composi-
tion. The composer acquires no copyright at all either in respect of the film or its sound 
track which he is capable of assigning.12
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court. The 
Supreme Court held that when a literary or musical work is commissioned by a 
producer for incorporation in a cinematograph film, the copyright in the entire film, 
including the underlying literary and musical works, vests with the producer by 
virtue of Section 17 of the Act:
This takes us to the core of the question namely, whether the producer of a cinematograph 
film can defeat the right of the composer of music … or lyricist by engaging him. The key 
to the solution of this question lies in provisos (b) and (c) to section 17 of the Act repro-
duced above which put the matter beyond doubt. According to the first of these provisos viz. 
proviso (b) when a cinematograph film producer commissions a composer of music or a 
lyricist for reward or valuable consideration for the purpose of making his cinematograph 
film, or composing music or lyric therefore i.e. the sounds for incorporation or absorption 
in the sound track associated with the film, which as already indicated, are included in a 
cinematograph film, he becomes the first owner of the copyright therein and no copyright 
subsists in the composer of the lyric or music so composed unless there is a contract to the 
contrary between the composer of the lyric or music on the one hand and the producer of 
the cinematograph film on the other…. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the rights of a music 
composer or… lyricist can be defeated by the producer of a cinematograph film in the man-
ner laid down in provisos (b) and (c) of section 17 of the Act.13
10 1977 AIR 1443. “The Cinematograph Exhibitors Association of India also filed objections chal-
lenging the right of the IPRS to charge fees and royalties in respect of performance in public of the 
musical works incorporated in the sound track of the films. Besides raising contentions identical to 
those raised by various associations of producers they averred that copyright in a cinematograph 
film which vested in the producers meant copyright in the entirety of the film as an integrated unit 
including the musical work incorporated in the sound track of the film and the right to perform the 
work in public…”.
11 IPRS is the primary copyright society in India for literary and musical works. It issues licenses 
and collects and distributes royalties, in respect of literary and musical works.
12 Paragraph 33, Eastern India Motion Pictures Association v. Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. 
AIR 1974 Cal 257.
13 Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association 1977 AIR 
1443. Paragraph 18 of the decision as sourced from Manupatra.
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The argument adopted by producers was clearly anomalous given that the “right 
to receive royalties” is not recognized by the Act as a right flowing from the copy-
right in a work. Section 14 of the Act14 details the rights that are construed to be 
included in the copyright in a work. The right to receive royalties is conspicuously 
absent from rights enumerated in Section 14. Hence, the right to receive royalties is 
deducible from the factum of authorship, i.e., it is attendant upon the authorship of 
a work and not the copyright in a work.
Further, the argument also overlooks the distinction created between the various 
classes of works in Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 clarifies that literary works, 
musical works, cinematograph films, and sound recordings are separate classes of 
works and copyright subsists in each work. The erstwhile Section 17(b) of the Act 
refers to the commissioning of a cinematograph film, not the independent works 
that are incorporated in it. The cinematograph film, as a whole, is owned by the 
person who commissioned it. Conceptually, the provision is inextricably linked to 
the distinction between the author and the first owner of a work under the Act. 
Section 2(d)15 of the Act states that the author of a cinematograph film is the pro-
ducer of the film. However, by virtue of Section 17(b), the first owner of the cine-
matograph film could be a person other than the producer, i.e., the person at whose 
instance and consideration the film was made.
The bifurcation becomes clear when the definitions in the Act are viewed in the 
context of the reality of film production deals in India. Section 2(uu)16 of the Act 
defines a “producer” as a person who takes the initiative and responsibility for mak-
ing the cinematograph film. The structure of film production deals in India involves 
multiple parties, frequently commencing at the instance of an entity that possesses 
the financial resources to commission the development of the film, and this entity 
usually delegates the responsibility of completing the film to a production house. 
Since the production house assumes the actual responsibility and initiative for mak-
ing the film, the production house is recognized as the “producer” under Section 
2(uu) of the Act. Conversely, given that the film is made at the instance of and with 
the aid of the consideration advanced by the financing entity, this entity is ultimately 
construed to be the “first owner” of the film under Section 17 of the Act.
14 Section 14(a) of the Act elucidates the various rights comprised in the copyright vesting in a liter-
ary or musical work, these include “(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including the 
storing of it in any medium by electronic means; (ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not 
being copies already in circulation; (iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the 
public; (iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work; (v) to make 
any translation of the work; (vi) to make any adaptation of the work; (vii) to do, in relation to a 
translation or an adaptation of the work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-
clauses (i) to (vi);.
15 “author” means,—(i) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, the author of the work; (ii) in 
relation to a musical work, the composer; (iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photo-
graph, the artist; (iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph; (v) in relation 
to a cinematograph film or sound recording, the producer; (vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be cre-
ated” Section 2(d), The Copyright Act, 1957.
16 “‘producer’, in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, means a person who takes 
the initiative and responsibility for making the work” Section 2(uu), The Copyright Act, 1957.
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While the law reflects the realities of film production in India through conferring 
appropriate legal status on the various parties involved, the argument advanced by 
producers and related entities conflates the cinematograph film with the literary and 
musical works incorporated in it. Ostensibly, the literary and musical works are cre-
ated for incorporation in the film. However, as stated earlier, under Section 13 of the 
Act, each work constitutes a separate and independent work. Section 14 delineates 
the various rights associated with the copyright in each work. Hence, while the cin-
ematograph film in totality is owned by the person that commissioned it, the various 
works comprised in it continue to retain their independent status and would con-
tinue to be owned by the author unless expressly assigned to the producer or the 
commissioning entity by the author. It is arguable to presuppose that to the extent 
that the literary and musical works are synchronized in the cinematograph film, they 
are owned by the commissioning entity to the extent of their synchronization, but to 
extend the argument to all other rights devolving from the copyright in a work 
would be counterintuitive to the independent status afforded to each class of work 
under the Act.17
A similar question was raised in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya 
Pandey & Ors.,18 wherein the Delhi High Court considered whether the underlying 
literary and musical works are also performed each time that a sound recording is 
performed. The court concluded that when a sound recording is communicated to 
the public, there is no separate communication of the underlying literary and musi-
cal works, since the sound recording fuses the underlying works during the process 
of production of the eventual sound recording:
when a sound recording is communicated to the public by whatever means, it is the whole 
“work” i.e. the lyrics, the score, the collocation of sounds caused by the equipment and the 
capturing of the entire aural experience which is communicated. The musical or literary 
work, which is the subject matter of the copyright under Section 14(a) of the Act, per se is 
not communicated or broadcast; nor is there a method of separating that element, while 
communicating the entire work, i.e. the sound recording, to the public. The recognition 
afforded by the Parliament to the content of sound recording itself suggests that the content 
of a sound recording is perceived in law, as different from that of a musical or literary work, 
though there may be a coalescence of the two, but not necessarily so, all the time. It is, 
therefore, unjustified to say that when a sound recording is communicated to the public by 
way of a broadcast the musical and literary work is also communicated to the public, 
through the sound recording.
The Delhi High Court hence ruled that a separate license is not required to be 
procured each time that the sound recording is communicated to the public since 
there is no separate communication of the underlying literary and musical works. 
17 “It may not be out of place to mention here that Section 17 of the Act specifies the only instances 
where an author, although engaged under a ‘contract for services’, loses copyright. Those are the 
instances of taking photograph, drawing painting or portrait, engraving and making cinematograph 
film.” Gee Pee Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Pratik Chowdhary and Ors., 2002 (24) PTC 392. Paragraph 16 of 
the decision as sourced from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1245689/
18 CS (OS) 1185/2006 and I.A. Nos. 6486, 6487, 7027/2006 and CS (OS) 1996/2009 and I.A. No. 
13692/2009. Paragraph 49 of the decision as sourced from Manupatra.
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The court also discussed the counteractive provision contained in Section 13(4) of 
the Act, which essentially states that the copyright in a cinematograph film or a 
sound recording has no effect on the separate copyright comprised in the underlying 
works that form a part of the cinematograph film or sound recording.19 The court, 
however, dismissed the argument that the clarification enunciated in Section 13(4) 
could be interpreted to posit a requirement that a separate license from the authors 
of the underlying literary and musical works would have to be procured each time 
that a sound recording is communicated. The court’s decision was reached based on 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. 
Eastern India Motion Pictures Association20:
In other words, the author (composer) of a lyric or musical work who has authorised a cin-
ematograph film producer to make a cinematograph film of his work and has thereby per-
mitted him to appropriate his work by incorporating or recording it on the sound track of a 
cinematograph film cannot restrain the author (owner) of the film from causing the acoustic 
portion of the film to be performed or projected or screened in public for profit or from 
making any record embodying the recording in any part of the sound track associated with 
the film by utilising such sound track or from communicating or authorising the communi-
cation of the film by radio-diffusion, as Section 14(1)(c) of the Act expressly permits the 
owner of the copyright of the cinematograph film to do all these things.
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Delhi High Court in 
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey & Ors., with an additional 
stipulation that subsequent to the enactment of the amendments to the Act in 2012, 
the authors of literary and musical works incorporated in sound recordings would 
remain entitled to receive an equal share of royalties accruing from the utilization of 
the sound recordings.21
3.2  The Problems with Copyright Societies in India
The amendments enacted in 2012 were also devised as reactionary measures to the 
denial of royalties and mismanagement of copyright societies in India by music 
labels. The parliamentary report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, noted 
the following in relation to the division of interests and inefficient functioning of 
copyright societies:
The Committees notes that there are inherent problems in the administration and function-
ing of copyright societies which have been continuing since long. Situation has deteriorated 
19 Section 13(4) of the Act provides “The copyright in a cinematograph film or a sound recording 
shall not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of which or a substantial part of 
which, the film, or as the case may be, the sound recording is made.”
20 1977 AIR 1443. Paragraph 16 of the decision as sourced from Manupatra.
21 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers v. Aditya Pandey & Ors. 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 9412-9413 OF 2016. Though the suit was decided post the 2012 amend-
ments to the Act, the law was applied as it existed prior to the effective date of the amendments 
given that the suit was pending prior to the introduction of the amendments.
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to such an extent that the owners of works/music companies are dominating these societies 
denying equity shares to the performers/authors. The basic reason for such a dismal sce-
nario is obviously entirely different considerations and interests of the owners and authors.22
The primary copyright societies in India are the IPRS, which grants licenses for 
and collects and distributes royalties in respect of literary and musical works, and 
the Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL), which deals with rights in sound 
recordings. There was, and continues to remain, a clear demarcation between the 
repertoire of works managed by both the societies. While the IPRS managed the 
literary and musical works underlying sound recordings, the PPL managed the 
sound recording itself. However, the music labels which controlled the PPL, as 
owners of sound recordings, succeeded in ousting the authors of literary and musi-
cal works from the governing body of the IPRS, leading to an establishment of 
control over both the IPRS and PPL by the music labels.23
Following the exclusion of authors from the governing body of the IPRS, the 
payment of royalties to authors effectively ceased. A series of notices were addressed 
by the government to the IPRS demanding an explanation on the cessation of the 
payment of royalties to authors:
The undersigned is directed to forward a complaint dated 20.12.2010 and 26.12.2010 
received by this Ministry from 28 authors and music composers regarding illegalities with 
respect to administration of Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS) and non- disbursement 
of royalties due to them. It has been alleged in the above complaints by these authors and 
music composers that IPRS is illegally distributing the royalties due to them to its other 
members.24
The emergence of new modes of exploitation of works exacerbated the issues of 
the authors. With the rise in popularity of ringtones, authors expected a concomitant 
increase in the royalties since each time that a ringtone was utilized, royalties were 
payable to the authors of the literary and musical works and to the owners of such 
works.25 However, the IPRS claimed that it had assigned the right to grant rights 
with respect to the utilization of works for ringtones to the PPL, which was man-
aged by music labels:
Sometime in 2004, IPRS inexplicably and certainly at the behest of its Music Company 
members decided to terminate existing mobile distribution agreements executed with third 
22 Paragraph 16.11, Clause 22: Section 35: Control Over the Copyright Society by the Owner of 
Rights, Two Hundred Twenty-Seventh Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Rajya 
Sabha Secretariat.
23 Supra Note 7, p. 502.
24 Notice dated January 14, 2011, Complaints by some lyricists and composers regarding illegali-
ties with respect to administration of Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS), Copyright Division, 
Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of 
India, F. No: 10/2/2010/CRB.
25 Authors were at the time entitled to 50% of the royalties, whereby 30% was paid to the music 
composer and 20% to the lyricist. The basis was the 1993 MOU between IPRS and authors. Letter 
dated December 26, 2010, addressed to Mr. G.R. Raghavendra, Registrar of Copyrights.
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party aggregators. It was discovered much later that the said rights were in fact handed over 
completely without sanction of the author or composer members to the Phonographic 
Performance Limited or PPL as it is referred to normally and/or the Indian Music Industry 
or IMI which is the association of the Music Companies.26
4  The New Royalties Regime
The 2012 amendments to the Act aimed to usher in a new regime of royalty collec-
tion and distribution and to ameliorate the existing condition of authors with respect 
to royalty payments. The most prominent contribution of the amendments was the 
introduction of an unwaiveable right to receive royalties27 by authors of literary and 
musical works forming part of cinematograph films and sound recordings.28 The 
new royalties provision was modelled on the authors’ remuneration provision con-
tained in the EC Rental Rights Directive.29 Article 4 of the aforesaid Directive 
encapsulates the following principles:
 (i) It assures authors of an equitable remuneration.
 (ii) The right to equitable remuneration cannot be waived by the authors.
 (iii) The administration of the right may only be entrusted to a collecting 
society.30
26 Letter dated December 26, 2010, addressed to Mr. G.R. Raghavendra, Registrar of Copyrights.
27 It is important to note that there is no affirmative right to receive royalties in the Act. The right is 
only deducible from the restriction on authors from assigning or waiving their equal share of royal-
ties, as incorporated in provisos to Section 18 of the Act vide the 2012 amendments.
28 The right was in the form of an unwaiveable entitlement to an equal share of royalties to authors 
of literary and musical works incorporated in a cinematograph film and to authors of literary and 
musical works incorporated in sound recordings to the extent that such sound recordings did not 
form part of or were exploited independent of a cinematograph film.
The provisions were incorporated in provisos to Section 18 of the Act and read as follows:
Provided also that the author of the literary or musical work included in a cinematograph 
film shall not assign or waive the right to receive royalties to be shared on an equal basis 
with the assignee of copyright for the utilization of such work in any form other than for the 
communication to the public of the work along with the cinematograph film in a cinema 
hall, except to the legal heirs of the authors or to a copyright society for collection and 
distribution and any agreement to contrary shall be void:
Provided also that the author of the literary or musical work included in the sound recording but 
not forming part of any cinematograph film shall not assign or waive the right to receive royalties 
to be shared on an equal basis with the assignee of copyright for any utilization of such work 
except to the legal heirs of the authors or to a collecting society for collection and distribution and 
any assignment to the contrary shall be void.
29 92/100/EEC.
30 The model was envisaged as a panacea to the unequal bargaining powers of authors in compari-
son with production houses and music labels. Silke von Lewinski, Collectivism and its role in the 
frame of individual contracts, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
downloaded from Elgar Online, p. 117.
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Under the 2012 amendments to the Act, royalties accrue and become payable 
only upon the utilization of the work. If the work is merely incorporated in a cine-
matograph film or a sound recording, no royalties become payable unless such work 
is also communicated to the public as part of the cinematograph film or sound 
recording. Further, royalties are not payable if the work is communicated as part of 
a cinematograph film in a cinema hall. It is interesting to note that when the 
Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, was under deliberation, the proposed language 
omitted “in any form other than for the communication to the public of the work 
along with the cinematograph film in a cinema hall” which forms a part of the cur-
rent language of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act. The draft amendment also 
excluded an obligation to pay royalties incumbent upon the exploitation of the 
works as part of sound recordings. The proposed language31 was amended to allevi-
ate the concerns of the authors that excluding royalties arising on account of exploi-
tation of works as part of cinematograph films and sound recordings would deprive 
the authors of an important source of revenue:
Another objection raised by authors pertained to the inclusion of words ‘other than as part 
of the cinematograph film’ in sections 18 and 19. Impact of such an amendment would be 
such that authors would be denied royalties arising out of television/cable broadcast of films 
and even the distribution/exhibition of films on mobile platforms through 3G technology. 
They would also be denied their share of the normal license royalty arising out of music 
used in advertisement films.32
It is also interesting to note that the amendment introduces an unwaiveable right 
to royalties to authors of all literary works forming part of a cinematograph film, 
which may include the script and the screenplay of the film as well, apart from the 
lyrics forming part of the songs of the film. However, the intention, as can be gath-
ered from the parliamentary debates on the amendments, was to enact a statutory 
regime for royalties owed to authors of lyrics forming part of songs. Further, cur-
rently, royalties are paid only to lyricists and music composers, and no royalties are 
collected or distributed to scriptwriters.33
31 “Provided also that the author of the literary or musical work, included in a cinematograph film 
or sound recording shall not assign the right to receive royalties from the utilization of such work 
in any form other than as part of the cinematograph film or sound recording except to the legal 
heirs or to a copyright society for collection and distribution and any agreement to the contrary 
shall be void.” Proviso to Section 18, The Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Bill No. XXIV of 
2010.
32 Paragraph 10.10, Clause 7, Section 19: “Mode of Assignment,” Two Hundred Twenty-Seventh 
Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
33 “When a song or music is incorporated in a film, it is relating to synchronization right of author 
and music composer which is assigned to the producer of the film as per section 17(b) or in the 
absence of agreement, film producer is the first owner. However, film producer is also getting other 
independent rights of author and music composer of their works envisaged in section 13 of the Act. 
As per section 17(b), he further assigns these rights to the music companies for upfront lump-sum 
amount. When the film songs are performed separately and independently through TV/Radio, 
restaurants, airlines, auditoriums or public functions etc. film producer becomes the first owner 
and authors/music composers lose economic benefits of exploitation of their works to music 
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As a response to the circuitous argument adopted by producers and music labels 
that the commissioning of a cinematograph film also signified the extinguishment of 
all copyright ownership of the authors of the underlying works, the amendments 
also introduced a reiteration of the principle that the incorporation of a work in a 
cinematograph film cannot be construed to affect the author’s independent copy-
right in the work.34 From a contractual perspective, this would mean that unless the 
author specifically assigns all rights to the work created by such author, the rights 
will continue to be owned by the author.35 The commissioning of a work for inclu-
sion in a cinematograph film will not affect the myriad of other rights that are 
encompassed in the copyright owned by the author as the first owner of the work. 
The clarification also serves to ensure that the author’s right to receive royalties 
pursuant to the exploitation of the work is not impacted by the commissioning of the 
work for incorporation in a cinematograph film.
The amendments also sought to introduce greater clarity and transparency in the 
operations of copyright societies. Section 33A36 introduced by the amendments 
mandates that every copyright society would be required to publish its tariff scheme 
in the prescribed manner and that a person aggrieved by the tariff scheme could 
appeal to the Appellate Board. Section 35(3) alludes to the exclusion of authors 
from the IPRS and enunciated that the governing body of every copyright society 
should have an equal number of authors and owners of works.37 Section 33(3A) 
also, inter alia, requires all pre-existing copyright societies to register themselves 
companies who become ultimate owners of these works.” Clause 6: Section 18: Assignment of 
Copyright, Two Hundred Twenty-Seventh Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, 
Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
The construct of the discussions was intended to secure royalty rights to lyricists and music 
composers. However, a consequence of the usage of “literary works” by default scriptwriters was 
also encompassed.
34 Proviso to Section 17 of the Act provides “Provided that in case of any work incorporated in a 
cinematograph work, nothing contained in clauses (b) and (c) shall affect the right of the author in 
the work referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 13.”.
35 Reiterating the overarching principle encapsulated in Section 17 of the Act that subject to the 
provisions of the Act, the author will be recognized as the first owner of the work.
36 Section 33A of the Act provides “Tariff Scheme by copyright societies.—(1) Every copyright 
society shall publish its tariff scheme in such manner as may be prescribed.
(2) Any person who is aggrieved by the tariff scheme may appeal to the Appellate Board and 
the Board may, if satisfied after holding such inquiry as it may consider necessary, make such 
orders as may be required to remove any unreasonable element, anomaly or inconsistency therein:
Provided that the aggrieved person shall pay to the copyright society any fee as may be pre-
scribed that has fallen due before making an appeal to the Appellate Board and shall continue to 
pay such fee until the appeal is decided, and the Board shall not issue any order staying the collec-
tion of such fee pending disposal of the appeal: Provided further that the Appellate Board may after 
hearing the parties fix an interim tariff and direct the aggrieved parties to make the payment 
accordingly pending disposal of the appeal.”
37 Section 35(3) of the Act provides “Every copyright society shall have a governing body with 
such number of persons elected from among the members of the society consisting of equal num-
ber of authors and owners of work for the purpose of the administration of the society as may be 
specified.”.
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with the central government within a period of 1 year from the date of commence-
ment of the amendments.38
5  The Aftermath of the Amendments
The copyright societies refused to comply with the dictates of the amendments.39 
Moreover, since the central government declined to re-register the IPRS and the 
PPL, as copyright societies, these societies utilized the denial of re-registration as a 
gambit to evade various investigations initiated by the government in relation to 
their operations and functionings.40 An illustrative argument adopted by the IPRS is 
reproduced below:
To our utter shock and surprise we were informed by an email/letter dated 25th May 2014 
from Office of Retd Justice Mukuk Mudgal that an “Inquiry Officer” has been appointed in 
exercise of powers under Section 33 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (Act) reas with Rule 50 of 
the Copyright Rules 2013 (Rules) under the impression that we are still a Copyright Society 
within the meaning of Section 2(ffd)/Chapter VII of the Act. IPRS is a company under the 
Company’s Act limited by Guarantee…..We have been directed to inform you by Governing 
Council (based on legal opinion), that we are not a Copyright Society within the meaning 
of Section 2(ffd) of the Act….we were to be registered on or before 21.6.2013. Since, the 
Central Government failed to register the Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS) as a 
Copyright Society, the old Registration Certificate…. is deemed to have lapsed.41
38 “The registration granted to a copyright society under sub-section (3) shall be for a period of 
5 years and may be renewed from time to time before the end of every 5 years on a request in the 
prescribed form and the Central Government may renew the registration after considering the 
report of Registrar of Copyrights on the working of the copyright society under Section 36:
Provided that the renewal of the registration of a copyright society shall be subject to the 
continued collective control of the copyright society being shared with the authors of works 
in their capacity as owners of copyright or of the right to receive royalty: Provided further 
that every copyright society already registered before the coming into force of the Copyright 
(Amendment) Act, 2012 (27 of 2012) shall get itself registered under this Chapter within a 
period of 1  year from the date of commencement of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 
2012.” Section 33(3A), The Copyright Act, 1957.
39 IPRS was also expelled from CISAC because of its failure to comply with CISAC’s professional 
rules. Achille Forler, My Songs, my royalties, available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/
tp-opinion/my-songs-my-royalties/article17692046.ece (March 28, 2017).
40 Shamnad Basheer, The Day the Music Died: In the “Company” of Collusive Collecting Societies, 
available at https://spicyip.com/2014/10/the-day-the-music-died-in-the-company-of-collusive-
collecting-societies.html (October 23, 2014).
41 Letter dated June 2, 2014, addressed to central government, Ministry of Human Resources 
Development, Department of Secondary & Higher Education.
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Section 33(1) of the Act also mandates that the business of issuing and granting 
licenses can only be undertaken by a registered copyright society.42 As stated above, 
the IPRS and the PPL were denied re-registration as copyright societies. Further, 
entities such as Novex Communications Private Limited have been engaged in the 
business of granting and issuing licenses, in the capacity of private entities. Despite 
the lack of registration, these entities have claimed to possess the power to issue 
licenses in respect of the repertoire of works managed by them in their capacity as 
the owners of the works or the authorized agents43 of the owners. The statutory 
authority for this stance has been Section 30 of the Act, which entitles the owner of 
the work to issue licenses in respect of the work or to designate an authorized agent 
to grant licenses.44 The stance assumed by these entities was bolstered by various 
judgments of the courts in India, which attempted to harmonize the principles 
reflected in Section 30 and Section 33(1) of the Act. The Bombay High Court in 
M/s. Leopold Café & Stores & Anr. v. Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd.45 ruled that 
that entities, not registered as “copyright societies,” could issue licenses for works 
as “authorized agents,” as long as they issued such licenses on behalf of the owner 
of the works:
42 Section 33(1) of the Act provides “No person or association of persons shall, after coming into 
force of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 (38 of 1994) commence or, carry on the business 
of issuing or granting licences in respect of any work in which copyright subsists or in respect of 
any other rights conferred by this Act except under or in accordance with the registration granted 
under sub-section (3).”.
43 Novex Communications Private Limited, for instance, states that it is the authorized agent of 
Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. “Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. (YRF) has appointed M/s Novex Communications 
Pvt. Ltd. (Novex) as its Authorised agent as per Section 30 of copyright Act as amended where 
Novex is allowed to enter into non-binding Deal Terms with Third Parties (as specified in Annexure 
1) to enable YRF to issue licenses to such Third Parties who wish to use the Content (Sound 
Recordings)…” Authorization Letter from YRF, dated January 17, 2018, available at http://www.
novex.in/rights-of-novex/. Further, it states that it is the assignee of “On Ground Performance 
Rights” in certain other sound recordings: “…. The Assignor, as beneficial owners, hereby agree to 
transfer and assign the On Ground Performance Rights in respect of Sound Recordings of the 
Songs….” Section 2.1 of agreement dated March 9, 2017, between Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. 
and Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd., available at http://www.novex.in/rights-of-novex/. “‘On 
Ground Performance Rights’ are defined as the communication of the Sound Recordings to the 
public during on-ground live events or in commercial establishments including but not limited to 
communication of such Sound Recordings in clubs, hotels, restaurants, playing of such Sound 
Recordings by disc jockeys like in discotheques or during on ground live events or using the Sound 
Recordings as a background to any other performances like dance or other performances during 
any ground live events, parties etc.….” Section 1(c) of agreement dated March 9, 2017, between 
Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. and Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd., available at http://www.
novex.in/rights-of-novex/, last visited on April 5, 2018.
44 Section 30 of the Act provides “The owner of the copyright in any existing work or the prospec-
tive owner of the copyright in any future work may grant any interest in the right by licence in 
writing by him or by his duly authorised agent:”.
45 SUIT (L) NO. 603 OF 2014. Paragraph 13 as sourced from https://indiankanoon.org/
doc/44713127/
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It is not, I believe, the mere “carrying on of business” that is interdicted by Section 33. It is 
the carrying on of the business of issuing or granting licenses in its own name, but in which 
others hold copyright. Every agent also “carries on business”, but that is the business of 
agency, with the functioning as such, i.e., clearly indicating that it is acting on behalf of 
another, one who holds the copyright. This is the only manner in which both Section 33 and 
Section 30 can be harmonized. An absolute bar even on agency, invoking Section 33, would 
undoubtedly run afoul of the plain language of Section 30 and render the words “or by his 
duly authorized agent” entirely otiose.
In a similar instance, the Bombay High Court ruled that the IPRS would not be 
precluded from granting licenses if such licenses are issued in the capacity of an 
owner or authorized agent of the owner of the works:
… This means that despite existence of a registered Copyright Society, an Author/Owner is 
free to be not part of it and can always license his own rights/works independently. Thus, 
there is no restriction on owner of copyrights in issuing or granting licenses in respect of 
such literary and musical rights.46
Apart from the ability of unregistered entities to engage in the business of issuing 
licenses in respect of works, another concern has stemmed from the legal entitle-
ment of such entities purporting to act as the authorized agents of the owners, to 
initiate infringement actions. Under Section 55 of the Act,47 only an owner of the 
work or an “exclusive licensee” can undertake actions to curb infringement of 
works. An authorized agent is neither an owner nor an exclusive licensee of the 
work.48 Recently, the Bombay High Court restrained Novex Communications 
Private Limited from undertaking any coercive action against a hotel chain.49
46 Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Harsh Vardhan Samor, Suit (L) No. 1345 of 2015. 
Paragraph 7 of the decision as sourced from Manupatra.
47 Section 55 of the Act provides “Civil remedies for infringement of copyright.—(1) Where copy-
right in any work has been infringed, the owner of the copyright shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided by this Act, be entitled to all such remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts and 
otherwise as are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right.” Section 54 of the Act 
provides: “Definition.—For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the 
expression ‘owner of copyright’ shall include—(a) an exclusive licensee; (b) in the case of an 
anonymous or pseudonymous literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, the publisher of the 
work, until the identity of the author or, in the case of an anonymous work of joint authorship, or a 
work of joint authorship published under names all of which are pseudonyms, the identity of any 
of the authors, is disclosed publicly by the author and the publisher or is otherwise established to 
the satisfaction of the Appellate Board by that author or his legal representatives.”
48 Prashant Reddy, Novex Muzzled by Bombay High Court in Recent Threats Action by Gulraj 
Hotels, available at https://spicyip.com/2018/02/novex-muzzled-by-bombay-high-court-in-a-
recent-threats-action-by-gulraj-hotels.html, (February 13, 2018).
49 Gulraj Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd., COMIP (L) NO. 166 OF 2018. It is 
pertinent to note that previously the Delhi High Court issued an order restraining the IPRS, PPL, 
and Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd. from issuing licenses in contravention of Section 33(1) of 
the Act, which requires the business of issuing and granting licenses in respect of works to be 
undertaken only by a registered copyright society. M/s. Event and Entertainment Management 
Association v. Union of India & Ors. W.P.(C) 12,076/2016.
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Certain anomalies in the language of the amendments have also been exploited 
contractually by various parties:
 1. The proviso to Section 18 does not specify which entity is responsible for the 
payment of the royalties to authors. The natural corollary would be that the entity 
utilizing the works should also assume the responsibility for payment of royal-
ties, since the royalties become payable only upon utilization of the works. 
However, contractually, this lacuna has been utilized by assignees or licensees of 
the works to state that they are not responsible for the payment of statutory royal-
ties. The author is, however, not asked to waive his/her right to receive royalties, 
since the same would violate the restriction embedded in the proviso to Section 
of the Act, resulting in the contract being declared void. However, simultane-
ously, the restriction in the proviso to Section 18 has not acted to preempt assign-
ees or licensees from disclaiming the responsibility to pay the royalty. In many 
instances, the principle that has been emulated is to clarify in the contract that 
despite being the assignee or licensee of the works, royalties would be payable 
only by the entity that eventually utilizes the works.
 2. When the amendments were enacted, several contracts between the assignees 
and authors required authors to agree that the royalties could only be collected 
through a registered copyright society of which the author was a member. As 
explained in the preceding sections, owing to the managerial control of copyright 
societies by the owners of the works, the societies were not distributing any roy-
alties to authors. Further, several societies in India were not re-registered or reg-
istered at all as “copyright societies” in accordance with the requirements of the 
amendments. The contractual provision hence operated to practically forestall 
the payment of royalties to authors.
 3. There is also some ambiguity surrounding what is intended by the “equal share” 
of royalties mandated by the proviso to Section 18. While ostensibly this would 
entail a one-third share to each author, i.e., the authors of the literary and musical 
works, forming part of the cinematograph film or sound recording, and the 
remaining one-third share to the assignee of the works, contractually the provi-
sion has been interpreted to mean the relegation of 50% of the share to the 
assignee of the works and the apportionment of the remaining 50% between the 
authors of the literary and musical works.
6  Conclusion: The Way Forward
The future of the royalties regime in India will be determined to a large extent by the 
manner in which the operations of copyright societies take shape. The IPRS recently 
re-registered as a copyright society.50 The annual report of the society stated that the 
50 Prashant Reddy, IPRS Gets Re-registered as a Copyright Society – Akhtar & Saregama Bury the 
Hatchet, available at https://spicyip.com/2017/12/iprs-gets-re-registered-as-a-copyright-society-
akthar-saregama-bury-the-hatchet.html (December 21, 2017).
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governing body now includes an equal number of authors and owners of works.51 
However, the society’s future course of conduct will determine its compliance with 
the requirements stipulated by the amendments. As a precursor to the streamlining 
of the collection and distribution of royalties in India, greater transparency is needed 
in the operations of copyright societies. Copyright societies are after all establish-
ment for the collective management of rights, given the benefits of collective man-
agement. Further, certainty is also required in the interpretation of the several 
provisions introduced by the amendments to curtail the myriad explanations and 
applications of the provisions. The disambiguation of these provisions will undoubt-
edly introduce finality in an important area of copyright law in India.
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This chapter provides a three-prong investigation framework on Chinese phar-
maceutical industry, namely, policy structure, market structure and IP (patent-
based) structure. The Chinese pharmaceutical industry has been developing fast 
in market size and revenue volumes. However, the scale of Chinese pharmaceuti-
cal companies is relatively small, and the market concentration is low. Therefore, 
local pharmaceutical companies with higher R&D input are generally less profit-
able. Although there is increase in the number of patented drugs in the pharma-
ceutical industry in China, patents have made relatively low contribution to the 
industrial values, and IP held by Chinese firms is less competitive compared with 
that of foreign companies. Most of the pharmaceutical enterprises in China still 
focus on generic drugs. Market regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in 
China is relatively strict, especially market entry and price control. A detailed 
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1  Approaches and Framework
The best way to understand the development of pharmaceutical industry and its 
ancillary industries in China is by analyzing the literature authored by the Chinese 
scholars and gaining insights into major research topics and findings. The data 
analyzed in this chapter is derived from about 60 research articles, publicly released 
information and PhD theses in Chinese academic journals and literature databases. 
We provide a three-prong investigation framework on Chinese pharmaceutical 
industry, namely, policy structure, market structure and intellectual property (IP) 
(patent-based) structure in the industries.
Prong 1 deals with government policy framework or structure for pharmaceutical 
industries in China, primarily market entry policy, pricing policy, monitoring and 
regulation policies, which may bring positive and negative influence on industrial 
development. Prong 2 deals with market structure of Chinese pharmaceutical 
industries, primarily competition and monopolistic characters, driven by multiple 
influencing factors. Prong 3 focuses particularly on IP (patents) resource structure 
in Chinese pharmaceutical industries and market.
This three-prong investigation framework is much relevant in the Chinese con-
text, since Chinese economies have been continually developed by policy and mar-
ket, where foreign investment and multinational enterprises are especially significant 
in pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, IP and patents in Chinese market are crucial, 
as in any other countries, especially emerging economies. R&D and patent resources 
often prove to be key for market competition.
This chapter first starts with an overview of China’s pharmaceutical industry, 
which covers both historical development and current market characters, especially 
problems, in pharmaceutical industries. It then proceeds to examine the policy 
structure, market structure and IP (patent-based) structure in the industries. The 
findings about Chinese market will be compared and contrasted with Indian ones on 
a number of important issues before this chapter ends with a conclusion.
2  Overview of China’s Pharmaceutical Industry
2.1  The Historical Development
The historical development of pharmaceutical industry in China from 1949 onwards 
can be summarized as below (see Table 1).
2.2  Current Status
2.2.1  Expansion of Total Industrial Scale
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the output of China’s pharmaceutical 
industry has been increasing year by year, from RMB 137.27 billion in 1998 to 
RMB 944.33  billion in 2009. Although the proportion of pharmaceutical 
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manufacturing industry in overall GDP dropped slightly in 2004, the industry was 
still showing a minor growth, from 1.63% in 1998 to 2.77% in 2009 (Liu 2012). 
Meanwhile, it had been also showing significant increase from 2006 to 2010, the 
average annual growth rate of China’s pharmaceutical industry amounted to 23.9%, 
the fastest growing in the world. In 2010 alone, China’s pharmaceutical industry 
achieved sales of US$ 41.1 billion, making it the third largest sales worldwide (IMS 
2015).




With primitive and unproductive facilities, chemical 
pharmaceutical industries mainly imported raw materials and then 
processed them into simple preparations. In 1950, China could 
only produce several tons of active pharmaceutical ingredients 
(APIsa). The first 5-year plan stated that “The pharmaceutical 
industry will focus on the development of APIs”. In light of 
endemic and infectious diseases, the strategies adopted by China 
combined self-development with introduction from the Soviet 
Union, focusing on the development of anti-infective drugs, 
antipyretics, analgesics, vitamins and so on. Unfortunately, in the 
1960s and 1970s, a chaotic situation developed under the influence 
of “Leftism”, where pharmaceutical factories were managed in a 
disorderly manner and drugs were produced indiscriminately. In 
the early 1970s, DNA recombination technology began to be 





At the beginning of opening up policy implementation, the State 
Pharmaceutical Administration was established, under which four 
state-owned pharmaceutical companies were set up to encourage 
medical institutions to generate profits. Thus, the number of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers increased rapidly, from 1000 in 
1985 to 6300 in 1995. However, most pharmaceutical companies 
operated on a small scale, facing ubiquitous and cut-throat 
competition. In 1998, the State Food and Drug Administration was 
established to gradually regulate the development of the China’s 
pharmaceutical industry, enforce Good Manufacturing Practice 
(GMP) and control the creation of new pharmaceutical companies. 
After the year 2000, with the influx of multinational and private 
enterprises, mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry increased. In 2011, the number of pharma companies in 
China increased to 5674, with total turnover of RMB 1.53 trillion 
(or about US$243 billion in price), among which 2110 were 
chemical pharma companies, with revenue of RMB 0.72 trillion. 
The market concentration level was low (share of top 10 pharma 
companies accounted only 15–18% of the market), which indicates 
larger proportion of medium and smaller companies
aAPIs are pharmaceutical raw materials, according to CHI (International Conference on 
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use) 
Q7A, APIs are any substance or material that can be used in pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
provided that the substance can be one of active composition, being pharmacologically effective in 
diagnostic procedure, medical treatment, and symptom release of certain disease, or influential to 
function or structure of human body
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In 2016, the business income of large-scale industrial enterprises1 in China’s 
pharmaceutical industry reached RMB 2.96 trillion, an increase of 9.92% over the 
previous year. In the first quarter of 2017, the revenue of the listed companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry increased by 14.64%, an increase of 0.04% over the same 
period of the previous year (Chen and Wang 2017).
In the field of biopharmaceuticals, the domestic sales revenue was at a relatively 
high level, but the growth rate slowed down. In 2013, the gross industrial output 
value reached RMB 229 billion, an increase of 24.24% over the previous year; and 
the annual value of industrial sales reached RMB 128.6 billion, up by 17.12%. As 
shown in Figs. 1 and 2, in 2015, China’s biopharmaceutical manufacturing revenue 
from product sales was RMB 186.4 billion, and the total profit was RMB 31.0 bil-
lion, up 14.8% and 21.6%, respectively, over the previous year.
According to Zhang (2009), who applied the C-D Production Function and 
Solow/Romer’s model on empirical investigation over industrial competitive advan-
tages in Chinese medicine manufacturing sectors, the industry was still on produc-
tion factor-oriented session, which revealed that technological innovation was one 
of the key factors in upgrading pharmaceutical industries in China.
2.2.2  Improvement in Industrial Capacity
In terms of industrial capacities, the production of Chinese pharmaceutical compa-
nies covers APIs, intermediates, preparations, pharmaceutical excipients, pharma-
ceutical packaging and pharmaceutical machinery. Among them, about 1300 kinds 
of chemical APIs and more than 4500 kinds of preparations were manufactured. 
1 According to National Economic Industrial Classification, 2017, GB/T 4754—2017, larger-sized 
industrial enterprises are classified based on two basic conditions: annual turnover larger than 
RMB 400 million and staff number more than 1000. As an example, the tenth largest pharmaceuti-
cal companies in China in 2016, Ha Yao Manufacturing Group, achieved annual revenue of RMB 
12 billion, with 407 million net profit and 198 million R&D investment, supported by 17,895 staff 
(http://www.hayao.com).
Fig. 1 China’s biopharmaceutical manufacturing sales revenue (2011–2015) (Li and Yang 2016)
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The output of chemical APIs reached 430,000 tons in 1999, of which 260,000 tons 
were APIs in 24 major categories. China became the second largest producer of 
APIs in the world. Its penicillin and P-Lactam drugs and vitamins accounted for 
30% of the world’s total output, making China the world’s largest producer and 
exporter with 205.07 million tons in 2007. In biological pharmacy, China currently 
produces more than 300 kinds of biological products such as vaccines, toxoids, 
blood products and diagnostic reagents in vitro and in vivo (Liu 2012). According 
to recent website information, both domestic market and export market increased 
despite 2009 world financial crises. The trade volume in pharmaceutical and health 
product in China in 2017 was US$116.76 billion, increased 12.64% year-on-year, 
among which US$60.8 billion export, the highest growth within a 5-year interval, 
and US$55.88 billion import, with a growth rate of 16.34%, and US$4.9 billion 
trade surplus, a 34.60% drop compared with previous year (Sohu website 2018). 
The domestic market increase might be related to medical service reform since 
2009, when RMB850 billion has been invested by government on medical social 
welfare system.
2.2.3  High Degree of Market Opening Up, Strong Market Shares 
by Foreign-Funded Enterprises
Another notable feature of China’s pharmaceutical industry is its opening up to the 
world. According to Mu and Cai (2001), both openness and innovative capacity were 
basically lower than overseas companies in 2000, if measured by four- dimension 
models (competitiveness, competitive potentiality, competitive environment and 
competitive position). However, the industry has been opened up since then.
At present, the top 20 multinational pharmaceutical companies in the world have 
all set up joint ventures, which are transforming into holding or wholly owned 
business models that occupy the key regional and high-end product markets in 
China. There are more than 1800 joint pharmaceutical enterprises and dozens of 
imported pharmaceutical enterprises in China, and they account for about one third 
Fig. 2 China’s biopharmaceutical manufacturing total profit (2011–2015) (Li and Yang 2016)
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of China’s chemical market. Among the top 50 best-selling drugs on the market in 
China, imported drugs and joint-stock drugs account for 40 species (Wang 2008).
Multinational pharmaceutical companies have large-scale deployment of R&D 
centres in China, such as AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline and Roche (Liu 
2012).
As for opening to the world, in June 2008, the Academy of Military Medical 
Sciences and Phytopharm, a British company in plant medicine, signed a cooperation 
agreement on “NJS” (a new type of Chinese medicine) with “patent licensing”, 
marking the first time that a Chinese patent for innovation in traditional Chinese 
medicine went abroad. This is also the first time that China has authorized the use 
of IP of Chinese medicine by international companies (Liu 2012).
2.2.4  Administration of Pharmaceutical Industries in China
Currently, the administrative oversight over pharmaceutical manufacturing indus-
tries in China involves government agencies in vertical as well as horizontal rela-
tionship, which includes National Food & Medicine Monitoring and Administration 
Bureau and its local sublevel branches in different regions, State Family Planning 
Commission, National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of 
Human Resource and Social Welfare. There are responsible departments and sec-
tions within the above-mentioned government organizations.
2.3  Problems in the Development of China’s Pharmaceutical 
Industry
2.3.1  Low R&D Investment in Pharmaceutical Companies
There are some advantages for drug R&D in China. For example, R&D investment 
in the chemical pharmaceutical industry is relatively low, and the cost of experimental 
and clinical studies on animals is only about 20% and 10%, respectively, of the cost 
in developed countries (Liu and Wang 2007). According to the IMS Pharmaceutical 
Industry Data Report, in 2007 the R&D intensity2 in China was 1.77% on average, 
while the R&D intensity of top 10 pharmaceutical companies in the United States 
was 35.3% (IMS 2008), which may imply that Chinese pharmaceutical companies 
are more focusing on close-to-current-market operations, rather than longer-term 
drug development for future market.
According to the data of “pharmaceutical managers” in the United States in 
2015, the top 50 global pharmaceutical companies invested 10% or more on R&D 
against their total turnover (William 2016). According to statistics from China 
Pharmaceutical Industry Information Centre, in 2015 only three of the top 100 
China’s pharmaceutical enterprises invested more than 10% in R&D.
There are three main sources of R&D funding: government, enterprises and 
financial institutions. By far, number 1 source is self-financing (see Fig. 3).
2 The R&D intensity means the ratio of R&D investment over their production value by pharma-
ceutical enterprises.
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In the past 10 years, China’s pharmaceutical companies have gradually increased 
their R&D intensity. Although some pharmaceutical companies have paid great 
expenditure on R&D, the R&D level is still relatively low compared to international 
companies (see Fig. 4)
In terms of full-time R & D personnel in China’s pharmaceutical industry, it is 
almost in line with the overall change in the pharmaceutical industry (see Fig.  5). 
Generally speaking, R&D efficiency in pharmaceutical industries in China is still low.3
3 According to Ji and Zhou (2010), the overall R&D efficiency slightly declined between 1997 and 
2008, with quite significant fluctuations based on the empirical examination via non-HMB 
Productivity Index (or Malmquist Index). Another study, via a stochastic frontier production func-
tion method by Zhang et al. (2011), proved that the overall R&D efficiency in Chinese pharmaceu-
tical industries was lower, although with a positively graduate growth, based on an examination of 
impact from government investment, technology reformation expenditure, company size and mar-
ket structure.
Fig. 3 Proportion of R&D sources for pharmaceutical enterprises in China (1995–2007) (Liu 
2012)
Fig. 4 R&D intensity of China’s pharmaceutical companies (1995–2007) (Liu 2012)
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2.3.2  Vehicle for New Drugs R&D Is Research Institutions, Not 
Enterprises
At present, China’s main vehicle for new drugs R&D is still research institutions, 
not enterprises (Liu 2012), through the following approaches:
 1. Research institutions and pharmaceutical companies jointly declare new drugs 
after achieving results in a mode where pharmaceutical companies funded study 
by the research institutions.
 2. The development of new drugs is completed by the research institutes, then 
transferred to pharmaceutical companies after the new drug eligibility approval.
 3. Research institutions have their own pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce 
the new drugs they developed.
Accordingly, the legal owners of pharmaceutical patents are mostly research 
institutes and small high-tech businesses.
2.3.3  Lack of Advanced Technology and IP Rights by Chinese 
Pharmaceutical Companies
Among the pharmaceutical products currently manufactured in China, less than 3% 
have IP rights. More than 97% of the domestically produced drugs are generic drugs 
(Yu 2008). At present, there are mainly two types of generic drugs produced in 
China: one that imitates drugs patented by foreign enterprises and have expired or 
are about to expire and another that imitates listed drugs by domestic enterprises. 
Even imitating others’ drugs, most pharmaceutical companies in China mainly 
focus on producing generic drugs with relatively lower technical requirements and 
mature technologies and involve less high-tech and high value-added pharmaceutical 
products. Often there are some 70–80 enterprises producing the same drug in China 
(Liu 2012).
Fig. 5 Full-time R&D personnel in China’s pharmaceutical enterprises (1995–2008) (Liu 2012)
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By September 2006, there were 1172 enterprises producing compound sulfa-
methoxazole files, 1049 enterprises producing analgene, 1049 enterprises produc-
ing vitamin C (Wei 2009) and more than 300 enterprises producing amoxicillin in 
China. This means serious overcapacity of China’s pharmaceutical industry. The 
utilization rate of production capacity of tablets, capsules, powder injection and 
water injection were less than 45%, 40%, 27% and 50%, respectively (Wu 2006).
2.3.4  Small-Scale Pharma Companies, Low Market Concentration 
and Substantial Percentage of Enterprises in Deficit
According to China Statistical Yearbook, from 1995 to 2008, the share of small- 
scale enterprises in the pharmaceutical industry in China was high at 70–80%. By 
2008, there were 6524 pharmaceutical companies in China. Only 1003 are medium- 
and large-scale enterprises and the rest small businesses. By 2009, there were 6807 
pharmaceutical companies in China, of which 5787 were small- and medium-scale 
enterprises (Liu 2012). In 2004, China’s pharmaceutical industry concentration 
ratio of the ten biggest companies (CR10) was 15.10%, while the world 
pharmaceutical industry CR10 had reached 55% (Jin et al. 2007). In 2008, the top 
100 enterprises in the pharmaceutical industry achieved a total sales revenue of 
RMB 246.937 billion, accounting for only 40.59% of the total sales of the industry 
(Cai 2009).
Pharmaceutical companies have lower economies of scale and larger losses. 
According to the “Statistical Yearbook of China’s Industrial Economy”, from 1999 
to 2009, among China’s pharmaceutical enterprises, the number of loss-making 
enterprises ranged from 739 to 1248, accounting for about 18.3%. Overall, from 
1999 to 2007, the proportion of loss-making enterprises in all pharmaceutical 
enterprises in China was 20%−26%, 18% in 2008 and 15% in 2009 (Liu 2012).
2.3.5  Increasing but Low Export of Traditional Chinese Medicine
Traditional Chinese medicine is the most advantageous pharmaceutical field in 
China and has developed greatly over the years. However, due to lack of innovation, 
larger market shares are still held by Liuwei Dihuang Wan and other traditional 
Chinese medicines (Liu 2012).
In 2012, there were more than 1500 traditional Chinese medicine manufacturers 
in China, with 2772 products and 6310 varieties and specifications, total sales of 
which amounted to RMB 60  billion. The development of traditional Chinese 
medicine in different disease treatments is not balanced, accounting for more than 
30% in therapeutic areas like cardiovascular, urinary, respiratory and skeletal muscle 
systems.
However, compared to the sales in the domestic market, the export value of tra-
ditional Chinese medicine is relatively low, and its share in the international market 
has not been high. It is reported that in 2012, the export of traditional Chinese medi-
cine products from China was only US$2.499 billion, of which Chinese herbal 
medicines US 265 million, extracts US1.164 billion, in total with US$ 3 million 
deficit.
Pharmaceutical Industry in China: Policy, Market and IP
224
3  Policy Structure of China’s Pharmaceutical Industry
Unlike the genetically modified food discussed in chapter “Genetically Modified 
Foods in China: Regulation, Deregulation or Governance?”, there are relatively 
detailed legislation in China’s pharmaceutical industry. On the whole, the 
pharmaceutical industry policy in China mainly involves two aspects: First, the 
management of the pharmaceutical market, including market access and approval of 
drugs. Second, the macro-management of the pharmaceutical industry, including 
drug pricing policy, drug regulatory policies on industrial structure and layout 
policy, drug procurement policies and even medical science and technology policy. 
This section will only deal with the issues of market access and approval of drugs, 
drug pricing policy and regulatory policies on industrial structure and layout.
3.1  The Access to Drug Market and Approval of Drugs
3.1.1  Approval of New Drugs
The access to pharmaceutical market reflects the regulatory requirements of the 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly for new drug products, which mainly include 
the registration and administrative approval of new drugs and technical review 
requirements. According to Chen (2014), such market entry starts from the initial 
research stage and goes through seven phases in total:
 1. The discovery and screening phase of new drugs: Pharmaceutical companies 
will first identify a new composition with certain pharmacological properties and 
then select the best compound to be used as a new chemical entity (NCEs) during 
ongoing optimizations.
 2. Preclinical research phase: research drug synthesis, which generally studies the 
extraction method, purity, dose, pharmacology, toxicology, etc.
 3. Clinical trial phase: start to form a regular procedure.
 4. The enterprise shall fill in The Application Form for Drug Registration and sub-
mit the relevant information to the drug regulatory department of the province, 
autonomous region or municipality.
 5. The State Food and Drug Administration will make the examination and approval 
decision. Those enterprises in line with the provisions will be issued Drug 
Clinical Trial Approval Document, those not in line with the requirements will 
be issued Notice of Trial Opinion and explained the reasons.
 6. Drug Clinical Trials (Including Bioequivalence Trials): This process requires the 
implementation of Quality Management Specifications for Drug Clinical Trials. 
Clinical trials are divided into I, II, III and IV. After the approval, the clinical trial 
must be implemented within 3 years; otherwise the original approval documents 
shall be abolished. For the applications of overseas pharmaceutical companies, 
the drugs must have entered phase II or phase III clinical trials.
 7. Applying for the production and sale of new drugs: the drug approval number 
shall be issued after the technical review by the drug administration department 
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so as to obtain the legal qualification for the production of the new drug. Even 
after the approval of new drugs, the national drug administration needs to monitor 
safety of the drugs, but not for more than 5 years.
For new chemical drugs, it takes approximately 17–18 months to get the clinical 
permit after the application. Even if the new drug is listed, it also has to face market 
access problems and must go through the provincial access (drug bidding) and hos-
pital access. The process depicted in Fig. 6 shows that the average bidding period of 
31 provinces and autonomous regions in China is 14 months. After winning the bid, 
the drug should be purchased by the hospital. If it needs to become a new drug 
which can be reimbursed, entering the national and provincial health insurance 
directory is necessary. Overall, it takes at least 3 years for new drugs to be listed in 
China (Chen 2014).
As a whole, the current system of examination and approval of new drugs has 
unclear and overbroad regulations. Meanwhile, the lack of related professionals and 
the lengthy process of approving new drugs have resulted in loss of revenue for 
innovative pharmaceutical products (Chen and Wang 2017).
3.1.2  The Generic Drug Application Procedure and Its Incentive 
System
The process of approving generic drugs in China is similar to the approval of new 
drugs, which takes about 3 years (Chen 2014) (Fig. 7).
Due to lengthy and complex processes, current market access mechanism also 
lacks incentives for the development of generic drugs.
3.2  Drug Pricing Policies
Regulations particularly on pricing in the industries are summarized in Table 2.
After thorough development of pricing policies in pharmaceutical industries for 
so many years, the current pricing system in the industry can be summarized in 
Table 3.
In 2011, the cost of purchasing drugs by residents accounted for 50%−62% of 
the total health expenditure in China, much higher than the world average of 
20%−30% (Yao 2011). At present, there are three ways of pricing the drug market 
in China: (Liu 2012).
 A. Government-guided pricing
Drugs included in the Catalogue of National Basic Medical Insurance shall be 
priced in the following ways: the central government is responsible for setting 
prescription drug prices, and local governments set the prices of over-the-counter 
medicines.
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Fig. 6 Flow chart of new drug listing in China
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Fig. 7 Flow chart of generic drug registration and approval process in China
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Table 2 Summary of China’s drug price management policies
Year Policies and regulations Relevant content
1954 Additional drug price 
policy for hospitals (Yuan 
2005)
An addition of price on the basis of the purchase price 
when selling drugs to allow the hospital to form a retail 
price for drugs. Additional rate of drugs: Western 
medicine shall not exceed 15%, traditional Chinese 
medicines shall not exceed 16%, Chinese herbal 
medicines shall not exceed 29% (Sun 2001)
2000 Government drug pricing 
method (Wang 2012)
–
2000 Notice on issues related to 
the development of 
separate pricing drugs
If the same type of drugs on the domestic market are 
produced by a number of enterprises, as long as one of 
those companies provides evidence that their product 
quality, effectiveness, safety treatment cycle or treatment 
costs were significantly better/lower than that of other 
companies, and therefore not suitable to follow pricing 
policy, this company can apply for a separate pricing. In 
addition, the original drug owner that has IP rights whose 
protection period expired may also apply for separate 
pricing
2001 Notice on issues related to 
the development of 
separate pricing drugs
Separate pricing application needs to be submitted to 
local or provincial price administration department, 
which would be further transferred to National 
Development and Reform Commission
2005 National Development and 
Reform Commission: 
directory for fixed price 
drugs
–
2009 Opinions on deepening the 
reform of medical and 
health system
Reforming the mechanism of drug price formation and 
using price leverage to encourage enterprises to innovate 
independently (Wang 2012)
2009 Opinions on reforming the 
mechanism of price 
formation for 
pharmaceuticals and 
medical services (State 
Council)
Original drugs whose IP protection period has expired 
were renamed model for generic drugs. Measures were 
proposed to gradually narrow the price gap with generic 
drugs (Wang 2012)
2009 Price law –
2009 Rules of price parities 
between drugs
–
2010 Management measures of 
drug prices (Draft)
For the original drug whose IP protection period has 
expired, the government department in charge of price 
can have price adjustment every 2–3 years, during which 
the government-guided price reduction is generally no 
less than 15% (Wang 2012)
2010 Notice on reducing the 
highest retail prices of 
some drugs such as 
ceftriaxone
Reducing the maximum retail price of some separate 
pricing drugs, and disqualifying separate pricing of some 
separate-priced medicines (Wang 2012)
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Year Policies and regulations Relevant content
2011 Notice on adjusting the 
highest retail price of 
certain antimicrobial and 
circulatory system drugs
–
Notice on adjusting the 
price of hormones, 
regulating endocrine and 
nervous system drugs and 
relevant issues
2015 Start of the first pilot 
project on drug price 
negotiations
Five varieties, including patented drugs for the treatment 
of hepatitis B, lung cancer and multiple myeloma, were 
selected as pilot drugs for price negotiation, of which 
three varieties have went through successful negotiations
2015 Notice on Issuing Some 
Opinions on Controlling 
Unreasonable Growth of 
Medical Expenses in 
Public Hospitals
–
2016 Announcement of the 
result of the first 
negotiations over drug 
prices
Tenofovir disoproxil (brand name, Viread), icotinib 
(brand name, Conmana) and gefitinib (brand name, 
Iressa) were the three varieties successfully negotiated, 
whose prices fell by more than 50%
Catalogue of national 
basic medical insurance, 
industrial injury insurance 
and maternity insurance 
drugs (2017 edition)
Identified 44 products to enter the negotiation for the new 
national directory of Medicare and added a new list of 45 
to-be-negotiated drugs





1. The comprehensive control of drug prices was changed into partial 
liberalization. The government adjusted the ex-factory price, the selling 
price and the distribution rate of the drug whose prices deviated from its 
true value too much
2. Unrealistically high prices of drugs appeared: the state-controlled 
drug production price is based on the reported production costs plus 
5% profit margin, the wholesale price is the production price plus 15%, 
the retail price is the wholesale price plus 15%. Due to the fixed 
additional rate, wholesalers and retailers prefer expensive drugs. 






By 1994 most drug prices were handed over to market mechanism from 
the government. As a result of soaring pharmaceutical prices, poor 
quality control, corruption and kickbacks, pricing control was 






Re-regulating part of the drug prices and continuing to launch a wide 
range of mandatory price-cutting operations. Since 1997, the 
government has been continuously reducing drug prices of different 
ranges. At present about 60% of the drug prices are under the 
government’s control
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 B. Government pricing
The drugs included in the government’s pricing range shall be priced by the gov-
ernment except for a few special varieties, and enterprises may not adjust prices on 
their own. The government uses the traditional cost-plus pricing method to set the 
maximum retail price and stipulates the sales profit margin and the circulation rate. 
Pharmaceutical companies can apply for separate pricing of government- priced drugs.
 C. Enterprise autonomous pricing
As for the enterprise autonomous pricing drugs, the price should be submitted to 
corresponding price control administration department4 to undergo examination and 
then publish relevant price online.
3.3  Regulatory Policies on Industrial Structure and Layout
The relevant policies and regulations on pharmaceutical industry mainly focus on 
plant environment, business sites, equipment and facilities, storage conditions, per-
sonnel qualifications, management organization system, industrial structure and 
layout policies (see Table 4). Those policies and regulations made clear the struc-
tural adjustment and developmental direction of the pharmaceutical industry, ratio-
nalized the industrial structure of pharmaceutical enterprises and regulated the 
regional spatial planning and layout adjustment of pharmaceutical enterprises.
4  The Market Structure of China’s Pharmaceutical 
Industries
4.1  The High Expenditure Rate Under China’s Medicare 
System
By the end of 2010, under China’s Medicare system (National Basic Medical 
Insurance System), people participating in urban basic medical insurance totalled 
432.06 million and participants in the new rural cooperative medical care reaching 
835.6 million, with a participation rate of 96%.
However, as shown in Fig. 8, the annual expenditure of basic medical insurance 
funds for urban workers exceeded 70% of the total income. The fund expenditure of 
the new rural cooperative medical care showed a more alarming annual increase 
trend, reaching as high as 97.72% of fund revenue in 2009. The high expenditure 
rate is a serious threat to the ability of Medicare funds to withstand risks (Wang 
2012).
4 Prior to 2015, price control administration in China was generally conducted by National Price 
Administration Bureau and later changed to Price Control Administration Department under 
National Development and Reform Commission.
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4.2  The Dominant Mode of Monopoly by Hospitals
Hospitals in China almost monopolized the drug sales market, whose market share 
was once as high as 95% (Wu 2006), and nowadays they still control about 4/5 of 
the market (Sun et al. 2008). The reasons for such a monopoly are as follows:
4.2.1  The “Hospital and Pharmacy Together” Model Facilitates 
Drug Sales by Hospitals
The hospital has its own pharmacy; most patients are accustomed to receiving medi-
cal treatment in hospitals and purchasing medicines in hospital pharmacies (Liu 
2012).
Table 4 Summary of China’s pharmaceutical industry structure and layout policies
Year Policies and regulations Relevant content
2007 Biological industry 
development under the 
“Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan”
Planning to speed up the development of biopharmaceutical 
industry (Li and Yang 2016)




The biopharmaceutical industry will be nurtured as a pillar 
industry in the high-tech field (Li and Yang 2016)
2010 Guiding opinions on 
accelerating the 




2011 Pharmaceutical industry 
under the “Twelfth 
Five-Year” plan
Relevant departments appropriated about RMB 40 billion 
for research, development and creation of major new drugs 
in the biomedical industry. The central government 
allocated RMB10 billion, and the remaining funds were 
provided by local governments and enterprises. The total 
amount is more than double of the amount of the “Eleventh 




2016 Pharmaceutical industry 
“Thirteenth Five-Year” 
plan
The state will start to set up a policy environment that 
adapts to the original medicine research from the 
perspectives of finance, examination, approval, bidding, 
insurance and patents
2016 Pharmaceutical industry 
development planning 
guide
Attach importance to the international registration of new 
drugs, generic drugs, traditional Chinese medicines and 
bio-analogues. Take priority over making 3–5 new drugs 
and over 200 chemical generic drugs in the market in 
developed countries (Meng 2017)
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4.2.2  The “Hospitals Supported by Medicines” Phenomenon 
Provides Hospitals with Monopoly Power
From 2003 to 2010, China’s medical institutions have a price increase of 15% on 
drugs, and the proportion of drug revenues in the revenue composition of public 
hospitals5 is only slightly behind that of medical revenues, with a stable rate of over 
40% (see Fig. 9). According to China Statistical Yearbook 2010, the total revenue of 
government-run medical institutions in China reached RMB 74,569,116 million in 
2009, of which drugs revenue was RMB 31,360,277 million RMB, accounting for 
42.1% of the total (Liu 2012).
4.2.3  Drug Management Policies Conducive to Monopoly
Prescription drugs are generally controlled by doctors when patients go to the hos-
pital for treatment. Hospitals usually take various measures to control the outflow of 
prescriptions drugs. In most cases, patients can only buy prescription drugs from 
hospital pharmacies, resulting in hospitals becoming the dominant drug distribu-
tors. In addition, the site-specific restrictions by Medicare also make patients buy 
medicines at hospital pharmacies in most cases (Liu 2012) (Table 5).
5 In China, public hospitals (or government-run hospitals, which are established and supported by 
regular government budget) and private hospitals are the two major resource of medical service. 
Although they are similar in number (13,069 public vs. 14,509 private ones in 2015), the public 
hospitals are far more important than private ones in terms of practical service (public hospitals 
provided service up to 2.71 billion person/times in 2015, private ones only 0.37 billion person/
times, which primarily could be attributed to higher quality and professionalism of the public 
hospitals. Available via http://www.360doc.com/content/17/0610/13/38907157_661600475.shtml
Fig. 8 Expenditure of Medicare fund in China (2004–2009)
National Health Commission of the PRC, 2011 China Health Statistics Summary, http://www.
nhfpc.gov.cn/cmsresources/mohbgt/cmsrsdocument/doc12294.pdf. National Bureau of Statistics, 
China Statistical Yearbook 2007 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm
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Fig. 9 Revenue in government-run hospitals in China (2003–2010)
The website of Ministry of Health Statistical Information, 2004–2010 Health Statistics Yearbook, 
2011 Health Statistics
Table 5 China’s drug administration policies leading to hospital monopoly (Liu 2012)
Year Policies and regulations Relevant content
1999 Pilot work of prescription 
drugs and non-prescription 
drug circulation
Officially launched
1999 Provisional regulations on 
the circulation management 
of prescription drugs and 
non-prescription drugs
Requiring drug administration at all levels to effectively 
promote drug classification management
2001 Drug administration law The government implements the system of the 
classification and management of prescription drugs 
and non-prescription drugs, the specifics of which are 
formulated by the State Council
2004 – About 400 kinds of antibiotics, amines, 
antituberculosis, antifungal and norethindrone shall be 
prescribed by a licensed practitioner
2006 The second national drug 
classification management 
conference
Drug retail outlets across the country shall not sell nine 
types of drugs, such as narcotic drugs. Drug retailers 
must place prescription drugs and non-prescription 
drug over different counters. And no advertisements or 
advertisements in disguise may be published in the 
mass media for prescription drugs
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4.2.4  The Supply and Demand Characteristics of the Medical 
Industry Conducive to Monopoly
Patients lack relevant information on the choice of drugs, and their price elasticity 
of demand for medicines is low. The hospital is both a provider of medical products 
and a determinant of the demand for medical products; the doctor has the ability to 
conduct supplier-induced needs. There is serious information asymmetry between 
doctors and patients in the medical industry. Patients have obvious information dis-
advantages in the selection of treatment plans and drug efficacy. The hospital has 
the initiative on the treatment plans and drug selection (Liu 2012).
4.3  China’s Generic Drug Market
4.3.1  Generic Drugs Occupy the Drug Markets
According to statistics, global sales of the patent-expired drugs amount to US$77 bil-
lion during 2011–2015 (Liu 2010). According to China Health-Care Industry 2016 
(Blue Book), the total revenue of China’s pharmaceutical market (covering chemical 
medicine, Chinese traditional medicine and biopharmaceuticals) reached RMB 
1335.4 billion, of which chemical drugs were RMB 888.0 billion, accounting for 
66.5%, while revenue of Chinese traditional medicines accounted for 25.3% and 
biopharmaceutical 8.2%. Among all the chemicals, generic drugs have a market 
share of 95%, while the market share of patented drugs and original drugs is only 
about 5% in total. The market of patented drugs is only RMB 12 billion, less than 
1% of the domestic pharmaceutical market.
Following typical medicines are on the top lists of market sale, also typical in 
generic drugs (see Table 6).
Table 6 Top10 medicines in terms of sales value in 2015
Drug name




Sodium chloride injection 15.85 9.77
Glucose injection 10.37 16.90
Clopidogrel hydrogen sulphate tablets 9.24 3.62
Pantoprazole sodium for injection 9.23 7.50
Omeprazole sodium for injection 8.94 16.51
Ceftizoxime sodium for injection 8.33 11.28
Human albumin 8.21 8.65




Cefoxitin sodium for injection 7.50 5.60
Total 93.51
Source: Zhong Kang CMH: http://drug.39.net/a/160318/4792071.html
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4.3.2  The Opportunities upon Patent Expiration
The expiration of the protection term of a patented drug gives generic manufacturers 
huge opportunities for profit-making. However, with the passage of time, this oppor-
tunity will gradually diminish and eventually vanish (Fig. 10). This is due to “price 
competition only” when the market is filled with too many competitors whose prod-
ucts in the market are almost the same. Figure 10 illustrates this scenario in I to IV 
stages.6
There are interesting movements in pharmaceutical-related stock markets during 
the patent expiration period. For example, some 16 companies have possessed the 
opportunity to avail themselves of the benefits of timely expiration of patents in the 
specialty pharmaceutical business and experienced a dramatic price hike (see 
Table 7).
The most successful case was Hisun Pharmaceutical, whereby the company 
obtained a huge profit in 2003 and 2004 when the patents of simvastatin and pravas-
tatin (which were the main products of the company) expired (see Table 8).
6 These four stages can be further explained: I Right Entrance period, to produce drugs just after 
the expiration of the patent, with producer enjoying 70% to 80% of original price on the previous 
patented drugs; II Crowded Market period, long after the expiration of the patent, with producer 
enjoying 30% to 50% of the patented drugs; III Crowding Out period, when the drug price drops 
to almost production cost or even lower, with some producers having to quite or leave the market; 
and IV Recovery period, after some companies leave the market, fewer producers and productions 
may raise the drug price again.
Fig. 10 Generic drugs’ price movements after the expiration of the patent (Wang 2013)
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5  IP Structure in Pharmaceutical Industries in China
5.1  The Patented Drug Market
5.1.1  The Demand for Drugs Against Infectious Diseases Relies 
on Patented Drugs
The key public health issues in China are infectious diseases and chronic diseases (Li 
and Lv 2002). According to statistics from National Bureau of Disease Prevention 
and Control of the National Health Planning Commission, the incidence of notifiable 
infectious diseases reported by China in 2015 was 470.35/100,000, and the reported 
death rate was 1.23/100,000. Now in China the treatment of most infectious diseases 
such as chronic hepatitis B, AIDS and other diseases depends on imported patented 
drugs, which are expensive due to their clinical efficacy (Jiang et al. 2017).





























3.86 6.34 7.67 7.72 13.72 2010/4/13
Huahai 
Pharmaceutical
4.31 5.07 5.60 6.79 11.08 2006/12/22
Huahai 
Pharmaceutical
7.62 7.14 12.79 14.55 15.92 2009/11/15
Hisun 
Pharmaceutical
4.49 9.57 9.76 7.64 14.03 2007/8/28
Hisun 
Pharmaceutical
11.91 15.09 15.79 14.90 24.43 2010/4/12
Hengrui Medicine 3.17 4.33 4.89 6.45 9.79 2006/9/8
Hengrui Medicine 14.76 16.21 16.42 18.24 22.25 2009/3/22
Hengrui Medicine 25.93 24.63 27.54 25.34 36.71 2010/5/25
Jincheng 
Pharmaceutical
12.00 11.48 13.80 16.01 – 2012/7/18
Topfond 
Pharmaceutical
5.27 5.80 5.86 7.94 11.26 2009/10/27
Livzon Group 22.30 27.60 31.63 37.58 47.81 2009/10/26
Baiyunshan 
Pharmaceutical A
9.23 11.60 14.32 12.26 18.40 2010/4/30
NHWA 13.61 16.71 19.72 22.72 23.63 2010/5/17
Salubris 18.43 23.36 25.47 39.50 37.61 2010/2/12
Joincare 4.10 5.32 5.99 8.13 8.60 2009/10/8
Beilu 
Pharmaceutical
10.53 8.81 9.34 14.10 12.71 2012/5/15
Data sources: WIND, FDA and companies’ announcement
Note: the stock price boom cases here are generally for special API drugs and imitating drugs
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According to the data from Publicity Department of the National Health Planning 
Commission, in 2012, the national statistics on the death rate of chronic diseases 
was 533/100,000, accounting for 86.6% of the total number of deaths. Almost all of 
the clinical standard medicines used in these areas of chronic diseases are patented 
drugs or patent-expired drugs (Jiang et al. 2017).
5.1.2  Patented Drugs Are More Profitable Than Generic Drugs
Patentees of patented drugs enjoy the market exclusivity to the products for a long 
time. The ultra-high profits during the market exclusivity period are the targets pur-
sued by the pharmaceutical companies (Chen and Liu 2006).
In 2010, there were 303 varieties of patent-expired drugs in China, which were 
produced or distributed by 315 pharmaceutical companies, including 253 foreign- 
owned enterprises (81%), 61 joint ventures (19%) and only 1 domestic enterprise. 
Compared with the generic drugs companies, the 116 foreign and joint ventures that 
produced the corresponding patent-expired drugs accounted for 56.4% of the mar-
ket sales and 52.1% of the total sales (PAC 2010).
5.1.3  National Drug Price Negotiations Increased the Sales 
of Patented Drugs
National drug price negotiations have brought huge market gains to patented drugs. 
The drop in the price of patented drugs has enabled more patients to pay for medi-
cines, and the clinical demand for patent drugs has increased. So the sales of patent 
drugs have risen (Jiang et al. 2017).
Table 8 Events which Hisun that seized the opportunities upon patent expiry (Wang 2013)
Year/month Event
Responses of Hisun 
Pharmaceutical Effective
2003/05 The patent of Merck’s 
second largest drug 
Simvastatin registered 
in the European Union 
(EU) expired
They finished the R&D of 
the production process 
ahead of schedule and 
started mass production. 
They received a large 
number of orders after 
multiple negotiations with 
Merck, and their sales 
increased rapidly
The growth rate of the 
main business income is 
103.45% in 2003, which 
ranked the fifth in “Top 
10 enterprises in the 
chemical raw material 
manufacturing industry”
2004/08 The patent of the 
pravastatin (owned 
originally by Daiichi 
Sankyo, a Japanese 
pharmaceutical 
company) in the EU 
market expired
Hisun’s pravastatin patents 
passed Certificate of 
Suitability (COS) 
certification earlier than 
patent expiration. After 
the product patent expired, 
Hisun conducted a wide 
range of sales before the 
process patent expires
The company’s stock 
price rose from 4 RMB in 
February 2004 to over 5 
RMB at the end of 2004, 
while the pharmaceutical 
bio-index dropped nearly 
30% over the same period
Note: The process patent expiry is generally later than the product patent expiry
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5.1.4  The Patent Linkage System Is Imperfect
Patent linkage means that when a drug manufacturer applies for registration of 
generic drugs with China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), CFDA will have 
to consider the status of the patent involved to balance the interests of all parties 
(Xiao 2017).
 A. Strict restrictions on the registration of generic drugs
Article 19 of Provisions for Drug Registration provides that “Applicants other 
than the patentee may submit the application for registration two years prior to the 
expiry date of the patent”, “After the expiry date of the patent, check and issue the 
drug approval number, Import Drug License or Pharmaceutical Product License if 
the application conforms with the provisions”, respectively, made rules on generic 
drug registration application time and the effective date of the provisions. However, 
can the regulations promote the generic drugs listed timely and increase the 
availability of public medicines? There are many questions in academia about this 
(Fang 2013).
 B. Imperfect patent information registration requirements
Some imperfections exist in Article 18 of the Provisions for Drug Registration, 
such as “The applicant shall provide the applicant’s or others’ patents in China with 
their prescriptions, techniques, uses, etc. for the drug to which they are applying for 
registration, and provide the state of patent ownership”, where the word “etc.” is 
ambiguous and has not been elaborated upon (Fang 2013).
 C. Single dispute resolution approach
Article 18 of the Provisions for Drug Registration stipulates that “Disputes over 
patent rights in the course of drug registration shall be resolved in accordance with 
the laws and regulations of the relevant patent”. CFDA will issue a notice stating 
that the application infringes the patent rights of others and require it to resolve the 
patent dispute on its own; otherwise no further examination will be conducted. 
However, according to Chinese Patent Law, this behaviour in the process of drug 
registration does not belong to the realm of patent infringement. The patentee has 
no basis for prosecution; generic drug companies cannot respond to the defence. For 
generic drug companies, the current defence approach is too monotonous, and it can 
only declare to the State IP Office that the patent in question is invalid (Fang 2013).
5.1.5  Domestic Patented Drugs Far Fewer Than Imported Patented 
Drugs
Nearly 90% of the patented drugs come from foreign enterprises (Jiang et al. 2017). 
So far, there are only two innovative drugs originated from China that have been 
internationally recognized, namely, artemisinin and Sodium Dimercaptosuccinate. 
Meanwhile, large overseas multinational pharmaceutical companies generally bring 
2–3 new patents with new chemical entities to market each year (Liu 2012).
X. Chen et al.
239
There are mainly two categories of patented drugs in China. One is the 265 
exclusively patented drugs approved for import, of which 48 have got core patents 
in China, accounting for 18.1% of imported patented drugs. The other is the 22 first 
type of new drugs7 in China, of which only 6 have core patents in China. The ratio 
between imported patented drugs and domestic patented drugs (those with core 
patents) is about 8:1 (Jiang et al. 2017).
5.2  The Characteristics of Typical Self-Developed Patented 
Drugs
5.2.1  Polymorphic Drug Patents
Drug polymorphism refers to the presence of drugs in two or more different crystal-
line states. It refers to a solid pharmaceutical polymorphic ingredient present in a 
particular crystalline form state, particularly solid chemicals (Zhang et al. 2016).
As shown in Fig.  11, annual patent application for polymorphic drugs has 
increased significantly in China in the last three decades. Between 1985 and 1994, 
the total number of patent applications for polymorphic drugs was only 30 (0.8% of 
the total). However, from 1995 to 2004, the total number of patent applications was 
471, accounting for 12.6% of the total, with an average annual number of 47 
applications and an average annual growth rate of 114.9%. From 2005 to 2014, the 
total number of patent applications was as high as 3009, 78.9% of the total, an aver-
age of 301 applications each year, with the average annual growth rate of up to 
147.9% (Fig. 12).
7 The first type of new drugs refers to chemical drugs and biological products.
Fig. 11 Annual patent application volume related to polymorphic drugs (1985–2015) (Wang et al. 
2017)
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As shown in Fig. 13, the majority of polymorphic drug patent applicants in China 
are enterprises, which are marked as deep black.
Figure 14 shows the polymorphic drug patent applicants in China from various 
countries. In terms of actual number, 2116 applications were from China, 651 were 
from the United States and 432 from Germany, India and Switzerland combined 
(accounting for 11.3% of the total).
Table 9 shows that coastal provinces and cities have stronger capabilities in the 
pharmaceutical industry than the western and inland regions.
5.2.2  Botanical Drug Patents
A botanical drug is one of the most important types of pharmaceutical products. 
Relevant patents are also key assets for such technology. In Table 10, it is clear that 
as of 12 December 2013, China has more than 100,000 patent applications, far 
greater than any other countries, and the amount of granted patents is 38,191. 
Among those Asian countries, the number of Japanese patent applications is the 
highest (more than 20,000), and South Korea’s amount is in the second position, 
while India has over 200 applications.
As shown in Fig. 15, the total number of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) appli-
cations from the United States is the largest, nearly three times that of Japan, more 
than four times that of Korea and nearly seven times that of China. However, the 
total application amount in the last 5 years of the United States is still higher than 
that of other countries, but the amounts have risen sharply for Korea, Japan and 
China.
Fig. 12 Trends of polymorphic drug patent applications in China by applicants from China and 
the United States, Germany and Switzerland (1985–2015) (Wang et al. 2017)
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Fig. 14 Polymorphic drug patent applicants in China from various countries (1985–2015) (Wang 
et al. 2017)
Fig. 13 Top 15 polymorphic drug patent applicants in China (1985–2015) (Wang et al. 2017)
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Chinese applicants filed 105,751 applications and got 38,191 grants worldwide. 
Japanese applicants applied for patents in China more than in other countries, but 
the total number of applications is only 552 and less than 250 grants, followed by 
the United States (see Fig. 16). Japanese applicants from cosmetics accounted for 
about 10%. The figure for Korean and American applicants is about 8%, while 
almost all of the applicants from Germany and India have little involvement with 
cosmetics (Zhang and Xu 2014).
According to Table 11, traditional Chinese medicine enterprises already have a 
large number of botanical drug patent applications and granted patents in China, 
while their foreign applications have just started.
Table 10 The amount of 
botanical drug patent 
applications in various 
countries (Zhang and Xu 
2014)
Country










Note: The data is from Espacenet Worldwide 
database as of 12 Dec 2013
Table 9 Polymorphic drug patent applications in China from various provinces and cities (1985–
2015) (Wang et al. 2017)
Regions Quantity Regions Quantity Regions Quantity
Jiangsu 
Province
365 Anhui Province 30 Hunan Province 12
Shandong 
Province
247 Fujian Province 30 Henan Province 12
Beijing 239 Liaoning 
Province
24 Shanxi Province 9
Shanghai 238 Jilin Province 22 Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region
6










132 Yunnan Province 19 Guizhou Province 1
Sichuan 
Province
100 Jiangxi Province 17 Gansu province 1
Hebei Province 66 Hainan Province 17 Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region
1
Chongqing 66 Heilongjiang 
Province
14 – –
X. Chen et al.
243
6  Comparison of the Pharmaceutical Industries 
Between China and India
6.1  Similarities and Differences
It will be beneficial to compare the development of pharmaceutical industries of 
China and India. The two countries are similar in many aspects, such as most con-
densed population (altogether, 40% of the population in the world), developing 
mode similar from an agricultural-based economy to gradually industrial econo-
mies, and most importantly, both are in the fastest growth rate in economic perfor-
mance. Moreover, the two countries also face serious problems of uneven 
Fig. 15 The amount of botanical drug patent applications filed through PCT from various coun-
tries (2009–2013) (Zhang and Xu 2014)
Fig. 16 The amount of Chinese botanical drug patent applications and granted patents by 
Countries (2009–2013) (Zhang and Xu 2014)
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development level between regions and populations and mounting challenges in 
environmental deterioration.
On the one hand, in terms of economic scale, both went through economic 
reforms in their own ways during 1970s and 1980s. Based on data from World 
Bank, the GDP of China increased from US$59.2 billion in 1960s to US$10.87 tril-
lion in 2015, while the GDP of India increased from US$37.7 billion in 1960s to 
US$ 2.07 trillion in 2015. On the other hand, in terms of ways of economic prog-
ress, there were indeed profound differences.
International scholars usually believe there are similarities in the two countries. 
For instance, Pye et al. (2006) did an all-round investigation from different perspec-
tive and considered strong similarities between them. As for Chinese scholars, how-
ever, differences were more emphasized. Zhao (2008) specially investigated the 
economic development modes of the two countries, suggested that it would be dif-
ficult to tell which way would be better than the other.
There are many contrasts between China and Indian in pharmaceutical indus-
tries. On the specific nature towards local pharmaceutical market, Huang and 
Khanna (2003) suggested that foreign direct investment (FDI), rather than local 
private firms, could be considered as major driving force for local economy in 
China, while local firms were strongly protected in India, and the local banking 
system and capital market were more appropriate for local firms in India as well. 
Farrell et al. (2004) clarified that the major growth power in China was from manu-
facturing sectors, accompanied by higher rate of bank savings8 larger scale invest-
ment on infrastructure and inward overseas capitals, while Indian free market 
mechanism might be more promising, although the country was slow in economic 
reform (which also implies less active in IP protections in pharmaceutical sectors) 
and infrastructure development. Quan (2006) and Li (2006) considered that there 
was much less government intervention in the market development in Indian case; 
8 In China, household saving rate is generally high. If compared with GDP volume, the household 
saving rate in China is about 9% on average between 1998 and 2015.
Table 11 The botanical drug patent applications granted patents and PCT applications in top 10 






Yunnan Baiyao 53 36 0
Jilin Aodong 44 26 0
Tasly 721 472 45
Kangmei Pharmaceutical 30 4 0
Kanion Pharmaceutical 110 103 0
Tong Ren Tang 102 57 3
Dong-E-E-Jiao 20 8 1
Tai Chi Group 53 38 1
Zhongheng Group Guangxi Wuzhou 
pharmaceutical
25 10 0
Conba 31 17 1
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therefore, the intellectual and financial resource, particularly technology resource in 
computer software industries could be developed “naturally”, whereas there would 
be stronger government intervention over manufacturing capacities in both 
technology and production in China; in such case, dynamic and active market 
players might be restricted. Shi (2007) further suggested that the economic growth 
mode was consumption-based in India, with less intervention from local government, 
while such growth could be investment-based in China, where government might 
play an important role in it.
6.2  India as Patent Maverick vs. China as Patent Taker
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under 
World Trade Organization (WTO) policy framework is often considered highly 
beneficial for industrialized nations (Nayyar 1992), especially in terms of 
pharmaceutical sectors (Marjit 1994). However, India has managed to go its own 
way on patent although it became WTO member in 1995. For example, on the issue 
whether biotechnology could be patented, India insisted on its interests (Rao 2002, 
Kumar 1998) and decided in the Patents Act of 1970 not to protect medicine, only 
production method of medicine, until the amended Patents Act of 2005. This means 
there was quite a long time for Indian companies to legally imitate medicine patented 
in other countries.
Even after 2005, the newly added section 3(d) of the Patents Act does not protect 
minor modification, in order to prevent evergreening of patents: “the mere discovery 
of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the 
known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new 
use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or appa-
ratus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one 
new reactant”. Section 3(d) allows the generic companies to continue operating 
with a breathing space (see chapters “Historical Evolution of India’s Patent Regime 
and Its Impact on Innovation in the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry” and “The 
Challenges, Opportunities and Performance of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
Post-TRIPS” for details). In contrast, China has been a faithful taker of TRIPS 
Agreement, never challenged or even questioned patent protection of pharmaceuti-
cal inventions.
6.3  Summary
A comparison of the developmental similarities and differences between China and 
India can be summarized as follows (see Table 12).
Based on items contrasted in Table 12 and other related analysis, the strength of 
China’s pharmaceutical industry mainly includes a strong industry base for APIs, 
low labour costs and well-established domestic infrastructure. The weakness, on the 
other hand, includes poor competitiveness in the domestic pharmaceutical market 
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compared with multinational pharmaceutical firms, comparatively low-level R&D 
and professional techniques in advanced medicine production and especially low 
added value in international market.
Li and Huang (2007) considered that Chinese pharmaceutical companies’ weak 
position in market competition can be attributed to inadequate innovation, restricted 
financial capital resource and less capable market control. Based on analysis via 
SWOT methodology9 over Chinese and Indian drug companies, Li and Huang 
9 SWOT is the typical methodology applies to strategic management cases, with four factor-based 
framework, namely, Strengths and Weakness (SWs, considered as inner factors), Opportunities 
and Threats (OTs, considered as environmental factors).
Table 12 A comparison of pharmaceutical industry development in China and India (Wang 2013)
Criterion Similarities Differences
Macroeconomy Populous developing countries, low 
per capita GDP
–
Experienced rapid economic growth 
over the past three decades
Low level of medical care and 
individual medicine consumption
Less sound social security and 
medical insurance systems
Market size Except for the population and the 
consumption of medicines, the 
pharmaceutical market fundamentals 
in the two countries are very similar
China’s pharmaceutical market is 
three times that of India
China’s population is 1.3 times 
that of India
China’s per capita consumption of 




Low market concentration China’s top ten pharmaceutical 
companies with total market share 
of 15–18%, while India’s has been 
about 35% since 1999
Excessive competition The polarization of the 
pharmaceutical companies between 
large and small is more significant 
in India
Low R&D investment in 
pharmaceutical companies
Low-level repeated competition
Industry policy Since India’s new Patents Act came 
into force in 2005, the patent systems 
in the two countries have been 
gradually harmonized and in line 
with international standards
China’s Patent Law met 
international standards in 1993 by 
extending the object of patent 
protection from method to products
Between 1970 and 2005, India 
only granted patents for drug 
production process, not for the 
compound itself
Infrastructure – India is less developed than China 
in industrial facilities. For example, 
India’s electricity shortfall was 
10.3% and reached a peak of 
12.9% in 2011
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found that Indian firms were more competitive in newly developed medicine in 
international market, quality certification and technical talents. In another compara-
tive study, Zhang and Zhang (2009) found that Chinese firms in pharmaceutical 
sectors are weak in market share, earning, innovation and, most importantly, IP 
resource. Cai and Xiao (2013) found that Indian pharmaceutical outsourcing (CRO) 
sector perform overall better than Chinese, especially in terms of labour, technolo-
gies and management skills, while Chinese CRO sector appears to have better pol-
icy environment and market size. Mao and Zhang (2011) have investigated Indian 
pharmaceutical industries primarily from a number of key dimensions, such as local 
IP policy system, basic research system, national drug policies and human resource 
training system, and concluded that those systems and relevant dimensions, which 
should be understood as Pharmaceutical Sectoral Innovation System, could explain 
the successful development of the pharmaceutical industries in India.
There are other quantitative studies on Chinese and Indian pharmaceutical indus-
tries. For example, Li (2008) found that although the product innovation was com-
paratively weak, the industry did have comparative advantage in terms of market 
size and policy support in China. Liu and Yu (2010) found Chinese industry falling 
far behind Indian firms in internationalization. Xiao (2015) further indicated 
Chinese industry might have comparative advantage only in production scale and 
market growth and might be falling behind in R&D and internationalization. As is 
emphasized in chapter “The Challenges, Opportunities and Performance of the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Industry Post-TRIPS”, though major Indian companies are 
all producers of generic medicines, they continue to invest sizeable share of their 
sales turnover in R&D. It may imply that the innovation and development of Indian 
pharmaceutical industry might be faster.
7  Conclusion
The Chinese pharmaceutical industry has been developing fast, in terms of increas-
ing market size and revenue volumes, and upgraded technologies, along with the 
gradual opening up of the industries. Although there is a huge increase in the num-
ber of patented drugs granted to Chinese pharmaceutical companies, patents have 
made low contribution to the industrial values, and IP held by Chinese firms is less 
competitive compared with foreign companies. Most of the pharmaceutical enter-
prises in China still focus on generic drugs.
The scale of Chinese pharmaceutical companies is small, and the market concen-
tration is low. Therefore, local pharmaceutical companies with higher R&D input 
are generally less profitable, which prevents Chinese companies from conducting 
effective R&D and leads them to develop in thinner profit margin market and in 
production of patent-expired drugs. Pharmaceutical R&D or related research is 
often conducted by research institutes or universities, rather than by companies in 
China.
Market regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in China is relatively strict, 
especially market entry and price control. Indeed, this may increasingly create more 
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monopolistic buying position for state-owned hospitals and decrease or weaken the 
negotiating power of pharma enterprises.
India is well known as patent maverick, whereas China as a naïve patent taker, 
especially in pharma invention. With Indian Patents Act utilizing the leeway left by 
the TRIPS Agreement to better suit its national interests and developmental needs, 
India’s pharma industry is poised to further outperform its Chinese counterpart.
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Abstract
Both China and India are developing countries in the pharmaceutical industry, 
and both need to seek a balance between protecting intellectual property rights 
and satisfying people’s healthcare needs. They also need to promote innovation 
and encourage the development of domestic industries. As members of the WTO, 
China and India have made a series of amendments to their respective intellec-
tual property systems to live up to the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards 
of protection, including recognition of pharmaceutical product patents, introduc-
tion of a compulsory licensing system, and Bolar exception. In promoting the 
development of its domestic pharmaceutical industry, India’s experience in leg-
islation and judicial practice deserves serious attention from China, such as using 
TRIPS’s flexibility to facilitate access to medicines, implementing compulsory 
licensing to create more chances for voluntary licensing negotiation, and updat-
ing the guidelines for examining pharmaceutical applications to prevent ever-
greening of pharmaceutical patents. Meanwhile, learning from India, China 
should start to provide its legal professionals with knowledge of global rules, to 
better further Chinese interests in the world arena.
Keywords
Patent · Pharmaceutical industry · Generic drug · Compulsory license · Bolar 
exception · Evergreening
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1  TRIPS Agreement and India’s Pharmaceutical Patent 
System
India was an early signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 
However, it is evident that GATT was more inclined toward developed countries 
than developing ones. Some developing countries, especially Brazil and India, have 
proposed during the Uruguay Round negotiations that GATT has no business deal-
ing with the issues of intellectual property protection, which should be discussed at 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). During the negotia-
tions, notwithstanding pointing out that countries at different levels of development 
should have their own right to decide whether to grant patent right to certain 
products,2 India decided to join the nascent World Trade Organization (WTO).
On January 1, 1995, the TRIPS Agreement went into force, which meant that 
India as a member of the WTO was required to abandon some of its long held posi-
tion in the intellectual property field to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. As a developing country, India obtained a 5-year transition period3 and 
an additional 5 years to amend patent laws on patent protection of pharmaceuticals.4 
The following analysis is based on the amendments to the Indian Patent Law of 
1999, 2002, and 2005 and delineates the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on India’s 
pharmaceutical patent system.
1.1  Amendment in 1999: Increased Exclusive Marketing 
Rights in Transition Period
According to Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement, members that have not provided 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products as of the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement are required to provide a means by 
which applications for patents for such inventions can be filed as of the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement: to apply the criteria for patentability as laid down 
in the TRIPS Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing 
in that member country and to provide patent protection from the grant of the patent 
and for the remainder of the patent term, calculated from the filing date. The pur-
pose of the TRIPS Agreement provision is to maintain the novelty and priority of 
1 India acceded to the GATT on July 8, 1948, and became a founding member of the World Trade 
Organization on January 1, 1995. As a result, India joined the TRIPS Agreement on January 1, 
1995. On September 7, 1998, India joined the Paris Convention.
2 Matthew O’Regan, The Protection of Intellectual Property, International Trade and the European 
Community: The Impact of the TRIPS Agreement of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 22 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (1995) Issue 1, 3.
3 TRIPS Agreement, Article 65.2.
4 Article 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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such applications. This is also called the “mailbox” application system and is used 
by developing countries during the transition period.
At the same time, in accordance with the requirements of Article 70.9 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, although it is not necessary to directly provide patent protection 
during the transition period, exclusive marketing rights are to be granted to pharma-
ceuticals and agricultural chemical products provided that, subsequent to the entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent 
granted for that product in another member and marketing approval obtained in 
such other member. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, was issued on March 26, 
1999, but effective since January 1, 1995, which is the effective date of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The Amendment of 1999 added Chapter IVA after Chapter IV of the 
Patents Act, 1970, to specifically regulate exclusive marketing rights.
According to the Amendment,5 product patent applications can be submitted in the 
food and pharmaceutical fields, which however will not be subject to patent examina-
tion until December 31, 2004. At the same time, the Amendment provides another 
way to obtain protection, namely, exclusive marketing rights to sell or distribute the 
article or substance in India. For the application for exclusive right to sell or distribute 
an article or a substance, the Controller6 shall first examine whether the invention is 
not an invention within the meaning of the Patents Act7 or the invention is an invention 
for which no patent can be granted.8 If the object of the application falls into the 
abovementioned matters, the application shall be rejected. In a case where an applica-
tion is not rejected by the Controller, he/she may proceed to grant an exclusive mar-
keting right in the following two situations: (1) the invention claiming the identical 
article or substance in a convention country has been granted a patent or sale or distri-
bution of the article or substance has been approved. (2) The invention claiming the 
method or process of manufacture for that invention relating to the identical article or 
substance has been granted a patent in India. The exclusive marketing right shall be 
granted by the Controller on behalf of the Central Government. The applicant shall 
have the exclusive marketing right to himself/herself, his/her agents or licensees to 
sell or distribute in India the article, or the substance from the date of approval granted 
by the Controller for a period of 5 years or till the date of grant of patent or the date of 
rejection of the application for grant of patent, whichever is earlier.
1.2  Amendment in 2002: Wide-Ranging Changes to Meet 
the TRIPS Standards
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, was promulgated on June 25, 2002, and came 
into force on such dates as the Central Government appointed, by notification in the 
5 Chapter IVA Exclusive Marketing Rights of The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999.
6 In Indian Patents Act, Controller means the Controller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks.
7 Section 3 of the Patents Act, 1970.
8 Section 4 of the Patents Act, 1970.
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Official Gazette, and different dates were designated for different provisions of this 
Act.9 In order to meet the TRIPS standards, many provisions of the Patents Act, 
1970, were amended, including the definition of invention, the object of patent pro-
tection, the patent term, the requirements of patent application, compulsory licenses, 
and the Bolar exception, which have a significant impact on India’s pharmaceutical 
patent system.
In relation to the definition of an “invention” under patent law, the TRIPS 
Agreement clearly stipulates that patents shall be available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.10 Therefore, 
the Amendment of 2002 stipulates the definition of invention, that is, a new product 
or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application, and 
further defines inventive step as a feature that makes the invention not obvious to a 
person skilled in the art.11
On objects that are not capable of protection under patent law, based on the 
Patents Act, 1970,12 the Amendment of 2002 further clarifies that a patent shall not 
be granted to the following items13: “(1) an invention the primary or intended use 
or commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to public order of morality 
or which causes serious prejudice to human, animal or plant life or health or to the 
environment; (2) discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in 
nature; (3) any process for diagnostic and therapeutic treatment of human beings 
or any process for a similar treatment of animals; (4) plants and animals in whole 
or any part thereof other than micro-organisms but including seeds, varieties and 
species and essentially biological processes for production or propagation of plants 
and animals; (5) a mathematical or business method or a computer program per se 
or algorithms; (7) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aes-
thetic creation whatsoever including cinematographic works and television pro-
ductions; (8) a mere scheme or rule or method of performing mental act or method 
of playing game; (9) a presentation of information; (10) topography of integrated 
circuits; (11) an invention which, in effect, is traditional knowledge or which is an 
aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally known component 
or components.”
On the term of patent protection, according to the TRIPS Agreement,14 the term 
of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of 20 years 
counted from the filing date. However, Section 53 of the Patents Act, 1970, stipu-
lates that the term of a patent in respect of an invention claiming the method or 
process of manufacture of a substance, where the substance is intended for use, or 
is capable of being used, as food or as a medicine or drug, shall be 5 years from the 
9 Section 1 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
10 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
11 Section 3(f) of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
12 Section 3. Chapter II Inventions not Patentable of the Patents Act, 1970.
13 Section 4 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
14 Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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date of sealing of the patent or 7 years from the date of the patent, whichever period 
is shorter, and, in respect of any other invention, shall be 14 years from the date of 
the patent. The Amendment of 2002 extended the term of protection of all patents to 
20 years in accordance with the TRIPS requirement.15 The Amendment stipulates 
that the term of every patent granted, after the commencement of the Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2002, and the term of every patent which has not expired and has 
not ceased to have effect, on the date of such commencement, shall be 20 years from 
the date of filing of the application for the patent.
On the subject of compulsory license, the Amendment has made a number of 
changes in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. First 
of all, the Amendment further clarified the grounds for compulsory license on the 
basis of the Patents Act, 1970,16 that is, at any time after the expiration of 3 years 
from the date of the sealing of a patent, any person interested may make an applica-
tion to the Controller for grant of a compulsory license for a patent on any of the 
following grounds: (1) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect 
to the patented invention have not been satisfied; (2) that the patented invention is 
not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price; and (3) that the patented 
invention is not worked in the territory of India. The third ground was introduced 
via the Amendment.17
In addition, the Amendment also provides a special provision for compulsory 
licenses on notification by the Central Government,18 which may be issued in a 
circumstance of national emergency, extreme emergency, or a case of public non-
commercial use, including public health crises, relating to AIDS, human immuno-
deficiency virus, tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics. At the same time, the 
amendment also provides for the termination of a compulsory license by the 
Controller,19 namely, if and when the circumstances that gave rise to the grant 
thereof no longer exist and such circumstances are unlikely to recur.
On exceptions for patent infringement, the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that 
members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a pat-
ent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.20 Based 
on the Patents Act, 1970,21 the Amendment inserted a provision for certain acts not to 
be considered infringement, also known as regulatory exceptions. That is, any act of 
making, constructing, using, or selling a patented invention solely for uses reason-
ably relating to the development and submission of information required under any 
law for the time being in force, in India, or in a country other than India, which regu-
15 Section 27(a) of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
16 Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970.
17 Sections 39 and 84 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
18 Sections 39 and 92 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
19 Sections 39 and 94 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
20 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.
21 Section 107 of the Patents Act, 1970.
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lates the manufacture, construction, use, or sale of any product, shall not be consid-
ered an infringement of patent rights.22 According to this provision, generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are allowed to use the patented invention to obtain 
market approval from a regulatory agency for medicines and healthcare products, 
without the patent holders’ permission. This rule is also known as the Bolar 
exception.
1.3  Amendment in 2005: Comprehensive Improvement 
Before the Expiration of Transition Period
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, was promulgated on April 4, 2005. While 
some specific provisions came into force on dates set by the Central Government, 
the remaining provisions came into force on January 1, 2005, when India’s transi-
tion period expired. The Amendment of 2005 is crucial for India to fully implement 
the TRIPS obligations.
The most important change introduced by the Amendment is the omission of 
Section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970,23 which provided that no patent shall be granted 
in respect of claims for substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as 
food or as medicine or drug or relating to substances prepared or produced by chem-
ical processes.24 The Amendment also omitted Chapter IVA “Exclusive Marketing 
Rights,” which was inserted into the Act by the Amendment of 1999.25 This means 
that, after the expiration of the transition period, in accordance with the TRIPS 
requirement,26 patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology.
The Amendment also made important adjustments to provisions on compulsory 
licenses. First, the Amendment added compulsory license for export of patented 
pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances.27 The TRIPS 
Agreement stipulates that a compulsory license may only be issued predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the member granting the license.28 However, 
many countries without a significant pharmaceutical sector have not been able to 
take advantage of the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration is aimed at finding a solution to the problem.29 
Therefore, the Amendment inserted a new section,30 which states that a compulsory 
22 Section 44 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
23 Section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970.
24 Section 4 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
25 Section 21 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
26 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
27 Section 55 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
28 Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.
29 WTO General Council, The Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, August 30, 2003.
30 Section 55 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
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license shall be available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical 
products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health problems, 
provided that a compulsory license that has been granted by such country or such 
country has allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from 
India. Pharmaceutical product here means any patented product or product manu-
factured through a patented process of the pharmaceutical sector.
Secondly, the Amendment added a special situation of compulsory license. 
According to the mailbox application system stipulated in the Amendment of 1999, 
applications in respect of a claim for the substances in the pharmaceutical sector 
could be filed, but these applications were not examined until January 1, 2005. The 
Amendment of 2005 inserted a new section, stating that, for product inventions in 
the pharmaceutical and chemical sector, the patent holder shall only be entitled to 
receive reasonable royalty from such enterprises which have made significant 
investment and were producing and marketing the concerned product prior to 
January 1, 2005, and which continue to manufacture the product covered by the pat-
ent on the date of granting of the patent, and no infringement proceedings shall be 
instituted against such enterprises.31 This means that a product patent entering the 
mailbox application system is in essence facing the same treatment as a compulsory 
license, to a certain degree.
Another important change brought by the Amendment is the addition of a situa-
tion that is not considered to be an infringement of patent rights. The Amendment 
of 2002 added the Bolar exception for the first time,32 while the Amendment of 2005 
extended the scope of application of the Bolar exception to importation.33 This 
means that any act of marking, constructing, using, selling, or importing a patented 
invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information required under any law in India or in other country, which act regulates 
the manufacture, construction, use, sale, or import of any product, shall not be con-
sidered an infringement of patent rights. This provision mainly focuses on pharma-
ceutical products and medical instruments.
2  The Impact of Indian Patent Law on the Local 
Pharmaceutical Industry
2.1  Rejection of Product Patent
The Report on the Revision of the Patent Law submitted by the Patent Law 
Amendment Commission in 1959,34 which was led by Shri Justice N. Rajagopala 
31 Section 10(c) of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
32 Section 44 of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002.
33 Section 58(a) of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
34 Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patent Law, Government of 
India, September 1959, 274, 285.
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Ayyangar, pointed out that at that time foreigners held 80% to 90% of India’s pat-
ents, of which 90% of the patented products were not manufactured in the Indian 
territory. Foreign companies could block the production of their patented drugs in 
India, causing the stagnation of the Indian domestic pharmaceutical industry. Thus, 
the Commission believed that the patent system had been used by multinational 
corporations to monopolize the market, especially in the food, pharmaceutical, and 
chemical industries. Market monopolies also led to high product prices. Therefore, 
the Commission recommended that only methods or processes in the abovemen-
tioned fields be patentable, as opposed to the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 
1911, which granted patent to both product and process inventions in the pharma-
ceutical sector.
This suggestion was adopted by the Patents Act of 1970, which has laid the foun-
dation for the boom in India’s generic drug industry. According to the Patents Act of 
1970, no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for substances intended for use 
or capable of being used as medicine or drug or relating to substances prepared or 
produced by chemical processes. The reason that the Patents Act of 1970 only grants 
method patents in the fields of pharmaceuticals and chemicals is because product 
patents have an inhibitory effect on other related research, as they can prevent others 
from obtaining the same products through different methods. Once product patents 
are granted to drugs, patentees can control the production of patented drugs and 
thereby unreasonably raise the prices of essential medicines.35 Thus, the rejection of 
the drug product patents guaranteed that India’s generic companies could produce 
drugs with the same or similar composition through reverse engineering and avoid 
being accused of infringement. India denied product patents in the pharmaceutical 
sector until the expiration of the transition period of the TRIPS Agreement on 
January 1, 2005. The rejection of product patents in the pharmaceutical sector for 
more than 30 years has created an opportunity for the development of the generic 
drug industry in India.
After comparing drug prices among India, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and 
Nigeria, before and after the Indian Patents Act of 1970, R.B. Saxena, consultant at 
the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, found36 that 
the prices of pharmaceutical products in India were highest before the enactment of 
the Patents Act of 1970 and that in 1987 the prices in India for commonly used 
drugs, such as analgin tablets, doxycycline capsules, diazepam tablets, and metroni-
dazole tablets, were low compared to those of other countries. The research also 
found that some of the important new drugs could be introduced into India with a 
time lag ranging between only 4 and 6 years. Thus, Saxena pointed out that the 
changes relating to process patenting incorporated in the Indian Patents Act of 1970 
had benefited Indian consumers in terms of prices paid for drugs and medicines and, 
meanwhile, it also became possible to produce many new pharmaceutical products 
in India much faster than what could have been otherwise.
35 R.B. Saxena, Trade-Related Issues of Intellectual Property Rights and the Indian Patent Act: A 




2.2  Mailbox Application Mechanism
The mailbox application mechanism during the transition period allowed India not 
only to meet the TRIPS requirements but also to take into account India’s own 
development needs. India’s transition period for complying with the TRIPS obliga-
tions related to pharmaceuticals was 1995 to 2005 . According to the Amendment of 
1999, applications in respect of a claim for the substances in the pharmaceutical 
sector could be filed and entered into the mailbox system but were not processed 
until January 1, 2005; and the application could be granted exclusive marketing 
rights to sell or distribute the article or substance in India.
Before 2005, local pharmaceutical companies were allowed to reverse-engineer 
the best-selling drugs and produce cheap generic drugs for the domestic market and 
export them to Russia, China, Brazil, and Africa. In the process of producing generic 
drugs, Indian pharmaceutical companies accumulated extensive experience and 
trained their own technical personnel. During the transition period, Indian domestic 
pharmaceutical companies allied with each other to conduct R&D and to manufac-
ture pharmaceuticals for multinational pharmaceutical companies. The Indian 
domestic pharmaceutical industry grew rapidly, and some local pharmaceutical 
companies embarked on medicinal R&D and applied for drug patents in the United 
States and the European Union.37
The transition decade was the fastest growing period for the Indian pharma-
ceutical companies, and the industry became one of the most lucrative sectors in 
India. Research38 shows that the average profit margin (profit as a percentage of 
sales) of the pharmaceutical industry was about 8.8% in 1995 (while the profit 
margin of the chemical industry was 5.8%, that of the food and beverage indus-
try was 4.8%, and that of the machinery manufacturing industry was 5.5%) and 
shot up to 15.4% in 2005. At the same time, generic drugs entering the Indian 
market grew rapidly. From 1980 to 1990, only 10 generic drugs entered the 
Indian market; the number reached 99 during the period 1990–1995, 156 during 
the period 1995–2000, and 262 during the period 2000–2005. It can be inferred 
that the transition period was a golden decade for the development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry.
After 2005, India started to examine product patent applications, which led 
Indian pharmaceutical companies to adjust their product development policy and to 
increase R&D investment. At the same time, multinational pharmaceutical and bio-
tech corporations started to increase contracted R&D and manufacturing in the 
Indian market.
37 Ravi Sarathy, Strategic Evolution and Partnering in the India Pharmaceutical Industry, in Subhash 
C.  Jain (ed.), Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International Business: Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (BRICs), Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2016, 229.
38 Mainak Mazumdar, Performance of Pharmaceutical Companies in India, Springer, 2013, 32.
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2.3  Compulsory Licensing System
In the Patents Act of 1970, there was already a special chapter for compulsory 
licenses, and the system was further improved in the Patents (Amendment) Act of 
2002 and 2005. The compulsory licensing system creates more chance for voluntary 
licensing negotiation between the domestic Indian pharmaceutical companies and 
multinational corporations to succeed.
According to Indian Patent Law, after the expiration of 3 years from the date of 
the sealing of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the 
Controller. The applicant is required to first attempt to procure a voluntary license 
from the patentee before applying for a compulsory license. If this attempt does not 
come to fruition within 6 months of the initial request, the applicant is entitled to file 
a compulsory license application.
In 2012, the Controller, upon the application of Natco Pharma Ltd. (Natco), 
granted a compulsory license on Nexavar (Sorafenib Tosylate), a kidney cancer 
medicine patented by Bayer Corporation (Bayer).39 This is the first ever and only 
compulsory license in India. One of the grounds on which the Controller made the 
decision was that the drug Nexavar was not manufactured in India but was instead 
imported and marketed in the Indian market and the term of “(not) work(ed)” only 
means manufacturing and does not include importing or selling.
The Controller pointed out that the grounds for issuing compulsory licenses are 
not defined in the TRIPS Agreement itself, which leaves considerable discretion to 
WTO members as to how to apply the criteria within their national laws. The 
Controller also emphasized that the use of these flexibilities can directly or indi-
rectly help the low- and middle-income countries to achieve a balance between 
intellectual property protection and specific developmental priorities, including the 
attainment of national public health objectives.40 The decision of the Controller was 
subsequently reviewed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and 
courts and was finally confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2014, despite fears that 
the compulsory license might discourage foreign direct investment in India.41
Admittedly, the Nexavar case in the long run will make patentees aware of the 
possibility of compulsory licensing and be more ready to enter into voluntary licens-
ing, thus creating more space for voluntary licensing negotiations, which would in 
turn help lower drug prices.
Thereafter, the Controller has been very cautious in issuing compulsory 
licenses. For example, in March 2013 BDR Pharmaceuticals Intl. Pvt. Ltd. (BDR) 
requested a compulsory license on Bristol-Myers Squibb’s cancer drug Dasatinib, 
39 Ibid.
40 Decision of the Controller in Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011, March 9, 2012; 
Application for Compulsory Licence under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970, in respect of 
Patent No. 215758, 41. Available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/compulsory-license-appli-
cation.pdf
41 James J. Nedumpara and Prateek Misra, Natco v. Bayer: Indian Patent Authority Grants Its First 
Ever Compulsory License on Pharmaceutical Products, 7 Global Trade and Customs (2012), 328.
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which is used by patients with chronic myeloid leukemia. BDR also submitted 
that the price of each tablet sold by the patentee was INR 2761, working out to 
INR 1, 65,680 for 60 tablets per month per patient.42 BDR promised that after 
obtaining the license, it would make the drug available to the public at a price of 
INR 135 per tablet, which would amount to INR 8100 per month, and moreover, 
it would provide the drug for free to a certain percentage of patients. However, the 
Controller rejected BDR’s application in October 2013, on the ground that BRD 
has not made enough efforts to obtain a voluntary license for the drug. Through 
this rejection, the Controller has shown that any decision on compulsory license 
will be carefully made and patent right will be duly protected.43 This approach 
effectively balances the interests of multinational corporate patentees and domes-
tic generic companies.
2.4  Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter
The flexibility to interpret patentable subject matter creates opportunities for the 
domestic generic drug companies to challenge a pharmaceutical patent in India. 
Given that the term “invention” is not defined in the TRIPS Agreement, there is flex-
ibility to interpret patentable subject matter. The Indian Patents (Amendment) Act 
of 2005 excludes any new form of a known substance from patentable subject mat-
ter, if the new form does not result in enhancement in efficacy. This amendment 
would make it easier to challenge a pharmaceutical patent in India.
In the Novartis v. Union of India case, the patent application on Gleevec was 
rejected by the Controller, which rejection was upheld by the IPAB and eventually 
by the Supreme Court on the ground that the patent failed to meet the requirements 
of section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005. According to section 3(d), 
a modification of a known drug is only patentable when it enhances therapeutic 
efficacy. The Supreme Court decided that the substance that Novartis sought to 
patent was indeed a modification of a known drug imatinib, which was disclosed in 
the 1993 patent application. However, Novartis did not present evidence of a dif-
ference in therapeutic efficacy between the final form of Gleevec and the raw form 
of imatinib.44 The rejection was considered an effective practice to prevent ever-
greening of pharmaceutical patents and create opportunities for local generic drug 
42 According to the national accounts data of the World Bank, India’s per capita income (nominal) 
was USD 1670 (approximately INR 113,710) in 2016. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=IN
43 Harsha Rohatgi, Indian Patent Office Rejects Compulsory Licensing Application, available at 
http://www.iiprd.com/2013/11/13/indian-patent-office-rejects-compulsory-licensing- 
application-bdr-pharmaceuticals-pvt-ltd-vs-bristol-myers-squibb/
44 Supreme Court of India, Judgment of Civil Appeal Nos. 2706–2716 of 2013, paragraph 128; 
Gopakumar G Nair, Andreya Fernandes and Karthika Nair, Landmark Pharma Patent Jurisprudence 
in India, 19 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights (2014), 80~82.
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companies.45 Novartis case was a benchmark for preventing the evergreening of 
pharmaceuticals. After 2013, every pharmaceutical patent has to pass the standards 
set by the Supreme Court in the Novartis case. Meanwhile, in 2014, the Controller 
framed a new set of guidelines for examining pharmaceutical applications, which 
incorporates the findings in the Novartis case.46
3  China’s Patent Legislation and Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceuticals
Compared with other industries, the pharmaceutical industry has its own particular-
ity, as the invention of pharmaceuticals is hugely expensive, and pharmaceuticals 
are closely related to human rights, such as the right to life and the right to health. 
The price of a patented drug is substantially higher than that of generic drugs, which 
affects access to medicine. In the legislative process of China’s Patent Law, which 
was first enacted in 1984 (effective April 1, 1985) and amended three times in 1992, 
2000, and 2008, the issues of whether to grant patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products, the extent of protection, and exceptions to patent infringement have 
always been important.
3.1  From Denying to Recognizing Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical Products
In 1979, Dr. Árpád Bogsch, the Director General of the WIPO, suggested that 
China’s first patent law should not provide any exceptions to patentability and pat-
ent protection should be available for any inventions in all fields of technology. He 
also suggested that for some technical fields, such as in the pharmaceutical sector, if 
the patented invention is not worked in China, a compulsory license could be 
granted to local companies in order to meet public interests.47
During the drafting of the Patent Law of 1984, patentable subject matter was a 
very important issue. There was a heated debate about which inventions should be 
protected and which should be excluded from the scope of protection under the 
45 However, incremental innovation should be distinguished from evergreening. A pharmaceutical 
company engages in evergreening if it merely modifies the color of the tablet or the inert ingredi-
ents of a drug and seeks to patent the modification. However, when a modification increases a 
drug’s bioavailability or absorptivity, it can produce significant improvements in drug delivery and 
effects, and hence should be treated as an incremental innovation worthy of patent protection; see 
Jodie Liu, Compulsory Licensing and Anti-Evergreening: Interpreting the TRIPS Flexibilities in 
Sections 84 and 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 56 Harvard International Law Journal, No. 1 
(2015), 220.
46 Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, Guidelines for Examination 
of Patent Applications in the Field of Pharmaceuticals, October 2014.
47 Zhao Yuanguo, The Formulation and Promulgation of China’s Patent Law (in Chinese), Beijing: 
Patent Literature Publishing House, 2003, 28.
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patent law. At the time, there were two very different views regarding the patent 
protection of pharmaceutical products. The argument that no patent right should be 
granted to pharmaceutical products was mainly based on the fact that medicines are 
related to people’s physical health and should not be monopolized by a small num-
ber of people and that granting patent protection would hinder domestic companies 
which were lagging far behind their foreign competitors in pharmaceutical 
technology.
After many discussions, the legislators decided that pharmaceutical products 
should not be monopolized by patentees for two reasons: first, medicinal supply is 
closely related to people’s health and life. Second, patent would have negative influ-
ence on the domestic pharmaceutical industry, because most of the pharmaceutical 
inventions were created and owned by companies of developed countries.48 Under 
Item 5 of Article 25 of the Patent Law of 1984, no patent right shall be granted for 
pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process. 
In fact, throughout the legislative process, in every version of the draft, including 
the final one, pharmaceutical products were not listed in the scope of patent 
protection.
However, on September 4, 1992, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress adopted the Decision on Amending the Patent Law, which aban-
doned the stance of denying patent protection for pharmaceutical products of the 
Patent Law of 1984. This means that, from January 1, 1993, when the amendment 
took effect, pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemi-
cal process could be granted patent right, provided that they possess the character-
istics of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial usefulness.
One of the major reasons for the amendment of China’s Patent Law in 1992 was 
the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights between the governments of China and the United States on January 
17, 1992. In the memorandum, the Chinese government promised to expand the 
patentable subject matter in China’s Patent Law, i.e., to extend patent protection to 
all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, 
whether products or processes.49 Since the late 1980s, in order to obtain full and 
effective intellectual property protection for American enterprises overseas, the US 
government held intellectual property negotiations with its trading partners and 
threatened trade sanctions, in an attempt to force them to accept the American stan-
dards for intellectual property protection.50 In addition, the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT adopted the TRIPS Agreement, which stipulates that patent protection should 
be available for any inventions in all fields of technology. The Amendment of 
China’s Patent Law of 1992 was a response to US trade pressure and the require-
ments of the TRIPS Agreement.
48 Tang Zongshun, Patent Law (in Chinese), Beijing: Law Press, 1996, 66.
49 Article 1 of the Sino-US Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 1992
50 Wen Xikai, Thoughts on Second Revision of the Chinese Patent Law (in Chinese), 1 China 
Patents and Trademarks (1999), 16.
Indian Patent Law and Its Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry: What Can China…
264
3.2  Compulsory License for Exploitation of Pharmaceutical 
Patents in Theory but Not in Practice
The compulsory licensing system was established in China’s Patent Law of 1984. 
According to Articles 51 and 52 of the Patent Law of 1984, the patentee has an 
obligation to manufacture the patented product or use the patented process in China. 
If, 3 years after the date of the grant of a patent right, the patentee of an invention or 
utility model has failed, without any justifiable reason, to manufacture the patented 
product or use the patented process in China, the Patent Office may, upon the request 
of a unit possessing the means to exploit the invention or utility model, grant a com-
pulsory license to exploit the patent.
These provisions are very similar to the condition of granting a compulsory 
license in Indian Patents Act, according to which if the patented invention is not 
worked in the territory of India within 3 years from the date of sealing a patent, any 
person may make an application for grant of a compulsory license. Admittedly, the 
obligation to exploit a patent within a country’s territory can increase the value of 
the patent in the country concerned, as it would promote technical transfer to the 
country and help the training of relevant technical personnel. For domestic generic 
companies, this can also mean more opportunities to exploit patents owned by for-
eign companies.
However, this obligation to exploit a patent in China was cancelled in the Patent 
Law of 1992, and two other conditions for granting a compulsory license were 
added in the law. Firstly, where any entity which is qualified to exploit the invention 
or utility model has made a request for authorization from the patentee to exploit the 
patent or utility model on reasonable terms and has been unable to obtain such 
authorization within a reasonable period of time, the Patent Office may, upon the 
application of such entity, grant a compulsory license to exploit the patent for the 
invention or utility model.51 Secondly, where a national emergency or an extraordi-
nary state of affairs occurs, or where the public interest so requires, the Patent Office 
may grant a compulsory license to exploit the patent for an invention or utility 
model.52
In order to better solve public health problems, the State Intellectual Property 
Office (SIPO) of China issued the Rules for Compulsory License of Patents con-
cerning Public Health Problems in 2006, which were abolished and replaced by the 
Rules on the Implementation of Compulsory Patent License issued by the SIPO in 
2012. The rules were promulgated for implementing the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health by the WTO Ministerial Conference and 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health by 
the General Council of WTO.
In the third Amendment, another new circumstance for granting a compulsory 
license was added in the Patent Law of 2008 (effective October 1, 2009), i.e., for the 
purpose of public health, the patent administrative department of the State Council 
51 Article 51 of the Patent Law, 1992.
52 Article 52 of the Patent Law, 1992.
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may grant a compulsory license for a patented medicine so as to produce and export 
it to the country or region which conforms to the provisions of the relevant interna-
tional treaty to which China has acceded.53 In accordance with this provision, in 
case any member of the WTO notifies the TRIPS Council of its desire to import 
medicines for treating certain epidemic disease(s), or least-developed countries 
which are nonmembers of the WTO notify the Chinese government through a dip-
lomatic channel of their desire to import from China medicines for treating certain 
epidemic disease(s), then the relevant department of the State Council may ask the 
SIPO to grant a compulsory license and allow the licensee to manufacture the rele-
vant kind of medicines and export them to the countries concerned.
As one of the drafters of the patent law has explained, the greatest value of the 
compulsory licensing system is its deterrent and persuasive effect.54 So far, no com-
pulsory license has ever been granted in China. However, every time when the pat-
ent law was amended, this issue has always been a contentious topic and received 
much attention. The reason is that a compulsory license is an important tool to sat-
isfy public interests.
3.3  From Experimental Use Exception to Bolar Exception
The Patent Law of 1984 already listed certain acts that were not considered patent 
infringement, including the use of a patent solely for the purposes of scientific 
research and experiment.55 However, different interpretations on how to define the 
boundary of the experimental use exception in practice existed. The first dispute aris-
ing from a clinical experimental use was handled by the court in 1995. In the 
GlaxoSmithKline v. Southwest Pharmaceuticals Plant case, the court granted the 
total damages caused during the clinical experimental use, which implied that the 
trial per se constituted infringement.56 This case also showed that it is difficult for the 
act of clinical experimental use of patented drugs to be exempted from liability for 
infringing others’ patent rights. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate special provi-
sions to regulate matters relating to the clinical experimental use of patented drugs.57
The first so-called Bolar exception case in China, the Sanyo case, was heard in 
2006 by the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court.58 In the ruling, the court 
held that the defendant, Wansheng Pharmaceutical Company, had used Sanyo’s pat-
ented process to make a drug for the purpose of undertaking a clinical trial and 
applying for approval of production. This act was aimed at testing the safety and 
53 Article 50 of the Patent Law, 2008.
54 Wen Xikai, The Value of Compulsory Licensing Lies in Deterrence and Dissuasion (in Chinese), 
1 China WTO Tribune (2003), 19.
55 Article 62 of the Patent Law, 1984.
56 Chongqing First Intermediate People’s Court (1995) Zhong Jing Chu No. 406, Civil Judgment.
57 Wu Yuhe/Liu Zhi, Experimental Use Exemption in Clinical Trial of New Drugs (in Chinese), 2 
China Patents and Trademarks (2003), 27.
58 Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court (2006) Min Chu No. 04134, Civil Judgment.
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effectiveness of the drug in order to satisfy the requirement of the relevant state 
agency for approval of the drug. Given that the defendant did not make the drug 
directly for the purpose of production and business, the act of clinical trial was not 
deemed an infringement. The judgment in the Sanyo case was supported by most of 
the Chinese IP legal practitioners, as the judiciary in China urgently needed to 
search from the existing provisions of the infringement exemptions contained in the 
patent law for a basis for not construing a clinical trial as patent infringement.59
The regulatory Bolar exception was introduced into the Patent Law of 2008. 
According to Article 69(5), any person who produces, uses, or imports patented drugs or 
patented medical apparatus and instruments, for the purpose of providing information 
required for administrative examination and approval, or any other person who produces 
or imports patented drugs or patented medical apparatus and instruments exclusively for 
that person shall not be deemed to have infringed the patent right involved.
4  What Could China Learn from India?
4.1  To Fully Utilize the TRIPS Exceptions to Prepare Domestic 
Pharmaceutical Industry
The transition period gives some exceptions to the implementation of TRIPS to the 
developing countries. Noteworthy is that India has fully utilized the transition period 
to prepare its domestic pharmaceutical industry. When the TRIPS Agreement came 
into force on January 1, 1995, India was a founding member of the WTO and should 
have implemented the TRIPS obligations after the 5-year transition period available 
to a developing country member. However, India made best use of the additional 
period of 5 years to extend product patent protection to pharmaceutical products. In 
other words, India only began to fully implement the TRIPS obligation to provide 
both product and process patent protection for pharmaceuticals starting from 
January 1, 2005. In contrast, China officially became a WTO member on December 
11, 2001, but China had amended its patent law as early as in 1992 and had begun 
to grant product patent for pharmaceutical products and substances from January 1, 
1993, onward, 12 years earlier than India. This period constituted an opportune time 
slot for preparing the generic drug companies in India to face new competition. 
Indian domestic companies used the decade not only to strengthen R&D capabili-
ties but also to dominate the international generic drug market.
4.2  Legal Professionals Who Understand Global Rules
After India signed the TRIPS Agreement, Mr. Zheng Xiaoguang, an official of the 
Chinese Embassy in India, wrote an article to remind Chinese readers that, in the 
59 Jiang Hongyi, Compelled Choice Made in Dilemma: Comments on the Issue of Application of 




past, India had always acted independently and declined to make concessions, but 
after the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, India had to extensively amend 
its patent system to comply with the TRIPS requirements and that while so doing 
India had paid a price far lower than that of China, especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry.60
This is not only because India was already a member of the GATT and a found-
ing member of the WTO and hence had an inherent advantage. What is more impor-
tant is that India has several generations of elite lawyers, who use English as their 
mother tongue and have received a Western education and gained familiarity with 
the Western legal system. These lawyers hold a global perspective and ability to 
handle complex global issues and therefore understand how to make full use of the 
flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement. China should start to cultivate its lawyers to 
be internationalized so that they become able to further Chinese interests in the 
world arena.
4.3  Measures to Promote Drug Innovation and Develop 
Generic Drugs
The Indian government strategically aligns its pharmaceutical policies with its eco-
nomic ambitions, to suit the domestic interests.61 India makes progress step by step, 
winning valuable opportunities for the local pharmaceutical industry to achieve 
technical sophistication and garner more market share. However, a realistic strategy 
and specific measures based on the developmental situation of the domestic phar-
maceutical industry were simply lacking in China until 2017.
It is therefore encouraging to see the General Office of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China and General Office of the State Council issued the 
Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Evaluation and Approval Systems and 
Encouraging Innovation on Drugs and Medical Devices in October 2017, to pro-
mote technological innovation in the drug and medical device industries and to 
enhance their competitiveness so as to meet the health needs of the general public.
In the opinions, the following measures are, inter alia, put forward: (1) to estab-
lish a catalog of marketed drugs of China, which shall categorize innovative drugs, 
modified new drugs, and generic drugs with the same quality and therapeutic effect 
as the brand-name drugs and contain information such as active ingredients, forms, 
specifications, holders of marketing licenses, patents obtained, and protection 
period of trial data; (2) to explore and establish a patent linkage system, which shall 
link drug evaluation and approval with drug patents, protect the lawful rights and 
60 Zheng Xiaoguang, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Indian Patent Law: Analysis of 
the Current Patent System in India (in Chinese), Patent Law Research (1994), Beijing Patent 
Literature Publishing House, 1995, 197.
61 Arpan Banerjee, The Law and Politics of Pharmaceutical Patents in India, in Kung-Chung Liu/
Racherla U. (eds) Innovation and IPRs in China and India. China-EU Law Series, Vol. 4. Springer, 
2016, 155.
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interests of patent holders, and concomitantly reduce the risks of patent infringe-
ments by generic drugs and encourage the development of generic drugs; and (3) to 
conduct the pilot program of a patent term compensation system, which foresees an 
appropriate patent term extension for certain new drugs to compensate for the time 
lost due to delay caused by clinical trial, evaluation, and approval.
5  Conclusion
Both China and India are developing countries and need to seek a balance between 
protecting intellectual property rights and satisfying people’s healthcare needs. 
They also need to promote innovation and encourage the development of domestic 
industries. As members of the WTO, both China and India have made a series of 
amendments to their respective legal systems in response to the TRIPS Agreement’s 
standards of intellectual property protection, including the recognition of pharma-
ceutical product patents, introduction of a compulsory licensing system, and the 
Bolar exception. In promoting the development of the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry, India’s experience in legislation and judicial practice deserves serious 
attention from China, such as using TRIPS’s flexibility to facilitate access to medi-
cines, implementing compulsory licensing to create more chance for voluntary 
licensing negotiation, and updating the guidelines for examining pharmaceutical 
applications to prevent evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. Meanwhile, learn-
ing from India, China should start to cultivate its legal professionals to understand 
global rules, so that they become able to further Chinese interests in the world arena.
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Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees every person and citizen of India 
the right to life and the right to personal liberty. Further, Article 47 of the Indian 
Constitution declares that it is the duty and obligation of the Indian state to 
improve public health. In addition, Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by India asserts that 
nations have an obligation to facilitate the right to health. Thus, the Indian 
government operates under the premise that medicines critical to the important 
healthcare needs of India’s population must be both available and affordable. 
Indeed, this paradigm is the foundational basis for India’s vision for the right to 
health under the Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Thus, the Indian policy 
makers strive to meet India’s constitutional obligations for the right to health 
while promoting its innovation ecosystem and safeguarding the legitimate busi-
ness interests of MNCs. Indeed, this powerful undercurrent has been shaping the 
evolution of the Indian patent regime since India’s independence in 1947, through 
the 1970s, the economic liberalization era initiated in the 1990s, through the 
membership of WTO and TRIPs Agreement in 1995, post-TRIPS in 2005 and all 
the way up to today. In this context, this chapter analyzes how the Indian patent 
regime has been leveraging the flexibilities afforded under the TRIPS Agreement 
for the prevention of evergreening, award of compulsory licenses, retention of 
pre-grant opposition, and introduction of post-grant opposition and discusses 
how these dynamic changes are having a global impact.
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1  Introduction
It has been recognized by industry, academia, and policy makers alike that innova-
tion is pivotal to value creation, competitive advantage, and sustainable economic 
growth. As knowledge economy became the basis for globalization, innovation 
opportunities have been incessantly emerging around the world for value-added 
products, processes, and services to meet the ever-growing needs, wants, challenges, 
and opportunities of the world. As a result, today we find many individuals, 
companies, communities, and nations working relentlessly on innovation. Thus, 
policy makers, both nationally and internationally, have recognized that innovation 
either flourishes or suffers depending upon the innovation ecosystem. However, the 
innovation ecosystem of a nation depends upon three primary factors, namely, 
technology environment, business environment, and policy environment (Fig. 1).1
Consequently, academia, industries, and governments around the world have 
been focused on strengthening and promoting the innovation ecosystem in order to 
meet the national priorities, as well as achieve competitive advantage, sustainable 
economic growth, and creation of employment in the global economy.
In this regard, it is important to note that the vision and strategies of a country’s 
patent regime play a crucial role in (a) advancing the goals of its innovation 
ecosystem (indigenously or as part of international agreements), (b) protecting its 
social and economic interests, and (c) safeguarding the legitimate business interests 
of competition.
Indeed, it is in this light that the historical evolution of the Indian patent regime 
and its impact on innovation in the Indian pharmaceutical industry must be analyzed 
and understood.
1 There are other secondary factors as well. Technology environment depends upon the quality of 
education, innovation support, and the training the citizens receive; business environment depends 
upon the investment and policy support for innovative growth of an existing business or new ven-
ture creation; policy environment depends upon the socioeconomic goals, science and technology 
vision, and commitment to innovation.
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2  Overview of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry
2.1  Business Achievements
India is a unique global player in the pharmaceuticals business world. To start with, 
India has a large pool of well-trained scientists and engineers who have the potential 
to innovate and steer the industry to meet India’s vision, national needs, and future 
goals.
The Indian pharmaceutical industry, valued at US $33 billion in 2017, is cur-
rently the largest global supplier of cost-effective generic drugs. Thus, the drugs 
made in India are exported to more than 200 countries around the world, with the 
United States of America (USA) being India’s biggest market. According to India 
Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), in 2016–2017, around 40.6% of India’s pharma-
ceutical exports (US$ 16.8 billion) were to the American continent, followed by a 
19.7% to Europe, 19.1% to Africa, and 18.8% to the Asian continent.2
The Indian pharmaceutical companies meet over 50% of the global demand for 
various vaccines, 40% of the generic demand in the USA, and 25% of demand of all 
the medicines in the UK. In addition, India supplies over 80% of the antiretroviral 
drugs needed globally for AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). In 2017, the 
Indian pharmaceutical companies received 304 Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) approvals from the US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA).
India is also emerging as a key player in the biotechnology industry. India’s bio-
technology industry includes biopharmaceuticals, bio-services, bio-agriculture, 
bio-industry, and bioinformatics. This sub-sector of the Indian pharma industry is 
expected to grow at an average annual growth rate of around 30% and reach US$ 
100  billion by 2025. In fact, the biopharma industry  – comprising of vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics – contributes US$ 1.89 billion, which is a significant 
portion of the total industry revenues.
Fig. 1 Innovation 
ecosystem and the factors 
governing it
2 https://www.ibef.org/industry/pharmaceutical-india.aspx
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The Indian pharmaceutical market grew at a CAGR3 of 5.6%, during FY4 2011–
2016, from US$ 20.95  billion in FY2011 to US$ 27.57  billion in FY2016. In 
FY2017 alone, the industry’s revenues grew by 7.4% and stood at US$ 33 billion. 
In March 2018, the market grew at 9.5% year-on-year with sales of US$ 1.56 billion. 
According to the industry analysts, India’s pharmaceutical sector is predicted to 
grow at a CAGR of 22.4% during FYs 2015–2020, to reach US$ 55  billion, as 
branded drugs worth US$ 55 billion will become off-patent during this period. By 
FY2020, India is expected to be among the top three pharmaceutical markets in the 
world by organic growth and sixth largest market in absolute size.
2.2  Investments, Mergers, and Acquisitions
The growing middle-class population in India, increasing demand for better access 
to healthcare, improving medical facilities, and better penetration of health insurance 
in the country point to lucrative investment opportunities in the Indian pharmaceutical 
sector. Not surprisingly, the Government of India amended its Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) policy in the pharmaceutical sector to automatically allow up to 
100% FDI for the manufacture of medical devices subject to, of course, some 
guidelines.
Thus, according to the data released by the Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion (DIPP), the Indian pharmaceutical sector attracted US$ 15.59  billion 
worth of FDI in 17  years, between 2000 and 2017. In Q2 2018, the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector posted private equity and venture capital investments of US$ 
396 million. Also, in 2017, India witnessed 46 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) – 
worth US$ 1.47 billion – in the pharmaceutical sector.5
3  Goals and Priorities of the Indian Patent Regime
The Indian pharmaceutical industry is well aware that innovation is critical for 
wealth creation, competitive advantage, and sustainable growth. Innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry is often a high-risk, high payoff gamble. While companies 
may deliver high returns on investment (ROI) when innovations are successful, 
innovation failures can threaten company’s survival itself.2 Consequently, Indian 
pharmaceutical companies rely on successful innovations6 to make high profits, 
deliver consistent ROI to shareholders, and achieve sustainable growth. On the 




6 Here the word “innovations” encompass not only new drug discoveries but also reverse engineer-
ing and remaking of old drugs for which patent rights have expired (known as generic drugs) or 
frugal innovation of important drugs for which compulsory licenses have been given − in a highly 
competitive and cost-effective manner.
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other hand, the policy makers of the Indian government depend on the patent regime 
to ensure that pharmaceutical innovations deliver affordable medicines and 
accessible health care to all citizens. Therefore, successful pharma companies are 
those that can innovate to solve the healthcare needs, wants, and challenges of 
millions of people in India while also posting robust revenues, profits, market share, 
and growth. In other words, nations such as India aim to balance social goals (which 
aim to ensure affordable medicines and accessible healthcare to all citizens) against 
the economic goals (which are aligned with the interests of pharmaceutical compa-
nies). Figure 2 summarizes this dilemma of Indian policy makers.
Indeed, it is this powerful undercurrent that has been shaping the policies of the 
Indian patent regime since India’s independence in 1947, through the 1970s, the 
economic liberalization era that started in the 1990s, through the membership of 
WTO and TRIPS Agreement in 1995, post-TRIPS in 2005, and all the way up to 
today. Therefore, the historical evolution of the Indian patent regime, imperfect as 
it may seem, makes sense only when one understands how India tries to continually 
balance its social goals and priorities against the economic goals.
4  Brief Overview of the Indian Patent Regime’s History
It is important to note that a seminal paper in this area has been published by Janice 
Mueller.7 Thus, the Indian patent regime reflects India’s journey in three different 
periods: colonization, post-independence, and globalization. During the 
Fig. 2 Dilemma of the Indian policy makers’ goals and priorities
7 Mueller, J. M. “The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of the Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 
2006, 68, 491–641.
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“colonization” phase, the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911 – drafted by the 
British – enacted India’s first patent statutes. India gained its independence in 1947. 
However, during the “post-independence” phase, the British-imposed, foreigner- 
favoring patent laws stunted the development of the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
and forced independent India to import even basic medicines at unaffordable prices. 
Consequently, in 1949, the Indian government constituted a high-powered commit-
tee headed by an eminent jurist of the Lahore High Court, Bakshi Tek Chand, and 
sought an intensive review of the existing patent laws. The most significant finding 
of the Chand Committee was that the prevailing Indian patent laws offered asym-
metrically strong protections to foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) while 
severely inhibiting the development of the domestic manufacturing sector. Further, 
according to the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trademarks8:
The committee also observed that the Patents Act should contain clear indication to ensure 
that food and medicine and surgical and curative devices are made available to the public 
at the cheapest price commensurate with giving reasonable compensation to the patentee.
In 1957, the Government of India appointed another committee led by the 
distinguished retired Justice of the Supreme Court of India, N. Justice Rajagopala 
Ayyangar, to examine the question of revising the Patents Act and advising 
government. This committee’s recommendations acted as a catalyst for changing 
the Indian patent law, which eventually led to India Patents Act of 1970. The India 
Patents Act of 1970 incorporated major provisions to reduce the social costs of the 
foreigner-owned patents. Thus, the Patents Act of 1970 (a) prohibited patents on 
products useful as medicines and food, (b) shortened the term of chemical process 
patents, and (c) significantly expanded the availability of compulsory licensing. 
This led to the birth and growth of the powerful Indian pharmaceutical generic 
drugs industry. The third “globalization” phase approximately spans the years 1986 
up to the present. According to Mueller, during the “globalization” phase:
India’s participation in the debates over the inclusion of intellectual property within the 
GATT framework and its eventual entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), along 
with its accession to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, have compelled significant strengthening of the nation’s patent 
laws. The implementation of those changes is ongoing, and their anticipated impact remains 
to be fully seen. Today India stands as a rising global power with a patent system still very 
much in flux.
5  The Historical Evolution of India’s Patent Regime and Its 
Impact
Now we can look at some of the important details in the evolution of India’s patent 
regime and its impact on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.9
8 http://www.ipindia.nic.in/history-of-indian-patent-system.htm
9 (a) https://www.rdmag.com/article/2016/02/intellectual-property-and-indian-pharmaceutical-




India won its independence in 1947. In its Constitution, India declared itself as sov-
ereign socialist secular democratic republic. Thus, from the beginning, Indian pol-
icy makers believed in the principle of distributive justice and government’s active 
role in curbing socioeconomic inequalities.
At the outset, the Indian government had to meet the needs of nearly 400 million 
people and confront simultaneous challenges such as food and water shortages, 
inadequate housing, illiteracy, unemployment, infant mortality, epidemics, 
inaccessible healthcare, and unaffordable medicines. Faced with the staggering 
healthcare needs and under the burden of British imposed, foreigner-favoring patent 
laws, India had no choice but to rely on importing even the most basic medicines 
such as insulin and penicillin manufactured by other nations, at some of the highest 
prices in the world.
The Bakshi Tek Chand Committee Report noted that the existing Indian patent 
law afforded “inequitably strong IP protection” to MNCs a situation that was 
blocking the Indian manufacturing industry in its infancy itself.
As reported in the Shodhganga  – the digital repository of Indian Electronic 
Theses and Dissertations – setup by the INFLIBNET Centre10:
The Indian patent system has failed in its main purpose, namely to stimulate invention 
among Indians and to encourage the development and exploitation of new inventions for 
industrial purposes in the country so as to secure benefits thereof to the largest sections of 
the people.11
Strong evidence for this had come just a few years afterward, when Hoechst 
pharmaceutical company won an injunction in Bombay High Court against Unichem 
Laboratories of India over infringement of its patent for the manufacture of a highly 
needed antidiabetic drug.12
Thus, the Bakshi Tek Chand Committee Report recommended13:
The main provisions suggested by the committee among others include compulsory licens-
ing, commercial working of patented inventions in India barring importations, setting up of 
appellate body in the form of an ad-hoc Special Tribunal nominated by the Central 
Government consisting of a sitting or retired judge of a High Court (as the President), and 
ensuring that food and medicines are available at cheapest rates to the public commensurate 
with giving reasonable compensation to the patentee etc.
This is the first instance where the Indian policy makers unequivocally articulated 
the need to balance India’s social goals against its economic goals.
10 http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/128146/14/07_chapter%202.pdf
11 Venkataramiah, E.S. Supra Note, 2, pp. 23.
12 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/865758/
13 Draft Manual 2008. Supra Note, 1, pp. 8 and 9.
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In 1957, yet another committee was constituted under Rajagopala Ayyangar, for 
the purpose of building on the recommendations of Bakshi Tek Chand Committee 
Report and sculpting policies that will ensure India’s national goals and interests 
and kick-start the Indian industry. Thus, the new committee once again carefully 
examined the patent laws of India, in light of the successful public welfare models 
of several other nations.
Accordingly, the 1959 Ayyangar Committee Report14a noted the following:
It would be convenient to consider the two matters dealt with by this provision separately –
(1)  The precise degree and extent of patentability to be permitted in regard to inventions of 
chemical products in general; and
(2) the law determining the patentability of inventions relating to food and medicine.
In continuation, the Ayyangar Committee Report14a recommended:
As regards inventions relating to chemical products, or products produced by chemical 
processes, I am clearly of the view that the interests of the country would be best served by 
confining patentability to the processes by which the products are obtained and to deny 
patents to the products either per se or in the qualified manner suggested in the Bill. The 
reasons for this recommendation are based on (1) the history of the law relating to patents 
regarding chemical inventions in Europe during the past nearly 100 years and the lessons to 
be derived therefrom; (2) the experience of other countries somewhat similarly situated like 
India; and (3) the disadvantages to an underdeveloped country of permitting product claims 
for such inventions.
Also notable are the arguments advanced in the Ayyangar Committee Report14b on 
patent grant vis-à-vis economic benefits and social costs:
Where the patentee has no intention of working the invention in this country either because 
he considers that this is not profitable or because he prefers to expand the production in his 
home country so as to achieve there greater efficiency and more production or is otherwise 
not interested in working the invention in India, the grant of the Indian patent might tend to 
improve the economy of the patentee’s home country but offers little advantage to us. Unless 
therefore the law provides for measures to be taken to compel the patentees to work the 
invention within the country, and these measures are effective to achieve their purpose, the 
social cost involved in the grant of the patent is not offset by any benefit to the community 
[by way of an increase of technical skill or of national wealth].
Next, a joint select committee of the parliament and the parliament itself debated the 
findings and recommendations of the Bakshi Tek Chand Committee Report and the 
Ayyangar Committee Report. This resulted in the Patent Bill of 1965 which 
incorporated changes relating to patents for food, drug, and medicines. This bill was 
introduced first in the lower house of the Parliament on September 21, 1965. The 
bill was reintroduced with some changes in the Parliament in 1966 but could not be 
passed. The bill eventually lapsed with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha (the lower 
14 a) https://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ayyangar_committee_report.pdf, page 23. 
(b) https://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ayyangar_committee_report.pdf, page 18.
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house of Parliament) in March 1967. However, the bill was finally passed by the 
Parliament, and the Patents Act 197015a came into force on April 20, 1972 along 
with Patent Rules 1972. Thus, the Patents Act 1970 repealed and replaced the 1911 
Act while incorporating the recommendations of both the committees. The 1911 
Act however continued to apply to designs.
5.2  1970–1995
In the Patents Act 1970, the following four articles and their intended purpose are 
noteworthy15b:
Chapter II (Inventions not Patentable), Article 5 clarifies that only processes are 
patentable:
In the case of inventions –
(a)  claim.ing substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine 
or drug, or
(b)  relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, 
optical glass, semi- conductors and inter-metallic compounds), no patent shall be 
granted in respect of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the methods 
or processes of manufacture shall be patentable.
Chapter VIII (Grant and Sealing of Patents and Rights Conferred Thereby), Article 
53 states:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the term of every patent granted under this Act 
shall –
(a)  in respect of an invention claiming the method or process of manufacture of a substance, 
where the substance is intended for use, or is capable of being used, as food or as a 
medicine or drug, be five years from the date of sealing of the patent, or seven years 
from the date of the patent whichever period is shorter; and
(b) in respect of any other invention, be fourteen years from the date of the patent.
Finally, XVI (Working of Patents, Compulsory Licences, Licences of Right and 
Revocation), Article 83 clarifies the economic goals of the Indian policy makers:
Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the powers 
conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general considerations, 
namely;
(a)  that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are 
worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably prac-
ticable without undue delay;
(b)  that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the 
importation of the patented article;
(c)  that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
15 (a) http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAct/1_113_1_The_Patents_Act_1970_-_
Updated_till_23_June_2017.pdf. (b) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128091
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conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations;
(d)  that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition and should 
act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of vital importance for 
socio- economic and technological development of India;
(e)  that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking mea-
sures to protect public health;
(f)  that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving title or interest on 
patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a person deriving title or interest on patent 
from the patentee does not resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology; and
(g)  that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at 
reasonably affordable prices to the public.
Chapter XVI (Working of Patents, Compulsory Licences, Licences of Right and 
Revocation), Article 97 clarifies when compulsory licenses will be given:
(1)  If the Central Government is satisfied in respect of any patent or class of patents in force 
that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest that compulsory licences should 
be granted at any time after the sealing thereof to work the invention or inventions, it 
may make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette, and thereupon the follow-
ing provisions shall have effect, that is to say –
(i)  the Controller shall on application made at any time after the notification by any person 
interested grant to the applicant a licence under the patent on such terms as he thinks 
fit;
(ii)  (in settling the terms of a licence granted under this section, the Controller shall endeav-
our to secure that the articles manufactured under the patent shall be available to the 
public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advan-
tage from their patent rights. …
Thus, the Patents Act 1970 (a) prohibited patenting of products and allowed patent-
ing only on the methods/processes of manufacture useful as medicines and food (see 
Article 5), (b) shortened the term of chemical process patents (see Article 53), and (c) 
significantly expanded the grant of compulsory licenses (see Articles 83 and 97).
Indeed, the India Patents Act, 1970, was momentous in the history of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry as it enabled domestic firms to replicate the drugs patented 
by MNCs, creating a booming generic pharmaceutical industry. As MNCs began to 
exit the Indian market due to significantly diminished IP protection, the Indian 
pharmaceutical companies began to fill the void and dominate the global business of 
reverse-engineered highly cost-efficient generics that sold at exceptionally cheaper 
prices compared to the counterparts marketed by MNCs. This is how the generic 
pharmaceutical industry of India was able to become one of the most prolific drug 
manufacturing industries in the world, ranking third globally in annual volume.
Thus, the Indian government was able to meet its social goals as well as eco-
nomic goals (Fig. 2). Interestingly, however, there were advantages as well as disad-
vantages to the unexpected nearly complete exit of the western pharmaceutical 
companies from India. Thus, while the generics industry saw a rapid growth, cre-
ativity and new drug discovery took a hit.
In 1990s, the Indian government led by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao 
initiated the economic reforms and opened up the Indian economy to foreign 
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investment.16 While this created many opportunities for rapid growth of the economy, 
it also necessitated India to become a member of the international trade agreements. 
Indeed, this exposed the limitations of the Indian patent regime on investment, 
imports, as well as exports of medicines.
As the USA succeeded in the inclusion of patent rights in particular and intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) in general, in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) negotiations, India faced new challenges.
Thus, India needed to figure out how to leverage the trade benefits of globaliza-
tion against its obligation to afford stronger patent protections to MNCs under the 
TRIPS Agreement, which could threaten its high priority social goals and the inter-
ests of the domestic pharmaceutical industry. India feared that the stronger IP pro-
tection mechanisms under TRIPS could once again unduly favor the MNCs and 
may unravel the benefits achieved under the Patents Act of 1970.
Initially, India opposed the strong IP protections which are part of the TRIPS 
Agreement, leading a group of developing countries with similar reservations. 
However, India signed the Uruguay Round Agreements (along with 116 other 
nations) on April 15, 1994, and became a member of the WTO effective January 1, 
1995, while continuing advocacy of more equitable provisions. Thus, India became 
obligated to modify its domestic intellectual property laws in order to comply with 
the TRIPS Agreement.
The TRIPS Agreement afforded a 10-year grace period to developing countries 
for configuring their judicial systems and economies, to fully comply with the 
TRIPS provisions.
5.3  1995–2005
To start with, the Indian government enacted the Patents (Amendments) Ordinance 
of 1994 to buy time, while statutory changes to the law were pursued in Parliament.17 
However, this ordinance expired on March 26, 1995, before a permanent legislative 
solution from the Indian Parliament was put in place for compliance of the TRIPS 
requirements. Unfortunately, the tenth Lok Sabha was itself dissolved later in 1995, 
throwing the Indian IPR regime into uncertainty. During this period of political 
chaos, India was taken to the dispute settlement panel of the WTO by the USA and 
EU separately that resulted in pronouncements against India. Under the impending 
threat of trade sanctions, the Indian Parliament then acted rapidly to pass the 
necessary laws.
Thus, changing the IP Laws for TRIPS Compliance was a big challenge for India 
once TRIPS Agreement came into force on January 1, 1995. To meet its obligations, 
India embarked on a substantive overhaul of its patent laws but chose to do so 
16 https://qz.com/india/799883/how-narasimha-rao-fixed-the-indian-economy-and-the-congress- 
party-only-to-be-forgotten/
17 See Reference 10.
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gradually and stagewise. This resulted in three separate patent amendment Acts in 
1999, 2002, and 2005 that incrementally modify the Patents Act of 1970 to make it 
fully TRIPS compliant.
In this context, it is important to note that the Doha Declaration of November 
2001 took into consideration the concerns expressed by several emerging and less- 
developed nations and strengthened the cause of flexibilities under TRIPS. Thus, 
these flexibilities enabled some WTO member states to alleviate hardships resulting 
from the need to modify patent laws to TRIPS standards.
The DOHA Declaration (2001): Key Articles
The DOHA Declaration recognized the serious concerns of the least devel-
oped countries.18a,b Some of the articles shown below exemplify this:
Ministerial Declaration
 (3) We recognize the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the 
special structural difficulties they face in the global economy. We are committed to 
addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and 
to improving their effective participation in the multilateral trading system. We recall 
the commitments made by ministers at our meetings in Marrakesh, Singapore and 
Geneva, and by the international community at the Third UN Conference on Least- 
Developed Countries in Brussels, to help least-developed countries secure beneficial 
and meaningful integration into the multilateral trading system and the global econ-
omy. We are determined that the WTO will play its part in building effectively on these 
commitments under the Work Programme we are establishing.
 (5) We are aware that the challenges Members face in a rapidly changing international 
environment cannot be addressed through measures taken in the trade field alone. 
We shall continue to work with the Bretton Woods institutions for greater coherence in 
global economic policy-making.
Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs
 (17) We stress the importance we attach to implementation and interpretation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access to 
existing medicines and research and development into new medicines and, in this 
connection, are adopting a separate declaration.





Finally, the India Patents Act 1970 was amended in 2005, so as to19:
 (a) Include products in the patentable subject matter category.
 (b) Make reverse-engineering or copying of patented drugs without requisite 
licensing from the patent holder illegal after January 1, 1995. One exception 
was that the Act did allow the manufacture of generic versions of drugs patented 
prior to 1995.
 (c) Provide a 20-year guaranteed term of protection to patents under Article 32 of 
TRIPS.
5.4  The Key Provisions That Gained Prominence After 2005
However, the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005), also needed to ensure that (Fig. 2):
 (a) The new policies did not adversely impact India’s social goals to provide 
affordable medicines and accessible healthcare to all its citizens; that means 
preventing abuse by MNCs.
 (b) The interests of India’s generic pharmaceutical industry are considered, while 
India meets its social goals; that means FDI and ensuring access to new markets 
outside India.
 (c) The innovation ecosystem is supported by the Indian government to facilitate 
the Indian pharma industry achieve long-term competitive advantage.
Accordingly, the Indian policy makers decided to (i) invoke 3(d) to prevent 
Evergreening by MNCs20 and (ii) retain certain articles to allow Compulsory 
Special and Differential Treatment
 (44) We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of 
the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns expressed regarding their operation in 
addressing specific constraints faced by developing countries, particularly least- 
developed countries. In that connection, we also note that some Members have proposed 
a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment (WT/GC/W/442). We 
therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed 
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and oper-
ational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme on special and differential 
treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.
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Licensing,21 so as to ensure its social goals. In addition, India decided to (iii) retain 
pre-grant opposition and (iv) introduce post-grant opposition. The details are 
described below.
Prevent Evergreening
Simply stated, “Ever-greening” refers to the different means a pharmaceutical pat-
ent holder employs to exploit the legal loopholes of patenting to extend/fortify 
monopoly typically over blockbuster drugs22 by either filing disguised or artful 
patents on previously patented invention just before the end of the term of the parent 
patent or employing other related regulatory policies.
According to Kumar and Nanda22:
Ever-greening is a strategy employed by the innovator companies to recover high costs 
incurred by them in Research and Development and as a means to legally protect any minor 
modifications that are intentionally made to the parent patent just to obtain multiple patents 
on the same drug and hence extend the overall term of the patent to enjoy monopoly for 
extended periods of time.
In simple words, a company launches a drug product and obtains patent protection for it 
and just before the end of the term of that patent; the company files a new patent for a minor 
modification in the original molecule that extends the overall term of patent protection 
which ultimately contributes to their monopoly. Hence, extending the patent protection 
period delays or prevents the entry of the generic versions of the drug which can affect the 
budget for public health and finally the patient.
Companies often seek protection of the following for the purpose of evergreening:
• Combinations of two or more drugs
• Dosing regimen, dosing rate, and dosing route
• Biological targets for a known compound
• Delivery profiles, mechanisms of action
• Isomeric forms and derivatives
• Screening methods
• Packaging
• Different treatment methods
Thus, the rationale and tactics for evergreening of blockbuster drugs by MNCs are 
the following22:
Pharmaceutical research and development is an expensive, time consuming and uncertain 
process that may take 8–10 years to complete. Patent clock starts much before a new drug 
is approved for marketing and significant amount of time may be lost in the review and 
21 http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAct/1_113_1_The_Patents_Act_1970_-_
Updated_till_23_June_2017.pdf, pages 64–73.
22 Kumar, A.; Nanda, A. “Ever-greening in Pharmaceuticals: Strategies, Consequences and 
Provisions for Prevention in USA, EU, India and Other Countries”, Pharmaceutical Regulatory 
Affairs: Open Access. 6(1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.4172/2167-7689.1000185 (2017).
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approval process by regulatory bodies. So, in order to recoup the considerable time and 
resources invested in the drug development and approval process, the pharmaceutical 
companies depend on exclusivity provisions granted by the regulatory bodies. There are 
several official and unofficial methods to extend term of a patent beyond 20 years. Official 
methods include provisions by some regulatory bodies such as data exclusivity, orphan 
drug exclusivity, pediatric exclusivity, the 180-day exclusivity (Hatch Waxman Act, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration),23 and supplementary protection certificate (European 
Medical Agency), whereas unofficial methods include altering or reformulating the existing 
compound to obtain a new patent by utilising polymorphism, creating combinations, stereo- 
selective/chiral switches, conversion to NDDS, OTC switching, authorised generics, etc.
Evergreening, if unchecked, blocks the generic drugs market, undermines inno-
vation, and prevents access to affordable medicines and accessible healthcare to 
citizens. Not surprisingly, this would be detrimental to India’s social goals as well 
as economic goals. Consequently, the following was substituted for clause (d) in 
Section 3  in the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, to discourage or prevent 
evergreening. Thus, the new Section 3(d) states24:
The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine 
or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one 
new reactant.
Explanation. For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabo-
lites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and 
other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless 
they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.
Aleksandar Ristanić nicely articulated how India leveraged the flexibility afforded 
by Article 27(1) TRIPS to design 3(d)25a:
First and foremost, Article 27(1) TRIPS requires member states to make patents “available 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that 
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”. TRIPS 
thus simply enunciates these essential patent law concepts such as invention, novelty, 
inventiveness and industrial applicability without defining them, which leaves a 
23 The “Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,” also known as the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, established the approval pathway for generic drug products, under 
which applicants can submit an ANDA under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 






OId=8894040, page 18. (b) Ho, Cynthia M., Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: 
International Agreements on Patents and Related Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2011), page 92.
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considerable discretion to states with how to apply those requirements in their national 
laws. The way these key terms are defined, however, can be of the utmost importance for 
both innovation and access to medicine. If a drug is unpatented it is in the public domain 
and anyone can produce it.25b An example of taking advantage of freedom and flexibilities 
under TRIPS is to be found in India’s 2005 amendment to its Patents Act 1970. While 
finally allowing the patent protection for pharmaceutical products, India’s patent law, 
Section 3(d), in particular, limits the number of patents that can protect a drug, providing 
two important exclusions from the scope of that protection. It excludes from the scope of 
inventions mere discoveries of (1) new forms of known substances – unless there is an 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance, and (2) new uses for known 
substances. In addition, the amendment provides a list of substances that would be 
considered a new form of the same substance unless they differ significantly in properties 
with regard to efficacy.
Indeed, the US and the EU strongly oppose Section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) 
Act, 2005. However, many other countries – like Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand  – either emulate India’s 
patent reforms or strongly support them.
Thus, in 2008, the Philippines amended Section 22 of the Republic Act 8293, 
exactly along the lines of Section 3(d). Argentina revised and restricted the 
patentability of derivatives of pharmaceutical products, following the example set 
by 3(d), and going even tougher in certain respects. Mexico revised its patent law 
precisely adopting the language of 3(d). The same is true of many other countries 
mentioned. The Novartis vs. Union of India Case Study is instructive of how 3(d) 
set a precedent in India.26a
5.5  The Novartis vs. Union of India Case Study
Soon after Section 3(d) in the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, came into force, the 
statute was tested. Thus, in 2006, Novartis applied for an Indian patent on the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.27 The Madras Patent Office rejected the patent 
application, citing that imatinib mesylate was a known compound (a pre1990s 
molecule) and the beta crystalline form was merely a derivative of imatinib mesylate.
Novartis then appealed the Madras Patent Office’s decision to the Intellectual 
Property Appellate Board (IPAB). IPAB modified the decision of the Patent Office 
stating that ingredients for grant of patent novelty and nonobviousness may be 
present in the application but rejected the application on the ground that the drug is 
not a new substance but an amended version of a known compound. Novartis 
mounted a separate and concurrent litigation before the Madras High Court arguing 
that Section 3(d) has violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution because the 
26 (a) https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/evergreening-in-pharmaceuticals-strategies- 
consequences-and-provisions-for-prevention-in-usa-eu-india-and-other-countries-2167-7689- 
1000185.pdf. (b) High Court of Judicature at Madras for W.P., Novartis AG and another v. Union 
of India and others, nos. 24759 and 24760 of 2006, 6 August 2007.




definition of “enhanced efficacy” was too vague and was in violation of India’s 
obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. The High Court ruled that the law was not 
vague and that the law complied with TRIPS. In upholding the constitutionality of 
Section 3(d), the Madras High Court noted that26b: “India, being a welfare and a 
developing country, which is predominantly occupied by people below poverty line, 
has a constitutional duty to provide good health care to its citizens by giving them 
easy access to life saving drugs. In so doing, the Union of India would be right, it is 
argued, to take into account the various factual aspects prevailing in this big country 
and prevent ‘evergreening’ by allowing generic medicine to be available in the 
market.” Thus, it was evident that Novartis could not back up its claim of “enhanced 
efficacy” for imatinib mesylate over the parent molecule, according to the 
patentability standards laid down by Section 3(d).
Next, Novartis appealed IPAB’s decision to the Supreme Court of India.28 
However, the Indian Supreme Court agreed with the IPAB ruling that Novartis had 
not established the “enhanced therapeutic efficacy” over the parent compound, and 
thus failed to meet the requirements laid down by Section 3(d). In addition, the 
Indian Supreme Court opined that the constitutional validity of Section 3(d) was as 
per the flexibilities offered by TRIPS framework.29
Analyzing the Novartis vs. Union of India case, Lukose30 noted that the patented 
drug “Gleevec” by Novartis costed the patients Rs. 4115/per tablet, while its generic 
version was available at Rs. 30/per tablet, at 99% cost savings to the patient. The 
differential is even greater in annual costs. Thus, while the annual cost of the 
Gleevec to patients in India is Rs. 1,500,000, its generic versions costed just Rs. 
10,000 annually, a whopping savings of Rs. 1,490,000. Typically, when a patent for 
a blockbuster drug expires, the price falls up to 95%.31
Thus, the Novartis vs. Union of India case makes clear that India will not permit 
the evergreening of patents, risking its social and economic goals. Indian patent 
regime also sends a strong message to the world that an extended monopoly to salts, 
esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures 
28 After IPAB rejected the patent application in 2009, Novartis appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court through a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution. Under normal 
circumstances, an appeal from IPAB should have been before one of the High Courts before it 
could proceed to the Supreme Court. However, the patent if granted on appeal would expire by 
2018 and thus any further appeal at that stage would be pointless. Considering this urgency and the 
need for an authoritative decision on Section 3(d), the Supreme Court granted special leave to 
bypass the High Court appeals process.
29 Banerjee R. “The Success of, and Response to, India’s Law against Patent Layering.” Harvard 
Int Law J. 2013, 54: 205–232.
30 (a) Lukose, L. “Patent Evergreening and Ethics,” 7th International Conference on Information 
Law and Ethics, University of Pretoria, South Africa (2016). (b) Proceedings of the 7th International 
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of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of a known substance 
will not be possible unless they exhibit demonstrably high therapeutic efficacy over 
the known substance.
Allow Compulsory Licensing
The flexibilities afforded by the TRIPS Agreement (see Articles 30 and 31 below)32 
allow “compulsory licensing”  – in the case of a national emergency, other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or public health use etc. Thus, compulsory 
licensing enables other companies to produce a patented product without the per-
mission of the patent holder, under certain conditions.
Article 30
Exceptions to Rights Conferred
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties.
Article 31
Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following 
provisions shall be respected:
 (a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
 (b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user 
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have 
not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement 
may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
noncommercial use. In situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, 
be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non- 





TRIPS Agreement empowers individual nations to rightfully exercise the option of 
compultsory licensing under justifiable socioeconomic circumstances and legiti-
mate needs. Therefore, a compulsory license would ensure much needed access to 
affordable medicines to all citizens, shielding them from the negative effects of the 
monopoly of patents. The Natco Pharma vs. Bayer Corporation case exemplifies 
how India awarded its first compulsory license in 2012.33
5.6  The Natco Pharma vs. Bayer Corporation (Nexavar 
Compulsory License) Case
Bayer first obtained a US patent (US8609854B2) on the drug sorafenib tosylate in 
1999. Following further development, it launched sorafenib tosylate internationally 
in 2005, under the brand name “Nexavar,” an oncology drug useful for the treatment 
of advanced stage liver and kidney cancers (Fig. 3).
In 2008, Bayer obtained the Indian patent (Patent No. 215758) on sorafenib 
tosylate and launched the drug into the Indian market under the same trade name, 
“Nexavar,” selling it at Rs. 275,000 (US$ 5500) per patient per month in India. In 
2010, Cipla, a well-known Indian generic drug manufacturer, which held one of the 
largest market shares in India, started selling the generic version of Nexavar at about 
Rs. 29,000 (US$ 580) per month, a price that is 90% cheaper. In 2011, Bayer sued 
Cipla for patent infringement. On a different front, the Indian generic drug 
manufacturer Natco Pharma Limited (“Natco”) applied for compulsory license in 
India on the sorafenib tosylate patent.
In 2012, the Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks of India 
granted the Indian generic drug manufacturer, Natco Pharma Limited, a compulsory 
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid 
patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall 
be informed promptly;
 (c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology 
shall only be for public noncommercial use or to remedy a practice deter-
mined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive;
 (d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
 (e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or 
goodwill which enjoys such use;
 (f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; …. (continued)
33 http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8894039&file
OId=8894040, page 33
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license for Bayer AG’s drug, sorafenib tosylate (“Nexavar”), an oncology drug use-
ful for the treatment of advanced stage liver and kidney cancers.
The compulsory license application of Natco was based on the grounds stated in 
Section 84(1) of the Indian Patents Act 1970, as amended by Act 15 (2005),34 which 
reads as follows:
In a landmark decision on 9 March 2012, the Controller granted the compulsory 
license to Natco and stripped Bayer of its exclusive right to the medicine in India, 
citing that the grounds (a)–(c) in Section 84(1) of the Indian Patents Act 1970 (2005) 
were individually met, though any one of them would have been sufficient for the 
grant of a compulsory license.
Fig. 3 Sorafenib tosylate (“Nexavar”)
 84. Compulsory licenses. – (1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the 
date of the grant of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the 
Controller for grant of compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds, 
namely:
(a) that the “reasonable requirements of the public” with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied, or
(b) that the patented invention is “not available to the public at a reasonably 
affordable price”, or




Further, the Controller reasoned that35:
• Bayer’s drug was available only to a small percentage of eligible patients 
(slightly above 2%), which failed to meet the “reasonable requirements of the 
public.”
• The 2012 price of Rs. 280,000 per month (approximately US$5600) to the 
patient does not meet the condition that the drug must be available to the public 
at a “reasonably affordable price.” This is based on the purchasing power of 
patients in India.
• Bayer’s patented invention was “not being worked in India” as Nexavar was not 
manufactured within India and imported from the manufacturing facilities 
outside India. This did not satisfy the third mandatory requirement.
• Natco may sell the drug to patients within India at a price of no more than Rs. 
8800 (approximately US$176) per month, which is 97% cheaper than the Bayer’s 
price.
• Natco was required to pay a 6% royalty to Bayer.
Next, Bayer then appealed the decision of the Controller to the IPAB.  Pending 
appeal, Bayer also petitioned for stay of the Controller’s order, which was denied. 
About a year later, the IPAB upheld the Controller’s decision of granting the 
compulsory license to Natco with certain changes. Though both the Controller and 
the IPAB arrived at the same conclusion in the Natco Pharma vs. Bayer Corporation 
Case, their approaches differed from each other. Thus, while the Controller relied 
on the statistical data submitted by the parties for analyzing the substantive issues 
of the case, the IPAB analyzed the issues from the public health perspective in the 
context of the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.36
Then, Bayer tried to appeal the IPAB’s decision to the Bombay High Court, 
which simply refused to take up the case. On 12 December 2014, the Indian Supreme 
Court finally dismissed Bayer’s petition against the Bombay High Court and ruled 
in favor of the compulsory license of Nexavar to Natco. The Supreme Court’s 
judgment fits the established opinion that all the three grounds for compulsory 
license had been fully met. Once again, being the first of its kind in the history of the 
Indian patent regime, the Bayer vs. Natco ruling has set a clear precedence for 
seeking compulsory licenses by other generic pharmaceutical companies in India, 
as well as by the policy makers and patent regimes of other countries.
Naturally, MNCs strongly opposed the judgment in the Natco Pharma vs. Bayer 
Corporation and expressed many concerns.37 On the other hand, the judgment was 
35 https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alerts-indian-pat-
ent-office-grants-compulsory-license.pdf; See 84(1) above.
36 Sood, M. “Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corporation and the Compulsory Licensing Regime in 
India,” NUJS Law Review, 99 (2013), p. 104.
37 http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8894039&fileOId=8894040
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hailed by the champions for affordable access to drugs. The case is also notable 
because it is only the second time in the world that a nation issued a compulsory 
license for a drug used for treatment of a chronic rather than an infectious disease. 
Prior to this case, only Thailand awarded compulsory licenses to four drugs between 
2006 and 2008.38
Retain Pre-grant Opposition
Pre-grant opposition39a was already there in the India Patents Act 1911,39b and it was 
retained in the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005).39c India’s pre-grant opposition 
procedures in 1911 were modeled similar to the British patent laws in force.40 
However, during that time, the British patent system was not the only patent system 
that relied on pre-grant opposition; many other countries also used a novelty-only 
examination system coupled with pre-grant opposition41 to supplement the resources 
of the patent examiner.
Thus, Section 25(1) of the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005), provides for pre-grant 
opposition of pending patent applications. The pre-grant opposition may be based 
on any number of grounds,42 including anticipation, lack of inventive step, non- 
invention under Section 3 of the Patents Act (including the anti-evergreening 
provisions of Section 3(d)), insufficient or unclear description of the invention in the 
specification, failure to disclose the source of biological material used for the 
invention, and inventions which are considered traditional knowledge.
Notably, Section 25(1) of the India Patents Act, 1970 (2005), does not impose 
any estoppel limitations on a party who first files a pre-grant opposition and later 
tries to challenge the patent’s validity in a court proceeding. The Act even mandates 
that the party filing the pre-grant opposition receive a hearing before the Controller 
if requested, which will delay the process even if patentability was affirmed over all 
objections.
The Indian patent regime views that pre-grant opposition is actually helpful to 
get all the prior art before the patent examiner. Hence, the same patent examiner 
who examines the initial patent application will also examine the pre-grant 
opponent’s submission. The Indian Patent Office does not agree that pre-grant 
opposition would delay the process of patent grants. It is important to note that the 
38 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-drugs/analysis-india-cancer-ruling-opens-door-for- 
cheaper-drugs-idUSBRE82C0IN20120313
39 (a) See Reference 3. This author describes the pre- and post-grant opposition to patents in great 
detail. (b) Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911. http://theindianlawyer.in/statutesnbareacts/acts/
d42.html, Section 9. (c) See Reference 20, Chapter V, Section 25, page 25.
40 Janis, M. D. “Patent Abolitionism”, Berkeley Tech. L. J. 899, 903 (2002).
41 Vojacek, J. A Survey of the Principal National Patent Systems, 28 (1936).
42 See Section 25(1)(k) for details.
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Indian generic pharmaceutical companies and the MNCs are on opposite sides of 
the pre-grant opposition debate. Thus, while the former favor pre-grant opposition, 
the latter strongly oppose it.43
Mueller observes44 that according to press reports in March 2006, approximately 
100 pre-grant oppositions were pending in the four Indian Patent Office branches, 
including challenges filed by Indian generic firms against pending patent applications 
on Astra Zeneca’s cholesterol drug Rosuvastatin, Pfizer’s antifungal drug 
Voriconazole, Wockhardt’s antibacterial drug Nadifloxacin, Gilead-Roche’s bird-flu 
drug Oseltamivir, and Astra Aktiebolag’s formulation of ulcer drug Omeprazole. In 
addition, nongovernmental organizations and healthcare advocacy groups in India 
have also been using the pre-grant opposition as a powerful tool to challenge the 
grant of patents on essential medicines.
Introduce Post-grant Opposition
Unlike pre-grant opposition “which already existed” in the Indian patent law in one 
form or another, post-grant opposition is a “new addition” to the Patents 
(Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005. The grounds for post-grant opposition are very 
similar to those of pre-grant opposition, including virtually all patentability criteria. 
Therefore, to understand the “new” grounds for post-grant opposition, see Section 
25 (2) (a)–(k) below of the India Patents Act 1970 (2005)45:
 25. Opposition to the patent.
 (2) At any time after the grant of patent but before the expiry of a period of one year 
from the date of publication of grant of a patent, any person interested may give 
notice of opposition to the Controller in the prescribed manner on any of the following 
grounds, namely –
(a)  that the patentee or the person under or through whom he claims, wrongfully 
obtained the invention or any part thereof from him or from a person under or 
through whom he claims;
(b)  that the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification has 
been published before the priority date of the claim – (i) in any specification filed 
in pursuance of an application for a patent made in India on or after the 1st day 
of January, 1912; or (ii) in India or elsewhere, in any other document: Provided 
that the ground specified in sub-clause (ii) shall not be available where such 
publication does not constitute an anticipation of the invention by virtue of sub-
section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 29;
(continued)
43 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/what-is-patents-amendment-bill/
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Unlike pre-grant oppositions, the post-grant oppositions will be heard by a three-
person Opposition Board that does not include the original patent examiner. Post-
grant opposition is a very important aspect of European Patent Convention (not yet 
part of the US patent law). In 2017, of all the patents granted under the European 
Patent Convention, approximately 3.7% were subjected to post-grant 
oppositions.46
It is important to mention that neither the Patents Act nor any other rules require 
the Controller to (a) notify (in the Official Journal) that a post-grant opposition has 
been initiated or (b) announce the decision taken and provide the underlying rea-
sons. At this time, it is yet unclear how much the post-grant opposition procedure 
will be used in India.
(c)  that the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification is 
claimed in a claim of a complete specification published on or after the priority 
date of the claim of the patentee and filed in pursuance of an application for a 
patent in India, being a claim of which the priority date is earlier than that of the 
claim of the patentee;
(d)  that the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification 
was publicly known or publicly used in India before the priority date of that 
claim.
Explanation. For the purposes of this clause, an invention relating to a process 
for which a patent is granted shall be deemed to have been publicly known or 
publicly used in India before the priority date of the claim if a product made by 
that process had already been imported into India before that date except where 
such importation has been for the purpose of reasonable trial or experiment only;
(e)  that the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification is 
obvious and clearly does not involve any inventive step, having regard to the mat-
ter published as mentioned in clause (b) or having regard to what was used in 
India before the priority date of the claim;
(f)  that the subject of any claim of the complete specification is not an invention 
within the meaning of this Act, or is not patentable under this Act;
(g)  that the complete specification does not sufficiently and clearly describe the 
invention or the method by which it is to be performed;
(h)  that the patentee has failed to disclose to the Controller the information required 
by section 8 or has furnished the information which in any material particular 
was false to his knowledge;
(i)  that in the case of a patent granted on a convention application, the application 
for patent was not made within twelve months from the date of the first applica-
tion for protection for the invention made in a convention country or in India by 
the patentee or a person from whom he derives title;
(j)  that the complete specification does not disclose or wrongly mentions the source 
and geographical origin of biological material used for the invention;
(k)  that the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification 
was anticipated having regard to the knowledge, oral or otherwise, available 







India is a dominant player in the global generics market, with the largest number of 
USFDA-approved labs outside the USA, and holding a 30% share (by volume) of 
the US generics market. However, India has been witnessing increasing competition 
from other nations such as South Korea and China, who are also trying to establish 
themselves in the global generics market. Indeed, competition is always better for 
the patients seeking cheaper medicines and better access to healthcare.47 In response 
to these dynamic market changes, the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry has 
been strategically repositioning itself. Some highlights are:
 (a) Gaining Proficiency in Complex Generics. According to Vijayaraghavan,48 
complex generics include, “Complex injectable formulations (liposomal, 
microsphere-based depot formulations et al), inhalation drugs, topical products 
and transdermals.” Case and point: Sun Pharma could commence selling 
Lipodox, a pegylated liposomal doxorubicin formulation (generic of Janssen’s 
Doxil), even prior to the patent expiry in the USA due to drug shortage and be 
the only generic on the market even after the Doxil patent expired.
 (b) Focusing on Specialty Portfolios. Indian pharma companies are increasingly 
focusing on specialty portfolios in specific therapeutic categories. In other 
words, Indian pharmaceutical companies are actively pursuing the Section 
505(b)(2) of USFDA specialty drugs.49 This is evident from industry examples 
such as:
• Glenmark’s targeted focus on dermatology, oncology, and respiratory
• Dr. Reddy’s focus on Dermatology  – through its US subsidiary Promius 
Pharma
• Lupin Pharma’s focus on pediatrics – proprietary portfolio of branded drugs 
such as Alinia® and Locoid® Lotion
 (c) Capitalizing on the Abuse Deterrent Opioids50 Market. The USFDA’s 
Opioids Action Plan laid down the new draft guidance in March 2016, for 
regulation of the generic versions of approved opioids with abuse-deterrent 
formulations.51 Indeed, this attracted the Indian pharmaceutical companies to 
47 https://www.sathguru.com/news/2017/05/03/innovation-in-indian-pharma-empowering- 
stronger-global-presence-but-fraught-with-challenges-for-serving-indian-market/
48 https://www.sathguru.com/Publication/download/Medcon-2017-Whitepaper.pdf, page 80. See 
full details in this reference.
49 For drugs approved under section 505(b)(2) of USFDA, an NDA must be filed but for which 
approval can be based in part on the safety and effectiveness of an already-approved drug.
50 Abuse deterrence is an emerging market segment in the global pharmaceutical industry for 
extended release and rapid release prescription control substances (opioids).
51 See Reference 47, page 17.
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do business in this space. Further, as the USA is a key market for Indian-made 
drugs, Indian pharma companies have been innovating to gain a strong foothold 
in this new market segment. This is evident in Zydus Cadila’s recent acquisition 
of Sentynl Therapeutics (USA) for $171 million. Currently, Sentynl holds the 
US market rights for “Abstral,” a unique sublingual abuse deterrent formulation 
of Fentanyl for cancer pain – a product that has no direct market competition.
 (d) Fortifying Domestic R&D and Fostering Innovation. The Indian pharmaceu-
tical companies as well as the policy makers of India have long recognized the 
absolute need to strengthen domestic R&D and nurture innovation opportuni-
ties for creating sustainable competitive advantage. Significant innovation 
opportunities for India include52 3D printing in medical applications across 
product development and commercial manufacturing, increasing pursuit of 
drug device combinations for life cycle management and competitive advan-
tage, innovations in biomaterials expanding possibilities, pervasive use of 
robotics, artificial intelligence and machine learning for developing smart 
devices, and leveraging Internet of Things (IoT) to progress toward a more con-
nected continuum of care.
Not surprisingly, therefore, India’s policy makers know that they have a critical role 
to play in fortifying the innovation ecosystem of India. Accordingly, the Government 
of India declared 2010–2020 as the “Decade of Innovation.” In 2013, the Ministry 
of Science and Technology unveiled a coherent vision for bringing the different 
pieces of the Indian innovation ecosystem together, which states53:
The guiding vision of aspiring Indian STI [Science, Technology, and Innovation] enterprise 
is to accelerate the pace of discovery and delivery of science-led solutions for faster, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. A strong and viable Science, Research and Innovation 
System for High Technology-led path for India (SRISHTI) is the goal of the new STI 
policy.
Therefore, India is embracing many important initiatives such as Make in India54 
and Startup India55 and many others56 shown below to meet its socioeconomic 
goals:
• The National Health Protection Scheme (Ayushman Bharat, 2018). This is the 
largest government funded healthcare program in the world, expected to benefit 







100  million poor families in the country for secondary and tertiary care 
hospitalization – by providing a cover of up to US$ 7720 per family per year.
• Single-window facility to provide consents, approvals, and other information. 
In March 2018, the Drug Controller General of India announced this to boost the 
Make in India initiative.
• Electronic platform to regulate online pharmacies. The Government of India 
announced this initiative to stop any misuse of online pharmacies.
• Drug Price Control Order and the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority. 
The Government of India introduced these initiatives to ensure the affordability 
and availability of medicines.
• The Government of India’s “Pharma Vision 2020.” This is aimed at making 
India a global leader in end-to-end drug manufacture with reduced approval 
time for new facilities.
In support of this vision, the Government of India is striving to create a robust IPR 
regime that can serve as the bedrock of innovative and competitive India. Indeed, 
many countries are closely observing the evolution of Indian IPR regime to see how 
it further leverages the flexibilities offered by TRIPS to advance its own socioeco-
nomic goals while simultaneously promoting its innovation ecosystem and protect-
ing the legitimate business interests of MNCs. Thus, India’s patent reforms are 
having a global impact.57
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India’s generic pharmaceutical producers face numerous challenges after the country’s 
patent law was amended to make it compatible with the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Two amendments were significant: 
introduction of product patent regime covering the area of pharmaceuticals, replacing 
the process patent regime existing earlier, and increase in patent term for pharmaceuti-
cal patents to 20 years, from the earlier 5–7 years (5 years from sealing of patent or 
7 years from the date of application, whichever was lower). India’s pre-TRIPS patent 
regime that did not allow product patents in the pharmaceutical sector provided the 
impetus for the emergence of a generic pharmaceutical industry from the 1980s.
How did the Indian pharmaceutical industry respond to the challenges posed 
by the TRIPS-consistent patent regime, in particular the product patent regime? 
This paper analysed a number of functional parameters to answer this question.
Analysis of the parameters explaining the size and the operational strengths of 
the major companies in the industry did not suggest structural weaknesses in the 
generic companies. They continued to remain the leaders in the industry, both in 
terms of invested capital and size of operations. They remained viable: their 
profit rates were higher than those in most major manufacturing sectors in India.
Although the major generic companies are all producers of generic medi-
cines, they continued to invest sizeable shares of their sales turnover in research 
and development (R&D). They have been active in taking patents, but their fil-
ings in foreign jurisdictions were significantly higher.
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1  Introduction
Since the 1980s, India has had a strong generic pharmaceutical industry that has 
been providing medicines at prices that are among the lowest in the world. The 
credit for the emergence of the generic industry should be given almost entirely to 
the Patents Act enacted in 19701 that replaced the colonial Patents and Designs Act 
of 1911.2 Two key provisions of Patents Act, 1970, were largely instrumental in sup-
porting the growth of local entrepreneurship in the pharmaceutical industry. The 
first was discontinuation of the product patent regime covering all chemicals of the 
1911 Act and introduction of a process patent regime. The second was the shorten-
ing of the period of patent protection for pharmaceutical processes to 5 years from 
grant or 7  years from the date of application, whichever was shorter, as against 
14 years for all other fields of technology. The process patent regime allowed the 
Indian companies to develop alternative processes to produce generic versions of 
proprietary drugs.3
India’s commitments to implement the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)4 changed the favourable conditions enjoyed by 
the generic industry until then. The critical issue was the introduction of the product 
patent regime that restricted the ability of the generic companies to work around 
proprietary processes. The future prospects of these companies, therefore, hinged 
critically on the ability of the Indian policy makers to design a patent law that incor-
porated the flexibilities existing in the TRIPS Agreement.
Two substantial amendments5 were needed to make India’s patent regime fully 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. The first was the amendment of the patent-
able subject matter by allowing patenting of microorganisms and “essentially non- 
biological processes” and increasing the term of patents to 20 years from the date of 
application. The second amendment introduced the product patent regime in the 
1 The Patents Act 1970 (No. 39 of 1970), Gazette of India, 1970-09-21, Part II, Sec. 1.
2 The Indian Patents and Design Act, 1911, Act 2 of 1911.
3 Dhar and Rao (2002) discuss the case of the then leading firm in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Ranbaxy Laboratories.
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C to the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization of April 15, 1994).
5 Another amendment was introduced in 1999 to meet the requirements of Article 70.9 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. India was obligated to provide a so-called mailbox for receiving product patent 
applications from 1 January 1995, well ahead of the introduction of the product patent regime. In 
case patents were granted on any of these applications in a WTO member country, India had to 
provide “exclusive marketing rights” for 5 years or until the rights were granted or rejected in the 
country.
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area of pharmaceuticals. The first two amendments had to be introduced on 1 
January 2000, and the second was introduced on 1 January 2005.
This chapter analyses the performance of the pharmaceutical industry in India 
after the introduction of the TRIPS-compliant patent law. To set the context, the key 
elements of the TRIPS-compliant patent law are discussed in the first section. The 
second section discusses the performance of the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
since India began amending Patents Act, 1970, to make it TRIPS-compliant. This 
exercise uses various indicators to assess the viability of the leading pharmaceutical 
companies when TRIPS-compliant patent standards are being implemented.
2  India’s TRIPS-Compliant Patent Law
One of the distinguishing features of the post-TRIPS patent law in India is that it 
seeks to balance the interests of the patent holder with the imperatives of public 
interest6 through two sets of provisions. The first relates to the scope of patentability 
and the second the compulsory licencing system.7
2.1  Section 3(d): Preventing Grant of Patents on Minor 
Modifications
Indian patent law has an important provision to prevent the grant of patents on 
minor modifications of known substances. Section 3(d) does not allow grant of pat-
ents on “mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result 
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of 
any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known 
process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product 
or following: employs at least one new reactant”. An explanation provided to this 
section says the following: “salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure 
form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and 
other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, 
unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy”. This exclusion 
is aimed at ensuring that a product can be considered for the grant of patent only 
when the applicant can prove that the claimed invention has “enhanced efficacy”8 
over an existing product.
6 This feature of the Indian patent law brings it close to the realisation of the objectives of the 
TRIPS Agreement stated in Article 7: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should [be] to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations”.
7 Pre- and post-grant oppositions are the other important provisions that have been exploited in 
public interest.
8 This was a point made by the Supreme Court when it heard Novartis’ appeal against the rejection 
of its patent claim on an anticancer drug on the ground that it did not meet the standards of Section 
3(d). Details are in the following discussion.
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Discussions in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the adoption of the 
TRIPS Agreement, provides the basis for Section 3(d), in our view. Participants 
dwelled on the problems arising from too short a period of patent protection to 
recoup the returns on investments in research and development (R&D).9 They, 
therefore, argued that new norms and standards of intellectual property (IP) protec-
tion were needed, including longer period of patent protection. This, they opined, 
would sufficiently incentivise R&D activities so that new molecules can be pro-
duced.10 These arguments were consistent with the persuasive position taken by 
Douglass North, who had argued that “development of a patent system and other 
laws protecting intellectual property … encouraged the growth of innovation”.11 
This implies that longer term of patent protection can be justified only when innova-
tors provide innovative products and processes, instead of minor modifications of 
known substances. In other words, it can be argued that providing 20-year patent 
protection for minor modifications of existing substances would tantamount to egre-
gious rent seeking and would therefore be anti-competition and anti-innovation.
Yet another strong case in favour of Section 3(d) is that it is an effective bulwark 
against “evergreening” of patents. Some of the originator companies have made it a 
common practice to create minor variations to proprietary medicines and seek 
another “full” term of patent protection on the trivial modifications and to repeat 
this process for along as possible (hence, the name, “evergreening”).12 This strategy 
works well for these companies as they successfully block new entrants into the 
market even after the patent on the original medicine expires. This issue was high-
lighted by the Technical Committee (better known as the “Mashelkar Committee”) 
that was appointed by the Indian Government to advice whether the Patents Act 
should limit the grant of a patent for pharmaceutical substance only to new chemical 
entities. The Mashelkar Committee recommended that the Patents Act must prevent 
“evergreening of patents”, achieved by “executing trivial and insignificant changes 
to an already existing patented product”.13
The legal validity of Section 3(d) was tested in the case that arose when Novartis 
petitioned against the rejection of the patent claim. The company had applied for a 
patent for the beta crystalline form of its anticancer drug, imatinib mesylate, in 
1998.14 The application was rejected by the Indian Patent Office on three grounds, 
namely, that the claimed invention (i) was anticipated by prior publication, (ii) was 
obvious to a person skilled in the art judging from the disclosure provided in the 
9 GATT 1987, Submissions from Participants on Trade Problems Encountered in Connection with 
Intellectual Property Rights, p. 8.
10 GATT 1988, Compilation of Written Submissions and Oral Statements  – Prepared by the 
Secretariat: Revision, p. 15.
11 North and Thomas (1970, 16).
12 Ali and Rajagopal (2008).
13 Report of the Technical Expert Group on Patent Law Issues 2006, paragraph 5.10.
14 The product patent application followed the “mailbox” procedures that India had put in place on 
1 January 1995.
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patent specifications and (iii) failed to meet the Section 3(d) standards. Novartis 
petitioned before High Court of Madras against the Patent Office ruling on its patent 
application. After the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB)15 became func-
tional in 2007, Novartis filed an appeal against the rejection of its application. When 
the IPAB rejected the patent claim, Novartis filed an appeal before the Supreme 
Court of India.
Novartis petitioned against the decision of the Patent Office in the High Court 
of Madras on two counts: (i) Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, was inconsis-
tent with Articles 1(1) and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement and (ii) Section 3(d) was 
unconstitutional being vague, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 
of India, which guarantees equality before law.16 The Court ruled that it did not 
have the jurisdiction to pass judgement on a provision of an international treaty and 
it therefore refused to comment on Novartis’ contention that Section 3(d) violated, 
in particular, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, which laid down the norms for 
patentable subject matter. However, the High Court made an important observation 
in the context of India’s amendments to its Patents Act to make it compatible with 
the TRIPS Agreement. The Court argued that Article 7 of TRIPS Agreement “pro-
vides enough elbow room to a member country” to comply with its obligations 
under the Agreement “by bringing a law in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare and to a balance of rights and obligations” and added that Article 1 
of the TIPS Agreement “enables a member country free to determine the appropri-
ate method of implementing the provisions of this agreement within their own 
legal system and practice”.
As regards the contention of the petitioner that Section 3(d) was unconstitutional 
as it was vague and arbitrary, and that it violated Article 14 of India’s Constitution, 
the High Court observed that the legislature had clearly laid down the parameters 
the any patent applicant had to meet for obtaining a patent: “if a discovery is made 
from a known substance, a duty is cast upon the patent applicant to show that the 
discovery had resulted in the enhancement of a known efficacy of that substance and 
in deciding whether to grant a Patent or not on such new discovery”. The Court 
ruled that Section 3(d) was not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 
It was the Court’s understanding that the Government of India had amended the 
Patents Act with the objective “to prevent evergreening; to provide easy access to 
the citizens of this country to life saving drugs and to discharge their Constitutional 
obligation of providing good health care to its citizens”.17 Further, the debates in the 
Parliament on the third amendment of Patents Act showed that “welfare of the peo-
ple of the country was in the mind of the Parliamentarians”18 and the Madras High 
Court, therefore, rejected Novartis’ petition arguing that Section 3(d) violated 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
15 IPAB was established by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, which was the Second Amendment 
of the Patents Act in fulfilment of India’s TRIPS commitments.
16 Novartis AG v. Union of India, High Court of Madras, paragraph 2.
17 Novartis AG v. Union of India, High Court of Madras, paragraph 19.
18 Novartis AG v. Union of India, High Court of Madras, paragraph 15.
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Yet another interesting observation of the High Court was regarding the obliga-
tions that the TRIPS Agreement brought on the WTO member states: “Article 7 of 
[the TRIPS Agreement] provides enough elbow room to a member country in com-
plying with [the] obligations by bringing a law in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare and to a balance of rights and obligations. Article 1 of 
[Agreement] enables a member country free to determine the appropriate method 
of implementing the provisions of this agreement within their own legal system 
and practice”.19 Thus, the Court endorsed the interpretation that the TRIPS 
Agreement provided a number of flexibilities that the governments could creatively 
use to safeguard public interest.
Novartis filed an appeal against the ruling of the Patent Office after the IPAB was 
established in 2007. IPAB reversed the findings of the Patent Office that the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate did not stand the tests of novelty and nonob-
viousness. However, the Board rejected the appeal of Novartis against the Patent 
Office decision on the ground that the claimed invention had failed to meet the 
requirements of Section 3(d). The Board explanation of its decision was as follows: 
India has established “a requirement of higher standard of inventive step by intro-
ducing the amended section 3(d) of the Act, what is patentable in other countries 
will not be patentable in India. [T]he object of amended section 3(d) of the Act is 
nothing but a requirement of higher standard of inventive step in the law particularly 
for the drug/pharmaceutical substances”.20
The Supreme Court of India heard the appeal of Novartis against the decision of 
the IPAB. The Court examined Novartis’ petition in light of the criteria for inven-
tive step laid down by India’s Patents Act, in Article 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja). In particu-
lar, the Court asked if the product for which Novartis claimed patent protection 
qualified as a “new product” which was an invention that involved technical 
advance over existing knowledge and made the invention “not obvious” to “a per-
son skilled in the art”.
Upon its examination of Novartis’ claims, especially on the use of Section 
3(d) by the IPAB to reject its application for a patent for imatinib mesylate, the 
apex court made a critical observation regarding Section 3(d). This section, 
according to the Supreme Court of India, “clearly sets up a second tier of qualify-
ing standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave 
the door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check any 
attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious 
grounds”.21 The Supreme Court thus denied patent rights to Novartis for its anti-
cancer drug, imatinib mesylate, since the claimed invention, in its view, did not 
meet the test of novelty and inventive steps besides failing to meet the require-
ments of Section 3(d).
19 Novartis AG v. Union of India, High Court of Madras, 2007, paragraph 15.
20 Novartis AG v. Union of India, The Supreme Court of India, 2013, paragraph 17.
21 Novartis AG v. Union of India, The Supreme Court of India, 2013, paragraph 103.
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2.2  Compulsory Licencing System
Public interest considerations resulted in the adoption of the system of compulsory 
licensing (CL) in India. These provisions can be invoked where the patent monopo-
lies are in conflict with public interest. India’s Patents Act included the CL provi-
sions, according to which, an application for the grant of CL can be made only after 
3 years from the date of grant of the patent unless exceptional circumstances like 
national emergency or extreme urgency can be used to justify the grant of a licence 
on an earlier date. Three broad grounds for the grant of the CL have been spelt out 
in Section 84 of the Patents Act: (a) reasonable requirements of the public with 
respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, (b) the patented invention 
is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price and (c) the patented 
invention is not worked in the territory of India. However, a CL can be granted only 
when the patentee is paid adequate remuneration taking into account the economic 
value of the authorisation.
The provisions for the grant of CL are wholly consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement as clarified in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.22 In the Doha Declaration, adopted in 2001, Ministers of WTO Member 
States agreed that “TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members 
from taking measures to protect public health”. More importantly, Ministers agreed 
that the “Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all”. And last, but not the least, the Declaration 
affirmed that “[E]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”.
India has exercised a high degree of prudence in the use of CL provisions. In the 
post-TRIPS regime, there has been a solitary instance of the use of these provisions. 
This was done when Bayer Corporation, the American subsidiary of the German 
firm, Bayer AG, which held the patent on the anticancer drug sorafenib tosylate 
(sold under the brand name, Nexavar), charged unreasonably high price for the 
product and also did not make the drug available in sufficient quantities even through 
imports. The generic manufacturer Natco Pharma Ltd. applied for the grant of CL 
for domestically producing sorafenib tosylate, assuring that it could sell the medi-
cine at Rs. 8000 (nearly $ 130) for a month’s supply, which was a fraction of Bayer 
Corporation’s price of Rs. 2,80,000 ($ 4600). Ruling on Natco Pharma’s applica-
tion, the Controller of Patents observed that Bayer was not making the patented 
invention available to the public at a reasonably affordable price and therefore 
granted a non-exclusive CL to the applicant.23 Natco Pharma Ltd. was required to 
pay Bayer Corporation royalty at the rate of 6% of the net sales of the medicine.24
22 WTO (2001).
23 Natco Pharma Ltd. vs Bayer Corporation: Application for Compulsory Licence Under Section 
84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 In Respect of Patent No.215758., Order issued on March 2012.
24 Bayer Corporation challenged this ruling by the Controller of Patents in the Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board (IPAB). The IPAB upheld the ruling. Bayer Corporation challenged IPAB’s deci-
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The above discussion shows the ways in which India used some of the available 
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and has been able to provide a regime of patent 
protection in which the rights of the patent holder have been balanced with public inter-
est imperatives. Importantly, the two crucial provisions that were discussed here have 
withstood scrutiny in its course of implementation and also upheld by the judiciary.
3  Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 
Since the Implementation of TRIPS Agreement
The previous section discussed the major amendments to Patents Act, 1970, to bring 
India’s patent regime in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement on TRIPS, 
which included the introduction of the product patent regime. The generic compa-
nies that had thrived in the absence of a product patent regime, this amendment, 
therefore brought significant challenges. However, the Indian government fully uti-
lised the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and introduced several provisions so 
as to ensure that the generic industry could remain viable.
3.1  Economic Performance of Leading Companies
Did using flexibilities have the desired impact on the generic industry? This section 
will use a number of indicators to answer this question.
3.1.1  Net Worth of 20 Largest Pharmaceutical Companies
The first indicator that we shall use, one which provides evidence of the market 
value of the companies, is “net worth”. Table 1 provides the details.
One of the distinctive features of the top 20 companies in the Indian pharmaceu-
tical industry is that, measured in terms of the book value, domestic companies were 
ahead of the affiliates of foreign companies, like Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline. In 
fact, this feature has been seen during the past three decades, i.e. ever since the 
generic companies were able to establish themselves in the industry.25
After the introduction of the post-TRIPS patent regime, the pharmaceutical 
industry in India displayed two-paced growth. During the previous decade, net 
worth of all the large domestic generic companies registered very high rates of 
growth. However, in the current decade, there has been a perceptible growth slow-
down, not only of the industry but also of some of the companies like Dr. Reddy’s 
and Cipla that have driven the consolidation and growth of the Indian industry since 
the 1990s. In recent years, Sun Pharmaceutical and Lupin have emerged as two of 
sion before the Bombay High Court (Bayer Corporation vs Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1323 
of 2013). The High Court once again rejected Bayer Corporation’s contention against the grant of 
CL to Natco Pharma Ltd.
25 Dhar and Rao 2002, Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into the Global Economy: 
A case study of the Pharmaceutical Industry in India, p. 18.
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the largest leading companies in terms of their net worth. Although these companies 
grew much faster than the industry average, they were unable to balk the trend of 
slowing growth rates. Sun Pharmaceutical was able to increase its net worth nearly 
threefold since 2013–2014, largely due to its acquisition of Ranbaxy Laboratories, 
which was the undisputed leader of the Indian generic industry until the middle of 
the previous decade. Among the affiliates of foreign companies in the top 20 list, 
only Pfizer experienced steady growth in its net worth in the new millennium.
3.1.2  Sales Turnover of Top 20 Pharmaceutical Companies
The trends in the market presence of the largest generic pharmaceutical companies 
in India measured in terms of their sales turnover are similar to that of their net 
worth. After growing impressively in the previous decade, sales turnovers of most 
Table 1 Net worth of 20 largest pharmaceutical companies
Company name
Net worth in 
2016–17 (US $ 
mn)









3165.7 28.8 33.6 32.6
Lupin Ltd. 2242.0 79.5 37.1 24.8
Cipla Ltd. 1941.7 22.8 25.2 5.4
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 
Ltd.
1759.6 45.6 21.8 5.8
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd.
1431.4 20.6 44.9 29.0
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 1281.7 28.5 19.6 21.2
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 999.3 10.9 21.9 14.8
Biocon Ltd. 992.1 79.9 17.4 25.4
Divi’s Laboratories Ltd. 820.5 32.2 35.7 13.9
Torrent Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd.
675.6 11.6 21.1 21.2
Alkem Laboratories Ltd. 666.3 40.8 20.3 12.2
Strides Shasun Ltd. 490.3 17.2 40.3 19.1
Ipca Laboratories Ltd. 375.5 17.3 21.6 8.6
Pfizer Ltd.a 366.9 21.4 25.8 32.7
GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.a
307.7 17.9 11.2 −3.0
Natco Pharma Ltd. 257.2 26.0 19.9 23.2
Sanofi India Ltd.a 255.6 26.3 12.0 4.1
Ajanta Pharma Ltd. 228.1 −3.1 14.8 33.6
J B Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
210.5 16.6 17.5 2.5
Abbott India Ltd.a 210.4 11.9 16.3 11.8
Average 28.5 24.3 17.2
Source: Prowess Database provided by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), down-
loaded on 1 March 2018
Note: a denotes affiliates of foreign companies in India
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companies in this decade were perceptively slower (Table 2). The two exceptions 
were Sun Pharmaceutical and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals; the sales turnovers of the 
two companies not only registering the fastest expansions in the industry, their 
growth rates in the current decade were the highest since the turn of the 
millennium.
The growth in sales registered by the leading generic producers in the early 
1990s led to a complete transformation of the composition of market leaders in the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry. In 1994–1995, five of the ten top companies in 
terms of sales were the associates of foreign companies, with GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (then Glaxo India Ltd.) as the market leader. But two decades 
later, nine of the top ten sellers were generic companies.
Table 2 Sales turnover of top 20 pharmaceutical companies
Companies
Sales in 2016–
2017 (US $ mn)







Lupin Ltd. 1933.7 23.5 20.1 12.6
Cipla Ltd. 1665.0 25.9 13.0 3.6
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 1483.7 12.5 18.9 11.4
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 
Ltd.
1474.4 31.0 22.6 2.1
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd.
1228.0 27.3 23.5 35.2
Sun Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd.
1175.7 18.7 11.3 31.7
Alkem Laboratories Ltd. 706.0 −5.0 15.4 12.2
Torrent Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd.
691.9 10.7 17.2 12.6
Divi’s Laboratories Ltd. 616.9 16.1 31.8 10.9
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 494.6 22.1 11.7 3.5
Ipca Laboratories Ltd. 481.2 14.3 17.8 0.9
GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.a
452.8 9.5 5.8 1.0
Abbott India Ltd.a 443.9 5.5 19.5 9.6
Biocon Ltd. 398.8 40.2 14.1 4.9
Sanofi India Ltd.a 356.4 9.4 5.2 7.3
Wockhardt Ltd. 348.5 2.9 15.3 −3.7
Strides Shasun Ltd. 321.0 13.1 14.8 25.9
Pfizer Ltd.a 310.7 15.2 5.9 11.7
Natco Pharma Ltd. 306.2 14.9 15.8 32.0
Ajanta Pharma Ltd. 276.5 11.9 18.0 18.0
Average 1933.7 16.0 15.9 12.2
Source: Same as Table 1
Note: a denotes affiliates of foreign companies in India
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Over the past two decades, therefore, there has been an interesting transforma-
tion in the composition of top five companies in terms of sales turnover. In 1994–
1995, the top five companies in terms of sales turnover included three affiliates of 
foreign companies (GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis and Aventis) and two generic com-
panies (Ranbaxy and Cipla). By 2005–2006 this group included four generic com-
panies (Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s, Cipla and Lupin) and one foreign affiliate 
(GlaxoSmithKline) with Ranbaxy at the top. In the current decade, only generic 
companies have figured in this group, with Cipla establishing itself as the market 
leader in most years. Cipla was the first company in the Indian industry to cross the 
threshold of 1-billion-dollar sales turnover in 2007–2008; by 2016–2017, five more 
companies figured in the billion-dollar league.
One aspect of the operations of the companies listed in Table 2 that has not been 
not captured is the growing importance of their global operations. For example, in 
2016–2017, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries reported that foreign sales accounted for 
68% of its revenue.26 Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, too, showed a similar tendency; 
foreign sales were 58% of the company’s total revenue.27
Thus, the top 20 companies in the Indian pharmaceutical industry continued to 
expand their presence, both in the domestic and international markets, notwith-
standing the uncertainties they faced following the introduction of the TRIPS- 
compliant patent regime.
3.1.3  Profitability Ratios of Top 20 Pharmaceutical Companies
Pharmaceutical companies having the highest profitability ratios (or, profit to sales 
ratios) in the current decade are shown in Table 3. Except two exceptions, all com-
panies included in the above table showed double-digit profit to sales ratios since 
2011. But these figures were significantly lower than the ratios in the second half of 
the previous decade.
The largest companies were not among those having high profitability ratios. 
One possible explanation for this is that global operations of these companies have 
not been included in the data presented in Table  3. Thus, Sun Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd., which does not even figure in the list of top 20 companies having 
high profitability ratios, reported net profits of 23% in 2016–2017 when the com-
pany’s foreign sales are also considered.28 This figure was above the average profit-
ability ratio for the industry since 2011–2012.
A noteworthy feature of the pharmaceutical industry is that it is the industry with 
the highest profitability ratio among all the leading sectors of the Indian industry 
(Fig.  1). Interestingly, the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry increased 
almost consistently through the period. It needs to be mentioned here that the phar-
maceutical industry had outperformed other sectors of the industry despite facing 
significant uncertainties arising from the changes in the patent regime.
26 Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 2017–2018, Annual Report, p. 12.
27 Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. 2017, Annual Report, p. 43.
28 Sun Pharmaceutical 2017, Sun Pharma reports Q4 and FY17 results.
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Fig. 1 Profitability ratios in different industries in India. (Source: Same as Table 1)








Strides Shasun Ltd. 8.3 4.2 58.3
Divi’s Laboratories Ltd. 17.9 32.1 28.4
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 11.0 18.4 24.4




Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 11.3 14.5 22.0
Ajanta Pharma Ltd. 5.6 7.2 21.5
Natco Pharma Ltd. 0.4 15.4 19.5
Pfizer Ltd. 8.6 23.3 18.2
F D C Ltd. 17.4 17.5 17.6
Alkem Laboratories Ltd. 13.0 16.4 17.5




Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. 17.0 16.6 15.5
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 7.3 11.4 14.0
Cipla Ltd. 15.9 16.9 13.4
Sanofi India Ltd. 11.5 16.7 13.2
Wockhardt Ltd. 16.4 −6.6 11.9
Ipca Laboratories Ltd. 9.0 11.4 9.4
Abbott India Ltd. 17.3 9.2 9.1
Source: Same as Table 1
Note: a denotes affiliate of foreign company in India
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3.2  Indian Industry in Global Markets
We had mentioned in our earlier discussion that the generic pharmaceutical industry 
performed significantly better in the international markets. This was essentially 
because the leading companies of this industry were considerably more export- 
oriented as compared to those belonging to other industries. The trend towards 
enhancing the export-orientation of the industry had begun in the early 1990s, which 
went through a rapid consolidation in the subsequent years. This was particularly 
noticeable in case of the large generic firms in the industry. Table 4 shows that in 
recent years, foreign markets were substantially more important than the domestic 
market for several companies, including the large companies like Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories and Cipla Ltd. Between 2011 and 2017, 74% of the sales of Dr. 
Reddy’s Laboratories were, on an average, in foreign markets, while for Cipla Ltd., 
the corresponding figure was nearly 51%. It is also important to note that these 
companies have steadily increased their export orientation over time. Sun 
Pharmaceutical Industries did not report export figures in 2016–2017, which 








Marksans Pharma Ltd. 21.2 26.1 97.5
Hikal Ltd. 79.6 78.5 77.5
Granules India Ltd. 57.4 73.5 76.5
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 
Ltd.
53.0 63.1 73.9
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 48.7 59.9 73.8
Neuland Laboratories Ltd. 57.2 68.3 71.4
Kopran Ltd. 26.3 53.7 70.2
Shilpa Medicare Ltd. 53.3 73.3 64.8
Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 36.0 38.6 55.2
Cipla Ltd. 35.9 50.6 50.7
Orchid Pharma Ltd. 79.2 68.9 48.4
Biocon Ltd. 48.3 44.1 46.4
Nectar Lifesciences Ltd. 17.2 37.5 45.6
Wanbury Ltd. 37.2 42.0 43.0
Indoco Remedies Ltd. 6.1 24.2 35.0




Panacea Biotech Ltd. 8.5 26.5 32.9
Unichem Laboratories Ltd. 8.9 19.2 31.7
Sanofi India Ltd.a 18.4 20.5 21.2
Average for the top 20 
companies
36.9 46.4 54.1
Source: Same as Table 1
Note: a denotes affiliate of foreign company in India
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explains its absence from Table 4, but in 2015–2016, 63% of its sales were in for-
eign markets. The company met its international obligations through its subsidiaries 
located in other countries.
In contrast, affiliates of foreign companies operating in India do not engage sig-
nificantly in exports; their production capacities in the country were increasingly 
being used for satisfying India’s internal demand. This tendency stood out in case of 
the affiliates of some of the largest companies in the global industry like 
GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer, which have reduced their exports from India since the 
middle of previous decade.
The strong performance of the generic industry in the global markets resulted 
from a number of its inherent advantages. It has been argued that Indian companies 
have lower costs – estimated to be one-eighth in R&D activities and one-fifth in 
manufacturing – as compared to the Western companies.29 The cost advantages are 
most pronounced in respect of lower fixed asset costs and labour costs, where the 
costs in India can be one-eighth of the cost in the United States. Table 5 shows the 
trends in India’s trade in pharmaceutical products.
Over the past two decades, India’s total trade in pharmaceutical products 
increased from less than US$ 2 billion to more than US $27 billion. This expansion 
came on the back of a strong export performance, which, as the table above shows, 
increased from just over US$ 1 billion dollars in 1996 to over US$ 20 billion in 
2016. Importantly, the pharmaceutical sector has been one of the few manufacturing 
sectors to have consistently increased its net foreign exchange earnings. Also, over 
the past 2 years, when India’s exports have generally experienced uncertainties, the 
pharmaceutical industry was the only one among the manufacturing sector to have 
registered a healthy export growth (Table 6).
India’s place in the global market as the supplier of cheap generics is confirmed 
by the pharmaceutical industry’s growing presence in the market for formulations. 
Until the beginning of the current decade, exports of the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) and the formulations were almost at par, but in the period since, 
exports of formulations have steadily increased, while exports of APIs have stag-
nated (Table 7).
29 Grace, Cheri (2004), The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry 
Prospects in India and China: Considerations for Access to Medicines, p. 8.
Table 5 India’s pharmaceutical trade – exports vs imports (in US $ billions)
Years Exports Imports Trade balance
1996 1.2 0.7 0.6
2000 1.9 0.8 1.1
2005 5.2 2.1 3.1
2010 11.4 5.5 5.9
2012 16.6 7.3 9.3
2014 18.4 7.8 10.6
2016 20.1 7.4 12.7
Source: Authors’ estimates using UN Comtrade database
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In 1995–1996, more than one-half of the exports of formulations by Indian 
generic companies were destined to Europe and Asia. Two decades later, the share 
of these two regions declined to a quarter. This decline, however, was not because 
of the decline in the value of exports but rather the expansion of exports to other 
regions. Decline in the share of Europe and Asia was matched by the expansion of 
exports to North America and Africa. In 2016, North America was the single largest 
market for India’s formulations, with a 41% share. Exports to this region grew from 
a mere $60 million in 1996 to more than $5 billion in 2016. Penetration of Indian 
generic companies in Africa was also particularly noticeable. Between 2003 and 
2016, exports of Indian formulations to Africa increased nearly tenfold, from 
$270 million to almost $3 billion.
The United States was the single largest market for Indian formulations with a 
39% share. This market had expanded from less than $300 million in 2005 to over 
$5.2 billion in 2016. The relative importance of the European Union as a market for 
Indian generics had, however, fallen during the same period. The chart below pro-
vides a summary of the main destinations of Indian formulations (Chart 1).
India’s place in the global market as a supplier of generic medicines is somewhat 
diminished by the fact that it is now a major importer of APIs. Between 2005 and 
2016, API imports have increased more than threefold. Exports of APIs have also 
expanded, almost doubling between 2005 and 2016. China has emerged as India’s 
Table 6 India’s trade in pharmaceutical products by main categories (Figs. in US $billions)
Years
Active pharmaceutical ingredients Formulations
Exports Imports Trade balance Exports Imports Trade balance
1996 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.6
2000 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.7
2005 2.8 1.6 1.2 2.4 0.5 1.9
2010 5.2 3.9 1.3 6.2 1.5 4.7
2012 6.9 5.2 1.8 9.7 2.1 7.5
2014 6.7 5.8 0.8 11.7 2.0 9.7
2016 6.9 5.2 1.7 13.2 2.2 11.0
Source: Authors’ estimates using UN Comtrade database
Table 7 Exports of generic formulations to major regions (% of total in parenthesis)
Years Africa Asia EU27a North America South America
1996 0.1 (15.1) 0.2 (26.1) 0.2 (23.3) 0.1 (8.9) 0.02 (2.3)
2000 0.2 (21.6) 0.3 (30.0) 0.1 (15.4) 0.1 (7.6) 0.04 (4.6)
2005 0.5 (20.3) 0.6 (24.4) 0.4 (17.9) 0.3 (12.8) 0.1 (5.2)
2010 1.5 (24.5) 1.1 (17.1) 1.0 (15.6) 1.7 (28.2) 0.2 (3.7)
2012 2.2 (22.7) 1.6 (16.6) 1.4 (14.3) 3.2 (32.8) 0.4 (3.7)
2014 2.9 (24.5) 1.9 (16.3) 1.5 (13.1) 4.0 (33.9) 0.5 (4.4)
2016 2.9 (22.0) 2.1 (15.8) 1.6 (12.0) 5.4 (40.6) 0.4 (3.2)
Source: Authors’ estimates using UN Comtrade database
Note: aEU-27 in the UN Comtrade database is an economic grouping created for statistical pur-
poses. The Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) provides EU-27 data
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largest supplier of APIs, accounting for nearly two-thirds of its total imports from 
its northern neighbour (Chart 2).
3.3  Penetration of Indian Generics into Industrially Advanced 
Countries: The Case of the United States
Since the mid-1980s, Indian generic manufacturers benefited from a series of 
changes in the regulatory framework adopted by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which explicitly favoured the generic drugs. The most 
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Chart 2 India: sources of imports of APIs
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significant of these was the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 
1984 (better known as “the Hatch-Waxman Act”) that created opportunities for mar-
keting of generics or the so-called abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs). The 
Hatch-Waxman Act established the ANDA approval process, which allows lower-
priced generic versions of previously approved innovator drugs to be brought into 
the market. The Hatch-Waxman Act established bioequivalence as the basis for 
approving generic copies of drug products. This allows the FDA to grant approvals 
to market generic versions of proprietary drugs without going through the costly 
and duplicative clinical trials for establishing the safety and efficacy of the 
generics.
An ANDA contains data which is submitted to FDA for the review and potential 
approval of a generic drug product. Once approved, an applicant may manufacture 
and market the generic drug to provide a safe, effective, lower-cost alternative to 
the brand-name drug. All approved products, both innovator and generic, are listed 
in FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations 
(Orange Book).
Generic drug applications are termed “abbreviated” because they are generally 
not required to include preclinical (animal) and clinical (human) data to establish 
safety and effectiveness. Instead, generic applicants must scientifically demonstrate 
that their product performs in the same manner as the innovator drug. One-way 
applicants demonstrate that a generic product performs in the same way as the inno-
vator drug is the time it takes the generic drug to reach the bloodstream in healthy 
volunteers. This demonstration of “bioequivalence” gives the rate of absorption, or 
bioavailability, of the generic drug, which can then be compared to that of the inno-
vator drug. To be approved by FDA, the generic version must deliver the same 
amount of active ingredients into a patient’s bloodstream in the same amount of 
time as the innovator drug.
Market penetration of generic drugs increased rapidly after the enactment of 
Hatch-Waxman Act. By the early years of the new millennium, generic drugs com-
prised of more than 47% of the prescriptions filled for pharmaceutical products, up 
from 19%, when the Act came on the statute book.30 Generic drugs continued to 
gain in popularity in the United States; the Office of Generic Drugs of the FDA 
reports that currently, 9 out of 10 prescriptions filled are for generic drugs.31 
Increasing the availability of generic drugs helps to create competition in the mar-
ketplace, which then helps to make treatment more affordable and increases access 
to healthcare for more patients. One estimate shows that due to the availability of 
low-cost generics, the healthcare system in the United States was able to save 
$263 billion in 2016 and nearly $1.7 trillion over the past decade.32
30 US Federal Trade Commission, Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy 2002, p. i.
31 US Food and Drug Administration, Orange Book: Preface (online publication).
32 Association for Accessible Medicines, Generic Drug Access and Savings in the United States, 
report prepared by the IMS Health Institute 2017, 20.
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The market penetration made by the Indian generic companies can be seen from 
the approvals they have been receiving from the FDA for the marketing products on 
the basis of their safety and efficacy. The approvals published in the “Orange Book” 
have been based on clearly defined criteria.33
Table 8 and Chart 3 show that until the late 1990s, Indian generic manufacturers 
received very few approvals from FDA to market their products in the United States. 
Although this trend had changed from early 2000s, it was only after the middle of 
the previous decade that there was quantum leap in the number of approvals received 
by Indian companies. Sun Pharmaceutical and Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., along with 
their group companies, were the main beneficiaries. A notable feature of the market-
ing approvals obtained was that the Indian generics have a major share of prescrip-
tion drugs.
3.4  The Technology Dimension
The pharmaceutical industry can be divided into three product groupings, viz. bulk 
drugs, intermediates and formulations. While bulk drug production can be sustained 
over a long period only through sustained involvement in R&D activities, formula-
tion production can be carried out with relatively low levels of technological 
sophistication.
During the past decade, however, the R&D profile of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry has undergone major changes. The most obvious of these is the manifold 
increase in the spending on R&D, particularly since the beginning of the current 
decade. The increase in R&D intensity (R&D to sales) of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry since 1999–2000 is the other significant aspect. This is an indication that 
the pharmaceutical industry in India is allocating increasing amounts of its sales 
turnover towards R&D spending (Chart 4).
Until the end of 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry, like other major industries, 
was spending only less than 1.5% of sales on R&D. But from the beginning of cur-
rent decade, there is a steep increase in the R&D spending, from 2% in 2000–2001 
to nearly 7% in 2015–2016. This trend is strongly reinforced by the R&D-intensive 
companies in industry (Table 9).
The top 20 companies in terms of R&D intensities were all manufacturers of 
generic medicines. Major companies, including Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Dr. 
33 FDA classifies as therapeutically equivalent those products that meet the following general crite-
ria: (1) they are approved as safe and effective; (2) they are pharmaceutical equivalents in that they 
(a) contain identical amounts of the same active drug ingredient in the same dosage form and route 
of administration and (b) meet compendia or other applicable standards of strength, quality, purity 
and identity; (3) they are bioequivalent in that (a) they do not present a known or potential bio-
equivalence problem, and they meet an acceptable in vitro standard, or (b) if they do present such 
a known or potential problem, they are shown to meet an appropriate bioequivalence standard; (4) 
they are adequately labelled; and (5) they are manufactured in compliance with current Good 
Manufacturing Practice regulations (for details, see US FDA. Orange Book: Preface, 2018).
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Reddy’s Laboratories, Cipla and Lupin Laboratories, registered upward trends in 
their R&D intensities from the beginning of the 2000s.
Globally, pharmaceutical industry is an R&D-intensive industry, with several 
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Chart 3 Trends in FDA approvals received by Indian companies (top ten recipients). (Source: 
Orange Book, accessed from: https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/index.cfm)
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Chart 4 Ratio of R&D to sales of major sectors in India. (Source: Same as Table 1)
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Tables 9 and 10 show that in 2017, Indian generics were lagging behind the 
research-intensive global companies. But, as mentioned above, the encouraging fact 
for the Indian pharmaceutical companies is that a number of companies have gradu-
ated into the league of companies that have double-digit R&D intensities.
A quick check on the R&D output of some of the leading companies can be made 
through their patenting activity. Table  11 shows that there is a correspondence 
between the worldwide patent filings of the companies and their R&D spending. 
However, while Dr. Reddy’s and Lupin Laboratories had either remained range 
bound or had increased their patent filings between 2010 and 2017, Cipla had 
decreased their patenting activity during this period.
Table 12 provides the data on the patents granted to a few major Indian compa-
nies in India, after the introduction of the product patent regime. Immediately after 
the introduction of the product patent regime in pharmaceuticals, the leading Indian 
companies obtained a significant number of patents in India. However, in the cur-
rent decade, these companies were unable to maintain the momentum.








Panacea Biotec Ltd. 3.0 6.1 13.7
Lupin Ltd. 3.6 8.0 12.7
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. 4.0 8.7 12.5
Suven Life Sciences Ltd. 6.8 19.9 11.9






Wockhardt Ltd. 5.2 3.0 8.8
Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. 1.8 8.3 6.9
Ajanta Pharma Ltd. 0.6 3.5 6.1







Natco Pharma Ltd. 0.8 2.8 5.3
Biocon Ltd. 2.4 5.3 4.9
Unichem Laboratories Ltd. 1.8 3.9 4.5
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. 1.2 3.6 4.1
Orchid Pharma Ltd. 1.7 3.4 3.8
Ipca Laboratories Ltd. 1.9 3.0 3.7
Indoco Remedies Ltd. 0.8 2.0 3.1
Divi’s Laboratories Ltd. 1.8 1.2 1.0
Average 3.2 5.8 7.1
Source: CMIE, Prowess database
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Another interesting fact is the patenting activities of the leading generic companies in 
India and in other jurisdictions were significantly different. While companies like Lupin 
Laboratories and Natco had increased their worldwide patent filings, they had stopped 
filing for patents in the Indian Patent Office. This behaviour needs to be analysed look-
ing at their firm-level characteristics, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Table 10 R&D intensity of 



















Source: The 2017 EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard (accessed from: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
scoreboard17.html)
Table 11 Worldwide patent filings by major Indian companies by year of publication
Years Dr. Reddy’s Lupin Cipla Natco Pharma Sun Pharmaceutical
2000 10 7 5 0 0
2005 54 35 61 15 5
2010 75 40 68 13 5
2015 53 76 71 14 4
2017 65 74 44 17 1
Source: Espacenet Patent search, https://worldwide.espacenet.com
Table 12 Patents granted to 






Cipla Ltd. 19 4
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories 22 0
Lupin Ltd. 6 0
Natco Pharma 16 0
Panacea Biotech Ltd. 8 7
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries 
Ltd.
8 1
Source: Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 
India
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4  Concluding Remarks
The strong presence of companies producing generic medicines has given a special 
character to the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The growth of these companies and 
their subsequent consolidation can largely be attributed to the Patents Act enacted in 
1970. This legislation had two key features that provided space for the growth of the 
generic companies. First, the Patent Law, 1970, allowed grant of only process pat-
ents for chemicals, including pharmaceuticals, and second, the term of patent pro-
tection was shorter for pharmaceutical patents. The process patent regime, in 
particular, enabled the generic manufacturers to develop alternative processes for 
proprietary products that were already in the market.
India’s accession to the TRIPS Agreement led to fundamental changes in the 
country’s patent regime. The two key provisions of Patents Act, 1970, which the 
generic companies had benefited from, were amended. Product patents were intro-
duced to cover pharmaceutical innovations, and a uniform period of patent protec-
tion of 20 years was introduced.
However, the Government of India exploited the flexibilities of the TRIPS 
Agreement and introduced two provisions in the amended Patents Act that could lessen 
the impact on the generic companies. The first was Section 3(d) that does not allow 
patents on minor modifications of existing product. This objective of this provision was 
to eliminate the possibilities of “evergreening of patents”. Section 3(d) ensures that 
public domain allows the generic companies to continue operating in the industry.
The second provision provided by the Indian Patents Act is the possibility for the 
grant of compulsory licencing if the patent is not worked in India or the product result-
ing from the exploitation of the patent has exorbitant prices. Importantly, both these 
flexibilities have successfully stood scrutiny, including by the highest court of the land.
This study analysed the performance of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the 
post-TRIPS patent regime. Our analysis showed that the leading generic companies 
of the industry have mixed performance. While most indicators exhibited an upward 
trend through the previous decade, in the present decade, there has been some slow-
ing of the growth rates. These figures do not provide conclusive evidence about the 
health of the industry.
The industry as a whole and some of the leading companies in particular have 
shown considerable improvement in R&D intensity since the previous decade. An 
indicator of the better performance of the industry has been the increase in its pat-
enting activity, as reflected in the figures of the major companies.
For the past two decades, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has emerged a 
global player, by being a supplier of affordable medicines to a large number of 
countries. Some of the leading companies, including the largest company, namely, 
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., have larger shares of their businesses in the 
global markets. The major markets of the industry are in the developed world, espe-
cially in the United States. In this market, the Indian pharmaceutical companies 
have been able to exploit the opportunities provided to the generic companies by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which provides an easier set of regulatory require-
ments for these companies to obtain marketing approval.
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In an ever-shifting world of intellectual property protection, the Indian pharma-
ceutical industry faces considerable challenges. The flexibilities provided by the 
Indian Patents Act, which has provided some space to the manufacturers of generic 
medicines in the country, have been critically commented on by two of India’s larg-
est economic partners, namely, the United States and the EU. The United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) has been conducting annual investigations under 
Special 30134 since 1989, and in each annual investigation, India has been named 
either as a “Priority Foreign Country” or has been included it in the “Priority Watch 
List”. The former designation is for countries “that have the most onerous or egre-
gious acts, policies, or practices and whose acts, policies, or practices have the 
greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant US products” and the 
latter for countries in which “problems exist … with respect to IP protection, 
enforcement, or market access for persons relying on [intellectual property]”.35
In 2014, the European Commission adopted the “Strategy for the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries” for “fighting IPR 
infringements in third countries…”.36 As a part of this strategy, the Commission iden-
tified India as a country, which has “[r]estrictive patentability criteria combined with 
difficulties to enforce patents granted, as well as very broad criteria being applied for 
granting compulsory licenses or for revoking patents” that “make effective patent pro-
tection in India very difficult, notably for pharmaceuticals and chemicals …”.37
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China has achieved remarkable results for the protection of new plant varieties 
since it promulgated and implemented “Regulations for the Protection of New 
Plant Varieties” in 1997. However, as a whole, the level of legislation is still at an 
early stage, primarily referencing to the UPOV Convention and the legal content 
of other countries. The legislation has not yet set up the ultimate goal and reason-
able protection measures that would meet China’s current actual needs. The 
chapter discusses the status of protection of new plant varieties in China and 
characteristics. It then analyzes the major deficiencies and shortcomings of exist-
ing laws and explores the main reasons behind. This chapter proposes a number 
of specific measures for perfecting the legal system for the protection of new 
plant varieties in China before it ends with a conclusion.
Keywords
New plant variety · UPOV · Variety name rights · Breeder’s right
1  Status of Protection of New Plant Varieties in China
1.1  The General Background
China is one of the oldest civilizations in the world and has a vast territory. From 
north to south, it spans the cold temperate zone, temperate zone, warm temperate 
zone, subtropical zone, and tropical zone. There is a large variety of plants growing 
on this vast land. According to scientific investigation, there are more than 30,000 
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kinds of higher plants in China, ranking third after Brazil and Colombia. This rich 
plant resource has laid a solid foundation for the cultivation of new plant varieties in 
China and for the enhancement of the protection of new plant varieties.
In the long historical development of China, the hardworking and wise Chinese 
farmers have domesticated and cultivated a large number of plant species and 
applied them to agricultural production. In modern breeding, workers continue to 
cultivate a large number of new varieties. Since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China’s crop varieties have been updated for 
several generations, which have made important contributions to China’s improving 
varieties and increasing yields. In particular, Academician Yuan Longping, the 
father of the well-known rice breeding in China, has made outstanding contribu-
tions to the world’s breeding business and helped solving the basic human need for 
food.
Under the background of this breeding history and breeding scale, China pro-
mulgated the Regulations for the Protection of New Plant Varieties in 1997 and 
began to introduce and implement a legal system for the protection of new plant 
varieties in China, which has its origin in the 1941 Breeders Ordinance of the 
Netherlands. Its central content is the protection of breeder rights, which enables 
breeders to derive economic benefits from the commercial exploitation of new plant 
varieties. Obviously, the value objective established by this legal system is mainly 
to obtain personal economic benefits through legitimate breeding labor1. However, 
the problem that is difficult to avoid is that compared with the “collectivism” and 
“devotion spirit” advocated and implemented in China since 1949, emphasis on the 
“pursuit of purely personal economic interests” is unlikely to take root in China due 
to its ancient and profound social tradition.2
Since the promulgation and implementation of the “Regulations for the Protection 
of New Plant Varieties” in 1997, China has made huge progress and achievements 
in the legislation for the protection of new plant varieties. The National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, the Supreme People’s Court, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the National Forestry and Grassland 
Administration have all played a role. In the revision of the Seeds Law in 2015, a 
section on the protection of new plant varieties was added; and the Supreme People’s 
Court has promulgated the judicial interpretation to specifically deal with this issue. 
The agriculture and forestry departments have promulgated respective regulations, 
1 Internationally, this legal system for the protection of new plant variety rights was established by 
the International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties (UPOV Convention), which 
was established in 1961. After three revisions in 1972, 1978, and 1991, there are now three valid 
texts: the 1961/1972, 1978, and 1991 texts. As of June 2018, the UPOV Convention has 75 member 
states. Only Belgium is applying the 1961/1972 text, 17 countries are applying the 1978 text, and 
the remaining 57 countries are applying the 1991 text. China joined the 1978 text in 1999.
2 In the traditional culture of China, people have advocated the spirit of “equality,” “dedication,” 
“mutual help,” and “supremacy of national interests” and have not promoted, or have even opposed, 
the simple pursuit of economic wealth.
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including the “Implementation Rules for the Protection of New Plant Varieties,” 
“Guidelines for the Examination of New Plant Varieties,” “The Protection List of 
Plant Varieties,” etc., which foresee the application, testing, authorization, review, 
and protection of new plant varieties and achieve basic complete coverage.
It is particularly worth noting that the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
has also issued the following important regulations, including “Nomenclature of 
Agricultural Plant Varieties,” “Registration Guidelines for Non-major Crop 
Varieties,” “Registration Measures for Non-major Crop Varieties,” “The Measures 
for the Protection of Agricultural Wild Plants,” and “Administrative Measures on 
Crop Germplasm Resources,” which reflect the fact that the Ministry is continu-
ously refining and improving this legal system.
1.2  The Research Status of Protection of New Plant Varieties
With regard to the research status of new plant varieties in China, the number of 
experts and scholars in China who study the protection of new plant varieties is very 
small. The main reasons for this are the following: (a) It is difficult for experts and 
scholars engaged in legal research to study this area in depth, as general legal 
knowledge is not enough and basic intellectual property legal knowledge is required. 
(b) Even experts and scholars who have mastered the knowledge of intellectual 
property law are unable to systematically study this area and can only understand 
the legal system from the literal meaning of the law and general social common 
sense, if they do not have expertise in biology, genetics, and breeding. (c) The num-
ber of legal cases in this area is still small compared with the cases of copyright, 
patents, and trademarks and has not attracted much attention.
Although Chinese scholars began to explore and discuss the issue of the protec-
tion of valuable non-plant new varieties, essentially derived varieties, criminal lia-
bility for infringement breeders’ rights, reasonable damages, range of special rights 
of farmers, and the establishment of special variety name rights in legislation. At 
present, research in China on the protection of new plant varieties is still mainly to 
learn and understand the basic content of the UPOV Convention and other national 
laws. China has yet to establish its own DUS (the Examination of Distinctness, 
Uniformity and Stability) test guide and genetic fingerprint data for plant varieties 
and to integrate the scientific spirit of this legal system into the inner spirit of the 
Chinese nation. The research on this legal system still faces the following problems 
that need to be solved: What is the goal that should be pursued in this legal system? 
What specific contents should be included in it? How could this legal system be 
improved according to China’s characteristics in plant resources and cultural and 
social development and from the long-term and overall perspectives? How can this 
legal system serve Chinese people and people of the world better? At present, there 
is basically little or no research on these deeper and broader issues in China.
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1.3  Granting of Breeders’ Rights in China
1.3.1  The Total Number of Breeders’ Rights Granted in China 
by June 2018
China has accepted and approved breeders’ rights since 1999. This work is handled 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (formerly the Ministry of 
Agriculture) and the National Forestry and Grassland Administration (formerly the 
State Forestry Administration). According to the statistics of the relevant depart-
ments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, by 2016, the number of 
applications for new plant variety rights in China already ranked first in the world.3 
From 1999 to June 2018, China approved a total of 12,221 breeders’ rights, of 
which 10,863 are for agriculture and 1358 are for forestry (the author carried out 
calculations based on the statistics and information published on the official website 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the National Forestry and 
Grassland Administration).
1.3.2  Period Needed for Applying for Breeders’ Rights in China
The average length of time from the application of a variety right to its acquisition 
in China varies, which can range from about 10 months to 9 years. For crops such 
as rice, corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton, generally, it takes 3 to 4 years. Cases with 
delay of over 5 years may have encountered opposition, related litigation, or dis-
putes during the application process. Since 2017, this period has been shortening. 
More and more breeders’ rights on new plant varieties have been obtained within a 
period of less than 1 or 2 years.
1.3.3  Foreign Applicants Obtaining Breeders’ Rights in China
The majority of breeders’ rights holders are Chinese units and individuals. A small 
number of foreign units and individuals have also been applying for breeders’ rights 
in China. Until 2018, foreign applications mainly come from the United States, 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, 
Japan, Switzerland, and New Zealand. Among these, the United States, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland have obtained 
the most breeders’ rights.
From 1999 to June 2018, 188 forestry breeders’ rights in China were obtained by 
foreign applicants from nine countries, accounting for 13.84% of the total forestry 
breeders’ rights. In the category of agricultural breeders’ rights, the proportion of 
breeders’ rights acquired by foreign units and individuals is smaller. In addition, due 
to the different types of varieties, it is difficult to compare the commercial advan-
tages of breeders’ rights for different owners. According to the statistics of the 
3 According to Zhang Yanqiu, the number of applications for breeder’s rights in China in 2016 has 




National Forestry and Grassland Administration, as of the end of 2016, the top ten 
units that have obtained forestry breeders’ rights in China are Beijing Forestry 
University; Chinese Academy of Forestry; Shandong Academy of Forestry; 
Kunming Yang Yueji Horticulture Co., Ltd.; Chinese Academy of Sciences; 
Shandong Agricultural University; W.  Korder’ Sohne (Germany); Shanghai 
Botanical Garden; Palm Garden Co., Ltd.; and Meilland International SA (France).4
1.3.4  Commercial Use of Breeders’ Rights in China
At present, the economic significance and commercial value of the new plant variet-
ies in China are mainly reflected in the fact that the breeders’ rights holders prohibit 
others from commercializing the authorized varieties and less in the use of these 
exclusive rights to gain commercial interests. In addition, breeders can also obtain 
benefits through cooperative breeding with others, or commissioned breeding for 
others, and licensing others to use their authorized varieties, or selling the applica-
tion right of breeders’ rights or the breeders’ rights. Finally, under China’s current 
legal provisions, breeder rights holders can also use the variety rights as capital 
contributions, or mortgages, and can also use breeder rights for financing. However, 
so far, such activities are still in their infancy in China.
1.4  Chinese Applying for Breeders’ Rights with Foreign 
Countries: Extremely Rare
The number of Chinese individuals and units applying for new plant variety rights 
with foreign countries is very small. From 2000 to 2013, Chinese applicants filed 
for a total of 133 applications with different foreign countries, obtaining 47 autho-
rizations in aggregate. In 2013, Chinese applicants submitted a total of 33 applica-
tions overseas and obtained 5 authorizations. In 2014, a total of two applications 
were filed with different foreign countries and one authorization was obtained. In 
other words, Chinese breeders mainly apply for breeders’ rights in China and rarely 
pay attention to applying abroad. The main reason for this situation may be that 
Chinese seed companies mainly engage in commercial activities related to the seed 
industry in China and have not expanded their activities overseas.
2  Types of Disputes Occurred in China
Chinese courts now mainly hear the following types of cases.
4 Intellectual Property Research Center of State Forestry Administration. Forestry plant new variet-
ies, http://www.cfip.cn/yjzx/SecondBrw.cbs?ResName=lyzs&RC=95&order=94&ResultFile=c%
3A%5Ctemp%5Ctbs%5CF249824%2Etmp&SortFld=&sortorder=
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2.1  Dispute Over Ownership and the Right to Apply 
for Breeders’ Rights
Cases include Tian Qingyi v. Zhongzhong Group Chengde Great Wall Seed Co., 
Ltd. (Civil Judgment of the Intermediate People’s Court of Shijiazhuang City, Hebei 
Province (2005), Shi Min Wu Chu Zi No. 00176); Shenyang Agricultural University 
v. Du Mingqi, etc. (Civil Judgment of the Higher People’s Court of Liaoning 
Province (2005), Liao Min Si Zhong Zi No. 73); and Wang Tengjin and Liu 
Zhenzhuo v. Sichuan Zhongzheng Science and Technology Seeds Co., Ltd., and 
Guangxi Bobai County Agricultural Science Institute (Civil Judgment of the 
Nanning Intermediate People’s Court of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
(2006), Nanning Min San Chu Zi No. 9).
2.2  Infringement of Breeder’s Rights
There are currently six types of cases that infringe on a breeder’s rights in China.
2.2.1  Fabricating a Variety Name
In this type of infringement, the infringer produces and sells another person’s autho-
rized variety, but deliberately uses another name to replace the name of the autho-
rized variety. The name used by the infringer may be the real name of another breed 
or may be a false name that was arbitrarily fabricates and does not exist at all. 
Currently, this is a major type of infringement in China. In the production and man-
agement of the seed industry, people generally refer to this type of infringement as 
“brand counterfeit.” For example, in the case of Dunhuang Seed Industry Pioneer 
Seed Co., Ltd. v. Xinjiang Xinteli Seed Co., Ltd. and the Fourth Group of the First 
Agricultural Division of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Civil 
Judgment of the Supreme People’s Court (2014) Min Ti No. 26.), the name of the 
plaintiff’s authorized variety was “Xianyu 335,” but the defendants replaced it with 
“Xianyu 696” and produced and sold it. “Xianyu 696” was a false name arbitrarily 
fabricated by the defendants. The court ruled that the defendants constituted an 
infringement according to Article 6 of The Regulations on the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (2014 Revision) and should assume tort liability5.
2.2.2  Forging or Imitating Another Person’s Authorized Variety
In this type of infringement, another variety is used as impostor of another person’s 
authorized variety. The basic feature of this type of infringement is using variety B, 
5 Article 6 of the Regulations on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants provides: The unit or 
individual that completes the breeding shall enjoy exclusive rights to its authorized varieties. No 
unit or individual may produce or sell the propagation material of the authorized variety for com-
mercial purposes without the permission of the owner of the variety right and may not reuse the 
propagation material of the authorized variety for the production of propagation material of another 
variety for commercial purposes. However, unless otherwise provided by this Ordinance.
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either legally owned by the infringer or a third party, and passing it off as authorized 
variety A. The variety produced and sold is nominally the authorized variety A, but 
is actually variety B. There are two specific ways of implementing specific torts: 
directly forging the denomination and packaging of an authorized variety to carry 
out production and sales activities and imitating the name of an authorized variety 
or its external packaging. For this type of infringement, some breeder’s rights hold-
ers are unwilling to sue publicly because they fear that once people know that there 
are fake varieties of their breeds, their normal sales will be affected. Therefore, 
fewer cases of this type have been brought to court.
2.2.3  Unauthorized Use of Authorized Varieties of Others
Currently in China this is also an important type of infringement, which involves 
producing and selling authorized varieties belonging to others for commercial pur-
poses without obtaining the permission of the right holders. Unauthorized here 
includes the following: no authorization was ever obtained (Guo 2006); authoriza-
tion obtained, but expired or terminated6, or the authorized geographical scope or 
time range was exceeded (Yangkun, 2015); and unauthorized permission by third 
party (Hou 2017).
2.2.4  Plundering Others’ Right to Apply for Breeder’s Rights
This type of infringement is a direct plunder of other people’s breeding achieve-
ments. The infringement usually takes place in employment breeding – often occurs 
after employees have retired, resigned, or switched to other companies – commis-
sioned breeding, and cooperative breeding. Infringers often deliberately violate the 
working regulations or the agreement of the parties, thus illegally utilizing the 
breeding results. An example in point is the abovementioned Wang Tengjin and Liu 
Zhenzhuo v. Sichuan Zhongzheng Technology Co., Ltd., and others, where the 
defendant used the opportunity to help the plaintiff submit the application materials 
to the relevant government agency and took the new plant variety cultivated by the 
plaintiff as his own, applying for the breeder’s right as the applicant. After finding 
out the facts, the court ruled that the defendant’s ill-gotten breeder’s rights should 
be transferred back to the plaintiff.
2.2.5  Stealing Others’ Authorized Varieties
The typical method of infringement is direct theft of the breeding materials for 
authorized varieties of others. These are generally stolen from the fields where 
reproduction occurs or from the households of farmers or purchasers who are 
entrusted with reproduction. The number of varieties obtained by this type of theft 
6 Sichuan Zhong Zheng Technology Co., Ltd. v. Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Bobai 
County Institute of Agricultural Sciences and others by the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
Higher People’s Court (2017), Gui Min Zong 95 civil judgment, in which the defendant’s act of 
producing and selling authorized varieties after the termination of the license contract was ruled to 
be constituting infringement, see the Supreme People’s Court, Top 10 Intellectual Property Cases 
in 2017, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-91312.html.
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is relatively small. For example, Hainan Province is an important breeding base for 
new plant varieties in China. Many breeding workers in the northern provinces gen-
erally need to go to Hainan to speed up their breeding progress; there, they can 
increase the planting period from one season to two seasons annually. During this 
process, pirates steal the seedlings or seeds of new plant species cultivated by others 
from the fields and then use them as their own breeding materials to breed their own 
new varieties.
It is very regrettable that China does not have any special provisions for such 
theft. It can only be dealt with in accordance with the Criminal Law promulgated 
and implemented in 1997. However, according to the provisions of the Criminal 
Law, the police can only file a case when the value of the stolen goods reaches a 
certain amount, and yet the value of small amount of breeding materials stolen is 
difficult to specify. Therefore, we have not yet seen charges against such a theft, 
which has led to the widespread occurrence of theft of breeding materials in Hainan. 
However, in the past 2 years, the Chinese government begun to pay attention to this 
situation and strengthen the management of the breeding base in Hainan.
2.2.6  Using Essentially Derived Varieties
This type of infringement involves using other people’s authorized varieties for 
modified breeding, that is, only adding or modifying a small portion of genetic 
traits, without changing the main genetic traits of the original varieties, so as to 
obtain an essentially derived variety. Although the essentially derived varieties may 
have some differences in form from the original varieties, the basic traits of the 
varieties are basically the same, and the infringers used the essentially derived vari-
eties to commit infringement. This use of the breeding technology to hide the 
infringement still amounts to a kind of tort.
After obtaining essentially derived varieties, the infringers would often apply for 
breeder’s rights on them; once obtaining the breeder’s rights, the infringers will be 
entitled to “frankly and squarely” and “legally” produce and sell the essentially 
derived varieties, achieving infringement of the varieties of others through legal 
means. Another way to commit infringement is through use of essentially derived 
varieties for commercial activities, without applying for breeder’s rights. During 
litigation, the appraisal technology may determine that the derived variety is distinct 
from the actually infringed authorized variety, thereby avoiding the possibility of 
being identified as a tort.
It is a great pity that the “essentially derived varieties” clause, which is in the 
UPOV Convention’s 1991 text, was not included in the 1978 text in that China is 
now participating. Therefore, in China, there is no concept of “essentially derived 
varieties” in the law, so there have so far been no cases or court decisions in China 
concerning “essentially derived varieties.”
However, since China already has advanced breeding technology, it is not a dif-
ficult task for many breeding units to cultivate “dependently derived varieties” pur-
posefully. In fact, many “essentially derived varieties” have been cultivated, widely 
produced, and sold. The current outstanding problem is that there is a lack of legis-
lation to deal with the reality.
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2.3  Contract Disputes for New Plant Varieties
There are mainly three types of contract disputes in China.
2.3.1  Over Commissioning Production Seeds
A variety owner, or licensed manufacturer and seller, needs to produce an autho-
rized variety in order to sell it. In reality, they generally need to entrust the farmer 
or the farm to produce the authorized variety, and the two parties need to sign a 
contract entrusting the farmer with production. There are also frequent disputes in 
the performance of such contracts.
There are two types of such disputes: one is simply an ordinary dispute between 
the two parties and the other is due to the fact that the entrusting party illegally pro-
duces an authorized variety of others, causing infringement of the breeder’s rights 
of others, resulting in inability to continue fulfilling the signed contract.
One such case is Henan Golden Dr. Seed Industry Co., Ltd. v. Jiaozuo Bonon 
Seed Co., Ltd.; see Civil Judgment of Henan Higher People’s Court (2006), Yu Fa 
Min San Zhong Zi No. 38.7 The plaintiff signed an entrustment contract with the 
defendant and entrusted the defendant to produce wheat seeds. However, the defen-
dant did not produce the quantity agreed in the contract, and a dispute between the 
two parties occurred. Finally, the court ruled that the defendant bore legal 
responsibility.
2.3.2  Arising from Transfer Contract or License Contract
In a dispute over a transfer contract, there are two types, namely, dispute over a contract 
transferring the right to apply for breeder’s rights and dispute over a contract transfer-
ring the breeder’s rights. In China, disputes based on transfer contracts and licensing 
contracts are common. An example is the case of Jiangsu Suke Seed Industry Co., Ltd. 
v. Jiangsu Siyuan Seed Industry Technology Co., Ltd. (Civil Judgment of Jiangsu 
Higher People’s Court (2008), Su Min San Zhong Zi No. 0051). The defendant failed 
to fulfill the contract for the transfer of the right to operate the breeder’s right signed by 
the two parties, and the court ruled that the defendant was legally liable.
2.3.3  Over Contracts on Breeding New Plant Varieties
Such contract disputes sometimes involve the issue of the ownership of breeder’s 
rights, and some involve only the issue of simply performing the contract. An exam-
ple is the case of Sichuan Agricultural University Hi-Tech Agriculture Co., Ltd. v. 
Mianyang Xiannong Seed Industry Co., Ltd. and the third person Sichuan Agricultural 
University; see Sichuan Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court Civil Judgment (2003) 
Cheng Min Chu Zi No. 926. Although the defendant actually participated in the 
breeding work of the plaintiff, it only provided financial support and assistance, and 
the ownership of the new variety was not clearly stipulated in the cooperative breed-
ing contract. The court ruled that the new variety belonged only to the plaintiff.
7 Available at the website of the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC: http://ipr.chinacourt.org/
public/detail_sfws.php?id=11919.[2007-11-29/2010-05-03]
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3  Major Deficiencies and Shortcomings of Existing Laws
Although China’s legislative work has achieved remarkable results, China’s legisla-
tion on the protection of new plant varieties clearly has the following defects and 
deficiencies due to the influence and constraints from various factors.
3.1  Overall Lower Level of Protection
Since China has acceded to the 1978 Act of UPOV Convention, the text of the 
Convention restricts the current legislation in China. This situation has made China’s 
level of protection of new plant varieties as a whole relatively low. This kind of 
legislative backwardness is mainly reflected in the following two aspects: (a) The 
content of breeder’s rights is too thin and simple. On the one hand, it only provides 
protection of propagation materials and does not involve harvested materials and 
their direct products; on the other hand, it lacks provisions on the essentially derived 
varieties, leaving room for this important type of infringement. (b) Tort liability is 
too simple and backward for two reasons. One is the absence of specific legal provi-
sions for criminal responsibility in legislation, and the other is that there are only 
three categories of civil tort liability: “stop infringement,” “damage compensation,” 
and “elimination of impact.” And there is no scientific refinement of “damage com-
pensation.” Since the entire legislative content is both simple and backward, it has 
severely hampered the legitimate expectations and demands of breeder’s rights 
holders and farmers. Obviously, this situation has not met the requirements of the 
times.
3.2  Serious Disconnect Between New Plant Varieties 
and Agricultural and Forestry Production
Due to the lack of “practicability” requirements in the current conditions for the 
identification of new plant varieties in the law, some new plant varieties for which 
breeder’s rights have been granted, but they have no practical value in agricultural 
and forestry production, or they cannot meet the need for large-scale agricultural 
cultivation. This makes these new varieties not useable in actual production. 
Obviously, as these new plant varieties can serve as breeding material for breeding 
work, they may still have some value during the breeding process. However, from 
the perspective of the agricultural production, these new plant varieties should not 
be eligible for, and therefore, should not be granted breeder’s rights.
Of course, in China’s legislation, the conditions for the establishment of “new 
plant varieties” are based on the provisions of the UPOV Convention. In terms of 
form, Chinese legislators should not bear any responsibility for this. However, 
because these conditions do not meet the actual needs of Chinese society, Chinese 
legislators have the responsibility to modify and improve such conditions to make 
them more scientific and reasonable.
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This involves a more in-depth issue. What is the purpose of establishing a legal 
system for the protection of new plant varieties? What do we want to achieve? Or is 
it that we are mainly to meet the requirements of developed countries that require us 
to establish such laws? Obviously, for this issue, the answer can be easily reached 
from a simple logical relationship and the literal meaning of the current law: 
“Protection of breeder’s rights and promotion of breeding development.” However, 
this answer faces two problems: (A) In reality, to what extent can the existing legis-
lative content guarantee the realization of the above objectives, or rather, how far 
has the current legislative content deviated from the way in which the above objec-
tives can be truly achieved? (B) In addition to the current legislative model and 
legislative content, is there a more scientific and reasonable legislative model and 
legislative content? Of course, people may find it hard to answer these questions. 
Many people may not have thought about these issues yet.
3.3  The Social Effects of the Existing Legislative Content Are 
Not Ideal
Over the years, through the implementation of laws for the protection of new varieties 
of plants, it has always been better for society to promulgate and enforce certain laws 
than to lack them. However, the objective reality that cannot be overlooked is that the 
new plant variety infringement activity in China has been relatively common, and it has 
been fairly serious in some provinces. In addition to infringing on breeders’ rights, there 
are also a large number of counterfeit seeds that have caused considerable harm to farm-
ers. This fact fully demonstrates that there is still a significant gap between the existing 
legislation on the protection of new plant varieties and the social reality of China.
In addition, using existing legal provisions to implement rights protection, espe-
cially the use of judicial means to protect rights, is not only complicated and costly, 
but the end result is often disappointing to the plaintiff. The main reason is that the 
tort liability that the infringer ultimately assumes is likely to be much lower than the 
actual illegal gains. The plaintiff has to bear additional costs in order to safeguard 
his rights. However, in the end, there is still no reasonable compensation or reason-
able compensation that can actually be obtained. This situation has objectively 
encouraged infringers to continue recklessly.
4  Main Reasons Affecting the Protection of New Plant 
Varieties
4.1  The Influence and Role of Social Status on Legal Status
There are two main factors affecting China’s legal system for the protection of new 
plant varieties: (a) the state of the society in which the legal system is located and 
(b) the state of the law, including the status of legal research, the level of legislation, 
and the level of justice.
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Among these two reasons, the state of society is the basis of the state of law and 
plays a decisive role in the state of law. The state of law is subject to the state of 
society. Just like the relationship between land and crops, the social state of a coun-
try in a certain historical period is like a piece of land, and the specific legal status 
is like crops growing on this land. Some crops are suitable for planting here, others 
are not; whether a crop can be harvested, eventually, to a large extent depends on the 
characteristics of the land and the adaptability of the crop itself.
4.2  Social Status and Legal Status Reflected in the Legislation 
and Enforcement of New Plant Varieties
4.2.1  Treating New Plant Varieties Simply as an Ordinary 
Commodity
In the existing theoretical research, legislation and enforcement of protection of new 
plant varieties, people generally regard new plant varieties as a kind of seed that can 
be produced and sold just like any commodity, and the breeder’s right is only an 
intellectual property right that belongs to the category of civil rights. Almost com-
pletely ignored is its close relation to the national genetic resources, ecological envi-
ronment, biodiversity, and food safety on which we all depend.
What should be seen is that no matter how advanced science and technology is, 
and no matter how amazing the technological products created by human are, there 
is one thing that human beings cannot detach themselves from, that is, we are part 
of the biological world. We need to guarantee the existence and continuation of an 
ecological environment in which we live. As a result, it is unscientific to disregard 
the genetic resources involved in new plant varieties, which cannot be treated as a 
pure economic issue.
4.2.2  Some Law Has Fallen into the Shadow of Foreign Law
Under the framework of the TRIPS Agreement, every sovereign state should ask 
itself what the ultimate purpose of its legal protection of plant breeder’s rights 
should be. Obviously, the ultimate goal in China should be to solve the problems 
that have occurred or will occur in China’s reality. However, for many years, the 
jurisprudence in China has been gradually dissociating from or ignoring China’s 
actual situation and instead blindly following foreign legal provisions and their lit-
eral meanings, without being able to learn their core spirit.
The spirit of law is connected to the basic conditions of the country and society, 
which are the root cause of their survival and function. Unfortunately, some people 
apply the judgment made by a foreign court as a legal standard to interpret a domes-
tic legal norm. In fact, this is a very unwise approach, because it is separated from 
the basic principle that the specific legal content needs to be combined with specific 
social soils.
Obviously, if the legal system for the protection of new plant varieties in China 
is to achieve true development and progress, it must emerge from the shadow of 
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foreign laws, be based on in-depth investigation on China’s basic national condi-
tions, and absorb good legal concepts and provisions of foreign laws.
4.2.3  The Spirit and Rationale of Law Are Affected by Times
The mission of law is to pursue fairness and justice in human society, which in turn 
aims to firmly safeguard the interests of the vast majority of people, protect the 
interests of honest laborers, and foster the development and progress of society. 
Since the 1990s, great changes have taken place in China, and have been accompa-
nied by widespread problems, including serious environmental pollution, food 
safety problems, counterfeiting of products, high housing prices, high school fees, 
expensive medical care, and lack of access to medical services. To this end, the 
Chinese government continues to take various measures, however with little 
improvement.
It is worth noting that these social issues have also had a significant impact and 
influence on China’s legal sciences. First of all, the prominent and ubiquitous nature 
of these social issues is increasingly affecting people’s normal lives. With the rising 
expenditures of people, pressure from life will make people feel that the relation-
ship between them and society is almost one of money and economic interests. This 
will, to a certain extent, obscure people’s understanding of the unifying ideals and 
goals that society should have. This will also force people to pay more and more 
attention to immediate and realistic economic interests. Obviously, this has deeply 
plunged people into the scope of a single economic interest and cannot take into 
account the personal spiritual interests and public interests of the entire society.
This situation is reflected in the field of law. Legal researchers, legislators, 
judges, lawyers, and administrative law enforcement officers are also ordinary 
members of society.
They must face the social problems that most ordinary people face, the actual 
feelings of the vast majority of ordinary people are also their actual feelings, and 
their actual feelings are that in the current Chinese society, economic interests are 
very important and even the only thing that is truly worth pursuing and getting for 
them. Therefore, economic interests should also become the main issue in the law, 
even the core issue. In this situation, the interests of the public, the interests of oth-
ers, and the long-term development of society may be ignored, and in some cases, 
basic fairness and justice may even be bought off or subverted by the pursuit of 
economic benefits in the real world.
In short, due to the influence of the social environment, in the field of law, it is 
easy to deal with many things and many problems in society from an economic 
standpoint. It seems that everyone is mainly living for the money in front of them, 
and all of human society exists for the current economic benefits. Obviously, if this 
situation occurs in the field of law, it will be very regrettable. However, an unaccept-
able reality is that in the current social reality, this situation has been not only uni-
versally existed but also serious in some respects. At present, there are also such 
effects in the legal system for the protection of new plant varieties, that is, all the 
problems of protecting the breeders’ right are simply attributed to an economic 
problem.
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5  Measures Proposed for Perfecting the Protection 
of New Plant Varieties in China
5.1  Institutions Authorizing Breeder’s Rights Should 
Be Unified
At present, China’s new plant variety authority is the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs and the State Forestry and Grassland Administration. Under this form, 
which set up Office for the Protection of New Varieties of Agricultural Plants and 
the Office for the Protection of New Varieties of Forestry Plants, respectively. These 
two offices have enacted their separate departmental regulations and management 
methods. Obviously, this model is very unscientific and unreasonable. The two 
agencies should be merged into one unified China Plant Variety Protection Office.
In addition, breeders’ rights are granted by the Chinese government and embody 
a kind of national behavior under state sovereignty. Granting of such rights should 
not be done by different governance agencies. Just as it is not possible for a country 
to have two independent foreign ministries at the same time, there should not be two 
offices that grant breeders’ rights.
5.2  To Apply the 1991 UPOV Convention Text as Soon 
as Possible
The prominent differences between the 1991 and 1978 UPOV Convention are the 
following two: (a) In terms of protected plant species, the 1978 text only requires 
the protection of some plant species, while the 1991 text requires the protection of 
all plant species. (b) The second is the content of breeders’ rights. The 1991 text not 
only extends the scope of protection from simple reproductive materials to har-
vested materials and their direct products but also protects essentially derived vari-
ety. In addition, the social role of the breeders’ rights is greatly improved and their 
protection enhanced. Based on China’s abundant plant resources, current breeding 
level, and agricultural development level, China should apply the 1991 text of the 
UPOV Convention to better protect plant resources and promote the further devel-
opment of breeding work.
5.3  To Revise and Improve the Legal Regimes on New Plant 
Varieties
The following modifications and improvements are proposed, which can be realized 
through revising the “Regulations on the Protection of New Plant Varieties” and (or) 
elevating the regulations into the level of a statutory law by People’s Congress to 
better satisfy the requirement of rule of law.
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5.3.1  To Set Up Special “Variety Name Rights”
As mentioned above, there is no provision in the existing UPOV Convention, includ-
ing the 1961/1972, 1978, and 1991 texts, or in the “Regulations for the Protection 
of New Plant Varieties” in China that recognizes the “variety name rights.”8 The 
author proposes the introduction of such rights, either as a new power of the breed-
er’s rights or independent of the breeder’s rights. In addition, this author suggests 
that the variety name rights should not have a time limit for the protection period 
and that the “variety name rights” should include (i) the right to use the variety 
name in commercial activities, (ii) the right to use the variety name similar to the 
protected variety name, and (iii) the right to use this variety name on other goods 
and services.
5.3.2  To Add the Requirement of Practicality as One Condition 
for Obtaining the Breeder’s Rights
As mentioned above, within the framework of the current UPOV Convention, vari-
eties that have acquired breeder’s rights may not have practical value in actual agri-
cultural production. This is because there is no “practicality” requirement in the 
conditions of obtaining the breeder’s rights. In particular, for some varieties, 
although the breeder’s rights have been obtained, they are not allowed to enter agri-
cultural production because of their obvious defects and bad characteristics. This 
has affected the role of the breeder’s rights legal system, which in turn affects peo-
ple’s attitude toward the protection of breeder’s rights.
Therefore, the “practicability” requirement should be added to the conditions of 
granting the breeder’s rights. “Practicability” here includes two items: (i) If the 
variety belongs to the scope of China’s variety certification, it should meet the basic 
conditions for the certification. (ii) If it does not belong to the scope of variety cer-
tification, it shall be able to satisfy the basic conditions for the variety to be planted 
in the field.
5.3.3  To Establish a Professional Qualification Restriction System 
for Infringers
At present, there are a large number of violations of breeder’s rights through various 
channels and methods in China. In particular, due to the relatively light tort liability, 
some infringers have continued infringement after being punished by the law. 
Obviously, it is no effective deterrent effects. Therefore, the author proposes to 
increase legal responsibilities, including “professional responsibility,” which would 
prohibit infringers from engaging in varieties breeding and seed production for a 
certain number of years. This kind of legal responsibility is commonly stipulated in 
8 The author has published a paper on this topic and related issues, see Yangkun Hou, On the 
Characteristics and Legal Functions of the Names of New Plant Varieties (in Chinese), Intellectual 
Property Rights, 2015(9):37–43.
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China’s traffic business administration and other related laws9 and can effectively 
contain illegal activities. Therefore, it is recommended to introduce and adopt pen-
alties for such professional qualifications in the punishment of infringement.
Based on the characteristics of new plant varieties in breeding and production 
operations, in order to effectively stop violations of breeder’s rights, the following 
should be added to the tort liability: (i) The infringer cannot apply for or own breed-
ers’ rights within 3 years, with an increase to periods of 5, 8, or 10 years for repeated 
infringement. (ii) The infringer shall not engage in or participate in varieties breed-
ing, seeds production, or related business activities and shall not have the qualifica-
tions for production of seeds within the following period of 3, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 
20 years.10
5.3.4  To Set Up a System of “Statutory Starting Point for Damages” 
in Legal Liability
According to the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Specific 
Application of Legal Issues in the Trial of Cases of Disputes over the Violations of 
New Plant Varieties,” the calculation of damages is mainly based on the following 
four criteria: (i) the actual loss of the infringed person; (ii) the illegal profits obtained 
by the infringer; (iii) the multiple of the license fee; and (iv) within RMB 3,000,000 
the court selects the appropriate amount as compensation according to the circum-
stances of the case. This is a common calculation standard and method in China’s 
current intellectual property laws, which ranges from“10,000 to 500,000 yuan” to 
“10,000 to 1 million yuan” and to “10,000 to 3 million yuan.”11
It can be seen that although the specific amount ranges are different, their basic 
ideas and models have not changed. In reality, for the general case, “the actual 
losses of the infringed person” and “the illegal profits obtained by the infringer” are 
all difficult to accurately calculate. So overall, this provision is more of a simple 
legislative declaration; for those cases not involving license for use, the “multiplier 
of license fees” has no practical significance. In addition to the above three items, 
although the law stipulates three ranges of 10,000 to 500,000 yuan, 10,000 to 1 mil-
lion yuan, and 10,000 to 3 million yuan, each range is quite large. However, in the 
legislation, there is no detailed refinement or division of specific standards in this 
scope, which makes this provision less operable.
9 According to Road Traffic Safety Law of the PRC (2011 Amendment), drivers who violate this 
law should bear the legal responsibility of “being issued warning, paying fine, motor vehicle driv-
ing license being temporarily seized or suspended, or being detent.” This law is valid throughout 
China.
10 At present, no foreign legislation has provisions on legal responsibilities suggested here, which 
are the author’s own proposals based on his estimate of China’s social reality.
11 In China’s copyright law, the amount of compensation that the judge can award at his discretion 
should be within 500,000 yuan; that in patent law is within 1 million yuan; in trademark law it is 
within 3 million yuan. In China, in general cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, 
compensation of at least 10,000 yuan will be awarded; less than 10,000 yuan has rarely occurred. 
Therefore, when judges consider appropriate compensation, they usually begin by considering 
more than 10,000 yuan.
Y. Hou
343
This kind of situation, whether for the judge or the parties involved, is undoubt-
edly a difficult problem for anyone who cannot find a standard answer. In this case, 
regardless of the discretion of the judge, it is difficult for both parties to be satisfied 
with his discretionary decisions, because the parties’ claims and demands are 
exactly the opposite. After going through lawsuits, many feel that the implementa-
tion of rights protection activities is generally worthless. It not only fails to achieve 
their desired goals, but it even makes them feel that they are far from their desired 
goal. Because, for these lawsuits, they have to spend time, energy, and money, after 
the lawsuits, in addition still having difficulty in effectively curbing the other party’s 
infringement, they may be worse off economically. Thus, in addition to the fact that 
the content of the legislation to stop infringement is too simple, in terms of compen-
sation for losses, the actual amount of compensation is often too low.
To make up for the abovementioned deficiencies, the author proposes to establish 
a statutory starting point for compensation in legislation. As long as the defendant 
is found to have committed a tort, he must bear this statutory amount of compensa-
tion. On this basis, the actual losses of the plaintiff or the illegal proceeds of the 
defendant are calculated again.
Establishing the statutory starting point for damages can largely guarantee that 
the plaintiff can obtain a basic amount of compensation and maintain faith in the 
implementation of rights protection. The author proposes to establish the following 
ten levels of statutory starting point in the protection of new plant varieties: (i) 
50,000 yuan, (ii) 100,000 yuan, (iii) 150,000 yuan, (iv) 200,000 yuan, (v) 300,000 
yuan, (vi) 500,000 yuan, (vii) 800,000 yuan, (vii) 1 million yuan, (ix) 1.5 million 
yuan, and (x) 2 million yuan.12 The reason why different levels should be set up is 
because different infringers have different infringement hazards. The compensation 
amount set up is relatively large, because the infringers who violate the breeder’s 
rights usually have higher sales revenue when they produce seeds.13 Judges can 
choose one of the statutory starting points according to the extent and scale of the 
infringement. In addition, the statutory starting point amount is not affected by the 
amount of actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. It is independent statutory damages.
5.3.5  To Set Up Clear Criminal Responsibility
In China’s Criminal Law (1997), the crime of infringement of intellectual property 
rights was specifically established, but only crimes concerning copyright, trademark 
rights, patent rights, and trade secrets were stipulated, and crimes for infringing 
breeders’ rights have not been stipulated. However, in reality, some serious viola-
tions of breeders’ rights constitute crimes in terms of their degree of infringement 
12 Yangkun Hou, Legislation Proposal for the Protection of New Animal Variety Rights Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (in Chinese), Beijing: Intellectual Property Publishing House, 2017: 81.
13 Supreme People’s Court Civil Judgment (2014) Min Ti No. 31 (Dunhuang Seed Industry Pioneer 
Variety Co., Ltd. v. Zhangye Olin Agricultural Science and Technology Development Co., Ltd. and 
Shihezi Jinshi Seed Industry Co.). The illegal profits obtained by the defendants were RMB 
2,650,920 yuan. The court ruled that all illegal profits must be returned to the plaintiff.
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and social harm, but due to lack of corresponding legal provisions in the current 
legislation, it is difficult to criminally punish such behaviors. Based on the strict 
nature of the Criminal Law, according to China’s current legal provisions, it is dif-
ficult to directly add relevant criminal liability clauses in the “Regulations for the 
Protection of New Plant Varieties” or the “Seed Law.” This will require joint efforts 
with the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and other units to facili-
tate the completion of this work. In terms of specific articles, it is possible to make 
clear provisions on the conditions for filing a case, what constitutes a crime, and the 
extent of sentencing, with reference to the existing provisions concerning intellec-
tual property crimes in the Criminal Law.
5.3.6  To Establish “Unified Jurisdiction of the Same Infringement 
Series of Cases”
In reality, there are often interrelated infringers and infringements, which can be 
divided into three types in China. One is in the same place; for the same breeders’ 
right, there are multiple different infringers and infringements; the second is in dif-
ferent places, for example, in different provinces, there are multiple different 
infringements and infringers for the same breeders’ right; and third, the same 
infringer has infringed on different breeders’ rights.
In this case, if an infringed right holder needs to file independent infringement 
cases at the defendant’s or defendants’ location(s) (residence(s)), infringement 
site(s), and place(s) where the result of a tort took place), then he may need to go to 
different provinces or different courts in the same province to file lawsuits, respec-
tively. Obviously, this will greatly increase the plaintiff’s litigation costs and the 
difficulty of litigation, objectively benefitting the infringers.
Therefore, the author proposes to establish a new infringement litigation system 
in legislation, that is, the system of “uniform jurisdiction over the same infringe-
ment series of cases.” The purpose of establishing this litigation system is that in 
cases of infringement of a certain authorized variety or set of varieties, regardless of 
where the infringement occurred and who or how many parties committed the 
infringement, all cases are subject to the jurisdiction and trial of a single court. The 
plaintiff needs only to file one case in a suitable court. For different cases, it is only 
necessary to file an additional case in this same court.
This system has the following advantages: (i) For the plaintiff, it saves a large 
amount of litigation costs, and the relevant evidence that has been submitted to the 
court in previous cases is not required to be submitted in any subsequent cases if the 
relevant evidence has been determined by the court. (ii) For the court, because the 
plaintiff’s situation is already familiar, there is no need to repeatedly review and 
confirm facts, which will save a lot of energy and resources, improve trial efficiency, 
and also avoid different understandings of the plaintiff’s basic facts in different 
cases. (iii) In the same or similar cases, verdicts will be basically the same, avoiding 
different decisions by different courts in separate cases. (iv) It can swiftly and effec-
tively crack down on infringement by different parties across the whole country and 
fully protect the interests of farmers and breeders.
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5.3.7  To Add “Special Rights of Farmers”
In the protection of new plant varieties, the protected owners are the breeders’ rights 
holders. After the varieties have been applied to production and business activities, 
the main stakeholders are the farmers who have purchased and planted the varieties. 
Moreover, because each farmer’s ability to withstand economic losses is relatively 
low, so the injury caused to each farmer is even more serious. In reality, infringers 
often produce and sell imitated seeds in large quantities, so the scope of the affected 
farmers is relatively wide. However, under the existing legal framework, although 
farmers are the direct victims of the torts as well as the breeders’ rights holders, 
farmers do not have any right to stop such infringements in their own name and to 
obtain compensation. Farmers can only lodge a compensation request on the ground 
that “the seed quality is unqualified” and the applicable law is the Contract Law. 
However, violation of the contractual agreement can lead to compensation of actual 
loss, and the amount of such compensation is generally low.14 In addition, since this 
is a contract dispute, farmers have no right to stop the defendant from continuing to 
commit the infringement, and they cannot claim punitive damages from the 
defendant.
Based on the legal spirit of fairness and justice, farmers should also have the 
right to file an infringement action against the infringer in their own name and 
request that the court order the infringer to stop the infringement and compensate 
their losses, including direct losses and reasonable returns that are normally avail-
able. Only in this way can farmers’ legal interests be fully protected. The injured 
farmers should be the joint plaintiff with the owner of the breeder’s rights or be 
added as joint plaintiff. If the number of farmers is large, they can elect representa-
tives to participate in the proceedings. In order to enable affected farmers to be 
aware of the infringement cases that have already been initiated, the court should 
notify the local government, which should issue a circular in the locality to inform 
farmers about the names and characteristics of the varieties involved, and encourage 
the affected farmers to join the lawsuit.
6  Conclusion
China is the most populous country in the world, with the largest demand for food, 
vegetables, and fruits, which means that excellent plant varieties and sufficient food 
production are important factors that China cannot ignore. Therefore, in-depth 
14 Intermediate People’s Court of Tieling City, Liaoning Province Civil Judgment (2017) Liao 12 
Min 840 (Zhao Guoqing v. Changtu Town, Changtu County, Iron Research Seed Shop) involving 
seed quality dispute. The plaintiff spent RMB 4500 yuan to buy seeds and planted 16 acres of land. 
Due to the quality of the seeds, the production was reduced. The estimated loss was 52,250 yuan. 
However, the court’s effective judgment only required the defendant to compensate for one-third 
of the losses, plus the cost of purchasing seeds, totaling 18,917 yuan. The plaintiff’s other losses 
were not compensated. http://www.pkulaw.cn/Case/pfnl_a25051f3312b07f396d6a91f52f22f-
cc56d620afd628d2f [2017-06-20/2018-07-19].
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research on the issue of new plant varieties and the establishment of reasonable 
legislative protection are also important.
At present, the main problems facing China in this regard are concentrated in 
three aspects.
First, the theoretical research on the protection of new plant varieties is relatively 
superficial. At present, it mainly translates and introduces the contents of the UPOV 
Convention, as well as some foreign research articles. It has not yet established its 
own theoretical content in line with China’s national conditions.
The second problem is that China’s current legislation is relatively backward and 
cannot meet China’s current social needs. It should be revised and improved as soon 
as possible by participating in the 1991 UPOV Convention and adding some reason-
able new content.
The third is the unscientific production and management philosophy that prevails 
in China’s current society – “money may be obtained by unscrupulous means” – 
which induces many businesses to infringements and other illegal acts in pursuit of 
their own economic interests.
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Whether to regulate or deregulate genetically modified food is an international 
debate, and each country or region has put forward specific policies and legisla-
tion based on its own special needs. When it comes to China, technological inno-
vation, economic development, and food security and safety are significant 
considerations during the decision-making process. This chapter will outline 
these considerations and examine their influences on the formulation of policies 
and legislation on genetically modified foods and then point out the trend of 
government regulations and regulatory debates in China before ending with a 
conclusion.
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1  Introduction
Generally speaking, state intervention in the form of regulation1 is to provide legal 
rules to modify the economic behavior of individuals and firms in the private sector, 
such as the research or marketing of genetically modified foods (GM foods). Thus, 
the reasons for regulation can be as diverse as the correction of market failure, maxi-
mization of economic efficiency and consumer choice, promotion of human rights, 
etc.2 To these ends, licensing, standard setting, and requirements of information 
disclosure are important regulatory tools. Given the continually changing economic 
and societal contexts, nations take various actions to reorganize or reform 
regulations.
For one thing, the expansion in the use of rule-making by the state has led to the 
regulatory state, in particular as a response to socially harmful acts. In this aspect, 
there is evolution from economic regulation to social regulation, in order to address 
the safety concerns of the society, such as public health, in addition to economic 
efficiency. Moreover, risk regulation puts the emphasis on government’s interven-
tion in market or social processes to control potential adverse consequences. Given 
the challenges in the characterization of risks and hazards, it calls for professional 
engagement of experts to carry out scientific work. Deregulation is also introduced 
to reduce or eliminate excessive state regulation, for the purposes of lifting the 
burdens on business to increase their competitiveness and promoting self-regula-
tion or private regulation on the basis of market mechanisms to achieve market 
relevancy.
Whether regulation or deregulation should be preferred depends on the economic 
sector and varies from state to state. The shift from deregulation in the 1990s to bet-
ter regulation in the 2000s in the UK has provided insight into the importance of 
public participation and deliberation to promote an evidence-based and transparent 
process of public administration. That is to say, in addition to the role of the state, 
cooperation and commitment of different stakeholders are also needed. Noteworthy 
is the trend toward governance, which is broader in scope than state intervention 
that emphasizes the importance of private and public sector cooperation as well as 
public participation. From the above, a rough structure for the state intervention 
models can be generalized as below.
1 According to one definition, regulation is one of the governmental actions with legal power to 
impose rules backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the economic 
behavior of individuals and firms in the private sector. See Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Glossary of industrial organization economics and competition law, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf, p. 73.
2 Tony Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise, Government, Regulation and Legitimacy, Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2010, pp. 11–18.
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The state intervention models
Models Characteristics Tools
Regulation Economic regulation Licensing
Social regulation Standards
Information disclosure
Risk regulation Expert participation




Governance Regulation as large subset of 
governance




As far as GM foods are concerned, the most important regulatory purpose 
considered is food safety and thus human health. In this aspect, the essential role of 
state regulation is to deal with public risk, which is largely outside the individual 
risk bearer’s direct understanding and control.3 That is to say, as the purpose of regu-
lating food safety is to control potential adverse consequences to health, food safety 
regulation in general, and GM food regulation in particular, can be regarded as a 
typical example of risk regulation. The newly emerging technological risks involved 
in GM food have increased the uncertainty in terms of safety. The involvement of 
experts and their advice can provide scientific evidence for regulatory measures in 
order to decrease such uncertainty. However, whether scientific rationale is ade-
quate to support public decision-making in the case of GM food is disputable.
On the one hand, a harmonized international rule provided by the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) requires that members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence.4 Moreover, in the scientific assessment of foods derived from 
biotechnology, it is also preferable to apply the principle of substantial equivalence. 
Accordingly, if a new or modified food or food component is determined to be sub-
stantially equivalent to an existing food, it can be treated in the same manner as its 
analogous conventional counterparts.5 In other words, once its substantial equiva-
lences have been established, a food that is produced from biotechnology can be put 
on the market without the requirement of procuring extra licenses.
On the other hand, there is also exception to the scientific principle, since the 
SPS Agreement on its own provides that in cases where relevant scientific evidence 
3 Huber, P., Safety and the second best: the hazards of public risk management in the courts, The 
Columbia Law Review, 1985, No. 85 (Arcuri 2011), p. 277.
4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 2.2.
5 OECD, Safety evaluation of foods derived by modern biotechnology, concepts and principle, 
1993, p. 14.
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is insufficient, a member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary mea-
sures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the rele-
vant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
applied by other members.6 In such circumstances, members shall seek to obtain the 
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review 
the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time. As far as how scientific uncertainty can justify the government’s action rather 
than inaction in waiting for sound scientific evidence, a precautionary principle has 
been further introduced in the risk regulation regime of environment and food in 
order to allow the government’s action and prioritize the public interest, like health, 
in the case of scientific uncertainty. Taking environmental protection as example, 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development has contributed 
to internationalizing this precautionary approach as a principle by proclaiming it in 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 as: “in order to pro-
tect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”7
In practice, the United States (USA) and the European Union (EU) represent 
different models regarding the state intervention in the case of GM foods. Generally 
speaking, the US model is relatively more “favorable” to the GM foods and has no 
license and labeling requirements for such tech-foods on the grounds of scientific 
assessment and substantial equivalence. The reason for such deregulation is to 
advance the biotechnology and international competitiveness of the USA. In con-
trast, the regulation of GM food in the EU may be characterized more as being 
precautionary, which has at its disposal regulatory tools that include license, label-
ing, and traceability. Notably, to support the regulation of scientific uncertainty in 
the case of GM foods, one important legal rule, the precautionary principle, is stipu-
lated by the so-called General Food Regulation8 in the EU. Accordingly, in specific 
circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possi-
bility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, 
provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health 
protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific 
information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.9
Despite the current regulatory arrangements in the USA and the EU, how to 
regulate GM foods is still an ongoing dispute within these regions. For the USA, 
there are calls for re-regulating GM foods in certain states, in particular the labeling 
requirement to protect consumers’ right to know. Taking Vermont as example, it was 
6 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 5.7.
7 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, Rio de Janeiro, June 3–4, 1992, 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 15.
8 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, Official Journal L 31, 
01.02.2002.
9 General Food Regulation, Article 7.
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the first state in the USA to adopt a law requiring labels for GM foods, which went 
into effect in July 2016. For the EU, there are also controversies between the EU and 
member states and between member states as well. For example, when the EU 
authorized MON 810 maize based on the risk assessment, member states like UK 
and France approved its access to their markets, while Italy forbade its introduction. 
For such derogation, the application of the precautionary principle has been the 
rationale for the Italian regulation, and thus derogation has been supported by the 
European Court of Justice.10
It should be emphasized that the regulation of GM foods is also closely linked to 
more general regulation of biotechnology and its products. Notably, a transparent 
and efficient regulatory system in this field not only protects public health and the 
environment based on the best available science but also prevents unnecessary barri-
ers to innovation and competitiveness, as the development and application of a tech-
nology need to go through various barriers, including technical challenges, economic 
costs, government regulations, and social responses.11 It is therefore these multiple 
interests or even their conflicts that add complexity to government’s regulation of 
GM food. That is to say, balancing multiple interests involved in the formulation of 
policies and legislation relating to the subject matters of food, biotechnology, and 
GM food poses a tremendous challenge. In China, for example, decision-makers 
have to consider the promotion of scientific and technological advancement, regula-
tion of risks resulting from novel science and technology, the engagement of scien-
tific experts and the public, and a myriad of other stakeholders. Therefore, whether 
GM technology can be transformed from laboratory results into commercial profits 
is decisively dependent on government’s regulatory model, which in turn depends on 
the understanding of the safety of GM technology. In this respect, the regulatory 
approach to scientific uncertainty and the degree of response to public perceptions of 
risk, as well as other economic and cultural considerations, have further shaped the 
regulatory differences between the USA and the EU in GM foods.
In the meantime, government intervention in GM foods in China not only takes 
reference from the American and European experiences but also takes into consid-
eration national condition from the political, scientific, economic, and societal per-
spectives. Comparatively speaking, national specialty in food regulation also 
contributes to the complexity of GM food regulation in China. Nowadays, food 
safety has become an urgent concern due to a series of food safety scandals, such as 
faked powdered milk and the so-called gutter oil (illicit reuse of cooking oil). 
Melamine-contaminated milk in 2008 received the most attention. Nevertheless, 
food regulation in China is not just about food safety. High on the agenda is also 
food security, given its large population. As a result, there is a host of disputes on 
whether to deregulate GM foods to ensure sufficient food supply or to regulate GM 
foods in a precautionary way that would highlight food safety and public health. 
Additionally, it is also important to mention the importance of governance pro-
moted in the food safety domain of China. As provided by the Food Safety Law after 
10 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia (2003) ECR II-8105.
11 Suk et al., Dolly for dinner? Assessing commercial and regulatory trends in cloned livestock, 
Nature Biotechnology, 2007, No. 25.
Genetically Modified Foods in China: Regulation, Deregulation, or Governance?
352
revision in 2015,12 social co-governance is one of the legal principles, and numerous 
institutional requirements are outlined for the subjects, content, and tools of gover-
nance.13 For example, risk communication from the perspectives of information dis-
closure and public participation was introduced for the first time to encourage 
participation by experts and the public.
In view of the above, this chapter first aims at outlining China’s policies and 
legislation in relation to biotechnology regulation, with the purpose of highlighting 
the role of government in promotion of science and risk prevention. Secondly, by 
discussing GM food regulation, this chapter also addresses the challenges on how to 
consider scientific advice and public perception of risks during state intervention. In 
conclusion, the chapter will revert to the question raised by the title of the chapter 
and attempt to provide an answer on regulation of GM foods in China.
2  Biotechnology: Promotion of Science and Risk 
Prevention
2.1  Scientific and Technological Advancement
It is trite to acknowledge that advances in science and technology are crucial for 
economic and social development, and it is self-evident that scientific and techno-
logical progress has contributed considerably to improvement in the quality of life. 
As popularly accepted in China, science and technology are the first production 
force. Similarly, the USA also puts emphasis on the fact that a nation’s economic 
performance and security depend on its ability to achieve world leadership in sci-
ence and its innovative capacity of engineering, among others. The government, 
with its overarching responsibilities for planning, budgeting, and review, is uniquely 
suited to promote—though not manage—this process.
However, the government has an additional role to play in the research and 
application of biotechnology, which not only calls for public support for its further 
development but also government intervention to address safety, health, and environment- 
related concerns. As a matter of fact, in the risk society that we are now living in, 
together with benefits come risks, which are likely to be manifest in physical, chemi-
cal, or biological harms. Moreover, these risks have attracted public attention amidst 
environmental disasters and food safety concerns emanating from events such as the 
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease) crisis.14 Therefore, 
12 Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, as revised and adopted at the 14th session 
of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on April 24, 2015.
13 Chinese Food Safety Law, Article 3. For a more detailed introduction to food safety governance 
in China, see Lepeintre Jerome and Sun Juanjuan (eds), Building food safety governance in China, 
Luxembourg Publications Office of the European Union, 2018, downloadable freely at https://
eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/building_food_safety_governance_in_china_0.pdf
14 The first diagnosed BSE in cattle was in the UK in 1986. However, the UK government did not 
take immediate action to protect consumers from contaminated meat products, as there was no 
sound scientific evidence to prove the risks to human health. The BSE crisis totally changed 
consumers’ perception of food and food safety regulation. The failure to deal with food safety 
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while it is a national prerogative to support the research and development of science 
and technology, it is also vital to regulate its application in actual practice, in order to 
hold people and institutions engaged in these activities accountable and to protect 
public interests such as public health and environmental safety.
The emergence of biotechnology from laboratory to industrial application was 
welcome in the USA and the EU alike at the beginning. However, as it later turned 
out, the USA is in favor of GM food, while the EU is against it, as mentioned above. 
Additionally, it is also important to note that the research and development of this 
kind of science and technology as well as its application do include the food field 
but are not limited to it. For example, biotechnology can also be employed in the 
pharmaceutical industry. In view of this, biotechnology is a strategic research tool, 
and government’s priorities in intervention can differ from sector to sector.
In the case of China, biotechnology has been applied in many specific fields, 
such as agriculture and food production and transgenic animal(s) in medicine and 
pharmacology. Although the legislative framework is still under development, many 
of the concerned departments have provided rules to mitigate the conflicts between 
the technological and economic benefits and safety concerns. Legal hierarchy in 
China accords precedence to laws enacted by the National People’s Congress and 
thereafter to administrative regulations issued by competent authorities, which are 
followed by departmental rules. Therefore, the introduction of legislation with 
respect to biotechnology would establish general principles of law and provide 
binding guidance to competent authorities.
2.2  Promotion of Biotechnology from a Scientific Perspective
Biological processes have traditionally been utilized to improve the quality of 
human life, as in the case of food production and preservation with biological fer-
mentation. Biotechnology has been regarded as one of the important scientific 
breakthroughs in China from the late 1970s. Since 1986, increased resources have 
been poured into research and application at the national level via in particular the 
“Seventh Five-Year Plan” of the National Key Scientific and Technological Project 
and the National High Technology Research and Development Program 863.
Therefore, early rules on biotechnology were promulgated by the State Scientific 
and Technological Commission15 to promote the research and development of bio-
technology, taking the assurance of safety, including human health and environmen-
tal safety as well as the ecological balance, into account. It is indubitable that 
high-risk investment is of necessity during the research and development of biotech-
nology, which is faced with the challenges of raising large-scale monetary support, 
a lengthy research period, as well as unpredictable barriers or burdens caused by 
new regulation. Furthermore, experience has shown that broad application of bio-
issues led not only to economic suffering but also to political mistrust and even loss of legitimacy 
of public authorities. To regain consumers’ confidence in food business and official control, the EU 
food safety regulation went through radical reform.
15 This national agency has been transformed to the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1998.
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technology will lead to considerable commercial value, such as genetic engineering, 
plant biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals, to name a few.
The national support for biotechnological research and development has enabled 
Chinese scientists to achieve a number of breakthroughs on novel gene identifica-
tion in crops, leading to development of GM crops. Plant biotechnology and its 
application have contributed to reducing the threats posed by pests and diseases and 
limited resources like land and water and thus to improvement in productivity, most 
notably in the field of GM cotton and rice. For the former, it was a miraculous 
result,16 since Bt cotton is resistant to the bollworm and thus reduces use of insecti-
cide and increases yields. For the latter, two strains of Chinese GM pest-resistant Bt 
rice, Huahui No. 1 and Bt Shanyou 63, obtained biosafety certificates in 2009.17
2.3  Legal Protection Mechanisms for Biotechnology
Intellectual property protection is implemented with the objective of incentivizing 
the research and development of biotechnology as well as its application. In this 
aspect, one of the typical examples is the development of plant biotechnology and 
protection of new varieties of plants. To this purpose, either a patent system or plant 
variety protection system based on the International Convention for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) can be applied. For the former, patent law has 
continued to develop and evolve in keeping with scientific and technological 
advancement, which with the emergence of biotechnology challenges the idea of 
non-patentability of living matter, as it proved to be incompatible with the biotech-
nological inventions surrounding plant varieties or human genes. As a result, patent 
regime in the USA was amended to extend patent protection to newly created 
microorganisms, genes, living animals, and plants. In relation to plant variety pro-
tection, the UPOV provides general rules for its member states to grant and protect 
breeders’ right(s), which allows breeders to authorize acts such as production and 
sale of the propagating material of the protected variety.18 Notably, the exceptions to 
16 There are more than 300 species of cotton pests in China, and there are frequent outbreaks in 
large areas, causing serious losses in cotton production. Besides, the use of chemical pesticides has 
led to the emergence of some cotton pest resistance, which seriously threatens cotton production 
and also worsens environmental pollution. In this aspect, insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant 
genetically modified cotton provides a new means for controlling pests, and China has started to 
commercialize GM cotton since 1997. See Liu Chenxi and Wu Kongming, Current progress in 
research and development of transgenic cotton and a strategic prospect for China, Plat Protection, 
2011, 37 (Alimentarius, 2001), pp. 11–17.
17 However, these two strains of approved GM rice did not get authorization for commercialization 
before the biosafety certificates expired on August 17, 2014.
18 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), 1991, Article 2: 
each.
Contracting Party shall grant and protect breeders’ rights.
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the breeder’s right(s) are acts done privately and for noncommercial purposes or for 
experimental purposes.19
From a comparative perspective, a plant breeder’s right is a specialized form of 
protection limited to new varieties of plant(s), while patent includes but is not lim-
ited inventions in the field of plant biotechnology. In view of the coexistence of 
these two systems as well as the interaction between them, a common understand-
ing has been reached, that is, the promotion of plant biotechnology can be realized 
by combining these two systems.20 Therefore, after several revisions, the 1991 Act 
of the UPOV recognizes that both of these systems can be applied to the same plant 
variety.21,22 However, application in practice differs by country, as each country gets 
to choose the protection afforded by either of the systems or two protections under 
both systems after the ban on “double protection” was lifted.23
As far as China is concerned, the Patent Law was enacted in 1984. However, it 
clearly provides that no patent right shall be granted to plant varieties. There was no 
specific law for protecting new varieties of plants at that time either, which led to a 
legal vacuum in the protection of new plant varieties until the Regulation on 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants was introduced by the State Council in 1997. 
That is to say, China has chosen a special model rather than patent protection to 
grant and protect breeders’ rights. It is interesting to note that the introduction of 
such regulation was a result of both internal and external pressures. For the former, 
it was the call for protection of breeders’ rights from scientists engaged in the 
research of plant breeding. For the latter, it was the pressure from the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) after China’s acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and UPOV. Accordingly, members of 
the WTO are required to provide for protection of plant varieties either by patents or 
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.24 However, the sui 
generis system in China, namely the 1997 Regulation, was based on the 1978 Act of 
the UPOV Convention, which has limited scope and extent of protection compared 
19 According to Article 15 of UPOV, the breeder’s right shall not extend to acts done privately and 
noncommercial purposes.
20 For more information, see WIPO-UPOV Symposium, http://www.upov.int/en/documents/
Symposium2003/intro_index.html. 2003
21 Compilation of the 2002 & 2003 Joint Symposia Document of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, UPOV 
publication No. 792(E), 2005, p. 16.
22 Comparatively, Article 2.1 of 1978 Act provides that each member State of the Union may 
recognize the right of the breeder provided for in this Convention by the grant either of a special 
title of protection or of a patent. Nevertheless, a member State of the Union whose national law 
admits of protection under both these forms may provide only one of them for one and the same 
botanical genus or species. However, Article 2 of the 1991 Act deleted such double protection.
23 For more information, see UPOV 78 to UPOV 91, http://www.apbrebes.org/content/
upov-78-upov-91
24 TRIPS, Article 27(3(b).
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to the 1991 Act of the UPOV as well as legislative updates in other regions, such as 
the EU.25
Despite the weakness in the legal protection of breeders’ rights in the 1997 
Regulation,26 some detailed rules have emerged (Chart 1): two rules for the imple-
mentation of the 1997 Regulation have been put forward in 1999 to satisfy the 
practical needs for implementation of the Regulation and for dispute settlement due 
to the quick development of the domestic plant breeding industry. One is for agri-
culture and the other for forestry. Additionally, a detailed rule for carrying out reex-
amination when rejecting applications was issued in 2001. There are also judicial 
25 Chen Chao, Zhan Jinpeng, The challenges on the protection of new varieties of plants in China 
with the application of genetically modified technology, Intellectual Property, 2006, 6, p. 44.
26 For example, the legal requirements are confusing, while coordination between related 
regulations is missing. See On choice of legal system for protection of new varieties in China, 
available at http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.aspx?id=4255 (last access on 2 July 2018).
Category of rules Title Year of taking effect 
and revision
Regulation Regulation on Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants issued by the State 
Council




Rules for the Implementation of the 
Regulation on the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (Agriculture Part) 
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture 
1999 (revised in
2014)  
Rules for the Implementation of the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(Forestry Part) issued by the Bureau of 
Forestry 
1999
Rules for Review of New Varieties of 
Plants by Reexamination Committee 




Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Trial of Dispute Cases
on New Varieties of Plants 
2001
Regulations of the Supreme People's 
Court on Some Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of 
Cases Involving the Disputes over 
Infringement upon the Rights of New 
Plant Varieties
2007
Chart 1 Summary of current legal provisions on new plant varieties in China
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interpretations and regulations from the Supreme People’s Court to solve disputes 
over infringement of the rights over new plant varieties.
More importantly, increased attention has been paid to the protection of new 
varieties of plants due to China’s ambition to develop a modern crop seed industry. 
As stated in the National Plan for Developing Modern Crop Seed Industry in China 
from 2012 to 2020 issued by the Office of the State Council,27 the crop seed industry 
is a national strategic and core industry and also the foundation for promoting long- 
term stable development of agriculture and for ensuring national food security. For 
this purpose, the Regulation on Protection of New Varieties of Plants was revised in 
2013. The most important change relates to the increase of fines in case of infringe-
ment of others’ new plant variety rights (1–5 times the value of the infringing goods 
or RMB 250,000 when no value of goods is available or the value of goods is below 
RMB 50,000).28
However, as analyzed in Chap. 14, the exiting legislative contents are from ideal 
arrangement due to the overall lower level of protection, serious disconnect between 
new plant varieties, and agricultural and forestry production.
2.4  Biotechnology in the Field of Agriculture 
and the Regulation of Its Biosafety
Agricultural biotechnology involves modification of living organisms such as plants 
by using scientific tools and techniques, including genetic engineering. However, 
not only benefits but also risks come with such development, such as risks relating 
to biosafety.
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)29 in China has formulated rules for applying 
agricultural biotechnology. In 1996, the MoA issued Implementation Rules on 
Safety Administration of Agricultural Biological Genetic Engineering according to 
the Rules on Safety Administration of Biological Genetic Engineering promulgated 
by the State Scientific and Technological Commission in 1993, which are applied 
specifically to genetically modified organisms in the field of agriculture, such as 
plants and animals. Government intervention in biotechnological development not 
only promotes research and development but also addresses safety-related concerns 
over the environment and human health. Accordingly, experimental research, pilot 
tests, environmental release, and commercial production should be regulated while 
taking into account the risk levels.30 On the other hand, China became a contracting 
27 Office of the State Council, National Plan for Developing Modern Crop Seed Industry in China 
from 2012 to 2020 [2012] No. 59, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-12/31/
content_2302986.htm
28 Regulation on Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Article 39.
29 Notably, after the reform of organizational arrangement in China in 2018, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has been expanded to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
30 According to the Implementing Rules on Safety Administration of Agricultural Biological 
Genetic Engineering, genetically modified agricultural organisms are classified into Classes I, II, 
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party of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1993. As a part of the Convention, 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety regulates the safety of handling, transport, and 
use of genetically modified organisms (GMO), which has an impact on the regulation 
of GMO for both internal biosafety and transborder biosafety. For example, a 
National Coordinating Group was established by the department responsible for 
environment to implement the Convention in 1993 with specific measures, such as 
the China National Biosafety Framework. Accordingly, it has clarified the framework 
of policy and legislation on biosafety management, technical norms for risk 
assessment and risk management of GMOs and their products, and requirements for 
national capacity building on biosafety management.
In addition to the abovementioned regulatory experiences, the increasing quantity 
of imported GM food (corns, beans, etc.) without appropriate regulation and 
unauthorized plantation of GM crops also called for stricter regulation.31 As a result, 
the Regulation on Safety Administration of Genetically Modified Agricultural 
Organisms was promulgated in 2001 by the State Council. Compared with the 
Implementation Rules issued by the MoA, the Regulation has more legal impor-
tance, as it provides the legal basis for all the rules made by the relevant competent 
authorities. More importantly, the definition and scope provided by this Regulation 
regarding GMO includes not only animals and plants produced by this new technol-
ogy but also products produced from these raw materials or products, such as seed, 
pesticide, and additives. To strengthen the official control and operators’ obligation 
for biosafety, this Regulation lays down requirements for the licensing for produc-
tion, distribution, recording, and labeling. Among these requirements, a safety cer-
tificate is required as an essential condition to obtain variety approval, and a license 
for production, distribution, and commercial applications is also mandatory. To 
make the Regulation more practicable, the MoA has further established detailed 
rules, namely, Administrative Measures on the Safety Assessment of Transgenic 
Agricultural Products, Administrative Measures on the Safety of Imported 
Transgenic Agricultural Products, Administrative Measures on the Labeling of 
Transgenic Agricultural Products in 2002, and Administrative Measures on 
Authorization of Processing Transgenic Agricultural Products in 2006.
Regrettably, the application of rules and measures of the MoA on agricultural 
biotechnology has been criticized for lack of transparency. According to the Top 10 
Food Safety Events published by the Research Center for Food Safety Law under 
the China Law Society in 2015,32 one lawsuit was brought by a lawyer against the 
MoA on the ground of the MoA’s failure to publish administrative information with 
III, and IV pursuant to their risks to human beings, animals, plants, microorganisms, and the 
ecological environment. More detailed information can be found in the Administrative Measures 
on the Safety Assessment of Transgenic Agricultural Products (infra Chart 2).
31 For more information, see the explanation for the adoption of stricter regulation by the State 
Council, http://law.npc.gov.cn/FLFG/flfgByID.action?flfgID=42320&showDetailType=QW&zls
xid=23
32 For more information, see the report Top 10 Food Safety Events in China 9, December 16, 2015, 
p. 10, available at http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20151216/Articel10003GN.htm
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respect to assessment and legal enforcement regarding GM food. Worse still, 
scandals involving illegal production and distribution of GM rice and its products 
have been consecutively exposed. For example, the EU imposed in 2011 and 2013 
emergency measures governing the importation of specific rice products originating 
or consigned from China due to unauthorized GM rice.33 In addition, CCTV reported 
the illegal production of GM rice in Hubei province in 2014. As a result, heightened 
nationwide enforcement of regulation on GM crops has been introduced. According 
to the Notification on the Strengthening of Official Control for GMO issued by the 
MoA, in 2016,34 the frequency of inspection and testing as well as the strictness of 
accountability in case of non-compliance with agricultural biotechnology shall be 
increased. Further, when the Seed Law was revised in 2015, specific traceability 
requirements regarding the use of seeds produced from biotechnology and harsh 
punishment for illegal production and sale of GM seeds were introduced.
3  The Regulation of GM Food in China
3.1  Evolution for GM Food Regulation
Although general regulation is applicable to agriculture when biotechnology is 
involved, there is no specific rule applicable to GM food. The rules provided by the 
MoA are mainly concerned with the safety of primary production, and there is a 
lack of regulation on safety assessment and testing methods if GM organisms are to 
feed human beings. In view of this, the Ministry of Health (MoH),35 as the compe-
tent authority for implementing Food Hygiene Law, decided to fill this legal lacuna 
in 2001. As a result, Rules on Hygiene Administration of Genetically Modified 
Food were issued by MoH in 2002. The rules were aimed at protecting consumers’ 
right to health and information and hence require all food produced from geneti-
cally modified plants and animals as well as microorganisms to be assessed for 
safety and nutrition and also labeled with information identifying them as GM 
foods. However, the rules were repealed by the Rules on Administration of Novel 
Food Materials in 2007, resulting in a legal lacuna for regulating GM foods. As a 
remedy, the revised Food Safety Law in 2015 put emphasis on labeling requirements 
in the production and sale of GM foods.36 In case of violation of the labeling 
33 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) No. 2011/884/EU in 2011. However, due to the 
continual notifications from member states for food and feed concerning unauthorized genetically 
modified rice in rice products originating from China, the Implementing Decision 2011/884/EU 
has been updated by the Commission Implementing Decision of June 13, 2013. Accordingly, other 
products which may contain rice were added to the scope of Implementing Decision 2011/884/
EU. Besides, additional sampling protocols were also added to address processed products which 
were not covered by the previous decision.
34 Notice on further strengthening regulation of GMO, 2016, available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/
zwllm/tzgg/tz/201604/t20160417_5096932.htm
35 Notably, after reform in 2018, MoH has become the National Health Commission.
36 Food Safety Law of 2015, Article 69.
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right to know  
2002, repealed in 
2007 by the Rules on 
Administration of 
Novel Food Material 





GM food shall 
be clearly 
labeled. 
2009, revised in 
2015




requirements, consumers can claim punitive damages in an amount equivalent to ten 
times the price paid for GM foods.37
In view of the above, from agriculture to food, a legislative evolution is 
summarized in Chart 2. Notably, the listed departments for rule-making also provide 
a regulatory system for GM food regulation in China.
3.2  Key Mechanisms to Ensure GM Food Safety
According to the abovementioned laws and regulations, the regulation of GM food 
safety is supposed to be precautionary. Because there is a license requirement for 
GMO, and if an approved GMO is used for food production, labeling is further 
required for the final product. Notably, even for imported GMO used as food or GM 
food, labeling is necessary to indicate its GMO status. During this process, as a risk 
regulation, the regulation of GM foods relies also on the following important insti-
tutional arrangements to ensure GM food safety: risk assessment, GM food label-
ing, and risk communication.
3.2.1  Scientific Assessment
As mentioned above, GM foods are regarded as a kind of tech-food and rely on 
scientific assessment to prove their safety. In this sense, scientific assessment is also 
a basic principle that enables the application of biotechnology in practice and the 
implementation of food safety regulation. It is generally acknowledged that the 
introduction of Food Safety Law in 2009 provided the legal basis for food safety 
regulation in China, and one of the progresses achieved is to establish a scientific 
rationale for food safety by introducing risk assessment as well as risk monitoring. 
In the case of agricultural food, as early as in 2001, the safety assessment for trans-
genic agricultural products was established. More importantly, greater progress at 
this stage of primary production was the establishment of the Expert Committee on 
Agricultural Food Safety Risk Assessment in 2007 by the MoA according to the 
Law on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products.38 Notably, to be approved for 
commercialization, after obtaining safety certificates, there are still a variety of 
review, production, and sale licensing processes to be complied with.
3.2.2  Labeling
Generally, food labeling is the primary means of communication between the 
producer and seller of food on the one hand and the purchaser and consumer on the 
other. From a regulatory perspective, labeling is an essential tool to deal with 
37 Food Safety Law of 2015, Article 148.
38 Law on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products, Article 6. Although the Food Safety Law is 
aimed to unify food safety regulation in China, the regulation of safety and quality of agro-food at 
the stage of primary production is still separate. See Sun Juanjuan, Review of the “Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products”, Journal of Resources 
and Ecology, 2018, 9 (Alemanno, 2012), pp. 106–113.
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information asymmetry, in order to ensure an informed choice by consumers. In 
view of this, the requirement of food labeling in the case of GM foods provided 
under Article 69 of the Food Safety Law is closely linked to the need to protect the 
consumers’ right to know. More importantly, the labeling provision has been further 
implemented by a national mandatory food safety standard, namely, GB 7718 on 
General Standard for the Labeling of Pre-packaged Foods.39 In practice, consumers’ 
claims for compensation due to the lack of GM food labeling have been supported 
by courts.40 As mentioned earlier, the provision of punitive damages in the Food 
Safety Law also encourages consumers to participate in the fight against GM food 
that violates labeling requirements.
3.2.3  Risk Communication
Food scandals in China have not only pushed the reform for food safety regulation 
but also raised the public’s awareness of food safety. As far as GM foods are con-
cerned, a tussle between the popular celebrities Fang Zhouzi and Cui Yongyuan also 
attracted considerable attention thanks to the power of new media such as Weibo. 
Briefly, Cui Yongyuan is a well-known television personality who has engaged in 
the fight against GM foods for a long time. Among others, he criticized an article in 
favor of genetically modified foods written by Fang Zhouzi, who is a prominent 
biochemistry blogger. Fang then accused Cui of spreading unfounded rumors that 
hindered the development of China’s national agriculture program. As a result, 
these disputes further raised public concern and mistrust on food safety of GM food.
Given the decline of public trust in food safety regulation, a communicative, 
participatory, and deliberative risk decision-making process can garner not only 
legitimacy but also public acceptability of protection levels. Therefore, in 2015 the 
Food Safety Law introduced risk communication among risk assessors, risk manag-
ers, consumers, industry, the academic community, and other interested parties, to 
encourage the interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout the risk 
assessment and management process concerning risk, risk-related factors, and risk 
perceptions, including the explanation of risk assessment findings and the basis of 
risk management decisions. Since then, increasingly, scientific experts have engaged 
in risk communication about GM foods. For instance, the 2016 Specific Project of 
Cultivation of New Varieties of GMO is one of the Major National Science and 
Technology Programs for the “Thirteenth Five-Year Plan”. In addition to “hard sci-
ence” research, two “soft science” research studies have begun in 2017, one dealing 
with science popularization and risk communication on GM technology and its 
development, the other exploring and implementing new approaches to risk 
39 GB 7718–2011 is available at http://bz.cfsa.net.cn/staticPages/9058ADC5-AFC3-4586-9798-
D0170F6F879C.html
40 For example, in a civil case decided by Beijing Haidian People’s Court, (2017) Jing 0108 
MinChu No. 29455, an imported food product was not labeled as GM food in line with its original 
labeling in English, and the court supported the consumer’s claim of ten times compensation since 




communication on innovative technologies of strategic importance and public 
controversy.41
3.3  Ongoing Debates on GM Food Regulation
Although there are international obligations for the WTO members to base their 
food safety regulations on sound scientific evidence, the disagreements between the 
USA and the EU have shown that the regulatory differences in relation to GM foods 
are shaped by their differing economic and cultural specialties, public perceptions 
of risk, and scientific uncertainty. Therefore, to create the right regulatory environ-
ment for GM foods in China, government regulation should take into account the 
following factors.
3.3.1  National Condition
Comparatively speaking, the light regulatory touch for GM food in the USA is 
aimed at promoting new technology and economic value, since it is conducive to 
technological innovation and commercialization, thereby increasing national com-
petitiveness. Benefiting from such light touch regulation, American biotech compa-
nies have taken leading positions in the field of biotechnology research and 
application and in turn become promoters of such light touch regulation of GM 
food. In contrast, the EU has paid more attention to public interest, since it had an 
urgent need to recover public confidence after the BSE crisis. Furthermore, listening 
and responding to public concerns also consolidated its democratic foundation as a 
Union and smoothed legislation at the EU level. In view of this, national specialty 
is an essential context for understanding the regulatory environment for GM food 
regulation.
As far as China is concerned, food security and food safety are both of great 
concern to the state and the public. Indubitably, the challenges of food security and 
the possible ways of overcoming such challenges are major concerns in China. 
However, issues like the surge in the import of staple foods, the drop in self- 
sufficiency rates of food supply, the reduction of cultivated land, and pollution of 
the environment all raise the expectations for the potential contribution of GM tech-
nology in improving yield.
Also as a special condition in China, public concern over GM foods exerts huge 
pressure on the commercial production of GM rice even after the granting of a 
safety certificate. Ongoing food safety problems have not only seriously affected 
consumer confidence in the government’s credibility but also have an adverse eco-
nomic impact on China’s food industry and food trade. In this regard, the current 
situation in China is similar to that of the EU after the BSE crisis. That is to say, 
41 News, project of scientific education and risk assessment of biotechnology was officially 
launched in Tsinghua, 2017-01-05 (in Chinese), available at http://www.biotech.org.cn/
information/144802 (last accessed on July 2, 2018).
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there is a strong need in China to restore consumer confidence in food administration 
and food industry through the strengthening of food safety regulations.
3.3.2  Scientific Assessment and Public Perception
Undoubtedly, scientific assessment provides sound evidence for food safety 
regulation. However, it is still questionable whether scientifically favorable opinion 
is adequate to support the government’s decision to release GMO into the 
environment and use it for food production. As a tool to communicate with the 
public, risk communication is used not only to inform the public but also to involve 
them in the decision-making. Certainly, the lack of knowledge may lead to 
misunderstanding among the public, and rumors may find a way to exacerbate the 
situation. Therefore, education and communication are needed to change and 
improve public perception. Moreover, transparency with respect to decision-making 
also matters and can be achieved through the involvement of stakeholders and the 
public. In so doing, the decision-makers can have adequate information to undertake 
risk- taking or risk-avoidance decision(s), and public’s tolerance of the risk can also 
increase.
Admittedly, participation of scientists and their opinions is necessary for 
decision- making during risk management in food safety regulation(s). However, lay 
people usually hold a different opinion from that of experts on technological risks. 
As shown by research,42 the ranking of risk among the ordinary public is based not 
on the statistics utilized by experts but on qualitative dimensions, such as whether 
risk is voluntarily or involuntarily taken, happens chronically or catastrophically, is 
known or unknown to science, and is controllable or uncontrollable. Furthermore, 
people tend to overestimate the probability of unfamiliar, catastrophic, and overly 
publicized events. Despite the subjectivity of the public’s attitude toward risk, the 
public’s perception of risk usually transforms into public concerns and, in turn, 
affects decision-making and eventually crystallizes into regulations. Therefore, the 
involvement of the public is also a mechanism to increase the social acceptance of 
a given risk.
3.3.3  Scientific Certainty Versus Scientific Uncertainty
Although science brings about certainty in public decision-making, it also entails 
uncertainty, which may result from indeterminacy, ignorance, or scientific contro-
versy. As shown in the lessons from the BSE crisis, the failure to consider a scien-
tific controversy may lead to an underestimation of a newly emerging risk as well as 
irreversible damage to human health. This is why the so-called precautionary prin-
ciple was introduced in the EU as a legal principle for food law. Generally speaking, 
the precautionary principle was put forth to enable appropriate action against scien-
tific uncertainty, with the purpose of dealing with irreversible damage in a proactive 
manner. Notably, the precondition for a precautionary action is still scientific assess-
ment. In this respect, as a structured decision-making process, risk assessment is the 
42 For more information about this research and finding, see Zhang Jie and Zhang Taotu, Risk 
communication researches in the USA: academic evolution, core proposition and key element, 
Public Relationship Research, 2009, 9, p. 98.
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first step to provide scientific certainty, while precautionary action should be taken 
to handle scientific uncertainty.
Yet, as a weak principle, the application of the precautionary principle is subject 
to review by continued scientific assessment as well as principles such as propor-
tionality, consistency, etc. Besides, in spite of an ongoing debate on whether being 
precautionary is a principle or an approach or an exception to scientific assessment, 
protective action with precaution has already been applied in the regulation of food 
safety. When it comes to China, the Food Safety Law provides risk prevention as a 
legal principle. However, without detailed rules to concretize this principle, it is dif-
ficult to discern whether it plays a role akin to the precautionary principle in 
European food law or not.
4  Conclusion: Governance Over Regulation
GM foods are specific foods produced through biotechnology. The regulation of 
such foods is undertaken with an aim of preventing technological risk and protect-
ing public health and safety. Although international obligations and American prac-
tices have emphasized the role of scientific assessment in regulatory decisions in 
this area, precaution is also needed to deal with scientific uncertainty, either through 
the exception of the safeguard clause provided by the SPS Agreement as mentioned 
above or the precautionary principle promoted by the EU. All of these constitute a 
controversial background against which China may build its own regulatory system. 
As far as GM foods are concerned, there are only regulations on transgenic agricul-
tural products in general and labeling requirements provided by the Food Safety 
Law in particular. The lack of detailed legislation reflects China’s evasive attitude 
toward this issue.
In the end, a balanced approach to risk management regarding GM foods depends 
on the various stakeholders. While regulation was introduced as a form of 
government intervention in the case of market failure, self-regulation or co-regulation 
has also been introduced to promote cooperation between the government and 
market players. As in the case of traceability of GM food, the role of the government 
is to impose necessary obligations and undertake inspections through documentation. 
However, it is still the food business operators that have an advantage in recording 
and sharing the traced information, since they are best suited to do so at the produc-
tion line. In addition to these important stakeholders, the participation of experts 
and the public are also important to guarantee science-based regulatory decisions 
and their social acceptance.
Therefore, this author is of the opinion that “governance” is a more preferable 
way to delineate a balanced regulatory environment for GM food. According to the 
definition proposed by the Commission on Global Governance43 in Our Global 
43 The Commission was established in 1992 with the full support of United Nations Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. One of its contributions was to make a standard definition on 
global governance.
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Neighborhood in 1995, “governance” is the summation of many ways in which 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs, as 
well as a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and cooperative action taken. By replacing regulation with 
governance, the emphasis is shifted to the engagement and coordination among 
different stakeholders. In this respect, food safety regulation, including regulation 
on GM foods, in China has yet to keep pace with the tendency of favoring governance 
over regulation.
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The status of patent protection for genetically modified plants is presently uncer-
tain in India and is a debate rife with economic and ethical considerations. The 
need for consistent public policy and robust frameworks for regulatory control 
poses significant challenges for the introduction of genetically engineered/modi-
fied crop plants in India. This is especially vital considering India’s desire to 
foster an innovation-based economy. The research questions of this chapter 
include the following: How is the insertion of different traits, such as insect resis-
tance in plants by methods such as transformation different from introgression/
hybridization? Can genetic modification of plants by methods such as transfor-
mation be termed as “an essentially biological process”? If not, how can the said 
process be classified for the purpose of Section 3(j) of the Indian Patents Act, 
1970?
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Although the diaspora of plant variation and biodiversity has been enriched by natu-
ral processes since time unknown, it was back in the mid-1960s that the first new 
high-yielding varieties of wheat were developed by Dr. Norman Borlaug of Mexico, 
followed by adaptation of this technology world over. It was in 1966, spearheaded 
by Dr. M.  S. Swaminathan, often addressed as the “Father of Indian Green 
Revolution,” that India introduced and further developed the high-yielding varieties 
of wheat under the High-Yielding Varieties Program (HYVP). India started as a 
country largely based on agriculture following its independence in 1947, and even 
today, about 55% of its population makes its living on farming, either directly or 
indirectly.1 Adoption of the HYVP in India overcame the life-threatening food crisis 
faced by Indians in the 1960s. With the rise in agricultural productivity, the “Green 
Revolution” made the Indian economy, self-sustainable. As India enters the new 
millennium, with increasing costs of living accompanied by increasing population 
and widening gaps in terms of access to resources, there has arisen a need and 
demand to revitalize Indian agriculture by “Gene Revolution.” Two technologies are 
at the forefront of shaping the next revolution in agriculture and plant-related tech-
nologies in India. One of them pertains to the recombinant DNA technology (rDNA) 
that was pioneered by Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen, who kick-started the field 
of biotechnology with the fundamental phenomenon of transferring genetic mate-
rial from one organism and artificially introducing it into the genome of another 
organism, where the genetic material so transferred gets replicated and expressed by 
that other organism. The rDNA technology-based genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) differ from traditional methods in nature and prior conventional plant 
breeding programs in that they do not involve overall mixing of genome between 
the plant species. Rather, GMOs involve very selective and precise movement of 
DNA fragment from one organism carrying a desired stretch/stretches of 
genetic material that can confer desired traits to the receiving organism by employ-
ing tissue culture techniques. The rDNA technology has been extensively recog-
nized as providing valuable tools, in agriculture and plant-related biotechnology, 
and products using these same tools have been extensively employed to produce 
GMOs and genetically modified (GM) plants (Commission 2010). Another path-
breaking technique that has the potential to change the agriculture and biotechnol-
ogy fields, both economically and technologically is clustered regularly interspaced 
short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) technology, which is a characteristic of the bac-
terial defense system and has been adapted and modified to become the foundation 
for CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing technology2 along with other alternate systems. 
Using such technologies can bring about a change in the technological and eco-
nomic landscape of Indian agriculture (Lakshmikumaran and Malhotra 2018). 
1 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/more-than-55-of-indians-make-a-living-from-farming- 
heres-how-we-can-double-their-income/
2 The new frontier of genome engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, Jennifer A. Doudna, Emmanuelle 
Charpentier,
SCIENCE, Vol. 346, Issue 6213, 1258096, November 28, 2014
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Much like the green revolution of the 1960s, which was a landmark adoption of 
innovative yet incentivized technology that enabled India to achieve a food surplus 
and feed its masses, the adoption of technologies such as rDNA technology and GM 
plants – Gene Revolution – may have a big impact on India’s agricultural needs 
(Herring 2008).
The first genetically modified crop to be commercialized in India was Bt cotton, 
which is a nonfood plant product. The Bt cotton plant has been created by incorpo-
rating endotoxin-producing Cry genes (Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab) from the bacteria 
Bacillus thuringiensis into the genome of the cotton plant. India first approved the 
Bollgard® technology directed to Cry1Ac and then approved Bollgard II® (Bg II) 
technology directed to two genes, Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab. Both these genes have been 
identified in Bacillus thuringiensis and inserted into plants, such as cotton using 
recombinant DNA technology. The incorporation of these genes into the cotton 
genome by using synthetic recombinant DNA constructs enables the plant to pro-
duce δ-endotoxins, hence making it resistant to infestation from pests like boll-
worm. This reduced the need for foliar insecticides that targeted these pests and 
reduced outbreaks of secondary pests, thereby improving crop quality and yield and 
increasing the economic value of the crop. By 2011 over 95% of cotton in India was 
produced by using Bg II technology (Herring 2014). With the incorporation of this 
technology, India has evolved from an importer to an exporter of cotton, and at pres-
ent, India’s average yield is around 500 kg of lint per hectare. The monthly report 
released on March 9, 2018, by the Cotton Association of India (CAI) gauges the 
cotton production in India for the season 2017–2018 (October–September) to be 
around 362 lakh bales (one bale = 170 kg cotton) and exports to be between 65 and 
70 lakh bales (Vyavhare and Kerns 2017).3 The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) corroborates India as the largest producer of cotton in the 
world with 365 lakh bales in the year 2017–2018.4 However, due to demand and 
consumption by local mills, India stands as the fourth largest exporter of cotton, 
behind the USA, Australia, and Brazil (James n.d.). It took India several years to 
grant regulatory approval of Bt cotton for commercialization. While Bt cotton has 
been successfully grown since, recent developments mar this success, posing chal-
lenges to the future of such crops/plants in India (Jamiepighin 2003). However, as it 
stands, there are no food crops approved for use in India using GM technology. The 
Indian regulatory authority, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), 
had approved Bt brinjal (eggplant) as being biosafe; however, its commercialization 
was not approved by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change more 
on the basis of the precautionary principle.
In contrast, Bangladesh has approved four varieties of Bt brinjal for cultivation, 
based on India’s biosafety analysis and data. Bangladesh’s approved varieties have 
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the brinjal plant has been transformed with a synthetic gene encoding the toxin 
protein Cry1Ac, which makes it resistant to pests and reduces the dependence on 
pesticides. Brinjal is second only to potato in terms of consumption in India; hence 
any decision on this issue of not accepting GM brinjal has far-reaching implications 
in the food crop industry.
In 2017, the GEAC had given approval to GM mustard, a genetically modified 
high-yielding variety developed in India by Delhi University’s Centre for Genetic 
Manipulation of Crop Plants (CGMCP), called DMH 11 (Dhara Mustard Hybrid) 
for commercial release. DMH 11 carries three genes that have been isolated and 
transformed into mustard plants, including bar, barnase, and barstar genes. While 
in May 2018, the GEAC called for more tests, including field demonstrations of GM 
mustard, its commercial release has been put on hold by the Environment Ministry.
The need for consistent public policy and robust frameworks for regulatory con-
trol poses significant challenges for the introduction of genetically engineered crops 
in India. The intellectual property (IP) framework is prescriptive in its scope, and 
the recent judgments5 preclude protection for technologies for the development of 
genetically engineered plants under the existing provisions of the Patents Act, 1970 
(the “Patents Act”). This would perhaps serve to disincentivize players who have 
developed proprietary technologies from bringing their latest inventions for use by 
farmers in India.
This chapter intends to, firstly, simplify and help the readers understand the science 
and technology involved in developing genetically modified plants and, having pro-
vided the readers with this background, move forward to discuss the eligibility of such 
genetically modified plants as patentable subject matter in light of relevant national, 
i.e., Indian, as well as international legal provisions. Thereafter, the chapter discusses 
the recent case of Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. v. Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors6 
which is especially relevant in understanding the current legal position in India regard-
ing patentability of genetically modified plants. The chapter also discusses the statu-
tory regime available for protection of plant varieties in India and ends by drawing a 
distinction between intellectual property rights guaranteed under the Patents Act ver-
sus the plant variety protection regime in the context of genetically modified plants.
2  Transgenic Plants/GM Plants: Understanding 
the Technology
Understanding the science is critical for understanding the frameworks for geneti-
cally modified/transgenic plants. A transgenic plant is a GMO and indicates that 
genes from either an unrelated plant or a microbe have been transferred artificially, 
using rDNA technology into a plant of interest.
5 Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. v. Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 86/2017, 
C.M. APPL. 14331, 14335, 15669, 17064/2017
Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors. v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 




Selecting for plants during cultivation is not a new phenomenon. For many years 
plant breeding entailed the selection of the elite plants for higher yields and toler-
ance to biotic and abiotic stresses. Earlier, variation occurred through induced muta-
tion or hybridization where two or more plants were crossed. Selection occurred 
through breeding process, and only the seeds with the best traits were selected. Even 
before the creation of a transgenic, the alteration of crops to improve their produc-
tion had been performed through selection for thousands of years, becoming a sci-
ence onto itself in recent centuries. However, to manipulate plants through selection 
takes many generations and does not always work due to randomness in the natural 
selection process. By using transgenic technology, which involves the use of genetic 
engineering techniques, one can control the process better and produce crops that 
are resistant to biotic and abiotic stresses. With recent developments in genetic engi-
neering techniques, scientists can now identify, manipulate, and exploit genes 
responsible for specific traits.
Creating a transgenic plant involves modifying the plant genome for expressing 
the desired trait(s). The steps involved in developing a transgenic plant as illustrated 
in Fig. 1 include:
 1. Step one. Synthesizing a DNA construct for a gene of interest under the control 
of a promoter (regulatory element) to express the gene and thus leading to the 
production of a desired protein in a host organism (recombinant host cell). In 
addition, the DNA construct could have DNA for selection markers for antibiotic 
or herbicide resistance, transit peptides that can localize its expression into 
organelles, and other transcription factors that function like an on/off switch.
 2. Step two. Transformation of plant cells by insertion of the recombinant DNA 
construct using genetic engineering methods. However, this technique may lead 
Fig. 1 Creating a transgenic plant involves modifying the plant genome for expressing the desired 
trait(s)
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to the insertion of the gene of interest at any random location in the chromosome 
of the plant, leading to the production of several transgenic plants. It is possible 
that the transformation method can result in insertion of one copy to several cop-
ies of the recombinant DNA construct carrying the gene of interest.
 3. Step three. It is possible that not all the insertions from the aforementioned trans-
formation lead to the expression of the gene of interest. Therefore, the next step 
is to screen and select for the desired transformants expressing the gene of inter-
est. Screening of these transformants involves identification of the most advanta-
geous insertions, namely, the elite transformants, which are named as “events.” 
In other words, when the gene of interest is located at different locations in the 
plant genome, each constitutes a different “event.” Thus, this step entails select-
ing one or more elite event(s) with the desired expression of the gene of interest 
in the transgenic plant.
There are applications for patents that comprise of the first two steps as described 
above (e.g., Indian patent no. 214436, where claims 1–24 relate to the transforma-
tion process or step 2 and claims 25–27 relate to recombinant DNA construct carry-
ing the modified bacterial gene of interest or step 1). There are also patent 
applications that pertain to specific events and their screening such as Indian patent 
no. 232681, for Bt gene associated with Bg II (more specifically the cotton event is 
named as MON 15985).
Finally, the elite transgenic event obtained from the transformation process is 
used to transfer the desired trait(s) (e.g., insect resistance) to different varieties of a 
plant. This can be done by using conventional crossing techniques like backcross-
ing, hybridization, etc. to produce new plant varieties expressing the desired gene of 
interest.
Usually, companies or research entities develop proprietary technologies for 
making the gene construct, transforming plant cells, and screening for the elite 
“events.” These events are licensed out as donor seeds in the exchange for licensing 
fees and royalties for the use of the GM technology in plants. The licensees (com-
mercial seed growers/breeders) use the donor seeds for introgression of the desir-
able genetic trait developed by the licensor into their own specific varieties by 
backcrossing breeding.
3  Genetically Modified Plants: Patent Protection
The status of patent protection for GM plants is presently uncertain in India and is 
a debate rife with economic and ethical considerations. It is relevant to note the 
legislative intent of the Patents Act and follow the history of its revisions to become 
TRIPS (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 
compliant to understand the issues surrounding the patentability of plant-related 
inventions in a broader context (Declaration on Patent Protection – Regulatory 
Sovereignty under TRIPS 2014).
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3.1  Plants or Animals and Conventional Methods 
of Production and Propagation of Plants and Animals Are 
An Unpatentable Subject Matter
Article 27.1 of TRIPS requires that “…patents shall be available for any inven-
tions…in all fields of technology….”
Article 27.3 of TRIPS states that “[m]embers may also exclude from patentability… 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes.”
Article 28.1(b) of TRIPS states that for process patents, the rights granted include 
the right “to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent …from the acts 
of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the 
product obtained directly by that process.”
Section 48(b) of the Patents Act states that “where the subject matter of the patent is 
a process, the exclusive right to prevent third parties, who do not have his con-
sent, from the act of using that process, and from the act of using, offering for 
sale, selling or importing for those purposes the product obtained directly by that 
process in India.”
A combined reading of Article 27.3 with Article 27.1 of TRIPS would render 
biotechnological inventions in agriculture patentable and not excluded subject mat-
ter, provided they would otherwise qualify to be patentable. However, it is con-
tended that plants, including GM plants are excluded under Section 3 of the Patents 
Act and hence constitute non-patentable subject matter.
The Ayyangar Committee Report of 1959, based on which the Patents Act was 
enacted, expressly clarified that the prohibition under Section 3(h)7 of the Patents 
Act, excluding “methods of agriculture or horticulture” from patentability, was 
intended to apply to “inventions in the field of plant propagation by asexual 
methods.”8 Presently, the Indian Patent Office tends to consider every conventional 
practice that is carried out in an open field as a method of agriculture. Consequently, 
any claim in a patent application that refers to terms like germinate, seeds, hybrid, 
variety, etc. is objected to under Section 3(h) by the Indian Patent Office and deemed 
to be excluded from patentability.
Prior to being amended in 2002, Section 3(i) of the Patents Act read as:
“(i) any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic or other treatment of 
human beings or any process for similar treatment of animals or plants to render them free 
of disease or to increase their economic value or that of their products;”
7 Section 3(h) of the Patents Act reads as: “3. What are not inventions.—The following are not 
inventions within the meaning of this Act,—(h) a method of agriculture or horticulture;….”
8 Paragraph 331 of the Ayyangar Committee Report of 1959
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Section 3(i) of the Patents Act was amended in 2002, and the words “or plants” were 
omitted by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002. Thus, the treatment of plants to 
render it free of disease or to increase its economic value no longer falls under the 
scope of the existing Section 3(i)9 nor under any of the other exclusions specified by 
Section 3 of the Patents Act.
Further, Section 3(c)10 of the Patents Act excludes the “discovery” of naturally 
occurring living things or nonliving substances from patentable subject matter. This 
means inventions such as isolated DNA or protein molecules are non-patentable 
subject matter. On the other hand, recombinant DNA constructs, modified DNA, 
and modified protein molecules developed in the laboratory and involving substan-
tial human intervention qualify as patentable subject matter as these cannot be con-
sidered as discovery.
Furthermore, Section 3(j)11 of the Patents Act excludes “plants and animals in 
whole or any part thereof other than micro-organisms, but including seeds, varieties 
and species and essentially biological processes for production or propagation of 
plants and animals” from patentable subject matter. The Indian position on plants or 
animals and on conventional methods of production and propagation of plants and 
animals is that they do not fall under patentable subject matter.
3.2  Differing Interpretations of What Is Covered Under “Any 
Part of a Plant” of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act: 
To Consider an Artificial DNA Construct as a Part of a Plant 
Is Scientifically Incorrect
The gray area lies in the interpretation and implication of what is covered under 
“any part of a plant” – is it limited to organs such as leaves, roots, stems, and flow-
ers, or can this term “any part thereof” extend to plant cells as well? The Indian 
Patent Office’s position at present does not allow claims directed to eukaryotic cells 
that include plant cells and animal cells as these are objected to under Section 3(j) 
of the Patents Act. The Indian Patent Office considers cell as a part of a plant even 
though it uses transgenic technology to produce transformed, recombinant plant 
cells. In contrast, all microbial cells (prokaryotic) are patentable under Section 3(j) 
9 Section 3(i) of the Patents Act reads as: “3. What are not inventions.—The following are not 
inventions within the meaning of this Act,—(i) any process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, 
prophylactic diagnostic, therapeutic or other treatment of human beings or any process for a simi-
lar treatment of animals to render them free of disease or to increase their economic value or that 
of their products.…..”
10 Section 3(c) of the Patents Act reads as: “3. What are not inventions.—The following are not 
inventions within the meaning of this Act,—….(c) the mere discovery of a scientific principle or 
the formulation of an abstract theory or discovery of any living thing or non-living substance 
occurring in nature;…..”
11 Section 3(j) of the Patents Act reads as: “3. What are not inventions.—The following are not 
inventions within the meaning of this Act,—….(j) plants and animals in whole or any part thereof 
other than micro organisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological 
processes for production or propagation of plants and animals;…..”
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of the Patents Act, as long as these do not fall under discovery and meet the criteria 
of novelty and inventive step.
While many patent applications for method of transforming plants have been 
allowed by the Indian Patent Office, interestingly, the Indian Patent Office has also 
found Section 3(j) of the Patents Act to be applicable in case of transgenic plants in 
the case of Monsanto Technology LLC. v. Controller General of Patents.12 In this 
case, the Controller of Patents refused Monsanto’s patent application claiming an 
invention titled “A method for producing a transgenic plant with increased heat 
tolerance” as non-patentable subject matter falling under the scope of Section 3(j) 
of the Patents Act, among others. Monsanto challenged the Controller’s order before 
the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). The IPAB accepted Monsanto’s 
argument that since the production of the transgenic variety being claimed involved 
substantial human intervention, it could not be considered as an “essentially bio-
logical process” and, thus, was not hit by Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. The IPAB 
held as follows:
“29. ……The plant is modified by the introduction of known recombinant DNA into its 
genome, thereby causing the said predisposition. The specification also teaches how the 
known regeneration and screening technique can be used to screen the transformed plant 
with heat, salt or drought tolerance. The appellant has given up all claims relating to 
recombinant DNA, plant cell, progeny, plant, crop plant, propagule, seed etc. [claims 1–15] 
and also claims 17 [transgenic plant,19 [Isolated protein] and 20 [a field crop].
30. Let us see amended Claim 1 [claim16 amended]. It relates to a method that requires 
several steps that together provide claimed solution. The method here is best considered as 
a series of individual steps. It is a method that includes an act of human intervention on a 
plant cell and producing in that plant cell some change. Therefore, the respondent erred in 
finding this method as essentially biological process and excluded under section 3(j). We set 
aside his findings to that extent.”
Following the above interpretation of the IPAB, there have been many decisions 
by the Indian Patent Office, wherein the objection under Section 3(j) of the Patents 
Act has been set aside on account of the inventions having a  substantial human 
intervention and tissue culture steps such that they no longer constituted essentially 
biological processes for the production or propagation of plants and animals, 
thereby allowing the patent grant. This has been especially true and applicable to 
method of transformation in plants involving recombinant DNA constructs. While 
the IPAB ultimately rejected Monsanto’s application on grounds of lack of inventive 
step and non-patentability under Section 3(d),13 it set aside the Controller’s order on 
the issue of non-patentability under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.
12 IPAB Order No. 146 of 2013 dated 5 July 2013
13 Section 3(d) of the Patents Act reads: “(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known sub-
stance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the 
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least one new reactant. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, 
ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, com-
plexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same 
substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.”
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In a differing interpretation of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act, the Division Bench 
of the Delhi High Court in the case of Nuziveedu v. Monsanto14 vide judgment dated 
April 11, 2018 invalidated Monsanto’s patent no. 214436, holding that the subject 
matter of the patent was non-patentable under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.15 First, 
the judgment does not address the question of whether DNA should be considered 
as a part of a plant or not and is further unclear with regard to the interpretation and 
applicability of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. This is especially relevant to an oth-
erwise patentable subject matter concerning isolated, modified genes, i.e., modified 
DNA molecules, to create DNA constructs for transformation of plants.
Claims 25–27 of the Monsanto’s impugned patent no. 214436 pertain to a DNA 
construct where the gene of interest encodes for Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) toxin. 
Claim 25 of the said patent is reproduced below:
“25. A nucleic acid sequence comprising a promoter operably linked to a first polynucleo-
tide sequence encoding a plastid transit peptide, which is linked in frame to a second poly-
nucleotide sequence encoding a Cry2Ab Bacillus thuringiensis 8-endotoxin protein, 
wherein expression of said nucleic acid sequence by a plant cell produces a fusion protein 
comprising an amino-terminal plastid transit peptide covalently linked to said δ-endotoxin 
protein, and wherein said fusion protein functions to localize said δ-endotoxin protein to a 
subcellular organelle or compartment.
Such a DNA construct comprising a promoter sequence, transit peptide, and a 
gene of interest expressing the Cry2Ab protein is a synthetic molecule called as 
recombinant DNA construct and considered a patentable product under the Patents 
Act in India. Such a DNA construct was never a part of a plant and further did not 
occur in nature. Therefore, the product claims for the recombinant DNA construct 
cannot be considered a plant or part thereof and thus should be excluded from fall-
ing under the purview of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. This is the view taken by 
the Indian research institutes and the scientists’ community.
The question to be asked is can and should DNA, proteins, RNA, cDNA, etc., 
which are chemical molecules, and although may be present in the plant cells, fall 
under the scope of the term “any part thereof” or the expression “parts of a plant”?
Recombinant DNA constructs cannot fall under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act, 
even if these constructs function, or express genes in plant species. Since, recombi-
nant DNA technology used in the construction and synthesis of such recombinant 
DNA constructs has been singularly practiced in the laboratories requiring human 
intervention and manipulation, these cannot fall under Section 3(j) of the Patents 
Act. It is to be emphasized that “plant” under the meaning of Section 3(j) of the 
14 Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. v. Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 86/2017, 
C.M. APPL. 14331, 14335, 15669, 17064/2017, Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors. v. Nuziveedu 
Seeds Ltd. & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 76/2017, CAV. 328/2017, C.M.  APPL. 
133348-13352/2017
15 This judgment has been set aside by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 08 January 2019 in 
C.A. Nos.4616 – 4617/2018, Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors. v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors.
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Patents Act is a “living organism,” while “DNA” or a gene or a DNA construct are 
inanimate molecules, not a living entity, which merely code for production of a 
protein in a living organism. Hence, it is erroneous to focus on the “application” or 
“use” of such an inanimate product, when used in a plant to conclude it as a part of 
a plant. Thus, to consider an artificial DNA construct as a part of a plant is scientifi-
cally incorrect. In fact, Section 3(j) of the Patents Act nowhere mentions “use” of a 
product as a basis for non-patentability of inventions; it only covers product (plant 
or parts thereof) or process (essentially biological process). DNA constructs inserted 
into a plant using recombinant DNA technology cannot be interpreted as falling 
under the definition of plants or parts thereof.
3.3  Transformation Is Neither a Conventional Breeding 
Method nor an “Essentially Biological Process” 
for Production of Plants
However, in contrast to the aforementioned IPAB order for the process of generat-
ing transgenic plants by transformation, in Nuziveedu v. Monsanto,16 the Delhi High 
Court inferred that claims 1–24 of the patent no. 214436 that are directed to a 
method of transformation of plants fall under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. Claim 
1 of the said patent is reproduced below:
“1. A method for producing a transgenic plant comprising incorporating into its genome a 
nucleic acid sequence comprising a plant functional promoter sequence operably linked to 
a first polynucleotide sequence encoding a plastid transit peptide, which is linked in frame 
to a second polynucleotide sequence encoding a Cry2Ab Bacillus thuringiensis δ-endotoxin 
protein, wherein said plastid transit peptide functions to localize said δ-endotoxin protein 
to a subcellular organelle or compartment.”
Transformation is the method by which a recombinant DNA construct is inserted 
into a plant system, which has been equated to a microbiological process and, thus, 
is patentable. Transformation creates hundreds or thousands of possibilities, i.e., 
gene insertion can take place at any location in the plant genome, and there can be 
multiple insertions as well. Thousands of plants having the DNA construct at vari-
ous locations in the plant genome can be produced by transformation methods. The 
recombinant DNA constructs, such as the construct of claims 25–27 of the patent 
no. 214436, has a gene of interest encoding for Cry2Ab protein. Similarly, any gene 
of interest can be introduced into a plant species. Importantly, the gene of interest 
expressed by such a recombinant DNA construct (as claimed in patent no. 214436) 
is a protein of bacterial origin, which cannot be considered as a part of a plant. 
This process is carried out in a laboratory under strictly controlled tissue culture 
16 This judgment has been set aside by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 08 January 2019 in 
C.A. Nos.4616 – 4617/2018, Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors. v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors.
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conditions and thus, under no stretch of imagination, can be said to be either a “con-
ventional method of breeding” or an “essentially biological process” for the produc-
tion of plants.
In fact, it is to be considered as a microbiological process, where the transforma-
tion occurs, which is an insertion of a recombinant, synthetic DNA construct into a 
plant species mediated by Agrobacterium tumefaciens, microprojectile bombard-
ment, etc., and cannot be equated to an essentially biological process. The Delhi 
High Court has overlooked the claims directed to the process of transformation of 
plants (using the recombinant DNA construct) to express  the Bt toxin and rather 
focused on post-invention, conventional breeding methods for introgression of 
desired traits into plants and not on the claimed transformation method, which does 
not involve any conventional method of breeding. Transformation can neither be 
considered a conventional breeding method nor an “essentially biological process” 
for the production of plants as it is carried out in the laboratory, involving tissue 
culture techniques in the laboratory which are results of human ingenuity, and, 
therefore, cannot fall under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.
It must be understood that transformation is in no way even similar, to any con-
ventional means of breeding such as hybridization or introgression. While transfor-
mation is not considered as an “essentially biological process” (since it is performed 
using DNA constructs in the laboratory), hybridization/introgression, on the other 
hand, falls under essentially biological process involving crossing, backcrossing, 
selfing, etc. of plant varieties to transfer the genes or genetic material conferring the 
traits from one plant to another; and these are carried out in the fields or greenhouses 
and constitute conventional methods of breeding.
The European Enlarged Board of Appeals, in its decision of Plant Bioscience 
Limited v. Syngenta Participations AG Groupe Limagrain Holding17 while expand-
ing the definition of an “essentially biological process,” has held that:
1. A non-microbiological process for the production of plants which contains or consists of 
the steps of sexually crossing the whole genomes of plants and of subsequently selecting 
plants is in principle excluded from patentability as being “essentially biological” within 
the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC.18
2. Such a process does not escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it 
contains, as a further step or as part of any of the steps of crossing and selection, a step of 
a technical nature which serves to enable or assist the performance of the steps of sexually 
crossing the whole genomes of plants or of subsequently selecting plants.
3. If, however, such a process contains within the steps of sexually crossing and select-
ing an additional step of a technical nature, which step by itself introduces a trait into the 
genome or modifies a trait in the genome of the plant produced, so that the introduction or 
17 Plant Bioscience Limited v. Syngenta Participations AG Groupe Limagrain Holding, G2/07 
dated 9 December 2010, page 71
18 Article 53(b) EPC reads as: “53. Exceptions to patentability – European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of: ….(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 




modification of that trait is not the result of the mixing of the genes of the plants chosen for 
sexual crossing, then the process is not excluded from patentability under Article 53(b) 
EPC.
4. In the context of examining whether such a process is excluded from patentability as 
being “essentially biological” within the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC, it is not relevant 
whether a step of a technical nature is a new or known measure, whether it is trivial or a 
fundamental alteration of a known process, whether it does or could occur in nature or 
whether the essence of the invention lies in it.
Since, transformation has introduced a recombinant DNA construct conferring a 
trait in the genome of the plant species; and this introduction of the trait is not the 
result of the mixing of the genes of the plants, but rather a process carried out in the 
laboratory under strict supervision and with ample human interference; it is not an 
“essentially biological process” for production of plants and thus ought not to fall 
under the ambit of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. The confusion arises due to the 
use of the terms, transformation and hybridization, but it is pertinent to distinguish 
them and to emphasize that the initial transformation process forms part of the pat-
entable subject matter in India, which cannot be equated to an “essentially biologi-
cal process” for the production of plants.
Further, in the case of Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace,19 the European 
Enlarged Board of Appeals has held that insertion of the relevant DNA sequence 
into the genome of a plant could not occur without human intervention, and conse-
quently, this step is an important technical step which has a decisive impact on the 
desired final result. Such a process is not “essentially biological” by any definition 
and thus not excluded from patentability. Moreover, the first plant directly obtained 
by such a transformation process is to be considered as a product of a microbiologi-
cal process. In contrast, the subsequent generations obtained using the first trans-
formed plants by conventional breeding them to other plants to obtain subsequent 
transgenic plants would constitute an essentially biological process.
Claims 25–27 of the patent no. 214436 pertain to a recombinant synthetic DNA 
construct where the gene of interest encodes a bacterial protein, Bt toxin, while 
claims 1–24 pertain to a transformation method for insertion of the recombinant 
DNA construct into the plant species. Clearly, the said patent is directed at a method 
of transformation. Therefore, neither the product claimed in claims 25–27 can be 
considered as a plant or part thereof, nor can the transformation method of claims 
1–24 be considered an “essentially biological process” under Section 3(j) of the 
Patents Act. Therefore, in our view, neither the product, nor the process claimed in 
the patent no. 214436 falls under the scope of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act.
19 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace, T0356/93, dated 21 February 1995, paragraph 40.1
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4  Genetically Modified Plants: Plant Variety Protection
4.1  Difference Between Patent Law and PPV&FR Act
4.1.1  Transformation Method Cannot Get Protection 
Under PPV&FR Act
The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act (PPV&FR Act), 2001, is 
a sui generis legislation formulated by India to fulfill its obligation under TRIPS20 
for providing effective intellectual property right protection for plant varieties. 
However, one is to note here that the PPV&FR Act awards protection to the com-
mercial growers/breeders/seed companies for specific varieties in terms of 
Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability (DUS) testing to distinguish and identify a 
new, extant,21 essentially derived variety22 and farmer’s variety.23
Moreover, Section 2(za) of the PPV&FR Act defines a “variety” as “a plant 
grouping except microorganism within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known 
rank, which can be -
 (i) defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype 
of that plant grouping;
 (ii) distinguished from any other plant grouping by expression of at least one of the 
said characteristics; and
20 Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows: “3. Members may also exclude from 
patentability: (a)diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals;(b)plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for 
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph 
shall be reviewed 4 years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.”
21 Section 2(j) of the PPV&FR Act defines “Extant Variety” as “a variety available in India which 
is— (i) notified under section 5 of the Seeds Act, 1966 (54 of 1966); or (ii) farmers’ variety; or (iii) 
a variety about which there is common knowledge; or (iv) any other variety which is in public 
domain.”
22 Section 2(i) of the PPV&FR Act states that an “Essentially Derived Variety” in respect of a vari-
ety (the initial variety) “shall be said to be essentially derived from such initial variety when it— (i) 
is predominantly derived from such initial variety, or from a variety that itself is predominantly 
derived from such initial variety, while retaining the expression of the essential characteristics that 
results from the genotype or combination of genotype of such initial variety; (ii) is clearly distin-
guishable from such initial variety; and (iii) conforms (except for the differences which result from 
the act of derivation) to such initial variety in the expression of the essential characteristics that 
result from the genotype or combination of genotype of such initial variety.”
23 Section 2(l) of the PPV&FR Act defines a “Farmers’ Variety” as “a variety which— (i) has been 
traditionally cultivated and evolved by the farmers in their fields; or (ii) is a wild relative or land 
race of a variety about which the farmers possess the common knowledge.”
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 (iii) considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated, which 
remains unchanged after such propagation, and includes propagating material 
of such variety, extant variety, transgenic variety, farmers’ variety and essen-
tially derived variety.”
Considering the aforesaid, a gene can never be equated to be a variety, wherein a 
trait is determined by the expression of one or more genes. Thus, a gene made of 
nucleic acids is a chemical compound within a plant which may confer a specific 
trait or characteristic to a plant but cannot be considered a variety under PPV&FR 
Act. Moreover, when a gene or DNA molecule is inserted into a plant species 
through the transformation method, such method cannot get protection under 
PPV&FR Act. Such methods can only be protected under the patent regime, since 
there is no provision of protecting a method of transforming a plant or regeneration 
of plant using tissue culture methods under PPV&FR Act.
It is further important to note that a trait for resistance to biotic and abiotic stress 
may be a distinct characteristic under the PPV&FR Act regime. However, the pro-
tection under this regime is for all the characteristics of a plant variety and not for a 
specific distinct trait which differentiates this variety from other closely related vari-
eties. Therefore, genes, proteins, promoters, enhancers, and traits in plants cannot 
get specific protection under PPV&FR Act and need to be protected under the patent 
regime. Thus, a recombinant DNA construct, which is neither a plant or part thereof, 
nor a variety, can be protected under the patent regime and not under the PPV&FR 
Act regime.
4.1.2  PPV&FR Act Allows Breeders to Use Protected Varieties 
to Develop Newer Ones
Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement gives the flexibility to member nations to 
exclude plants and animals from being patentable subject matter, provided that the 
members have an alternative provision for protecting plant varieties through a sepa-
rate system such as the PPV&FR Act, or a combination thereof. In terms of the lee-
way provided under the Patents Act and PPV&FR Act in India, it is to be understood 
that the Patents Act only allows the use of a patented invention for merely “experi-
mental use,” while the PPV&FR Act allows breeders to use even protected varieties 
to develop newer varieties. The aforesaid exemption is described under Section 3024 
of the PPV&FR Act.
24 Section 30 of the PPV&FR Act reads as: “30. Researcher’s rights—Nothing contained in this Act 
shall prevent— (a) the use of any variety registered under this Act by any person using such variety 
for conducting experiment or research; or (b) the use of a variety by any person as an initial source 
of variety for the purpose of creating other varieties: Provided that the authorisation of the breeder 
of a registered variety is required where the repeated use of such variety as a parental line is neces-
sary for commercial production of such other newly developed variety.”
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4.1.3  Benefit Sharing Under PPV&FR Act Offers No Benefits  
to IP Holders
Another difference between the PPV&FR Act and the Patents Act is the benefit 
sharing provisions under Section 26 of the PPV&FR Act.25 But the system of benefit 
sharing, much like the limitation to “variety” under PPV&FR Act, is applicable only 
for varieties registered under the PPV&FR Act regime. Post registration of a variety, 
the authority invites claims of the public, and where it is established that the third 
party had played a role in contributing to the development of the registered variety, 
such third party is awarded the right to seek part of the benefits that a registered 
owner of a variety may derive. The overall scheme and object of PPV&FR Act sug-
gests that the benefit sharing system has been created to benefit the farmers and 
communities who have helped conserve plant germplasm that may have contributed 
to the development of registered varieties.
To interpret the benefit sharing system as catering to IP holders will actually lead 
to an absurdity. This is because the benefit sharing system under Section 26 of 
PPV&FR Act only applies to registered varieties that are generated out of the 
research varieties that are in the true sense the varieties produced by the primary 
transformation event, also referred herein above as a microbiological process. 
Therefore, if a recombinant technology is used to develop subsequent transgenic 
varieties that are not ultimately registered under the PPV&FR Act, the benefit shar-
ing system will not apply, and the IP holder would have no recourse for being 
rewarded for their valuable technology. This injustice would only become manifold 
25 Section 26 of the PPV&FR Act describes benefit sharing as: “Determination of benefit sharing 
by Authority — (1) On receipt of a copy of the certificate of registration under sub-section (8) of 
section 23 or subsection (2) of section 24, the Authority shall publish such contents of the certifi-
cate and invite claims of benefit sharing to the variety registered under such certificate in the man-
ner as may be prescribed. (2) On invitation of the claims under sub-section (1), any person or group 
of persons or firm or governmental or non-governmental organisation shall submit its claim of 
benefit sharing to such variety in the prescribed form within such period, and accompanied with 
such fees, as may be prescribed: Provided that such claim shall only be submitted by any person or 
group of persons, if such person or every person constituting such group is a citizen of India; or 
firm or governmental or non-governmental organisation, if such firm or organisation is formed or 
established in India. (3) On receiving a claim under sub-section (2), the Authority shall send a copy 
of such claim to the breeder of the variety registered under such certificate and the breeder may, on 
receipt of such copy, submit his opposition to such claim within such period and in such manner as 
maybe prescribed. (4) The Authority shall, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties, 
dispose of the claim received under subsection (2). While disposing of the claim under sub-section 
(4), the Authority shall explicitly indicate in its order the amount of the benefit sharing, if any, for 
which the claimant shall be entitled and shall take into consideration the following matters, namely 
the extent and nature of the use of genetic material of the claimant in the development of the variety 
relating to which the benefit sharing has been claimed; the commercial utility and demand in the 
market of the variety relating to which the benefit sharing has been claimed. (5) The amount of 
benefit sharing to a variety determined under this section shall be deposited by the breeder of such 
variety in the manner referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 45 in the National Gene 
Fund. (6) The amount of benefit sharing determined under this section shall, on a reference made 
by the Authority in the prescribed manner, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue by the 




if there is no patent protection for the technology in the first place. Thus, the inter-
pretation that IP holders under the PPV&FR Act regime can take the advantage of 
the benefit sharing system is not a possible option.
4.2  Infringement Under PPV&FR Act
Section 6426 of the PPV&FR Act states that the sale, import, and production of a 
variety registered under the PPV&FR Act by a person who is not the breeder of the 
said variety or the registered licensee of a registered breeder, without the permission 
of the registered breeder of the said variety, shall constitute as infringement of the 
registered variety. Further, the said section also states that the sale, import, and pro-
duction of any other variety by giving it a denomination identical with or decep-
tively similar to the denomination of a variety registered under the PPV&FR Act, in 
a manner that causes confusion in the mind of general people, will also amount to 
infringement of the registered variety.
Section 6527 of the PPV&FR Act states that a suit for infringement of a registered 
variety or any right relating to a registered variety shall not be instituted in a court 
inferior to a District Court.
Thus, it can be seen that the PPV&FR Act only provides for a legal recourse 
when either the variety registered under the PPV&FR Act or any right relating to 
such a registered variety is infringed by any person who is not authorized to use 
such a registered variety. The factum of infringement would have to be established 
by examining whether the allegedly infringing variety carries all characteristics of 
the registered variety or not, as infringement under Section 64 of the PPVFR Act is 
with respect to a registered variety only and not for a trait.
Therefore, recourse in the manner of a suit for infringement under Section 65 of 
PPV&FR Act is no recourse to the developers having IP in the recombinant DNA 
technology by which the GM plants are created.
26 Section 64 of the PPV&FR Act reads: “Infringement.— Subject to the provisions of this Act, a 
right established under this Act is infringed by a person— (a) who, not being the breeder of a vari-
ety registered under this Act or a registered agent or registered licensee of that variety, sells, 
exports, imports or produces such variety without the permission of its breeder or within the scope 
of a registered licence or registered agency without permission of the registered licensee or regis-
tered agent, as the case may be; (b) who uses, sells, exports, imports or produces any other variety 
giving such variety, the denomination identical with or deceptively similar to the denomination of 
a variety registered under this Act in such manner as to cause confusion in the mind or general 
people in identifying such variety so registered.”
27 Section 65 of the PPV&FR Act reads: “Suit for infringement, etc.—(1) No suit— (a) for the 
infringement of a variety registered under this Act; or (b) relating to any right in a variety registered 
under this Act, shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try 
the suit. (2) For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), ‘District court having juris-
diction’ shall mean the District Court within the local limit of whose jurisdiction the cause of 
action arises.”
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4.3  Researcher’s Rights?
Nevertheless, even if one were to consider the PPV&FR Act as an alternative regime 
for protecting the transgenic plant variety containing the recombinant DNA con-
struct conferring the specific trait to the plant, the third party infringes under the 
garb of researchers’ rights provided under Section 30 of the PPV&FR Act can use 
such a variety as an initial source to create other varieties containing the recombi-
nant DNA construct.
Section 30 of the PPV&FR Act reads:
Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent –
 (a)  the use of any variety registered under this Act by any person using such variety for 
conducting experiment or research; or
 (b)  the use of a variety by any person as an initial source of variety for the purpose of 
creating other varieties:
Provided that the authorisation of the breeder of a registered variety is required 
where the repeated use of such variety as a parental line is necessary for commercial 
production of such other newly developed variety.
It is clear from Section 30 of the PPV&FR Act that one can use the initial research 
variety to create other varieties, which in turn if not registered would lead to unau-
thorized and inappropriate use of research varieties. Such unauthorized and inap-
propriate use of research varieties cannot be brought into justice under any provision 
of Indian IP law. In other words, the PPV&FR Act regime does not offer any protec-
tion against the unauthorized use, sale, export, import, and production of the spe-
cific distinct trait, e.g., insect resistance, which may have been inserted into another 
plant variety by conventional breeding methods using the initial transgenic plant.
Accordingly, neither the benefit sharing under Section 26 nor infringement under 
Section 64 of the PPV&FR Act can come to the aid of an innovator when it comes 
to protecting a specific distinct trait in a plant variety. Thus, it is imperative to have 
protection under the patent regime for such inventors as a compensation for disclos-
ing and sharing their technology for the public’s benefit.
5  Conclusion
In case of transgenic plants developed using recombinant DNA technology, such as 
those having a trait for insect resistance, the flow of innovation, inter alia, requires 
the synthesis of a recombinant DNA construct, followed by the transformation of a 
plant cell by insertion of the recombinant DNA construct. Due to fundamental dif-
ferences in biology, if the gene is obtained from a completely unrelated species 
(e.g., a bacterium), it cannot be successfully inserted into a plant with any success. 
Significant human intervention in the form modifying the gene for it to be suitable 
for a plant genome and adding several other components is required. Further, the 
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insertion of the DNA constructs into the plant can occur at different locations in the 
plant genome, but not all of them will result in a desired trait. Only through signifi-
cant human intervention can one select one of these “events” that will result in the 
transgenic plant expressing the desired trait at the optimal level. The recombinant 
DNA constructs developed in vitro, the method for developing the genetically modi-
fied plants using that gene, and the integration of the DNA construct into the plant 
genome at a specific location in the plant genome cannot be termed as “essentially 
biological processes” and should be considered as patentable subject matter.
Such recombinant DNA constructs, recombinant DNA sequences, and methods 
of developing a transgenic plant are per se not a subject matter of protection under 
the PPV&FR Act because none of them can be considered as a “variety.” A variety 
as defined under the PPV&FR Act only refers to a plant grouping within a given 
species of plants and does not cover such recombinant DNA constructs. A plant 
variety being registered under the PPV&FR Act could also be a variety which was 
developed by backcrossing/breeding/hybridization of the transgenic plant  – the 
“event.” The PPV&FR Act also does not deal with granting any form of intellectual 
property rights to plant breeding methods.
Effectively then, rights under the PPV&FR Act and the rights granted under the 
Patents Act operate in completely different spheres. What is protected under the 
Patents Act cannot be protected under the PPV&FR Act, and the vice versa holds 
true as well.28
Recently, on January 8, 2019, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the Delhi 
High Court, Division Bench judgment in Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. (Supra), 
holding that the findings of the Division Bench were not based upon examining any 
technological or expert evidence, which was of critical value in the present case, the 
issue involved therein being complicated and relating to chemical, biochemical, 
biotechnological, and microbiological processes. The matter has been remanded 
back to the Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court for proper adjudication and 
disposal in accordance with law. Even though the Supreme Court has not provided 
any observations or interpretation of Section 3(j), setting aside of the Division 
Bench’s order entails that the interpretation of Section 3(j) adopted by the Division 
Bench shall no longer be applicable. A trial will commence soon, and the outcome 
of this case will be of great significance and will have a deep impact on how plant- 
related biotechnological inventions are treated under the Indian patent regime.
Thus, the future of IP protection for agricultural biotechnologies in India needs 
(Statutory?/Regulatory?) clarification on the scope of protection for technologies 
involved in developing transgenic plants – the “events” – the scope of protection for 
“plant varieties” being made clear under the PPV&FR Act. This is especially vital 
considering India’s desire to foster an innovation-based economy.
28 Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors. v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors., C.A. Nos.4616 – 4617 of 
2018
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‘Zero hunger’ as a sustainable development goal requires macro-level multisec-
toral innovation in any regulatory setting. This is more so in the case of India, 
which grapples with poverty, famine, shortage in food supply and massive hike 
in prices of basic foodstuffs. In this chapter, I critically analyse the recent Indian 
efforts to overcome challenges posed by the pervasive problem of food insecurity 
and discuss the issues that India must overcome to position itself in a low-hunger 
bracket globally. In that I elaborately reflect on whether the prevailing food dis-
tribution system is being reformed to achieve aims of creating sustainable food 
systems through action-oriented policies. Further I contend that agroecological 
practices in comparison to the intellectual property-centred industrial model are 
the more sustainable approach in the longer run. However, the high concentra-
tion of firms in the sector seems to often create an imbalance, since capitalist 
tendencies outweigh the presence of any competition in the market. I argue that 
this imbalance has specifically led to regulatory failure in the Indian context by 
exemplifying the litigations concerning ag-biotech gene patents held by 
Monsanto. Thus, improved oversight through better understanding of the long-
term goal of regulation in light of the food-health-climate nexus is the need of the 
hour. Preserving gene diversity, traditional farm practices and adapting to sus-
tainable ways that aid regulatory governance in India is the plausible way to 
create a hunger-free future, as envisaged in UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s definition of food security.
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1  Introduction
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life. – 1996 World Food Summit Plan of Action, UN FAO.1
To reduce, no later than 2015, the number of undernourished people to half the 
present (1996) level was a promise made at the World Food Summit after much 
deliberation.2 Around 12 years later, on June 19, 2009, over one-sixth of humanity 
1 The World Food Summit pledge of 1996 committed the World’s governments to reducing, no later 
than 2015, the number of undernourished people to half the present (1996) level. See http://www.
fao.org/docrep/w9990e/w9990e07.htm
2 This number was later announced as being close to 790 million at the end of 1999, though not 
accounting for the number of undernourished since 1996 which was the base year as per the 
Summit pledge. See “Food Security: When People must live with hunger and fear starvation” 
(UNFAO, 1999) – The first ‘State of Food security in the world’ (SOFI) report, 1999 available 
online http://www.fao.org/3/a-x3114e.pdf. The SOFI report is jointly prepared by FAO, IFAD, 
UNICEF, WFP and WHO and is released annually. The UN General Assembly Resolution for 
adoption of Millennium Development Goals (http://www.who.int/topics/millennium_develop-
ment_goals/about/en/) in September 2000 reiterated the goal with modifications in the base year as 
2000 and the action of now halving “the proportion of the world’s people [i.e. the entire world 
population]…who suffer from hunger [i.e. the number of undernourished people].” This propor-
tion-based metric assumes an accurate calculation of the number of undernourished as a fixed 
number to be supported without accounting for the ever-increasing world population. Thus shifting 
focus to increased government action to control world population which is expected to automati-
cally lessen the number of undernourished thereby sizing down the amount of action required to 
halve the number of (now reduced) hungry people. This way, any food programme that caters to 
the miniscule number of undernourished while the world population is uncontrollably expanding 
will merely register an institutional effort of window dressing for a solution to the problem of food 
security but not resolve the food crisis. For a descriptive critique on the approaches of international 
agencies such as FAO and the World Bank in remedying undernourishment, see especially, Pogge, 
T., “The Hunger Games” in Food Ethics, Springer, 2016, Vol 1, pp. 9–27, available online: https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41055-016-0006-9?view=classic [‘Pogge, Hunger Games’]  – 
(governments kept the headline formulation of the goal – “We will halve poverty and undernour-
ishment by 2015” – but they [surreptiously] lowered the bar so as to make this goal more easily 
achievable.) The goals were further narrowed down to focus only on ‘undernourishment in the 
developing world’ and also backdated such that government action for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) seemed to have commenced in the year 1990. Consequently, the first 
UN report on the progress made in regard to the MDGs depicted that world’s most populous coun-
tries such as East Asia (China included) and the Pacific had succeeded in halving extreme poverty-
related concerns (such as hunger) in 1999 itself. However, subsequently the success rate diminishes 
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was, more than ever before, reported as ‘undernourished’ by the United Nations’ 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO).3 This was also the first time in world 
history that the official figures had climbed above 1 billion.4 Severe shortage in food 
supply and massive hike in prices of basic foodstuffs were identified as the primary 
reason for undernourishment.5 A phase of institutional reform followed, and new 
metrics for calculating hunger were employed.6 The last report released by UNFAO 
upon the lapse of the timeline for achieving the millennium development goals in 
2015, indicated that the proportion of undernourished people in the developing 
regions, fell by almost half since 1990, from 23.3% in 1990–1992 to 12.9% in 
2014–2016.7 Such assertions notwithstanding, the World Food Price Index was 
found spiking from 201.4 in 2008 to 229.9 in 2011 and more recently to 163.5 in 
considerably reflecting uneven progress. For the first UN Report, see United Nations, 
‘Implementation of United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary-General’ 
(July 31, 2002) available online: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/sgreport2002.
pdf?OpenElement; for the last UN Report, “Millennium Development Goals Report 2015”, see 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20
(July%201).pdf.
3 See UNFAO, “1.02 Billion People Hungry” (June 19, 2009) available online: http://www.fao.org/
news/story/en/item/20568/icode/. See also Conway, G., One Billion Hungry: Can We Feed The 
World (Cornell University Press, New York, 2012) – the routes to World Food Security are techno-
logical innovation, fair and efficient markets, people and political leadership.
4 These official figures may be an understatement of the real-world scenario as the earlier FAO 
metric for measuring ‘undernourishment’ overlooks nutritional deficiency in food intake (such as 
necessary vitamins and their absorption for healthy and balanced living), energy expenditure due 
to work (as opposed to sedentary lifestyle), famine or disease and merely focuses on state of 
dietary energy deprivation lasting over a year. Clearly discounting extended periods of short-term 
starvation that last under a year’s duration. See for example, [‘Pogge, Hunger Games’] supra at 1 
for a critique on the FAO definition of undernourishment.
5 See Timmer, P., ‘Reflections on Food Prices Past’ in Food Policy, Elsevier, February 2010, Issue 
1, Vol 35, pp. 1–11 – from the beginning of 2007 to early 2008, the prices of some of the most basic 
international food commodities increased dramatically on international markets.
6 After the Global Food Crisis (See fn.2), the old FPPI was redesigned by the Committee on World 
Food Security (CWFS). The now reformed CWFS convened a High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) 
for Food Security and Nutrition in October 2009 and developed an expert report for new FPPI 
along with recommendations for monitoring undernourishment before the expiration of the time-
line for realization of the Millennium Development Goals (http://www.who.int/topics/millen-
nium_development_goals/about/en/).The new FPPI depicted 13% reduction in undernourishment 
which co-related with World Bank’s cumulative extreme poverty decline since 1996 reported after 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in November 1999. See especially, [‘Pogge, Hunger 
Games’] supra at 2—“[The new method] ensured, at least, that the officially reported undernour-
ishment and extreme poverty trends were now firmly headed in the same direction.”; see also 
[“Special Feature article on the New FPPI, 2013”] at fn 8; see also HLPE Secretariat, UNFAO, 
“The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition: Key elements” available online: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/HLPE_Key_elements_EN.pdf
7 UN Report, “Millennium Development Goals Report 2015” see http://www.un.org/millennium-
goals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf
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October 2018.8 Food prices have only continued to remain volatile over the years,9 
and India, the highest exporter of rice in the world,10 grapples with food insecurity 
still.
The promise made in 1996 has been rechristened as one of the sustainable devel-
opment goals (SDGs) to be achieved by the year 2030.11 Newer policies and regula-
tory measures ought to have been designed to achieve the ‘zero hunger’ goal by 
then. It is worthwhile to consider whether this goal-shifting will help resolve the 
problem of hunger or at least make it manageable for countries such as India. These 
concerns constitute the main premise of this chapter.
Pragmatically speaking, a hunger-free future, as envisaged in the definition 
above, requires innovation in food regulation overall. From regulating innovation in 
food production techniques (farming and seed cultivation) to innovation that 
safeguards the produce from contamination (due to reasons of ecological imbalance 
or human-activity), while ensuring adequate supply and successful distribution 
through innovative government strategy, food security as a development goal 
requires macro-level multisectoral innovation in any regulatory setting. For instance, 
at the national level, strategies employing subsidies or what is referred to as 
expenditure tax credits to innovative firms, specifically tailored national intellectual 
property (IP) policy that benefits important sectors and activities that foster 
collaborative partnerships between public and private firms for effective distribution, 
characterize policies that are vital catalysts for achieving the goal.
In a similar vein, aiming for skill enhancement and job creation in over 25 sec-
tors (including agriculture), the Indian government launched the ‘Make in India’ 
8 See UNFAO, “Food Price Index” in World Food Situation (November 01, 2018) available online: 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/; for a discussion on the methodology 
for determining the FFPI and measurements that assess trends in food prices, see Ali Arslan 
Gurkan, “FAO’s Food Price Index Revisited” Food Outlook (November 2013) available online: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/worldfood/Reports_and_docs/Special_feature_FFPI_
en.pdf [“Special Feature article on the New FPPI, 2013”]
9 See [‘Pogge, Hunger Games’] supra at 2. The World Food Crisis due to the exorbitant food prices 
had led to food riots in several developing economies including Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen.
10 See US Department of Agriculture, “Principal Rice Exporting Countries worldwide in 2017/18 
(in 1000 metric tons)” in Statista (As of February 2018, rice export of India was projected to 
amount to some 12.5  million metric tons) available online: https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/255947/top-rice-exporting-countries-worldwide-2011/; see also Cahill, C and Gulati, A., 
OECD/ICRIER (2018), “Agricultural Policies in India” OECD Food and Agricultural Reviews, 
OECD Publishing, Paris (Despite… notable achievements, challenges remain; among them, the 
prevalence of very large numbers of smallholders, low productivity, climate change, pressure on 
natural resources such as water, persistent food insecurity, and an under-developed food processing 
and retail sector), available online: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/agricultural-
policies-in-india_9789264302334-en#page4 [‘OECD/ICRIER 2018 Report’]
11 The ‘2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ still encompasses food security as a major goal. 




initiative in the year 2014.12 As a result, national strategies integrating employment 
for farmers and approaches to tackle their vulnerability via climate adaptation, 
social protection and disaster risk reduction were called for. Since food systems 
account for 30% of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions,13 emphasis on shift-
ing to the low-carbon economy as the low-cost path to long-term international com-
petitiveness and environmental sustainability as per the Cartagena Dialogue14 now 
constitutes positive action points at the policy level. These efforts may well mark the 
beginning of a trend to address the food-health-climate nexus and remedy the prob-
lem of uninformed and ineffective policy.15 It thus, becomes imperative to take a 
closer look at the regulatory challenges faced by India and the solutions that it has 
been subscribing to as part of its mandate to realize this sustainable development 
goal. Prominent in such analysis emerges the tale of violations in the ag-biotechnol-
ogy sector, and its deleterious effects on food security in India. In this chapter, I will 
critically analyse the recent Indian efforts to overcome challenges posed by the 
pervasive problem of food insecurity and discuss the regulatory challenges that 
India must overcome to position itself in a low-hunger bracket globally.
The discussion in the chapter is structured into three main parts, wherein, the first 
part elaborates on the aims of creating ‘sustainable food systems’; second part 
compares agroecological practices with the IP-centred industrial model from a 
sustainability lens; the third part ponders on the problems emerging from the trend 
of relying on genetic engineering for production of food and agriculture in India; 
and the concluding section summarizes the views advanced by emphasizing the 
importance of effective regulation to address the aspirational goals of food security. 
12 For description of ‘Make in India’, see India Brand Equity Foundation,
https://www.ibef.org/economy/make-in-india. Also see Key highlight of Union Budget 2017–
2018 includes plans to double the income of farmers in 5 years as part of the Agenda 2017–2018 – 
“Transform, Energise and Clean India”. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2017-2018/
ub2017-18/bh/bh1.pdf
13 See generally, World Resources Institute in collaboration with the World Bank, UNEP, 
UNDP,CIRAD and INRA, “Creating a sustainable food future: Interim findings,” WRI Report 
2013–2014 (Washington DC: WRI) at p.73, 83–89, available online: https://wedocs.unep.org/bit-
stream/handle/20.500.11822/10731/CreatingSustainableFoodFuture.pdf?amp%3BisAllowed=&s
equence=1
14 India is one of the 40 countries that are committed to becoming (now remaining) low-carbon 
countries and is working towards a legally binding Agreement under the United Nations’ 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Five regional groups (including Asian 
States) came together to form this group which was founded in Cartagena, Columbia in 2010 after 
COP12 in Copenhagen in 2009. For more details on the negotiations, see online: http://www.cicep.
no/copguide/2015/10/25/cartagena-dialogue
15 See generally, Tripathy, S and Rosencrantz, A., “Climate impacts food security and health” 
(March 25, 2018). The Statesman https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/climate-impacts-food-
security-health-1502607709.html  – The recent unusual smog occurrence in New Delhi and 
Haryana between November 2017 and February 2018 … came to be incorrectly explained as 
environmental contamination caused due to vehicular pollution. Actually, the practice of burning 
residual crop stubble is the main reason for elevated rates of airborne particulate matter in the 
area…The pollutants further deteriorate the soil composition which makes farming susceptible to 
pests; and the pests are treated with more chemicals and pesticides which go on to contaminate the 
upstream food chain again – leading to the vicious cycle that engenders consumer health.
Rooting for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Through Improved Regulatory…
392
Admittedly, ‘right to food’ may just be the starting point to regulatory implementation, 
thus newer approaches that compliment it are also suggested to achieve an improved 
food future for India.
2  Sustainable Food Systems: An Ideal Approach
Availability, accessibility and adequacy remain recurring concerns while develop-
ing policies to achieve ‘zero hunger’. Climate change and land limitations are also 
emerging as critical factors that compound the problem of food insecurity at a global 
scale. Notably, ‘[i]ncreasing food insecurity is likely to intensify debates about 
patenting of seeds and plant variety protection, fueling calls for compulsory 
licensing provisions akin to those used to provide access to life-saving medicines in 
developing countries’.16 With a population of over 1.35 billion, India can achieve 
food security only through measured proactive steps.
Interestingly, India was the ninth largest exporter of agricultural products in 
2017, and the sector constitutes a share of 13% of total exports of the country.17 
However, incidence of poverty contributes to the persistence of food insecurity at 
the domestic level. Additionally low nutritional quality of food has led to increase 
in stunting and wasting of large sections of the population.18 A historical 
understanding of the regulatory framework to counter these challenges can help 
shed light on the reasons behind the government action, which allows for an 
opportunity to scrutinize them objectively.
2.1  Food Distribution as a Policy: The Why’s and How To’s 
for India
Food security has always featured as an important component of the agricultural pol-
icy. Regulatory reforms in the sector came about as a measure to counter the disas-
trous impact of the Bengal Famine of 1943.19 The Indian public distribution system 
16 Leidwein, A., “Food Security, climate change and IP rights” – WIPO Magazine, 2011. Also note 
that similar debates have started to ensue in relation to climate resilient plant and seed varieties.
17 India Brand Equity Foundation Report 2018, “Agriculture in India: Information about Indian 
agriculture and its importance,” (September 2018) available online: https://www.ibef.org/industry/
agriculture-india.aspx
18 Supra [‘OECD/ICRIER 2018 Report’] at fn 10
19 See Swaminathan, M.S., “From Bengal Famine to Right to Food” The HINDU (February 13, 
2013) available online: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/From-Bengal-Famine-to-Right-
to-Food/article12342992.ece; notably post-second world war, food had become crucial for long-
term peace and post-war reconstruction globally as well. In 1943, a conference on food and 
agriculture was convened that led to the institutional development of the UNFAO and eventually 
the international harmonization of food standards started in earnest through the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, a subsidiary body of the FAO and the WHO.  See specifically, Drahos, P and 
Braithwaite, J, (2000) “Ch. 16: Food” in Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
England: 2000) at 400.
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(PDS) was designed to address the consequent inequality.20 However, the scheme was 
found to aid distribution of food grains to urban areas mostly and was later revamped 
in 1992 to specifically include remote areas of India. The revamped PDS was further 
replaced by the targeted PDS (TPDS) in 1997. TPDS focused on distribution of food 
grains to the impoverished in every area – urban and remote – of the country. The 
categorization was done in terms of the household income, i.e., households below the 
poverty line (BPL) would constitute the beneficiaries of the scheme. Foodstuffs were 
made available at subsidized rates for the BPL category.
In order to support the poorest of the poor, in the year 2000, a new scheme 
Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) introduced further subsidies for the extremely 
marginalized BPL households. These schemes along with the other welfare schemes 
(OWS) especially the wheat-based nutrition programme and midday meal provisions 
were consolidated as a common policy goal. Finally, the ‘right to food’ as a legal 
entitlement was incorporated within the newly enacted National Food Security Act 
(NFSA) in September 2013.21 The coverage under the NFSA has been delinked 
from poverty estimates and is based on officially reported consumption expenditure 
of households.22 A further change in categorization of beneficiaries distinguished 
between the priority households (including all BPL and some above the poverty line 
(APL) beneficiaries) and the AAY households under the TPDS. Each AAY house-
hold is entitled to 35 kilogramme of food grains per month, while priority category 
beneficiaries are entitled to 5 kilograms of grains per person per month. The issue 
price is fixed as rice, 3 INR; wheat, 2 INR; and coarse grains, 1 INR per kilogramme 
by the central government, and no price-fluctuations would be experienced for at 
least 3 years.23 It has been noted that the issue price has remained unchanged since 
2013,24 but objective reports evaluating the claims of marked improvement in food 
security at the household level are unavailable.
The aforementioned schemes have been operationalized through the centralized 
procurement undertaken by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the decentralized 
procurement facilitated by authorized agencies which hold and distribute grains in 
certain remote regions of the country.25 The FCI procures food grains from farmers at 
20 Government of India (2017), Department of Food and Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, “Targeted Public Distribution System,” available online: 
https://dfpd.nic.in/public-distribution.htm
21 Government of India (2013), Department of Food and Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer 




22 The Planning Commission relied on the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) data on con-
sumption expenditures for the TPDS scheme under the NFSA.
23 See supra [‘OECD/ICRIER 2018 Report’] at fn 10.
24 Ibid, [‘OECD/ICRIER 2018 Report’] at fn 10.
25 Government of India (2015), Press Information Bureau, Department of Food and Public 
Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, “Decentralized procure-
ment to be encouraged to enhance the efficiency” (December 15, 2015) available online: http://pib.
nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133255; for a comparable understanding of the efficiency 
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the minimum support price (MSP) predetermined by the Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Affairs based on the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP).26 These grains are stored and accounted according to opera-
tional stocks that are distributed under the TPDS and OWS and the food security 
stocks that are utilized to meet shortfalls and supply inadequacies.27 According to the 
NFSA, changes to the issue price can be made by the central government on the con-
dition that in no event does the issue price exceed the MSP. Also, in order to counter 
problems of availability due to a lean season or to stabilize market prices, the central 
government can direct the FCI to release food stock at predetermined minimum issue 
price in the domestic market under the Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS) or have 
State trading enterprises and private agencies export the grains.
Despite these, food security self-sufficiency at the national level remains illu-
sionary due to implementation failure.28 It is my view that the regulatory framework 
would be efficient once the relation between the regulation and the risk it seeks to 
avoid is clearly gauged. Risk posed due to food security can be better tackled when 
the informational gaps that contribute to the continuity of the social problem are 
ascertained. An independent body of specific domain experts  –  a  plurality of 
knowledgeable minds – that can be brought together and funded to study existing 
data sets as a multi-sectoral problem, identify areas for research, depute teams for 
data collection, analyse data so collected based on prevalent indices in that disci-
pline, conduct stakeholder consultations and present findings supported by policy 
prescription for effective implementation and compliance. Such ‘openness’ in regu-
latory decision making, can effectuate relevant research to plug the gaps, provide 
objective evaluation, generate public awareness and build trust in the system through 
a practicable roadmap for a nourished and healthy India. In essence, failure to effec-
tively distribute can be checked by means of an enforcement structure akin to 
‘responsive regulation’ making agencies accountable for improving the food 
of the decentralized procurement system, see also Government of India (2013), Press Information 
Bureau, Department of Food and Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and 
Public Distribution, “Center to Encourage Decentralized Procurement” (March 05, 2013) available 
online: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=93033
26 Government of India (2017), Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, “Determinants of MSP” available online: https://cacp.dacnet.
nic.in/content.aspx?pid=62. The MSP is fixed by considering several factors such as the cost of 
production, the domestic and international price trends.
27 Food Corporation of India (2017), see online: http://fci.gov.in/aboutUs.php. The Food 
Corporation of India was setup under the Food Corporation’s Act 1964, in order to fulfill following 
objectives of the Food Policy: (i) effective price support operations for safeguarding the interests 
of the farmers, (ii) distribution of food grains throughout the country for public distribution system 
and (iii) maintaining satisfactory level of operational and buffer stocks of food grains to ensure 
National Food Security. Since its inception, FCI has played a significant role in India’s success in 
transforming the crisis management-oriented food security into a stable security system.
28 See The Economic Times, “National Food Security Act not implemented as it should be: Supreme 





distribution effects.29 A new policy wing, the National Institution for Transforming 
India (NITI) or ‘Niti Aayog’ which came into existence in 2014, is the main body 
currently undertaking all  policy evaluations.30 Being a government-funded think 
tank that was institutionalized after replacing the erstwhile Planning Commission 
instituted in 1950, Niti Aayog may not be considered independent. Effective policy 
formulation and implementation deserves intermittent and objective evaluation for 
the purposes of growth and consistency.
2.2  Sustainable Agriculture for Practicable Food Security: 
The Law and Policy of It
The price of key staples for world food supply will increase 70–90% by 2030, relative 
to 2010 prices, before the effects of climate change.31 In order to meet the domestic 
demands of the consumers in 2050, agriculture in India is required to grow annually at 
nearly 3% to keep pace with the rising populations.32 One way to ensure such growth 
is to incentivize adoption of ‘sustainable agriculture’ as a matter of practice.
29 See Braithwhite, J., “Responsive regulation and developing economies” World Development, 
2005, 34: 884–98; see also Braithwhite, J., “The essence of responsive regulation” University of 
British Columbia L. Rev., 2011, 44: 475–520; also take note that group of actors united by com-
mon regulatory discourse and technical expertise constitute an important ‘epistemic community’ 
who can help achieve the goals of regulatory globalization cautiously. See especially, Drahos, P., 
“Regulatory Globalisation” in Drahos, P ed., Regulatory Theory, Foundations and Applications 
(Australian National University Press, 2017) at 253; for role of experts in ensuring compliance, see 
also Parker, C and Nielsen, V., “Compliance: 14 Questions” in Drahos, P ed., Regulatory Theory, 
Foundations and Applications (Australian National University Press, 2017) at 229. For a descrip-
tive understanding of empirical work undertaken for developing regulatory frameworks, see espe-
cially, Henne, K., “Multi-sited fieldwork in regulatory studies” in Drahos, P ed., Regulatory 
Theory, Foundations and Applications (Australian National University Press, 2017) at 97.
30 See National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) http://niti.gov.in/ – The govern-
ment of India, in keeping with its reform agenda, constituted the NITI Aayog to replace the 
Planning Commission. This was done in order to better serve the needs and aspirations of the 
people of India. An important evolutionary change from the past, NITI Aayog acts as the quintes-
sential platform of the government of India to bring States to act together in national interest and 
thereby fosters cooperative federalism.
31 Bailey, R., Oxfam International Report on “Growing a Better Future: Food justice in a resource-
constrained world” (May 31, 2011) at 6, 12
32 National Academy of Agricultural Research Management, NAARM Vision 2050, Indian Council 
of Agricultural Research, available online: https://naarm.org.in/publications/naarm-vision-2050/. 
Definitional description of sustainable agriculture at the international level includes, ‘the manage-
ment and conservation of the natural resource base, and the orientation of technological change in 
such a manner as to ensure the attainment of continued satisfaction of human needs for present and 
future generations’. See UN FAO, “Building a common vision for sustainable food and agricul-
ture: Principles and approaches”(2014) available online: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3940e.pdf. 
Ideally, sustainable food systems would entail the following important components: (i) viable food 
economy for farmers and producers; (ii) accessibility and affordability for consumers; (iii) nutri-
tious, healthy and wholesome food; (iv) sound environmental stewardship; (v) cultural heritage 
and customs evolving within communities; (vi) effective use of technology; and (vii) clear distinc-
tion between sustainability from organic.
Rooting for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Through Improved Regulatory…
396
The ‘successful management of resources for agriculture, to satisfy the changing 
human need while maintaining ecological balance by avoiding depletion of natural 
resources’ is referred to as ‘sustainable agriculture’ in India.33 Building sustainable 
food systems has been undertaken as part of the National Mission for Sustainable 
Agriculture (NMSA), which is one of the eight missions introduced under the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) by the government on June 30, 
2008.34 It focuses on four main areas, namely, (i) dryland agriculture, (ii) risk 
management, (iii) access to information and (iv) use of biotechnology.35 The aim is 
to make appropriate adaptation and mitigation strategies for combating climate 
change-related effects on Indian agriculture and thereby warranting food security 
and enhancing ecological sustainability. Integrated farming practices and 
agroforestry techniques are detailed in operational guidelines and are to be monitored 
through progress reports periodically. While the aims of the mission are noble and 
can contribute towards knowledge sharing of sustainable practices, there is no 
express compliance requirement for it. Thus the mission may be understood as a 
nudge towards adopting sustainable agriculture.36 With increased stakeholder 
engagement at the grass-root level, it could very well transform into an effective 
responsive regulation qualified with appropriate mandates and deliverables in the 
longer run.
A conjoint reading of Articles 39, 43 and 47 which feature as Part IV of the Indian 
Constitution denoting the Directive Principles of State Policy recognizes the ‘right to 
adequate food’ as a legislative mandate.37 Accordingly, all citizens have the right to 
adequate means of livelihood, for which the State shall endeavour to provide a decent 
standard of life for everyone and raise levels of nutrition and improve public health 
as among its primary duty. Furthermore, India became State party to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1979 by way of 
accession – recognizing everyone has a right to […] be free of hunger.38 It is also 
33 See National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), available online: https://nmsa.dac.
gov.in/
34 See Department of Science and Technology, “Climate Change Programme” available online 
http://www.dst.gov.in/climate-change-programme; see also Yasmin, S and Sheikh, M.A., 
“Sustainable Agriculture: A Legal Perspective,” International Journal of Socio-Legal Analysis and 
Rural Development L. Vol. 2 No. 1, 125, 126 (2016).
35 Id at 128
36 See Thaler, R and Sunstein, C, Nudge, Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness 
(Yale University Press, 2008); for a general understanding of what constitutes a nudge success, see 
Kosters, M and van der Heijden, J, “From mechanism to virtue: Evaluating Nudge Theory” in 
Evaluation 21:276–91; note that awareness of the benefits of nudges can allow freedom to alter 
behaviour as opposed to addressing digression through command and control. For a critique on 
consumer choices shaped through nudges from supermarkets, see Drahos, P and Krygier, M., 
“Regulations, Institutions and Networks” in Drahos, P ed., Regulatory Theory, Foundations and 
Applications (Australian National University Press, 2017) at 1.
37 For text of Articles 39, 43 and 47 of the Indian Constitution, see online https://www.india.gov.in/
sites/upload_files/npi/files/coi_part_full.pdf at p. 21, 22 and 23, respectively.
38 Article 11 of ICESCR, 1966
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obligated as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to 
take measures so that ‘everyone has a right to standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being […] including food, clothing, medical care and necessary 
social services’.39 With 48% of children under the age of 5 being stunted, 43% being 
underweight and 7 out of every 10 children between 6 and 59 months are reported 
anaemic,40 India is challenged with a crisis of malnourishment and requires strategic 
action. Sustainable agriculture may well be the path for India to confer food security 
in a practicable way by minimizing social inequality and poverty41 through sustained 
State action.
2.3  Regulatory Aims, Efforts and Challenges
Institutional credit to the agriculture sector is targeted at Rs. 11 lakh crores (~ US$ 
172.93 billion) for 2018–2019 in the Union Budget.42 The total allocation for the 
rural, agriculture and allied sectors in 2017–2018 – Rs. 1,87,223 crores, which is 
39 Article 25 of UDHR, 1948
40 See especially, Grebmer, K et al., “2017 Global Hunger Index – The Inequalities of hunger” 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) publication at 12, available online: http://
ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131422/filename/131628.pdf (See Table 2.1 
at 13 – “At 31.4 India’s 2017 GHI score is at the high end of the serious category” at 12); also see 
The MINT, “The fuzzy numbers on child malnutrition” (October 14, 2014) available online https://
www.livemint.com/Opinion/bgIJC0LykMr6iwAYSUfMNJ/The-fuzzy-numbers-on-child-
malnutrition.html that discusses the India case study and the pervasive problem of malnutrition 
since 2004 to 2014; also, for press reports on alarming food insecurity and the slow improvement, 
with India ranking 55th out of 76 nations in the Global Hunger Index in 2014, see BusinessLine, 
“India moves up 8 places on Global Hunger Index” (October 29, 2014) available online: https://
www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/India-moves-up-8-places-on-Global-Hunger-Index/
article20898587.ece; the depth of food deficit (kilocalories per person per day) estimates has been 
staggering over the years with almost 20 crore (~200 million) people being undernourished in 
India. See FAO/STAT (March 16, 2017) available online: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SN.ITK.DFCT; see also 2018 SOFI Report: http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/
en/; for an understanding of the impact of natural disaster induced hunger and their economic 
consequences, see Gordon, K.P., The Chilean Protein Problem: A Case Study (Cornell University, 
1975); see also [‘Hunger Games’] supra n. 1. The children of women born just before the Great 
Leap Forward famine in China or the 1960 earthquake in Chile – that periods of severe undernour-
ishment during childhood often damage the health of one’s offspring born decades later.
41 See Sen, A., Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford University 
Press, 1983) at 257. As key contributor to the associated risks of non-communicable diseases, 
poverty creates greater social inequality due to inability to access adequate food and essential 
healthcare; see also Reutlinger, S and Selowsky, M., “Malnutrition and Poverty: Magnitude and 
Policy Options”, World Bank Staff Occasional Paper No. 23 (1976) for underlying determinants of 
hunger.
42 India Brand Equity Foundation, Highlights of the Union Budget 2018–2019, available online: 
https://www.ibef.org/economy/union-budget-2018-19. It is noteworthy that the budget 2017 tar-
geted Rs 10 lakh crores (~ US$157.2 billion) for agricultural credit in 2017–2018.
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24% higher than the previous year.43 The interlinked challenges of production, 
equity and resilience need thorough systemic reform so that the future will not be 
one of zero-sum competition between States, resource grabs by powerful elites and 
ecological collapse. In that light, building a sustainable bio-economy expects that 
disciplines of science, law and policy intertwine and help identify a nexus between 
food, health and climate justice especially to close prevailing inequalities between 
developing agrarian economies such as India, and other developed economies.
The following sections discuss regulatory aims, efforts and challenges posed to 
the Indian government followed by suggestions for a possible way forward.
2.3.1  UNFAO CPF for India: New Aspirations for Zero Hunger
The UNFAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) for India envisions a strong 
involvement from national stakeholders, both the private and the government 
sector.44 The main policy-making wing of the government, NITI Aayog’s 7 year 
National Development Agenda, the medium-term 3 Year Action Agenda as well as 
the Union Budget contain overarching framework for the agriculture sector and 
enhancing farmers’ income and wellbeing in the main.45 The aim is to double the 
farmers’ income in a period of 5  years by effectuating efficient solutions and 
ensuring equity in a sustainable manner.46 Since the IFPRI Global Hunger Index in 
2014, India has focused on community development as a means for capacity 
building. As per the 2015–2017 CPF, ‘[t]he areas that [will be]… prioritised are 
sustainable agricultural development, food and nutritional security, transboundary 
cooperation that includes India’s contribution to global public goods… and climate 
change as cross-cutting issues wherever they are applicable’.
In order to combat climate change, the goal for UNFAO and India is to increase 
the community capacities to adapt farming patterns by applying strategies that will 
help minimize the effects of climate change in India.47 Furthermore, newer schemes 
for knowledge sharing through digital networks (e-Krishi Samvad) have been 
introduced in May 2017,48 similar projects for improved access to irrigation 
43 The Indian agriculture sector includes – agriculture (Agriculture proper & Livestock), forestry 
and logging, fishing and related activities. The Indian agriculture and allied sector contributes 
17.32% of the gross value added (GVA), which was around Rs 23.82 lakh crore INR in 2016–
2017. See The Central Statistics Office, India (updated as on November 2017). See also source: 
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Planning Commission of the government 
of India, http://statisticstimes.com/economy/sectorwise-gdp-contribution-of-india.php
44 See UNFAO India CPF, 2018 available online: http://www.fao.org/india/programmes-and-proj-
ects/en/
45 Ibid.
46 See Agenda 2017–2018 – “Transform, Energise and Clean India” https://www.indiabudget.gov.
in/budget2017-2018/ub2017-18/bh/bh1.pdf
47 UN FAO India CFP, 2015–17
48 It is noteworthy to mention the ‘Digital India’ initiative (http://www.digitalindia.gov.in/) which 
aims to make India a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy; for understanding of 
Smart regulation, Gunningham, N and Sinclair, D., “Smart Regulation” in Drahos, P ed., Regulatory 
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(Pradhanmantri Gram Sinchai Yojna (PGSY)) implemented, and farmers motivated 
to adopt sustainable and organic farming (Paramparagat Krishi Vikas Yojna (PKVY)). 
Moreover, to improve sales of the agricultural produce and allow for network bene-
fits among farmers, all Agriculture Produce Marketing Committees were unified to 
create an Electronic National Agricultural Market (eNAM) in April 2016.
3  Agroecological Practices Versus IP-Centred Industrial 
Model
Increased drought, soil salinity, pests and disease, adaptation to climate change in 
many agricultural regions may require stress-tolerant plant varieties. Thus genetic 
engineering and plant breeding as an approach for increasing the availability and 
adequacy of global food supplies has become prevalent. IP privileges can help 
attract investment in R&D of new plant varieties (PV) that would enable adaptation. 
Recognizing a market opportunity, companies have begun marketing GM plants 
that are tolerant to a variety of stress factors such as abscisic acid, which is a 
hormone that regulates plant growth, discovered in 2009 under the Bayer Climate 
Program.49
While IP is often considered necessary for innovation, it is my view that it is 
never sufficient by itself to catalyse it. A competitive environment is quite necessary 
as well. Otherwise, over time any monopolist would have fewer incentives to 
innovate further50 and may abuse the IP privilege. On that note, I look at the possible 
impact of adopting IP-centred agriculture instead of the sustainable alternative.
Theory, Foundations and Applications (Australian National University Press, 2017) at 133; see 
also Gunningham, N and Grabosky, P., Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,) pp. 5–19.
49 Bayer Climate Program, “Climate Protection and adaptation to climate change” available online, 
www.Climate.bayer.com/en/stress-tolerant-plants.aspx
50 See Arrow, K (1962) “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention” in Nelson, 
R. ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 609–25. 
Also note that new theoretical models that have offered to test the Schumpeterian hypothesis (con-
centrated markets provide an innovative environment) in certain product markets while compli-
menting the Arrowian view have noted that the positive effects of market competition on innovative 
activity when competition is not intense is significant, whereas intense competition may reduce the 
reward for innovation thereby reducing the incentive to innovate. Therefore, a mere IP like exclu-
sivity is insufficient. The relationship between product market competition, especially in labor-
intensive sectors such as agriculture, and the price-cost margin measurement (e.g. by means of 
Lerner’s index) will not be stable. This is characteristic of agriculture markets in countries such as 
India and China. For reference, see especially, Aghion, P., Burgess, R., Redding, S and Zilibotti, F 
(2003), “The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Theory and
Evidence from India” available online: http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/rburgess/wp/abrz031002.pdf.
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3.1  Impact of Adopting Proprietary Plants and Seeds: 
An Overview
Instant or current impact Long-term impact
Supra-competitive returns for many 
years along with yield improvements
At the expense of biological diversity as herbicides and 
pesticides are sprayed over genetically altered crops
Short-term bump in yield, pressures 
other farmers to adopt it as well as 
to compete in the short term
Dependent on fertilisers and are water-intensive
Slow the adoption of approved but 
environmentally (unsound) 
technologies, e.g. technologies such 
as GM seeds, synthetic fertilisers 
and pesticides and purchase of 
economically costly staples
Erosion of indigenous knowledge – such as manuring 
and compost for soil replenishment
Rapid price escalation Excessive pricing has been observed and fined
Dependency on high-tech seeds by farmers in India, due to the instant gains, has 
been historically evidenced.51 They have in turn added to the regulatory woes while 
governing food security in India.
3.1.1  Capitalism and Competition Concerns
There exists high degree of concentration in the agriculture sector on a global scale. 
China National Chemical Corporation acquiring Syngenta,52 and more recently 
Bayer, the world’s second largest agro-chemicals concern, taking over Monsanto, 
which is the world’s largest Seed and Genomics Company exemplify it.53 Reportedly, 
51 See Ministry of Agriculture, “Cultivation of Genetically Modified Food Crops: Prospects and 
Effects” New Delhi, Loksabha Secretariat, 2012 [‘The Acharya Report’]; see also Tripathy, S and 
Rosencrantz, A., “Climate impacts food security and health” (March 25, 2018) The Statesman 
supra n.13 – [l]ow-cost or subsidized chemical-intensive farming has led to the depletion of tradi-
tional manuring practices that are a sustainable alternative. For a long-term solution to the prob-
lem, incentivizing traditional agricultural practices with resource management through a 
decentralized participatory approach needs to be adopted. Self-government authorities, namely, 
the Village Panchayats and the Gram Sabhas, can help with data collection at the grassroots level 
so as to comprehend the risks and uncertainties in their completeness. Otherwise, such glaring 
evidence gaps can lead to incorrect health narratives and polarize public debate on what should 
constitute as sustainable food system, without offering alternative workable solutions best suited 
for the Indian population.
52 See Media Release on the ChemChina Syngenta acquisition, “Syngenta shareholders accept 
ChemChina Offer” (May 05, 2017) available online https://www.syngenta.com/media/media-
releases/yr-2017/05-05-2017; see also Press release on the DowChemicals and DuPont ‘Merger of 
Equals,’ “DowDupont Merger Successfully Completed” (Sept 01, 2017) available online https://
www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/dowdupont-merger-successfully-completed
53 See News Release on the Bayer Monsanto Acquisition, “Bayer Closes Monsanto Acquisition” 




DuPont, Limagrain, Monsanto and Syngenta control over 50% of global seed sales, 
and three firms, Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and Cargill, control 90% of global 
grain trade.54 Incidences of anticompetitive behaviour and wilfully subverting 
operation of free markets have been proven to cause inflated prices to purchasers or 
depressed prices to suppliers in several markets.55 These instances have severe 
negative effects on food security.
Increasing number of farmer suicides and poor seed sector governance are inter-
linked in India.56 The average farmer grapples with concerns related to income as 
well as basic livelihood, and these factors are magnified with further concentration 
through mergers and acquisitions. The fear that the acquisitions would further limit 
the number of sellers of seeds, chemicals, machinery and equipment from whom 
they have to buy, and also limit the number of customers for crops and livestock to 
whom they can sell, is pervasive. Thus, much depends on the government action 
through responsive regulation that will alleviate these fears by reforming systems 
that play the crucial role in reinvigorating the whole demand-supply affecting the 
agricultural produce in India.
3.1.2  Seed Regulation and GMOs in India
Crops involving the introgression of certain genes of Bacillus thuringiensis (naturally 
occurring bacteria) commonly referred to as Bt technology altered crops have been par-
ticularly controversial in India. Let us take the example of Monsanto, which was able to 
enter the Indian seed market due to the 1988 Seed Policy imposed by the World Bank,57 
requiring the government to deregulate the seed sector in favour of private players. This 
54 Bailey, R., Oxfam International Report on “Growing a Better Future: Food justice in a resource-
constrained world” (May 31, 2011) at 6; see also “Global Seeds Business Market 2015–2022: 
Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta Leading Seed Companies Worldwide” (June 26, 2018) 
available online: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-seeds-business-market-
2015-2022-monsanto-dupont-and-syngenta-leading-seed-companies-worldwide-300672455.
html; for detailed analysis with seed company profiles, see Research and Markets, “Seeds – Global 
Strategic Business Report” (April 2018) available online: https://www.researchandmarkets.com/
research/8zmc4z/global_seeds?w=5
55 The practices include abuse of patented seed technologies, price-fixing, the allocation of custom-
ers, etc. that have resulted in antitrust scrutiny and even fines and criminal charges in the USA. For 
detailed reference on the US episodes, see, Tuncak, B, “The ‘new normal’: Food, Climate Change 
and Intellectual Property” in Brown, A ed., Environmental Technologies, Intellectual Property and 
Climate Change (Edward Elgar, 2013) at 233.
56 See generally, Tripathy, S and Rosencrantz, A., “Climate impacts food security and health” 
(March 25, 2018) The Statesman supra n.15 – farmer suicides in India have been frequently asso-
ciated with cotton farming, a non-food agricultural commodity that has been severely affected due 
to the pricing strategies and market practices of corporate conglomerate Monsanto. Monsanto’s 
required annual repurchase of its “super-seeds” forces the farmer-purchasers of these seeds to 
incur unsustainable debt, leading to thousands of farmer suicides over the years; see also Gruère G 
and Sengupta D, ‘Bt Cotton and Farmer suicides in India: an evidence-based assessment” J Dev 
Stud. 2011; 47(2):316–37; see also Merriott D. “Factors associated with the Farmer suicide crisis 
in India” J Epidemiol Glob Health. 2016 Dec; 6(4):217–227. Epub 2016 Apr 11.
57 New Policy on Seed Development, 1988 (September 16, 1988) available online: https://seednet.
gov.in/PDFFILES/NEW_POLICY_NPSD.pdf
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seed policy resulted in Indian companies being locked into joint ventures with Monsanto. 
Eventually, the ‘common heritage principle – promotion of free exchange of seeds amongst 
farmers’ was replaced with the corporate’s dominance as the IP right holder, and open pol-
linated seeds came to be replaced by hybrids in the market.58 Cotton now had to be culti-
vated as a monoculture, and this increased vulnerability to pests, disease and drought and 
crop failure.59 A stark increase in pesticide use on farms was noted.60 Eventually the boll-
worm became Bt resistant.61 However, Monsanto continued to push public resources to 
make the genetically modified seeds through public-private partnerships.62
The world’s largest cotton producer and second-biggest cotton exporter, next 
only to China,63 the India case study on food regulations requires an understanding 
of the Bt cotton controversy, typically as a top-down approach with grave conse-
quences. The field trials for Bt cotton were not done in accordance to the legal 
procedure and were in violation of the Environment Protection Act at the time. The 
unauthorized large-scale, multicentric, open-field trials of Bt cotton in 40 locations 
spread across 9 States in India,64 while initializing crops to GM technology has been 
58 For reference on protection for new varieties and hybrids, see Ramanna, A and Smale, M., 
“Rights and access to plant genetic resources under India’s New Law” Dev Pol Rev. 2004; 22(4) 
423–42; See Peschard, K., “Farmers’ Rights and Food Sovereignty: Critical Insights from India” 
J. Peasant Stud 2014: 1085–1108.
59 Ho, MW., “Farmer suicides and Bt cotton nightmare unfolding in India,” Science in Society, 
2010 http://www.i-sis.org.uk/farmersSuicidesBtCottonIndia.php
60 Shiva, V., “Introduction” in Shiva V, Barker, D and Lockhart, C eds., The GMO Emperor Has No 
Clothes: A Global Citizen’s Report on the State of GMOs (New Delhi: Navdanya, 2010), 11 to 26. 
See also Thomas, G and Tavernier, J-D., “Farmer-suicide in India: debating the role of biotechnol-
ogy” Life Sci Soc Policy, 13:8, 2017. The practice of monoculture, increased chemical fertiliza-
tion, rising resistance of bollworms, new pests and the destruction of predator species that control 
pests were responsible for pest-proneness in Bt cotton. As a result a 13-fold hike in pesticide use 
in comparison to the pre-Bt cotton era.
61 See Cummins, J., “No Bt Resistance?” Science in Society 20, 34–35, 2003; see Kalaspurkar, R., 
“Deadly gift from Monsanto to India” Science in Society38, 51, 2008; see also Ho, MW., “Mealy 
Bug Plagues Bt Cotton fields in India and Pakistan” Science in Society 45, 2010.
62 Shiva, V., “Monsanto in India- A Story of Corruption, Biopiracy, Seed Monopoly and Farmers’ 
Suicides” in Shiva V, Barker, D and Lockhart, C eds., The GMO Emperor Has No Clothes: A 
Global Citizen’s Report on the State of GMOs (New Delhi: Navdanya, 2010), 143–185.
63 See Times of India “Cotton exports likely to jump 43% in 2018–2019” (June 14, 2018) available 
online: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/cotton-exports-likely-to-
jump-43-in-2018-19/articleshow/64586372.cms. India’s cotton exports are expected to jump 43% 
to 10 million bales (of 170 kilograms each) in the 2018–2019 marketing year on strong overseas 
demand, especially from China, according to industry body Cotton Association of India (CAI).
64 The Biosafety Framework of India calls for prior authorization from the Genetic Engineering 
Appraisal Committee (GEAC) of the Department of Environment Forests and Wildlife (now 
Ministry of Environment Forests and Climate Change), for conducting any trials related to GMO 
in India. See Article 4 of the Biosafety Rules for the Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage 
of Hazardous Micro Organisms, Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells (notified under the 
Environmental Protection Act, 1986) available online: http://www.geacindia.gov.in/acts-and-rules.
aspx; for information on GEAC, see specifically, the Institutional Biosafety Committee u/Article 4 




criticized as regulatory failure.65 The contamination due to the trials is said to have 
severely compromised food safety by negatively impacting the entire food chain 
and overall health of consumers in India.66
Monsanto violated the Rules for the Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and 
Storage of Hazardous Micro-organisms, Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells, 
1989 (notified under the Environment Protection Act, 1986),67 by failing to seek 
approvals from the authorized government body, namely, the Genetic Engineering 
Appraisal Committee (GEAC) prior to importing over 100 grams of cottonseeds con-
taining the MON531-Bt gene into India through its Indian subsidiary company, 
Mahyco, in 1995 for conducting the large-scale open-field trials.68
65 See Ramaswamy, B et al., “The spread of illegal transgenic cotton varieties in India: Biosafety 
regulation, monopoly and enforcement” World Dev. 2012, 40(1):177–88; See opposing view, 
Herring, R., “Why did ‘operation cremate Monsanto’ fail? Science and class in India’s great termi-
nator-technology hoax” Crit Asian Stud 2006; 38(4): 467–93; see Herring, R., “State Science, Risk 
and Agricultural Biotechnology: Bt Cotton to Bt Brinjal in India” J Peasant Stud 2015, 42(1) 
159–86 (Monsanto gained from an advantaged market position thanks to India’s bio-safety regula-
tions and not due to monopoly in seed sector.)
66 Shiva, V., “The Seeds of Suicide: How Monsanto destroys Farming” available online http://www.
globalresearch.ca/the-seeds-of-suicide-how-monsanto-destroys-farming/5329947; some discus-
sion on the successful adoption of technology also exists. For instance, Keith Kloor views differ-
ently from Vandana Shiva; “Bt cotton has been all the rage in India since it was officially approved 
in 2002. The technology has been adopted by over 90% of Indian cotton farmers. Multiple studies 
point to significant reduction in pesticide spraying and subsequent cost savings for cotton farmers. 
India has harvested an average of 5.1 million tons of cotton per year, which is well above the high-
est production of 3 million tons before the introduction of Bt cotton”. See Kloor, K., “The GMO-
Suicide Myth.” Issues in Science and Technology 30, no. 2 (Winter 2014). Note that similar 
findings attest to the same in China, where Bt cotton accounts for 80% of its crop. See for example, 
Lang, S., “Seven year glitch: Cornell warns that Chinese Bt Cotton farmers are losing money due 
to ‘secondary’ pests” ChronicleOnline Cornell University (25 July 2006) http://news.cornell.edu/
stories/2006/07/bt-cotton-china-fails-reap-profit-after-seven-years See especially, Ho, MW., 
“Farmer suicides and Bt cotton nightmare unfolding in India,” Science in Society, 2010 http://
www.i-sis.org.uk/farmersSuicidesBtCottonIndia.php (China was initially held up as the success 
story on Bt cotton […]. It first granted permission to Monsanto to grow the crop in 1997, and for 
the first several years reported great reductions in the use of pesticides. Early warnings appeared in 
a study published in 2002 by researchers at an institute funded by China’s Environmental Protection 
Agency. It found that although Bt cotton was effective in controlling bollworm, it had adverse 
impacts on the bollworm’s natural enemies and was not effective in controlling many secondary 
pests. A second study published in October 2004 found that Bt cotton did not reduce the total 
numbers of insecticide sprays because additional sprays were needed against sucking pests. A 
study of 481 Chinese farmers by researchers at the Cornell University released in 2006 reported 
that after 7 years, populations of other insects such as mirids have increased so much that farmers 
have had to spray their crops up to 20 times a growing season). For similar discussion in regards to 
Indonesia and United States as well, see Gala, RM., “GM Cotton Fiascos around the world” 
Science in Society 26–27 (2005).
67 See Article 7 on Approvals and Prohibitions in the Biosafety Rules, http://www.geacindia.gov.in/
resource-documents/biosafety-regulations/acts-and-rules/Rules-for-the-manufacture-use-import-
export-and-storage-1989.pdf
68 Mahyco, a Monsanto joint-venture had obtained permission for small controlled trials from the 
Review Committee of Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) under the Department of Biotechnology. 
The RCGM is a body that monitors the safety of on-going research projects and activities involv-
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These field trials were conducted without following the evaluation protocol and 
exposed the environment to biosafety risks and genetic pollution. Further no 
postharvest management of transgenic plants or disposal precautions as required by 
the Biosafety Guidelines, 1994, was observed.69 The infected fields were replanted 
with food crops in less than a year, and the food chain was irreversibly plagued by 
GMOs that were unverified and potentially unsafe for both health and environment. 
The integrity of the genetic engineering regulatory procedures was questioned by a 
public interest litigation (PIL) filed before the Supreme Court of India in 1999.70 
This led to a temporary ban on the field trials until the GEAC could satisfactorily 
confirm that the safety to human health and environment was guaranteed.
Meanwhile, former US President Bill Clinton’s India visit in March 2000 culmi-
nated on a high note, when despite the pending PIL Monsanto’s Bt cotton was 
handed the necessary biosafety approval by the Department of Biotechnology 
(DBT). Furthermore the procedural rules were amended such that the RCGM under 
DBT was now empowered to approve multilocational small-scale field trials for a 
total of 20 acres up to 1 acre each.71 A classic case of regulatory capitalism in 
action,72 Monsanto’s transgenic seeds found their way into the Indian farms despite 
several pending trials at the time and eventually replaced indigenous cultivars with 
hybrids as a result of self-pollination.73 Easy provisions of micro-credits from local 
banks and at times distribution of free samples for initial plantation were incentives 
designed to establish Monsanto’s seed sales in India. Thus farmers became GM 
seed-dependent and incurred debt to overcome increasing input costs of seed pur-
chase, water and pesticides. Low yield or at times no returns resulted in severe life 
ing GMOs by prescribing guidelines specifying the regulatory procedure while conducting high-
risk and controlled field experiments (lab research) with them. Its mandate is to review the 
compliance of such guidelines from a safety standpoint. It is not the authorized body for approvals 
for large-scale experiments and importation concerning GMOs. For information on RCGM, see 
specifically, Article 4 (2) on Competent Authorities [“Biosafety Rules”]
69 Shiva, V., “Seed Satyagrah: A Movement for Farmers’ Rights and Freedoms in a World of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Globalized Agriculture and Biotechnology” in Tokar, B., Redesigning 
Life?: The Worldwide challenge to Genetic Engineering (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal, 2001) at 355.
70 Research Foundation for Science and Technology v. Union of India, filed on January 06, 1999; 
See especially, Kumar, S et al., “The legal battle over field trials of GM crops” Nature (January 31, 
2014) available online: https://www.natureasia.com/en/nindia/article/10.1038/nindia.2014.14
71 Damodaran, A., “Re-engineering biosafety regulations in India: Towards a critique of policy, law 
and prescriptions” Law Environ Dev Journal, 2005 1(1):1–20.
72 Regulatory Capitalism refers to a trend that demonstrates how the pursuit of capitalistic growth 
often gives rise to more regulation and bureaucracy. See Levi-Faur, D, “The Global Diffusion of 
Regulatory Capitalism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598:12–
32 (2005).
73 See Shiva, V., “25 Years of Bija Swaraj” in Shiva V et al eds, Seed Freedom: A Global Citizen 
Report by Navdanya (New Delhi: Navdanya, 2012), 57–85; see also Scoones, I., Contentious 
Politics, Contentious Knowledges: Mobilising Against GM Crops in India, South Africa and Brazil 
(Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, 2005). Bija Panchayat or Seed Tribunals were espe-
cially set up in 2000 in Indian villages for conducting hearings against Monsanto before jury com-
prising of village heads and farmers.
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stresses for farmers in several regions of agrarian India. Overtime the Bt cotton 
production significantly declined causing an uproar of identity politics and public 
outcry.
3.1.3  Litigation Concerning Ag-Biotech (Gene) Patents in India
Monsanto was granted patent on second-generation Bt gene technology (licensed 
under the trademark Bollgard II variety), which increases resistance of the cotton 
seeds against the bollworm, a pest of the lepidopteran species on March 20, 2009.74 
Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Ltd., a joint venture company, issued sublicenses 
to Indian breeders and seed companies to develop varieties introgressed with Bt gene 
technology.75 The breeders would pay a technology licensing fee to Monsanto and 
sell the genetically modified seed varieties to farmers, who were charged retail prices. 
Without any patent on the first generation of the Bt gene technology, Monsanto had 
to lower the technology licensing fee for the breeders to enjoy benefits of market 
entry. However, Monsanto was found to be charging excessively for its patented ver-
sion of the technology later.76 With the retail price of the seeds escalating, the State 
governments passed price control legislation to ensure seed affordability.77 To side-
step these regulatory hurdles, Monsanto proceeded with filing a patent for the sec-
ond-generation Bt gene technology and was granted exclusive rights to commercialize 
and price it for specified period of 20 years. The breeders were now paying higher 
royalty accounting for the ‘trait value’ and ‘technology license fees’, and subse-
quently profits from sale of seeds were unstable due to the State law. Thus conflicts 
arose. Non-payment of royalty by the eight Indian seed companies (or breeders) led 
to the termination of their license agreements. Series of arbitration proceedings78 and 
patent infringement suits79 were also instituted by Monsanto. The Indian seed com-
panies led by Nuziveedu Seeds Limited have countered the court action by question-
ing the validity of Monsanto’s patent and the legal basis for charging royalty rates 
that are higher than the government fixed rate under the Cotton Seeds Price Control 
74 See Indian patent 232681 claim description available online: http://www.allindianpatents.com/
patents/232681-cotton-event-mon15985-and-compositions-and-methods-for-detection. It draws 
priority from US 60/297, 406 for the ‘Cotton event Mon 15985 and compositions and methods for 
detection.
75 For understanding of the Plant Varieties Protection Regime in India, and the infringement action 
under the Act, see Chap. 16 of this book by Lakshmikumaran, M.
76 See Overwalle, G and Dycke, L., “Genetically Modified Crops and Intellectual Property Laws: 
Interpreting Indian Patents on Bt Cotton in View of the Socio-Political Background, 8 (2017) 
JIPITEC 151.
77 For instance, see The Andhra Pradesh Cotton Seeds (Regulation of Supply, Distribution, Sale and 
Fixation of Sale Price) Act, 2007 (Act No. 29 of 2007).
78 See Monsanto’s arbitration proceedings before Bombay HC discussed generally by Reddy, P., 
“Delhi High Court Declines to Grant Monsanto an Interim Injunction in Dispute with Nuziveedu” 
SpicyIP (March 29, 2017) available online: https://spicyip.com/2017/03/delhi-high-court-rules-
declines-to-grant-monsanto-an-interim-injunction-in-dispute-with-nuziveedu.html
79 Monsanto v Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. (Delhi HC) decided on March 28, 2017 by Single Judge R. K 
Gauba. Order available online: http://lobis.nic.in/ddir/dhc/RKG/judgement/28-03-2017/
RKG28032017IA24062016.pdf
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Order (CSPCO), 2015.80 The single judge of the Delhi High Court held the patent to 
be prima facie valid but directed that the royalty rate be aligned to the CSPCO81 rate. 
An appeal was preferred, and the Division bench of the High Court summarily held 
that Monsanto’s invention was ineligible under Section 3(j) of the Indian Patent Act, 
1970. The provision, that excludes plants from patent eligibility in India.82 This deci-
sion was appealed before the Apex Court.
Meanwhile, several attempts at fixing the licensing fee through specialized price 
control orders for regulating the cotton seed industry nationally  has been made. 
These include: appeal for standardization,83 and seeking enhancement in the supply 
of the patented technology through applications for compulsory licensing.84 
On May 18, 2016 a new set of licensing and formats for GM technology agree-
ments guidelines were issued with a fixed rate of royalty.85 These guidelines required 
Monsanto’s Bollgard II to be considered as a ‘standard essential patent,’ thereby 
stating among other things that ‘all patentees of GM technology [are] to offer tech-
nology on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) basis to any seed com-
pany willing to pay Monsanto, a government mandated royalty’. Drafted under 
clause 5(8) of the CSPCO,86 these guidelines were later withdrawn as they were held 
to be ultra vires the scope of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
80 Ibid, at paras 17 and 18 discussing the defendants written statements
81 Gazette Notification No. G.S.R.936 (E) dated December 7, 2015, under Section 3 of the Essential 
Commodities Act, 1955. Legislation used to control the royalty or licensing fee for the use of a 
patent or for technology transfer. The legislation vests in the government, powers to control the 
prices of a wide range of essential commodities such as drugs, food crops, sugar, foodstuffs, etc. 
for the purpose of securing the “equitable distribution and availability of these commodities at fair 
prices or for maintaining or increasing supplies of the same.” For the text of the Legislation, see: 
https://consumeraffairs.nic.in/consumer/sites/default/files/userfiles/ecact1955.pdf
82 Monsanto v Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. (Delhi HC, Division Bench) decided on March 09, 2018 by 
the Division Bench of Justices Rohinton Nariman and Navin Sinha. See also DB Order dated May 
08, 2017, available online: http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=98458&yr=2017
83 See generally, Fernandes, V., “Why is Prabhakar Rao of Nuziveedu Seeds fond of FRAND 
licensing?” (Dec 17, 2015) available online: http://www.smartindianagriculture.in/why-is-prabha-
kar-rao-of-nuziveedu-seeds-fond-of-frand-licensing/to be read with Vacca, R, Cole, BM and 
Brent, BJ., “Food for Thought: Genetically Modified Seeds as De Facto Standard Essential 
Patents” (March 12, 2014) 85 University of Colorado Law Rev. 313 (2014); U of Akron Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 13-7, available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2245887 for assertion related to GM Seeds as standard essential patents; For 
understanding of Standard Essential Patents and FRAND Licensing generally, see Chap. 5 of this 
conference volume by Dhar, B on India’s technology industry.
84 For understanding of compulsory licensing as a part of the patent policy generally, see Chap. 12 
of this volume by Racherla, U.S., “The Historical Evolution in Patenting in the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Its Impact on Innovation.”
85 Ministry of Agriculture Notification u/clause 5(8) of CSPCO (May 18, 2016) “Licensing and 
Formats for GM technology Agreements Guidelines, 2016” [The 2016 Guidelines]
86 The ‘CSPCO’ derives its authority from the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Legislation used 
to control the royalty or licensing fee for the use of a patent or for technology transfer. The legisla-
tion vests in the government, powers to control the prices of a wide range of essential commodities 
such as drugs, food crops, sugar, foodstuffs, etc. for the purpose of securing the “equitable distribu-
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To add to the fiasco, State government of Andhra Pradesh and the Department of 
Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), which functions under the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, sought for outright revocation of Monsanto’s patent, on the 
grounds of it being mischievous and prejudicial to public interest (Section 66 of the 
Indian Patent Act, 1970).87 Furthermore, the State government of Andhra Pradesh 
urged that the central government invoke powers under Section 92 of the Patent Act 
and issue a compulsory license for making Monsanto’s seed available at reasonable 
prices, as it was charging excessive royalties. The declaration of a compulsory license 
under Section 92 is made only in cases of national emergency or in case of extreme 
urgency or public noncommercial use. Therefore, such a compulsory license would 
not only interfere with the freedom to contract norms but also strengthen the provi-
sion as an enforcement mechanism or competition remedy within the patent regime.
Finally, based on the reference received from the Ministry of Agriculture and a 
complaint by the Indian seed company (Nuziveedu Ltd), Monsanto’s licensing 
practices were subject to competition scrutiny in India.88 A prima facie case of abuse 
of dominant position and restrictive licensing practices has been established as 
well.89
More recently, on January 8, 2019 the Apex Court decided the aforementioned 
commercial dispute between Monsanto and Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd.90 The question of 
tion and availability of these commodities at fair prices or for maintaining or increasing supplies 
of the same.” For the text of the Legislation, see: https://consumeraffairs.nic.in/consumer/sites/
default/files/userfiles/ecact1955.pdf
87 Section 66 of the Patent Act, 1970: Revocation of patent in public interest – Where the Central 
Government is of opinion that a patent or the mode in which it is exercised is mischievous to the 
State or generally prejudicial to the public, it may, after giving the patentee an opportunity to be 
heard, make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette and thereupon the patent shall be 
deemed to be revoked. For a historical account of the two episodes of patent revocations u/S 66, see 
the case of Agracerus’s process patent on ‘the method of producing transformed cotton cell lines 
by tissue culture’ (Indian patent number 168950) which was revoked in the year 1994, for being 
prejudicial to the interests of Indian farmers as it had ‘far-reaching implications for India’s cotton 
economy’. See also the case of Avasthagen’s patent on ‘synergistic ayurvedic/functional food bio-
active composition’ (Indian patent 1076/CHE/2007) used as a medicine to treat diabetes, which 
was revoked in the year 2012 on the finding that it was based on the traditional medicinal knowl-
edge held by indigenous communities in India.
88 See specifically, CCI Reference Case No. 2 of 2015 and Case No 0.107 of 2015: https://indiank-
anoon.org/doc/122804601/?type=print; based on Justice BN Srikrishna’s recommendation, the 
National Seed Association of India (NSAI) has sought suitable corrective action through the CCI; 
see Economic Times Report, “Hybrid seed producers want government to move CCI against 
Mahyco Monsanto” (October 15, 2015) available online: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/economy/agriculture/hybrid-seed-producers-want-government-to-move-cci-against-ma-
hyco-monsanto/articleshow/49367624.cms; also see CCI Order dated July 26, 2016, available 
online: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Ref%20Case%20022015%20%26%20others.
pdf;
89 CCI’s prima facie order u/S 26 (1) against Monsanto (Order dated June 09, 2016): https://www.
cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Ref%2002-2015%20and%20107-2015%20-26(1)%20
order_10.02.2015.pdf
90 Supreme Court of India, Monsanto v Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. decided on January 08, 2019, https://
www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/16059/16059_2018_Judgement_08-Jan-2019.pdf
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patent validity has been reverted back to the trial court for a full-fledged hearing, 
while the license arrangements with the Indian seed companies have been revived on 
the condition that royalty be paid as per the CSPCO rates. Thus Monsanto’s patented 
seed can be used by the Indian companies to develop the plant varieties upon fulfil-
ment of the royalty condition.91 Clarity on the legality of ag-biotech patents in India 
will be gained once the question of validity is settled in the near future. That will also 
allow deliberation on the necessary regulatory robustness needed to minimize risks 
associated with the working of such ag-biotechnology products and processes as well 
as their overall impact in the long run.
3.1.4  Other Noteworthy Developments
Another significant example in terms of regulating use of Bt technology for develop-
ing GM food in India is that of ‘Bt Brinjal’. The gene modification claims to make the 
plant pest resistant. Indian farms were affected as a result of pollen drift from 
Bangladesh. The Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) ordered for a morato-
rium in 2010 calling for a better understanding of the impact of such pollen drift – 
safety studies to assess impact on environment as well as human health and for 
eco-labelling practices.92 Despite the safety concerns, the increase in price of the seeds 
in Bangladesh was noted to be almost three times more, and no seed saving was reg-
istered.93 With reduced price of pesticides, the GM seed sales were offset. The crop 
losses to pests were found to be fewer, while the crop yield from the Bt plant was 
disappointingly lower than expected.
Learning from the Bangladeshi experience, the government of India called for consul-
tations on the Bt brinjal adoption. The mandate was to develop institutional structures and 
capacity to ensure safety to the environmental and human health, farmers’ and 
91 Basheer, S., “The Monsanto Bt Cotton case is not over yet” Hindustan Times (January 10, 2019) 
available online: https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-monsanto-bt-cotton- case-is-not-
over-yet/story-weAMtHbuDSsCumrhpLzfIK.html?fbclid=IwAR0AJIfEtRdFIO750FX_cqRfpkIs
LXxOVhRT_8VPofMF1oucyzM6avk4kL8
92 Bt Brinjal moratorium 2010; also note that Bt cotton has been more expensive than Bt Brinjal, 
but the yield still returned a net profit of Rs. 5,294 in 2003 as compared to Rs. 3,133 per acre for 
conventional cotton. See Brooke Glass-O’Shea (7 J. Food L. & Pol’y 1 2011) – regional variations 
in yield returns are due to geographic conditions, droughts and over use of pesticides which 
increased the input costs – especially in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Average yield gains in states 
other than Andhra Pradesh were up to 42% to 59%.
93 See, Robinson, C., “Bt Brinjal on “life support” in Bangladesh” GMWatch (November 17, 2015): 
https://gmwatch.org/en/news/latest-news/16535; for counterview see Shelton AM, Hossain MJ, 
Paranjape V, Azad AK, Rahman ML, Khan ASMMR, Prodhan MZH, Rashid MA, Majumder R, 
Hossain MA, Hussain SS, Huesing JE and McCandless L (2018). Bt eggplant project in Bangladesh: 
History, present status, and future direction. Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol. 6:106. doi: https://doi.
org/10.3389/fbioe.2018.00106; see also Antoniou MN, Robinson CJ (2017). Cornell Alliance for 
Science evaluation of consensus on genetically modified food safety: Weaknesses in study design. 
Front. Public Health. 13 April. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2017.00079/
full; see especially, GMWatch, “GM Bt Brinjal in Bangladesh: GMO win or smoke and mirrors?” 




consumers’ rights and inclusive decision-making for GM crops. However, not a single 
attempt has been made in this direction since the consultation.94
However, GM mustard – Dhara Mustard Hybrid (DMH-11)95 which has been 
developed by scientists at Delhi University for a project that is part-funded by the 
Department of Biotechnology, a division of the Science Ministry – has come to be 
the first transgenic food crop to be allowed for commercial cultivation in India. The 
GEAC after conducting a safety study cleared it to be commercially cultivated for 
4 years. However, independent safety study has been requested by citizen groups 
which have led to a stay on the introduction pending re-release and evaluation of the 
study. The Supreme Court is awaiting the status report from the centre96 on the 
matter. Thus, the issue of GMOs is likely to continue testing the workings of the 
existing regulatory framework in India.
4  Conclusion
With a paucity of studies that validate the impact of GM crops on human health, 
regulation in this area has been problematic for India.97 Moreover the current trend 
of stronger IP favours a regime where the industrial style of agriculture – one which 
promotes dependency on synthetic chemicals and monoculture production models – 
thrives. Monocultures are ill-suited for traditional models of farming dependent on 
diverse crop varieties and traditional techniques.98 Apparently, from more than 
100,000 varieties of rice during the 1970s in India, only 6000 varieties are available 
today.99 Gene diversity requires a diversity of knowledge forms. The sector calls for 
94 See MoEF, Government of India, “National consultation on Bt Brinjal” available online: http://
www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/Bt%20Brinjal%20Primer.pdf; see also Report of 
the Expert Committee (EC-II) on Bt Brinjal Event EE1.: (2009) Developed by: M/s Maharashtra 
Hybrid Seeds Company Ltd. (Mahyco), Mumbai, University of Agricultural Sciences (UAS), 
Dharwad and Tamil Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU), Coimbatore. Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, New Delhi, 
available online: http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/publicinformation/Report%20on%20Bt%20
brinjal.pdf
95 This variety has two main functions that could be attributed to its GM traits. The first is it makes 
hybridization for mustard easier, since mustard is a self-pollinated plant, and it is not easy to pro-
duce hybrids for mustard. Second, it has a gene that provides the plant with herbicide tolerance.
96 Press Trust of India, “Supreme Court seeks Center’s reply on field trials of GM Mustard crops” 
NDTV (October 30, 2018) available online: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/
supreme-court-seeks-centres-reply-on-field-trials-of-gm-mustard-crop-1940273
97 For a comparative understanding of the European experience while regulating GMOs, Hartley, S 
and Millar, K.M., “The Challenges of Consulting the Public on Science Policy: Examining the 
development of European Risk Assessment Policy for Genetically Modified Animals” Review of 
Policy Research, 31:6, 2004 at 481.
98 See Kochupillai, M, Promoting Sustainable Innovations in Plant Varieties (Springer 2016).
99 Basheer, S “Pest Policy: Confusion, Capture or a Fetish for the Foreign?” (October 30, 2017) 
SpicyIP, https://spicyip.com/2017/10/pest-policy-confusion-capture-or-a-fetish-for-the-foreign.
html
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a greater understanding of the relation between regulation and risk, since collective 
well-being is at stake.
With the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report 
2018, informing that the planet is likely to die sooner than later,100 ignoring the 
cumulative risks of regulatory failure in addressing food insecurity, poor nutritional 
health and climate change is no more a black swan event but a definite certainty.101 
Failure to acknowledge the nature and magnitude of harm is not an option anymore. 
In order to avoid terrible hindsight, the Indian bio-economy requires serious 
attention and proactive action from all quarters of government and citizenry.
It serves to question at this point, how far science at its self-reflective best can go 
to create a case for ecological science as ‘the sustainable solution’? As the UN 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in general comment 12  – 
realization of a ‘right to food’ is everyone’s responsibility – stated, the transfer of 
technology for adaptation that is informed by human rights would increase the 
overall effectiveness of international efforts for protecting human health and 
environment.102 Thus, a right-based approach to regulation, in this case, a right to 
food, requires full regulatory thrust to play an influential role in discussions over 
adaptation, as well as the innovation of and access to climate-related technologies 
and know how. The effectiveness of NFSA depends on successful implementation 
of such an approach.
Measures to involve key private sector partners to invest in sustainable agricul-
ture will encourage financing mechanisms for developing climate resilience and 
access and benefit-sharing regimes.103 There is a pressing need to develop consensus 
on private sector investor advisory for adaptation funding so as to further sustain-
ability goals.
Agricultural productivity has direct implications for poverty alleviation. Labour- 
intensive farming in populous countries such as China and India can particularly 
benefit from increase in produce, as not only wages for farmers would improve as a 
result, but the cost of basic foods which make up a large share of the poor’s 
expenditures is likely to plummet as well.104 Till such time, the claim made by the 
100 IPCC Special Report, 2018, see https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Global temperatures could rise by 
1.5 °C by as early as the year 2030 and we ought to become carbon neutral urgently by 2050.
101 A black swan event is referred to as an occurrence that deviates beyond what is normally 
expected of a situation and is extremely difficult to predict. See especially, Taleb, N, The Black 
Swan: The Impact of the highly improbable (Penguin Books, 2007).
102 UNHCHR, the general comment 12, contained in document E/C.12/1999/5.
103 For an early discussion about developing sustainable food systems in India from an ecologists’ 
perspective, see Ho, MW et al., (2008) “Food Futures Now” available online http://www.i-sis.org.
uk/foodFutures.php
104 See Ravallion, M and G. Datt 1996 “How Important to India’s Poor Is the Sectoral Composition 
of Output?” World Bank Economic Review 10(1):1–25; see also Loayza, N and C. Raddatz 2010 
“The Composition of Growth Matters for Poverty Alleviation” Journal of Development Economics 
93:137–51; for a comparative discussion, see especially, Ivanic, M and W. Martin 2016 Sectoral 
Productivity Growth and Poverty Reduction: National and Global Impacts. Mimeo. International 
Food Policy Research Institute.
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UN agencies of having achieved the promised halving of the number of the hungry 
in the developing world in 2015 seems to be a fiction, at least in the Indian 
context.
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The aim of this chapter is to analyze and review the progress of China’s techno-
logical innovation in the automobile sector. First, the structure of the Chinese 
automobile industry and its relevant innovation system are characterized by mul-
tiple camps of actors – namely, multinationals, large state-owned firms, and new 
local entrants – with different business goals, innovation objectives, and techno-
logical capabilities. Secondly, different camps of actors entered the Chinese 
automobile sector in different phases of the developmental strategies of China. 
Thus, China’s policy transition during 2005–2006 to indigenous innovation cre-
ated a drive among all indigenous firms toward technology and product develop-
ment, and the demand for electrical vehicles created a valuable opportunity. 
However, the internal dynamics or rigidities of the different camps of actors 
appear to show significant path resistance. Only a persistent push by the Chinese 
government for indigenous innovation will enable a total structural change, par-
ticularly involving the large state-owned enterprises.
Keywords
Automobile industry · Indigenous innovation · Trading market for technology · 
Patent · SOE
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Peter Drucker termed the automotive industry “the industry of industries.”1 Indeed, 
the automotive industry around the world has played a vital role in driving the indus-
trialization of large modern economies. Naturally, the Chinese society also expects 
this to be the case. This chapter discusses the growth and development of the Chinese 
car-making industry in two fields: “traditional” internal combustion engine (ICE) 
cars, also known as fossil fuel vehicles (FFVs), and electric vehicles (EVs). We also 
highlight the significant differences in research and development (R&D) between the 
two groups of major local producers: the traditional large backbone state-owned 
enterprises (backbone SOEs)2 and those that have entered this industry only after the 
second half of the 1990s (new local entrants; see Appendix 1 for a list of firms). We 
found that there are significant differences in the technological progress of the 
Chinese car-making industry between the two enterprise groups, and the differences 
are induced by a historical policy structure. Furthermore, there are also significant 
differences in the innovation achievements of Chinese enterprises in the fields of 
FFVs and EVs, which are dependent on technological characteristics and maturity.
On the whole, although China has become the world’s largest automotive pro-
ducer and consumer, the indigenous car-makers of China are far from being global 
technology leaders. However, the developmental pattern of China’s indigenous car- 
making industry shows positive transformation. Thus, the previous dominant strat-
egy of the automobile firms, involving the assemblage of imported foreign designs 
only, has already given way to the strategy of indigenous innovation. Despite being 
a latecomer, China has started to develop products and technologies locally, and 
Chinese manufacturers are gradually becoming competitive in the global automo-
bile market during the rise of EVs.
1  Introduction: Two Camps and Two Catching-Up 
Trajectories in One Industry
For the Chinese society, the car-making industry is always an appealing topic. On 
the one hand, this industry had long been left aside by the state planning system. 
Due to the emphasis on industrial capital goods rather than consumer goods, the 
passenger vehicle sector (including car-making) was not listed by the central plan-
ner as a key industry for decades, which is a typical Gerschenkronian strategy of 
industrialization.3 It was not until China’s introduction of “the 1994 automobile 
1 Drucker, Peter F. (1946) Concept of the Corporation, New York: John Day
2 The compound term “backbone SOEs” in this chapter refers to large SOEs directly influenced by 
the central government. “Backbone” indicates large size, and a critical role within their corre-
sponding sectoral systems, particularly in the previous central planning era. Even in the current 
reform era, through direct oversight by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), the central government still influences their strategy making. By contrast, 
the term “SOE” in this chapter is defined by the ownership of a firm, in which some state investors 
own significant stock shares.
3 The Gerschenkronian strategy refers to a typical state-led pattern of industrialization: The state 
plays a critical role in resource mobilization in society and pinpoints the selected areas for strategic 
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industry policy” that car-making has been recognized as a national pillar industry 
along with the entire sector of automobile manufacturing. Nevertheless, the car 
industry has been of high interest to the Chinese society for decades. The transfor-
mation of China’s developmental strategy, from emphasizing “trading market for 
technology (TMFT)” to focusing on indigenous innovation, was triggered by public 
dissatisfaction with the pace of technical progress in the domestic car-making 
industry. The policy transformation was marked by the “National Medium- and 
Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) 
Outline,” which was promulgated in 2006. That is to say, the concern over the lack 
of technological capability in the car-making industry has promoted the transition 
of development strategy at the national level. This concern also has pushed the 
industrial regulator to change its previous practices, allowing a group of new, local, 
innovative firms to enter the industry.
However, even with the current favorable environment, which supports indig-
enous innovation, it remains challenging for late-coming firms to accumulate 
technical competitive advantage in a global industry consisting of a large number 
of complex technologies and components. The following four factors determine 
the extent to which technical capability accumulates in the automotive industry, 
thereby increasing the difficulty for the latecomers to catch up in technology.
First, the car-making industry is closely related to many other industries and 
technology domains, such as the steel, machine tool, and electronics industries 
and materials engineering. Manufacturing in this industry also relies heavily on 
the capability of the national industrial system. Second, much of the technical 
knowledge in the automotive industry is tacit in nature and often protected by 
intellectual property (IP) rights. This makes it difficult for latecomers to directly 
imitate complicated technologies of the first-movers. Third, the dominant design 
of a car was primarily determined in the 1920s.4 Although some new technologies, 
such as materials and electronics, have been gradually added to the dominant 
design over the century that followed, and the value created by these new tech-
nologies is becoming more and more important, these new technologies do not 
change the core design. Thus, the relevant innovations are competence-enhancing 
rather than competence- destroying for the incumbents.5,6 Finally, a great deal of 
key knowledge of car- making is highly embedded in specialized social networks 
investment. The strategy implemented by Korea during the Park Chung-Hee administration (1961–
1978) is a representative case. For detailed discussion, see Amsden, Alice H. (1989) Asia’s Next 
Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press.
4 Clark, Kim B. (1985) “The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological 
evolution.” Research Policy, 14(5): 235–251
5 Tushman, Michael L. and Philip Anderson (1986) “Technological discontinuities and organiza-
tional environments.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 31:439–465
6 Anderson, Philip and Michael L. Tushman (1990) Technological discontinuities and dominant 
designs: a cyclical model of technological change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 
604–633
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among the collaborating firms.7 This type of knowledge is difficult to be trans-
ferred as a simple sum of information, and difficult to be withheld by individual 
participants, which greatly enhances the stickiness of knowledge, making it hard 
for the latecomer to grasp easily.8
In short, unlike a science-based industry, the car-making industry is manufacturing- 
intensive and scale-intensive.9 In this industry, key knowledge is embedded in manu-
facturing or design experience, and does not appear in explicit forms such as utility 
and invention patents. Although patents are becoming increasingly important, a vast 
majority of “know-how” or “know-whom” kind of knowledge in this industry cannot 
be mastered by a firm through the acquisition of patents or patent licenses. Indeed, 
the technical trade and R&D collaboration of many core businesses are through engi-
neering services, design transfer (usually including engineering services), and com-
ponent supplies. Hence, capacity building in this industry is a long-term process and 
may take many decades for latecomers, although imitation and reverse-engineering 
are emphasized as the methods for learning technology.10
Technological catching-up by domestic Chinese manufacturers in the FFV 
industry highlights a two-sided story. On one hand, aided by national policy, a group 
of new entrants have successfully entered the mass automobile market by providing 
consumers with more cost-effective cars, gaining a relatively stable living space and 
continuing to climb the technical ladder. The success of these firms and the rapid 
expansion of China’s car-making industry have proved the policy case for indige-
nous innovation. On the other hand, established Chinese auto manufacturers have 
faced difficulties in developing cutting-edge technologies and competing in the 
high-end market. The significantly accumulative characteristics of the industry in 
capacity building have left the indigenous Chinese manufacturers behind global 
auto industry leaders. Thus, while the domestic market share held by new local 
entrants has been stable for a long time at about 30%, the Chinese automakers have 
been able to penetrate only the middle- and low-end segments of the third-world 
markets, though they are increasingly being recognized globally.
Development of EVs has created an alternative landscape for the Chinese govern-
ment as well as the indigenous Chinese firms. EVs are returning to the mass market 
because of the need for energy conservation and environmental protection, and this 
change is to some extent an innovation with technological discontinuities.11 In EVs, 
7 Clark, Kim B. and Takahiro Fujimoto (1991) Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organization, and Management in the World Automobile Industry. Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press
8 von Hippel, Eric (1998) “Sticky information” and the locus of problem solving: implications for 
innovation, In Alfred Chandler et  al. (eds.), The Dynamic Firm, New York: Oxford University 
Press: 60–77
9 Pavitt, Keith (1984) Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a theory. 
Research Policy 13(6): 343–374
10 Kim, Linsu (1997) Imitation to Innovation: the dynamics of Korea’s technological learning. 
Boston, Harvard Business School Press
11 Tushman, Michael L. and Philip Anderson (1986) Technological discontinuities and organiza-
tional environments.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 31:439–465
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motors and batteries are employed to replace the engines and gearboxes of the FFVs. 
New requirements for complex technologies have also emerged, such as for control-
ling the batteries. Moreover, compared to FFVs, EVs are better able to interface with 
computer-based technologies, such as AI, the mobile Internet, and cloud computing. 
This has induced an explosive development of ICT technology applications on the 
car platform, creating an opportunity for China to pursue catch- up development.12 
The Chinese government has tabled a range of battery research and production proj-
ects and has enacted policies to encourage investment in development and industrial-
ization of EVs while subsidizing investments in infrastructure, especially a network 
of rechargeable devices. These measures have enabled China to overtake the USA as 
the world’s largest producer and consumer of EVs in 2015.
Compared to the incumbents in China’s domestic car market, including back-
bone SOEs and multinationals, as well as the joint ventures (JVs) between these two 
groups of firms, the new local entrants also have more enthusiasm in developing 
EVs. Because they are challengers to the original pattern, they look forward to 
building their own competitive advantage by seizing this opportunity. They are the 
main driving force for the development of China’s EV industry, followed by some 
new subordinate companies set up by backbone SOEs due to the pressure of indig-
enous innovation policy. In some areas of EVs, such as specific battery technologies 
and business models, Chinese innovation has reached the forefront of the world. 
This has paved the way for the Chinese automakers to become challengers in the 
global EV markets.
However, EVs are not radical innovations. Compared to an FFV, EV has revolu-
tionized the engine and transmission modules, but many other modules of a pas-
senger car, such as the bodywork design, chassis engineering, and security system, 
remain largely the same. More importantly, in terms of market reputation, consum-
ers still follow traditions, perceiving the cars of multinational companies as higher 
quality compared to the Chinese cars. Also true in a developing country like China 
is that people associate the ownership of foreign-made, well-recognized global 
brands with social status. None of these factors is helpful to gain competitive advan-
tage in the auto market for the new domestic Chinese entrants.
As a result, local Chinese firms also face difficulties in the EV sector, although 
much less so compared to the FFV sector. They have only captured some space in 
the middle- and low-end market segments, while multinationals such as Volkswagen, 
Toyota, Tesla, and BMW still dominate the high-end market. Also notable is the fact 
that though the EV market share of local firms may be increasing, the EV market pie 
itself is still very small compared to the size of the FFV market. This implies that 
local EV producers have difficulties quickly expanding scale through substantial 
economic gains from the market.
12 Perez, Carlota and Luc Soete (1988) Catching up in technology: entry barriers and windows of 
opportunity. In: Technical Change and Economic Theory, eds. G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, 
G. Silverberg and L. Soete. London, Pinter: 458–479
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2  Technological Catching-Up in FFV Sector
2.1  Through Strict Entry Regulation and TMFT
Before China’s national development strategy turned to indigenous innovation, its 
original sectoral system of automobiles was mainly supported by two institutional 
pillars. The first pillar was strict regulation of entry permission. Through collabora-
tion among the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT); Ministry of Environmental 
Protection; General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine; and other ministries, the government has maintained substantive con-
trol over entry into the car-manufacturing sector. The core means is a regulative 
system based on the “product catalog management,” according to which all car 
products formally launched into the Chinese domestic market for sale must have 
prior permission from the MIIT to be listed in a regularly updated product catalog. 
This policy is nominally based on product safety (e.g., collision safety), environ-
mental protection (such as mandatory emission regulations), quality qualification 
(such as production consistency), and other conditions. Though some critics regard 
the “catalog-based regulation” a rigid legacy of the planned system, it continues 
even after the transition to indigenous innovation. At the same time, since the state 
plays a critical role in resource allocation in China, especially given its influence on 
the financial sector, local car producers seldom challenge the fundamental regula-
tory arrangements.
The second pillar was the national strategy of TMFT since the 1980s, which was 
originally developed to promote the expansion of local industrial capacity. This 
strategy literally involves the trading of market access for technology with the mul-
tinationals possessing advanced technology, as acquisition of intangible IP assets on 
technologies would be less productive without the benefit of associated operational 
learning and expertise. So, TMFT in practice encourages JVs between the backbone 
SOEs and multinationals. The approach began with a JV between Beijing Auto and 
American Motors Corporation (AMC) in 1984.13 Then rapidly, all backbone SOEs, 
both those managed by the central government (such as First Automobile Work 
(FAW), Dongfeng Auto, and Shanghai Auto) and those managed by provincial gov-
ernments (such as Guangzhou Auto, Nanjing Auto, and others), have been included 
in this wave. By 2000, a total of 71 such automobile-producing JVs had been estab-
lished, in addition to five other cooperative projects involving multinationals. In 
order to promote the localization rate of manufacturing, another 557 JVs had been 
set up to produce components and parts by 1998.14 By 2005, nearly all 
13 When the JV was set up, AMC was owned by Renault; later it was acquired by Daimler Chrysler.
14 Feng, Kaidong (2016) Chinese indigenous innovation in the car sector: being integrated or being 
the integrator, Chapter 5 of Y. Zhou, W. Lazonick, and Y. Sun (eds.) China as an Innovation Nation, 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 133–164
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multinationals active in the international market had entered China with car- 
producing JVs with Chinese SOEs.15
2.2  Through China-Foreign JVs
As the backbone SOEs focused their strategy on the operation of China-foreign JVs 
(except in rare cases),16 they officially abandoned their own efforts to develop self- 
owned car brands.17 Instead, they stressed production based on imported blueprints 
with the brands of their foreign JV partners. JV production was often dependent on 
the introduction of complete sets of equipment, technical licensing, knockdown 
components, and personnel training from the foreign value network. Before the 
policy transition to indigenous innovation in 2006, most backbone SOEs had only 
retained the functions of investment and administration while relying on coopera-
tion with multinationals for product development, manufacturing, and branding.
After the policy transition to indigenous innovation in 2006, backbone SOEs 
were also required to innovate. However, they did not have sufficient motivation or 
technical capacity. They had gained great benefits through JV production, while 
doing indigenous innovation would have created huge risks, without providing a 
clear prospect of decent returns. Therefore, backbone SOEs generally adopted three 
strategies during the second half of the 2000s under political pressure and social 
appeals.
First, they acquired foreign assets. Some multinationals were weakened after the 
fierce global competition during the 1970s–1990s, which created good conditions 
for the Chinese to acquire them as a shortcut for gaining technological assets. Not 
only did the backbone SOEs have such a desire, but so did some new entrants. The 
well-known case of acquisition of Volvo in 2010 was by the new entrant Geely. 
However, as the backbone SOEs had not built up their absorptive capacity for 
assessing and assimilating technologies, they did not perform well in identifying 
quality assets and negotiating better prices. Beijing Auto bought most of the IPs of 
SAAB in 2009. However, as revealed by the media afterward, many high-value IPs 
had already been peeled off before the deal, as previously SAAB had been traded 
for several rounds on the market. So what Beijing Auto obtained were just two rela-
tively aging platforms, the Saab 9–3 and Saab 9–5, the latest update of which was 
in the late 1990s.
15 According to the author’s rough calculation, there are at least Volkswagen, AMC, Peugeot, 
Chrysler, Citroen, Nissan, Mitsubishi, GM, Toyota, Honda, Fiat, Ford, GM, etc.
16 Such as ChangAn Auto. For more details on this exceptional case, see Feng, Kaidong (2016) 
Chinese indigenous innovation in the car sector: being integrated or being the integrator, Chapter 
5 of Y. Zhou, W. Lazonick, and Y. Sun (eds.) China as an Innovation Nation, Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press: 133–164.
17 FAW was an exception keeping its own car brand, since the brand “Red Flag” has always been 
regarded as the national car with political symbolism. However, in the 1990s, FAW also gave up 
the technical platform of Red Flag and replaced it with that of Audi-100 while keeping the Red 
Flag name.
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The Chinese acquisition of Rover was more dramatic. In 2005, two Chinese 
SOEs, Shanghai Auto and Nanjing Auto, announced acquisition of Rover’s core 
assets. In fact, Rover successfully sold its assets to these two separate buyers, 
namely, the soft technologies (IP, drawings, etc.) to Shanghai Auto and the hard 
assets (production equipment and factory buildings) to Nanjing Auto. The chaos 
about the Rover technologies was not finally resolved until 2007, when Shanghai 
Auto acquired Nanjing Auto, which allowed it to combine the soft technologies and 
the hard assets from Rover. Of course, this approach can provide an initial shortcut 
for backbone SOEs to build their own technological capabilities. However, these 
firms still need to earn experience through indigenous innovation to become a genu-
inely competitive car developer for the long term. According to our observations, 
this has not happened yet.
As a second method to respond to the indigenous innovation drive, backbone 
SOEs established new brands through their JVs with multinationals. Looking for 
shortcuts, they often purchased the IPs of some existing or even outdated products 
(for more affordable cost) from abroad. Adjustments were done on the existing plat-
forms, which were often very marginal, such as redesigning bodywork, installing 
new auto electronics, improving interiors, etc. However, most products of this 
nature were less satisfactory to local consumers, who have become picky as they 
have witnessed superior products entirely developed for them. Many of these self- 
built brands were soon marginalized on the market, such as the Everus brand 
launched by the Guangzhou Auto-Honda JV and the Ciimo brand developed by the 
Dongfeng Auto-Honda JV. Only those really based on localized R&D were able to 
survive through tough competition, such as the Baojun brand of the SAIC-GM- 
Wuling JV.
The third way was to buy technology from local developers. Some backbone 
SOEs have come to ally with new local entrants or directly procured technological 
packages from them. For example, in 2012 Guangzhou Auto signed an agreement 
with Chery18 to obtain the basic technology of the A-class platforms from Chery, as 
well as the full package for a G3 model. With this agreement, Guangzhou Auto also 
outsourced the engineering service provided by Chery concerning the engines and 
the continuously variable transmission gearboxes adopted in the relevant car mod-
els. In fact, these inputs aided Guangzhou Auto in developing its own Trumpchi 
brand.
It is only after 2013, witnessing how the new administration of Xi continues to 
stress indigenous innovation, that the backbone SOEs have begun to take innovation 
seriously. Within these firms, the units running self-built brands get promoted in 
terms of resource support. Baojun, the brand of the Shanghai Auto-GM-Wuling JV, 
has become a competitive brand in the low-end market. The Trumpchi brand of 
18 Chery is one of the leading local firms that focuses on indigenous development of auto products. 
It was funded by the provincial government of Anhui and entered the car-making sector since 
1997. For its distinguished performance in developing indigenous technologies, Chery was consid-
ered by the Chinese government as one of the representatives of new local entrants after the policy 
shift around 2005–2006.
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Guangzhou Auto, as mentioned, also made its name in the mid-range market seg-
ment. The continual investment in R&D and relevant experience accumulation after 
the policy shift have forged their rise. But as newcomers to indigenous innovation, 
their trajectories of capability growth are not different from those of the forerunning 
local innovators such as Chery, Geely, BYD, and Great Wall. Longer periods of 
investment and experience accumulation are needed in order to develop sustainable 
capability building. All these facts will be clearly demonstrated by our patent analy-
sis later on.
2.3  Through New Local Entrants
Since 1997, new local entrants such as Chery and Geely began to produce cars 
based on different strategies, suggesting the possibility of strategies other than 
TMFT.19 But the entry of these manufacturers was “illegal” to some extent, because 
they had not been listed in the official catalog yet. These new entrants were mainly 
supported by local governments. As the spin-off effects of car-making on related 
industries were attractive, some local governments, in their bid to promote local 
GDP growth, risked supporting local firms even without official permission from 
the central regulator.20 The support was vital for new entrants, as the local govern-
ments not only provided funds but also allowed them to sell their products in local 
areas.21 It is important to note that these new entrants are not the industrial players 
directly managed by the central government, and represent only local economic 
power, which is critical for understanding the subsequent policy changes. At least in 
the car industry, the policy transition from TMFT to the indigenous innovation strat-
egy has not happened in a completely radical manner. This is partly so because the 
leading cadres of the ministries of industrial administration, especially the MIIT, 
had often been the former heads of large SOEs. This explains why policy-makers 
acquiesce in the slow response of backbone SOEs to this strategic transition, espe-
cially in their continued emphasis on JV production.
The influx of new local entrants has fundamentally changed the rules of the game 
in China’s car industry. They offer more cost-effective products and are more 
inclined to listen to the needs of local consumers by continually launching new 
products, which makes Sino-foreign JVs unable to sustain high profits by producing 
a handful of outdated models. Thus, since 2001, as the new entrants gradually 
obtained regulatory approval, the entire production scale and the amounts of new 
19 Lu, Feng and Kaidong Feng (2005) The Policy to Develop the Indigenous Automobile Industry 
(Fazhan Woguo Zizhu Zhishi Chanquan Qiche Gongye de Zhengce Xuanze). Beijing: Peking 
University Press
20 Thun, Eric (2006) Changing Lanes in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Governments, 
and Auto Sector Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
21 See Chapter 3  in Lu, Feng and Kaidong Feng (2005) The Policy to Develop the Indigenous 
Automobile Industry (in Chinese). Beijing: Peking University Press, pp. 42–74
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products launched annually in China’s car industry have skyrocketed, due to the 
leveraging effects created by new firms (see Fig. 1).
As new local entrants often lack technology accumulation, their first-generation 
products were developed mainly by mimicking existing products. Thus, after 2001, 
when their threat to incumbents was recognized, multinationals sued China’s new 
local car-makers for IP violation in a series of cases. These disputes affected public 
opinion and reinforced the notion that new local entrants were technologically 
backward.
Therefore, the new entrants who survived the initial phase of market competition 
demonstrated obvious commitment to developing self-owned technologies to solve 
their sustainability problems. Their efforts, though diverse, can be categorized into 
three types. Firstly, they invested heavily in in-house R&D. Chery, for example, was 
founded in 1997, and by 2005 it had an R&D center of more than 2000 profession-
als. In addition to the development of car models, Chery also has specialized in 
engines, gearboxes, new materials, electronic control systems, and so on. The culti-
vation of this R&D force was supported by high resource density: in 2005, on aver-
age, each of Chery’s R&D personnel was involved in more than 12 projects at the 
same time. By 2012, Chery’s R&D team reached its peak, with more than 6000 
people and more than 120 ongoing projects for developing car models and impor-
tant assemblies.22
The second type of activity that the surviving new entrants undertook was to 
establish their own core supply system to provide key technical modules, such as 
air-conditioning, automotive electronics, stamping molds, and so on. At the begin-
ning, they had to rely on existing local suppliers. However, under TMFT, most car 
component suppliers, though not all, were attached to a Sino-foreign JV value net-
work. As those incumbents, especially the multinational part, had tight control over 
core suppliers, i.e., the tier-1 suppliers, the new entrants could only reach tier-2 or 
even more marginal suppliers. However, the technologically inferior tier-2 
22 The data are collected by one of the authors through his annual on-site investigations and inter-












Fig. 1 Output of Chinese car sector. (Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbooks)
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suppliers23 were not willing to provide engineering R&D services to new enter-
prises, to avoid potential pressure from their car-making partners. All these con-
strained the scope and quality of components the new entrants could outsource.24 To 
break through the roof, the new entrants had to set up their own tier-1 core supplier 
system. The concrete approach was to invest in cooperation with talented engineers 
who have already accumulated considerable experience through their prior work at 
giant international firms. For these engineers, the plans of Chery and Geely offered 
them a chance to start their own businesses. After witnessing their rapid growth, 
some established suppliers gradually became willing to set up JVs or specialized 
factories for these new players. Chery, for example, by 2012, had established a net-
work of more than 200 tier-1 suppliers and already had several tier-1 suppliers to 
choose from in some areas. These achievements enable the new entrants to indepen-
dently develop and produce cars and key modules, including a large number of 
patented technologies.
The third type of activity that the surviving new entrants underwent was a wide 
range of technical cooperation with international professional technology firms. 
After the 1990s, the growth of the global mainstream market had slowed, and some 
professional engineering technology providers began to develop strong incentives 
to open up the Chinese market, giving the new entrants opportunities to outsource 
engineering services and learn through cooperation with these service providers. As 
the earliest case of this kind, the Italy-based design house, Pininfarina, in 1991, took 
the initiative to approach Hafei Auto (a Chinese minibus manufacturer) to inquire 
into whether the latter was willing to employ its services.25 This pattern quickly 
spread among local newcomers, who sought specialized services on the global mar-
ket in different fields, such as systemic configuration, chassis engineering, engine 
calibration, and so on.
These kinds of cooperation were not just simple turn-key projects, but involved 
personnel training. Young and most elite Chinese engineers participated in these 
23 The terms “tier-1” and “tier-2” are defined by the closeness of suppliers to the flagship firms (car 
producers) in their value chains. When a project for developing new products is started by a flag-
ship firm, its tier-1 suppliers are required to set up corresponding development projects in a parallel 
manner and send their representatives to join the development team of flagship firms. By doing so, 
the development activities both internally in the flagship firms and in each tier-1 supplier are inte-
grated to serve the purpose of developing a product. Therefore, the tier-1 suppliers are obliged to 
develop their in-house technological capability and have close collaboration with the flagship firms 
in the long run. By contrast, the tier-2 suppliers are not included for participating in core activities 
of development immediately. Rather, they are expected to be the capacity buffer or to provide more 
options for the flagship firms when a product design has been solidified. Therefore, in most cases, 
the technological capabilities of tier-2 suppliers are incomparable to those of tier-1 suppliers. For 
the collaboration between flagship firms and their tier-1 suppliers, see Clark, Kim B., and Takahiro 
Fujimoto (1991) Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization, and Management in 
the World Automobile Industry. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
24 This also explains to some extent why the early products of new businesses are being criticized 
in the same way that multinationals produce vehicles through joint ventures.
25 Lu, Feng and Kaidong Feng (2005) The Policy to Develop the Indigenous Automobile Industry 
(in Chinese). Beijing: Peking University Press, p. 45
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projects. The foreign partners had to cooperate in such learning schemes to win a 
long-term place in the emerging Chinese car market.26 In such schemes, the Chinese 
participants played a more dominant role in cooperation, which helped them better 
identify technologies at the systemic level and explore more frontier issues.27
New local entrants kept their focus on technological progress for sustainable 
survival, which also changed the behaviors of multinationals. Before they were 
challenged by new local entrants, multinationals rarely launched new products on 
the Chinese market, despite the fact that a large number of multinationals had actu-
ally established their Sino-foreign JVs before 2001. In 2001, there were only 13 
new car models in China by 12 vehicle-producing JVs set up by international giants 
(see Table 1). Only after the new local entrants were allowed to enter the industry 
was product-based competition triggered. After that, the rules of the game have 
changed, and the amount of new products on the market every year has increased 
rapidly, above 100 for most of the years after 2006, many with investment by 
multinationals.
3  China’s Technological Innovation in EV Industry
3.1  Government-Backed Development
3.1.1  Central Government
The technological progress in the Chinese EV sector presents a series of character-
istics dissimilar to the FFV sector. The discontinuity of automotive technological 
progress, created by the rise of EV, is perceived as an opportunity for latecomers to 
overtake their competitors. The Chinese government has provided long-term and 
consistent support for indigenous innovation in this domain. This measure 
26 It is important to note that developing new models is an expensive investment activity, so in the 
original international market, the opportunity to participate in new model development projects is 
highly valuable and limited; only these new enterprises from China are extravagantly spending 
efforts to save money from other areas to start one after another. The new model project has 
become a new opportunity that technology service companies cannot give up. Even if Chinese 
companies are more concerned about learning technology from them, they are still passively 
accepting this. In fact, they have also gained great benefits from the development of the Chinese 
auto industry. After the growth of new Chinese companies, these international technology compa-
nies continue to obtain cooperation contracts, although their cooperation is no longer clearly 
“teacher-student” relations, so they have successfully nurtured a new group of consumers.
27 Feng, Kaidong, Tongyao Yin, and Yanmin Wang (2007) Innovation pattern of Chery (Qirui de 
Chuangxin Moshi). China Soft Science. No.3: 76–84
Table 1 Newly launched car models in the Chinese market
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
New 
models
13 28 50 50- 80+ 117 90 107 221
Source: Feng (2016), p. 151)
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incentivizes local actors to innovate and helps to shape an active ecology where 
developers of relevant technologies, such as the mobile Internet, big data, and AI, 
take it as a good chance to extend their business to the automobile industry. Under 
such circumstances, not only new local entrants but also some backbone SOEs have 
better performance in EVs than in FFVs.
The Chinese government began to aid EV development projects in 1992. At that 
time policies were initiated to address the concern of “(petroleum) energy consump-
tion.” The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was the first at the central 
government level to act on the EV issue. As MOST was not set up for economic 
planning or industrial administration, it paid more attention to technological 
advances and did not strictly follow the TMFT strategy. Furthermore, it emphasized 
indigenous innovation when subsidizing EV development. Later, NDRC and MIIT 
took part in the support of EV after the 2006 policy shift and treated the advent of 
EVs as an opportunity to implement a leapfrogging strategy. NDRC and MIIT have 
gradually become the ministries steering EV policies, as they command more 
resources and administrative power.
However, the ministries were not directly involved in commercial competition, 
could not perceive potential targets still under water, and were not sensitive to vari-
ous commercial considerations and technological choices. What they could identify 
as targets for leapfrogging strategy were technologies already on the market and 
advocated by international giants. Then they set metrics for the measurement of 
technical objectives for a given period of time, which was typical of “technological 
mounting” programs, namely, to mobilize domestic actors to achieve break-
throughs.28 In the special program for EV under the National Technology Research 
and Development Program (the “863 Program”),29 which is part of the 10th Five- 
Year Plan, planners from the central government emphasized fuel cell vehicles, tra-
ditional non-plug-in hybrid EVs (HEV), and pure electrical vehicles (PEV) as the 
three selected technologies that government supported since 2001. Among them, 
the HEV and fuel cell vehicles had long been advocated by Japanese car-makers. 
However, due to the lack of the battery technologies for PEV, people still had their 
eyes fixed on traditional lead-acid and Ni-MH batteries. Lithium batteries, which 
were later proven to be a better choice, had not been included for policy consider-
ation at that time due to cost and safety issues.
The government is also a critical player in shaping the technological trajectory of 
the rise of Chinese EVs. To circumvent the advantages of international giants, such 
as that of Toyota in HEVs, the Chinese government released policies such as the 
28 Technological mounting program was a traditional pattern for Chinese central planners to facili-
tate technological progress. In such kind of programs, ministries would mobilize all the major units 
in relevant domains, including those of universities, research institutes, factories, and so on. 
Collaboration between these units would be arranged by the ministries with great details, so would 
the tasks of technological progress for each participant.
29 The “863 Program” is a national program for basic research. It is led by the Chinese central 
government and focuses on a series of selected areas only. This program is named after its starting 
date, namely, March (the third month) of 1986. It is always regarded as a signpost for the govern-
mental emphasis on research.
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“Administrative Regulations on New Energy Vehicle Production Enterprises and 
Product Access” in 2017 to clearly exclude the HEV from the officially defined “new 
energy vehicles” in China. Therefore, only the PEV, plug-in hybrid EV (PHEV), and 
fuel cell vehicle development can receive governmental incentives and other special 
treatments, leading local Chinese firms to spend more on PEV and PHEV.
3.1.2  Local Governments
In addition to the catching-up strategy of the central government, the rise of EV also 
benefited from the policy actions of provincial governments. The “image creation” 
campaign by provinces and cities provides a rising market for EV. Nowadays dem-
onstration of commercial operation of EV has become an important element of large 
international events and exhibitions organized by Chinese cities. For example, the 
first Chinese EV demonstration was at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Game. Shenzhen 
hosted the 26th Summer Universiade in 2011, which became the start for a new 
round of EV demonstration by BYD.  The municipal government of Shenzhen 
launched a project to sponsor the public transportation service to purchase 200 elec-
tric buses (BYD and another EV coach producer together were awarded the domi-
nant share) and also invested in an EV taxi company, purchasing 500 BYD PEVs. 
This was the first large-scale commercial operation of EVs in China. As these proj-
ects became very successful, the Shenzhen government decided that all newly added 
public buses must be electrically driven, as well as all newly licensed taxis after 
2014. These experiences were partly copied by the government of Beijing in 2014 
(for the APEC conference) and Hangzhou in 2016 (for the G20 Summit).
Meanwhile, the central government also propelled the competition among 
regional governments for EV development. Regional governments have to compete 
against each other. In 2009, a “thousand EVs in each of ten cities” program was 
launched, and 13 cities were listed as pilots to promote EV application. In 2010 and 
2011, another seven and five cities were included, respectively. In 2012 a broadened 
program, namely, the “New Energy Automotive Industry Development Plan (2012–
2020),” was announced with a nationwide target of production and sales of over 
500,000 new energy vehicles by 2015.30 To implement these programs, the central 
government subsidizes EV purchasers and has ordered regional governments to fol-
low its incentive plan. The sum of subsidies provided by central and regional gov-
ernments usually reaches 50% of the purchase price. These policies create a series 
of consequences. Customers become more willing to buy; more particularly, 
regional governments are incentivized to provide subsidies to benefit the local econ-
omy. For example, Hangzhou’s government has sponsored the rise of two EV manu-
facturers, Kandi and Zotye.31 Beijing’s municipal government incentivized and 
pressured Beijing Auto to start a subsidiary on PEV production.
30 Shen, Qunhong, Kaidong Feng, and Xiaobo Zhang (2016) Divergent technological strategies 
among leading electric vehicle firms in China: Multiplicity of institutional logics and responses of 
firms. Science & Public Policy 43.4:scv056
31 Kandi is a privately owned industrial group, established in 2002, focused on manufacturing com-
pact cars. In 2013, Kandi and Geely jointly (50%–50%) invested in an EV producer, Kandi 
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Beijing Auto, JAC (an SOE owned by Anhui Province), and ChangAn Auto (an 
SOE originating from the state-owned weapon-making enterprise) are the first- 
movers among SOEs to take EV as an important business and a platform to rebuild 
their technical capabilities.
3.2  Chery-Led Development
The MOST encouraged local firms to participate in projects it commissioned and 
funded. Backbone SOEs, such as FAW and Dongfeng Auto,32 were those that the the 
MOST needed to persuade to join in. However, some new entrants signed up for 
these programs and also invested their own money. A typical example is Chery, 
which took part in the 863 EV program in 2001 and infused its strategic resources 
into it.33 Therefore, in the second half of the 863 EV program, which started in 2003, 
Chery has become the most important participant, and its automotive engineering 
institute was accredited by the MOST as “national engineering and technology cen-
ter for energy-saving and environment-protection vehicles.”
During this phase, Chery invested heavily in HEV, partly out of its eagerness to 
be recognized by the central government as a competent car-maker. It even invested 
in a series of collaborative developmental projects with Ricardo, a renowned British 
technological firm, starting in 2004. With intensive learning through a 4-year period, 
Chery mastered various mainstream HEV technologies, including a range of light, 
medium and full modes of electric motor-engine hybridization.
However, Chery’s technological choice was problematic. As the development 
proceeded, Chinese developers found that Japanese manufacturers, particularly 
Toyota, have obvious first-mover advantage in this area. Leading Japanese firms had 
already patented a large number of high-value inventions, and many of these pat-
ented technologies were fundamental to this domain and difficult for latecomers to 
circumvent. Therefore, not only Chery but also giant firms from Europe and North 
America were hardly able to proceed with commercialization of their technologies. 
Technological ecology in the fuel cell EV was also similar, and some core patents 
were in the hands of a limited number of international giant firms.
EV. Zotye is also a private industrial group, established in 2003. It started to produce cars in 2003 
and entered the EV market in 2009.
32 FAW is the most privileged automobile producer in China. It was the first automobile works 
established in China in 1953 and had been always the largest Chinese automobile producer before 
2005 (when overtaken by Shanghai Auto). Dongfeng Auto is also a leading backbone SOE estab-
lished in 1969. As Dongfeng Auto was the second largest automobile group directly constructed 
under the instruction of the State Council, common Chinese also refer to it as “Second Automobile 
Works.” This name also indicates the significance of Dongfeng Auto in China’s automobile 
industry.
33 MOST provided Chery only 0.5 million RMB in the first half of the project during 2001–2003. 
As a reference, Chery imported a Toyota Prius (the first mass-produced hybrid car worldwide) 
from abroad, which cost 0.8 million RMB.
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3.3  The BYD-Led Development
The rise of BYD in EV is a story highly similar to that of the new entrants’ rise in 
the FFV sector. BYD was originally below the radars of the government and tradi-
tional Chinese automotive community. BYD had built strong capacity in battery 
development by the early 2000s and became globally competitive in providing lith-
ium and Ni-MH batteries for laptops and cell phones.
In 2005, a research team at MIT released their findings about lithium iron phos-
phate as the cathode material for batteries. BYD reacted quickly, launched its indus-
trialization program in 2006, and started to produce large volumes of lithium iron 
batteries in 2009. The reason for BYD’s efficient reaction lies not only in its long- 
term accumulation in battery technology but also in its research-oriented core orga-
nization. BYD was created by a group of former scientists of China’s General 
Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals and maintained the tradition of carrying 
out wide-ranging developmental activities in-house, from researching metal materi-
als to producing battery packaging and developing cars. After BYD successfully 
launched its EV models named F3DM and Qin, most of the EV manufacturers in 
China turned to PEV or PHEV. Chinese developers created a niche market and gave 
up their previous mistaken trajectory, the HEV.
3.4  Overall Assessment
China’s EV industry outpaced the USA’s to become the world’s No.1 in 2015 and 
accelerated the technological development in China. Relevant suppliers of compo-
nents and engineering service have been quickly established, including batteries, 
charging facilities, electrical and electronic control, etc. Taking the battery as an 
example, in addition to BYD, there are more than ten large-scale battery providers 
in China, including CATL, Fortunate Solar, Guoxuan High-Tech, Optimum Nano, 
and LiShen.34
New local entrants are the major drivers to China’s EV rise, including BYD, 
Chery, Zotye, Geely (in cooperation with the Kandi Group), and Great Wall.35 
Attacking the previous industrial ecology, they actively embraced the disruptive 
change of technology to gain greater market share and greater government 
recognition.
34 All the firms listed here are newly established private firms.
35 Geely is a private firm and a leading one among the new local firms. It entered the automobile 
industry in
1997, focusing on compact cars and a low-price strategy during its early phase. For the EV 
business, Geely mainly relies on collaboration with the Kandi Group, as these two jointly invest in 
Kandi EV. Great Wall is also a privately run company with partial governmental ownership. It 
entered the automobile industry in 1996 and is well known for its SUVs.
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4  Patent Analysis in China’s Car-Making Industry
As mentioned previously, key technologies for car-making can be tacit and often 
embedded in complex technological or social networks. Therefore, for car-makers 
and technological inventors, patenting is just one of the several methods to extract 
economic benefits from innovations.36,37 Even international giant firms may have 
reservations regarding how much to spend on patenting.38 Thus, it appears that pat-
ent analysis may not be highly reliable for assessing the definite values of automo-
tive technologies. Nevertheless, a comprehensive patent analysis is expected to be 
enlightening in this study. First of all, it can indicate the behavioral evolution of a 
select group of firms and the comparative tendencies among different groups. 
Secondly, the gaps in patenting strengths among different car-makers or groups in 
China are substantial rather than nominal; thus, analyzing patents becomes an effec-
tive method to demonstrate the capability gaps.
This section mainly analyzes the patent applications of 25 selected firms docu-
mented by China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO). According to the 
China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2016), the 25 firms are directly related to the 
top 12 Chinese car-makers, including multinationals, SOEs, and new entrants, with 
each producing more than 400,000 vehicles in 2015 (see Appendix 1). In the follow-
ing, we categorize them into three groups, the multinationals, the backbone SOEs 
and their JVs with foreign partners, and the new local entrants.
4.1  General Patent Analysis
In China, patents are divided into three categories: inventions, utility models, and 
appearance designs. Among these, the invention patent requires the highest novelty 
and undergoes a more rigorous examination procedure, which gives it longer pro-
tection and higher value. Therefore, the patent portfolio of a firm can partly indicate 
its technical orientation. In the car-making industry, from 1999 to 2017, multina-
tionals have submitted a total number of 87,089 patent applications in China, while 
new local entrants filed 66,043 and backbone SOEs and JVs filed 32,227. As for 
portfolios in the three categories of patent, multinationals have the highest ratio of 
inventions, at 79.53% (69,265), and a low ratio of utility models, merely 3.06%. The 
respective ratios for new local entrants are 32.84% and 50.24%, and for backbone 
SOEs and JVs 20.55% and 57.72% (see Fig. 2). The group of backbone SOEs and 
36 Levin, Richard C., Alvin K.  Klevorick, Richard R.  Nelson, and Sidney G.  Winter (1987) 
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, No. 3: 783–820
37 Nelson, Richard (1990) Capitalism as an engine of progress. Research Policy 19(3): 193–214
38 For example, it is well recognized within the automotive community that given the same condi-
tions of technology, Japanese firms, especially Toyota and Honda, are obviously keener on 
patenting.
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JVs exhibits obvious weakness in patent applications, as 58% of their patents fall in 
the category of utility model (Yang and Mu 2009).
The patent grant rate is another index to look into. According to the report 
released by National Intellectual Property Administration in 2016, the rate for the 
JVs is just 35.35%, markedly below that of multinationals and new local entrants, 
which are 57.01% and 50.28% respectively.
Multinationals are the first-movers at implementing patenting strategy in China, 
accounting for the absolute majority of patents in automobiles prior to 2004  in 
China. However, due to the absence of strong rivalry in China, the patent portfolios 
of multinationals remained thin early on. Only after being challenged by new local 
entrants did their quantity of patent applications in China rise quickly after 2005. 
Toyota, GM, Honda, Hyundai, and Ford are the top five applicants for Chinese car- 
making invention patents, accounting for 56.3% in total among the 25 selected 
firms. Most patent applications of multinationals are submitted by entities from 
their home countries, which indicate that their collaboration with their JV partners 
in China remains highly irrelevant to their patent applications. For example, among 
the 16,708 patents applied for Toyota in China, there are only 5 patents with Chinese 
co-applicants. Toyota subsidiaries in China, including the Toyota (China) Research 
Center, FAW-Toyota R&D Center, and Guangzhou Auto-Toyota R&D Center, have 
only submitted 19 invention patent applications in the past 40 years. That is to say, 
the offshore R&D may have helped the multinationals to localize their technologi-
cal capability to better fit the local market or forward local customers’ feedback to 
their global headquarters to enhance R&D performance.39 Anyhow, it indicates that 
multinationals such as Toyota do not allow their subsidiaries in China to cultivate 
real technological capability.
In 2003, GM claimed that the QQ model, a minicar product of Chery, violated its 
IP of the Matiz model, which was originally developed by Daewoo. In response to 
the lawsuit, Chery urgently submitted more than 20 patent applications to SIPO, 
39 Liu, Mengchun, and ShinHorng Chen (2012) “MNCs’ offshore R&D networks in host country’s 
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Fig. 2 Patenting activities of firms from three groups, 1999–2017. (Note: collected through 
incoPat)
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which could be considered the point at which local car-makers began to emphasize 
patenting. After that, we have witnessed the rise of new local entrants, which gradu-
ally become the second largest group of patent applicants, only after the multina-
tionals. In 2016, the number of invention patent applications submitted by seven 
Chinese new local entrants has reached 3386, equivalent to a half of that submitted 
by the 13 multinationals. The leading group of new local firms, namely, BYD, 
Chery, Geely, and Great Wall, even exceed some multinationals, such as Volkswagen, 
Kia, and BMW, in patent applications (see Fig. 3).
We are not arguing that the technological expertise of these Chinese firms has 
already overtaken that of multinationals. However, at least data indicate a shift in 
their IP strategies in the Chinese market. In fact, the total number of invention patent 
applications submitted by the new local entrants has already surpassed the sum 
submitted by Toyota and Honda after 2012. This is remarkable, as the leading 
Japanese firms are always very active in patent applications. The growth rate of 
invention patent applications filed by the new local entrants as a whole is almost 
equal to that of the multinationals. As for Sino-foreign JVs, although the sum of 
their patent applications has also increased after 2010, the growth rate is still signifi-
cantly behind that of the multinationals and the new local entrants.
4.2  Patents in FFV Sector: Engines As an Example
Multinationals started their patenting in China much earlier with much better 
performance. Over the past 20 years, multinationals have already submitted at 
least 7695 applications on engine technologies, and this has grown steadily, from 




























































































































Patent Applications Overall Proportion
Fig. 3 Patent applications and overall proportion in Automotive, 1999–2017. (Note: Numbers of 
patent applications in China during 1999–2017, in the field of Automotive, collected from National 
Intellectual Property Administration, China.)
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Japanese car manufacturers have striking advantages in this field, as Toyota has 
accumulated 2285 applications on engines, GM 1167, Ford 1084, and Honda 
1049 (see Fig. 4). In recent years, although people are arguing about the American 
deindustrialization or the decline of Detroit’s automotive industry, the American 
car-makers still maintain a higher innovation rate on engines than their overall 
general level through strengthening specialized R&D and utilizing links with 
European and Japanese collaborators.40 Gradually, Japanese and Korean actors 
have already transferred their focus to the EV technologies rather than the 
ICE. For example, the invention patent applications of Honda for engine tech-
nologies in 2016 have declined by more than 50% from 10 years ago.
Compared with the leading group of multinationals, the new local entrants and 
backbone SOEs with their Sino-foreign JVs exhibit obvious disadvantages in 
engine technologies, with a total of only 1434 and 704 cumulative invention pat-
ents, respectively. Before 2002, only some backbone SOEs had the competence to 
patent engine technologies. However, the number of their applications was very 
limited, just one or two a year. Only with the rise of the new entrants did local 
applications in engine patents start to increase. For example, Chery’s invention 
application started to top the local Chinese applicants in 2005, with about 40 
annual applications on average.
In general, the patenting performance of new local entrants is far better than the 
backbone SOEs and their JVs with multinationals. Among the backbone SOEs, 
40 Hannigan, Thomas J., Marcelo Cano-Kollmann, and Ram Mudambi (2015) Thriving innovation 
amidst manufacturing decline: the Detroit auto cluster and the resilience of local knowledge pro-
















































































































Patent applications in ICE Overall Proportion
Fig. 4 Patent applications and overall proportion in ICE, 1999–2017. (Note: Numbers of patent 
applications in China during 1999-2017, in the field of ICE, collected from National Intellectual 
Property Administration, China.)
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Shanghai Auto has the best performing Sino-foreign JV, Shanghai 
Auto-GM. However, Shanghai Auto and its JVs have only 208 invention patent 
applications, clearly not comparable to the leading new entrants such as Chery or 
Great Wall. Out of the 208 applications, only 38 are co-submitted with its multina-
tional partners, which again indicates the inefficiency of technological learning 
under the TMFT scheme.
4.3  Patents in EV Sector
Compared with the FFVs, the power of EVs mainly depends on new energy 
supplies such as batteries or fuel cells, which leads to remarkable changes in 
core modules and the overall design. The huge potential of the Chinese EV 
market has attracted multinationals to apply for patents in China. Thanks to the 
governmental incentive programs, local applicants have made rapid growth in 
EV patenting.41,42 Prima facie, the group of multinationals still has an absolute 
advantage with over 16,758 invention applications compared to 938 from back-
bone SOEs and JVs and 4303 from new local entrants. Yet a closer look shows 
that among those multinationals, 6316 applications are submitted by Toyota 
alone. The gap between local Chinese applicants and multinationals is not as 
formidable as in the ICE sector. Especially BYD, together with GM, having 
2188 and 2537 invention patent applications, respectively, has become the sec-
ond-tier applicants, with visible advantages over the third-tier applicants, 
including Hyundai, Ford, Nissan, Honda, and Chery. Even a handful of back-
bone SOEs, such as Beijing Auto, Shanghai Auto, and ChangAn Auto, are 
incentivized by governmental policies to develop their own technologies and 
file for patents (see Fig. 5).
BYD, as the largest EV producer in China today, cooperates with Daimler-
Benz in a JV, namely, the Denza, to produce PEV. BYD and Daimler-Benz col-
laborate on the bodywork design. And BYD leads most of the rest product 
development tasks in Denza. Indeed, the technological capability of BYD in EV, 
embodied in 2188 invention patent applications, is the reason why Daimler-
Benz chose to collaborate with the young Chinese car-maker.43
In fact, only Toyota and GM can maintain their leading positions ahead of 
BYD, although the advantages of GM have begun to fade. Further, given that 
Toyota has long been more focused on HEV rather than PEV or PHEV, which 
are the domains that BYD stresses, more detailed analyses need to be done in 
the future to judge the leadership contest in each market segment.
41 Zheng, Jie, Shomik Mehndiratta, Jessica Y. Guo, and Zhi Liu (2012) Strategic policies and dem-
onstration program of electric vehicle in China. Transport Policy, 19(1): 17–25
42 Yang, Lifeng, Jinhua Xu, and Peter Neuhäusler (2013) Electric vehicle technology in China: an 
exploratory patent analysis. World Patent Information, 35(4): 305–312
43 Up to 2015, Daimler-Benz has only applied for 139 invention patents in China.
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5  Conclusion and Prospects
The Chinese policy transition to indigenous innovation during 2005–2006 is a clear 
milestone for understanding the technological progress in this country. In the car- 
making industry, two rounds of invasion by newcomers, from the periphery to the 
central stage, are critical. The first round, represented by the entries of Chery, Geely, 
and so on, built the foundation for the policy shift. The second round was led by 
BYD, with a new mindset of developing EV. Overall, it is the new local entrants that 
have been steering China’s automotive industry efforts to catch up in automotive 
technologies, while backbone SOEs have lagged behind as they have been shackled 
by their own previous policy practices. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe point out that 
the higher the ratio of indigenous innovation is, the easier it is for developing coun-
tries to free themselves from their reliance on foreign technologies. Our compara-
tive patent analysis between the new local entrants and the backbone SOEs has also 
amply demonstrated this.44
The governmental support has provided a favorable environment for Chinese 
indigenous innovations, especially those in the EV sector. On the prospects for sus-
tainable development in the long run, policy-makers in China have decided to shift 
the policies again, in order to create a more competition-oriented industry. As a 
44 Guellec, Dominique, and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) The internationalisation 



























































































































Patent applications in EV Overall Proportion
Fig. 5 Patent applications and overall proportion in EV, 1999–2017. (Note: Numbers of patent 
applications in China during 1999-2017, in the field of EV, collected from National Intellectual 
Property Administration, China.)
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result, the restrictions on foreign investment in China’s EV industry have been 
removed in 2018; fully liberalized entry into the entire auto industry will be allowed 
in 5 years; the subsidy for purchasing EV will be totally abolished by 2020 and has 
already been gradually reduced since 2017. In addition, the long-existing JVs will 
lose all policy preferences that they have enjoyed, the backbone SOEs will not have 
the same attractiveness to multinationals anymore, and all EV producers need to 
enhance the cost performance of their products in order to compete against the 
FFVs. In short, there will be a reshuffling in the Chinese car-making industry, which 
can be another big opportunity for the new local entrants, as they have the most 
experience necessary to survive unfavorable institutional circumstances and tough 
competition.
 Appendix 1: Firms in Different Categories (25 Firms Analyzed 
in This Chapter)
Multinationals
Toyota, Honda, General Motor, Ford, Hyundai, Nissan, Kia, BMW, Volkswagen (and Audi), 
Suzuki, Daimler-Benz, Mazda, PSA Peugeot Citroen
Backbone SOEs with Sino-Foreign JVs
FAW, Shanghai Auto (SAIC), Dongfeng Auto, Beijing Auto (BAIC), Guangzhou Auto 
(GAIC), ChangAn Auto (JV), Brilliance Auto (JV)
New Local Entrants
BYD, Geely, Chery, JAC, Great Wall, ChangAn Auto (indigenous), Brilliance Auto 
(indigenous)
References
Anderson, P., & Tushman, M. L. (1990). Technological discontinuities and dominant designs: A 
cyclical model of technological change. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 604–633.
Clark, K. B. (1985). The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological 
evolution. Research Policy, 14(5), 235–251.
Clark, K. B., & Fujimoto, T. (1991). Product development performance: Strategy, organization, 
and management in the world automobile industry. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Drucker, P. F. (1946). Concept of the corporation. New York: John Day.
Feng, K. (2016). Chapter 5: Chinese indigenous innovation in the car sector: Being integrated or 
being the integrator. In Y. Zhou, W. Lazonick, & Y. Sun (Eds.), China as an innovation nation 
(pp. 133–164). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feng, K. T. Y., & Wang, Y. (2007). Innovation pattern of Chery (Qirui de Chuangxin Moshi). China 
Soft Science, (3), 76–84.
Guellec, D., & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. (2001). The internationalisation of technology 
analysed with patent data. Research Policy, 30(8), 1253–1266.
Hannigan, T. J., Cano-Kollmann, M., & Mudambi, R. (2015). Thriving innovation amidst manu-
facturing decline: The Detroit auto cluster and the resilience of local knowledge production. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 24(3), 613–634.
Challenges in Reshaping the Sectoral Innovation System of the Chinese Automobile…
438
Kim, L. (1997). Imitation to Innovation: The dynamics of Korea’s technological learning. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press.
Levin, R. C., Klevorich, A. K., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1987). Appropriating the returns 
from industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 18(3), 
783–820.
Liu, M., & Chen, S. H. (2012). MNCs’ offshore R&D networks in host country’s regional innova-
tion system: The case of Taiwan-based firms in China. Research Policy, 41(6), 1107–1120.
Lu, F., & Feng, K. (2005). The policy to develop the indigenous automobile industry (Fazhan 
Woguo Zizhu Zhishi Chanquan Qiche Gongye de Zhengce Xuanze). Beijing: Peking University 
Press.
Nelson, R. (1990). Capitalism as an engine of progress. Research Policy, 19(3), 193–214.
Pavitt, K. (1984). Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a theory. 
Research Policy, 13(6), 343–374.
Perez, C., & Soete, L. (1988). Catching up in technology: Entry barriers and windows of oppor-
tunity. In G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, & L. Soete (Eds.), Technical change 
and economic theory (pp. 458–479). London: Pinter.
Shen, Q., Feng, K., & Zhang, X. (2016). Divergent technological strategies among leading electric 
vehicle firms in China: Multiplicity of institutional logics and responses of firms. Science & 
Public Policy, 43(4), scv056.
Thun, E. (2006). Changing lanes in China: Foreign direct investment, local governments and auto 
sector development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. (1986). Technological discontinuities and organizational environ-
ments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 439–465.
von Hippel, E. (1998). “Sticky information” and the locus of problem solving: Implications for 
innovation. In A. Chandler et  al. (Eds.), The dynamic firm (pp.  60–77). New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Yang, G., & Mu, L. (2009). Reflection on the independent innovation capability in China automo-
bile industry: Analysis through patent data (Woguo Qiche Hangye Zizhu Chuangxin Nengli de 
Sikao—Tongguo Zhuanli Shuju Yuyi Toushi). Intellectual Property, (3), 35–39.
Yang, L., Xu, J., & Neuhäusler, P. (2013). Electric vehicle technology in China: An exploratory 
patent analysis. World Patent Information, 35(4), 305–312.
Zheng, J., Mehndiratta, S., Guo, J. Y., & Liu, Z. (2012). Strategic policies and demonstration pro-
gram of electric vehicle in China. Transport Policy, 19(1), 17–25.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
K. Feng and J. Li
439© The Author(s) 2019
K.-C. Liu, U. S. Racherla (eds.), Innovation, Economic Development,  
and Intellectual Property in India and China, ARCIALA Series on Intellectual 
Assets and Law in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8102-7_19
S. Miglani (*) 
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER),  
New Delhi, India
e-mail: smiglani@icrier.res.in
The Growth of the Indian Automobile 
Industry: Analysis of the Roles 




The automobile industry is one of the most important drivers of economic growth 
of India and one with high participation in global value chains. The growth of 
this sector has been on the back of strong government support which has helped 
it carve a unique path among the manufacturing sectors of India. The automo-
biles produced in the country uniquely cater to the demands of low- and middle- 
income groups of population which makes this sector stand out among the other 
automobile-producing countries. This chapter analyzes the roles of government 
policy, infrastructure, and other enabling factors in the expansion of the automo-
bile and automotive component sectors of India. In 2017, India became the 
world’s fourth largest automobile market, and the demand for Indian vehicles 
continues to grow in the domestic and international markets. To meet the future 
needs of customers (including the electrical vehicles) and stay ahead of competi-
tion, manufacturers are now catching up on upgradation, digitization, and auto-
mation. The chapter also analyzes India’s national policy in light of these 
developments.
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1  Introduction
The automobile industry is an important driver of the economic growth in India and 
one of the successful sectors in which the country has high participation in global 
value chains (GVCs).1
This chapter analyzes the role of government policy, infrastructure, and other 
enabling factors in the expansion of the automobile and automotive component sec-
tors and the direction they are likely to take for growth path in the next few years. 
The analysis in this chapter is organized into seven sections: The first section dis-
cusses the structure and makeup of the Indian automobile industry. The second sec-
tion analyzes the growth of the sector over the past decades, while the third section 
discusses the role of government. The fourth section deals with other enabling fac-
tors in the growth of the industry. The fifth section analyzes initiatives in upgrading 
and innovation. The sixth section includes a discussion of the future scenario and 
the seventh section concludes.
2  Structure and Makeup of the Indian Automobile 
Industry
The Indian automobile industry – comprising of the automobile and the automotive 
components segments  – is one of the key drivers of economic growth of India. 
Being deeply integrated with other industrial sectors, it is a major driver of the 
manufacturing gross domestic product (GDP), exports, and employment. This sec-
tor has grown on account of its traditional strengths in casting, forging and precision 
machining, fabricating (welding, grinding, and polishing) and cost advantages (on 
account of availability of abundant low-cost skilled labor), and significant foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows.
India was the sixth largest producer of automobiles globally with an average 
annual production of about 29 million vehicles in 2017–2018, of which about 
4 million were exported.2 India is the largest tractor manufacturer, second largest 
two- wheeler manufacturer, second largest bus manufacturer, fifth largest heavy 
truck manufacturer, sixth largest car manufacturer, and eighth largest commer-
cial vehicle manufacturer. The contribution of this sector to GDP has increased 
1 The index of the length of GVCs helps ascertain the “number of production stages” involved in 
the industry. This index was above 2.5 for India (in 2008), indicating fairly high level of vertical 
linkages including stages of production located abroad. GVC participation can be measured 
through exports and imports of intermediate goods. The automobile industry exports have been 
growing continually. In the 1990s, the average annual growth of exports was around 15%. For 
details, see OECD (2012), Mapping Global Value Chains. TAD/TC/WP/RD (2012) 9.
2 Approximate figures, based on Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) Statistics. 
Available at http://www.siamindia.com/statistics.aspx?mpgid=8&pgidtrail=10. For more details, 
see Table 3 of this chapter.
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from 2.77% in 1992–1993 to about 7.1% now and accounts for about 49% of 
manufacturing GDP (2015–2016).3 It employs more than 29  million people 
(direct and indirect employment). The turnover of the automobile industry is 
approximately US$ 67 billion (2016–2017)4 and that of the component industry 
is US$ 43.5 billion (2015–2016).5 As per the OICA6 statistics, the Indian indus-
try accounted for 4.92% of vehicle production globally in 2017 (5.38% of pro-
duction in the car segment and 3.48% of production in the commercial vehicle 
segment).7
India is a prime destination for many multinational automobile companies with 
aspirations of business expansion in Asia. It attracted about US$ 14.48  billion 
(5.2% of total) in cumulative FDI equity inflows between 2000 and 2015.8 The 
basic advantages that the country provides as an investment destination include 
cost- effectiveness of operations, efficient manpower, and a fast-growing dynamic 
market. In the past, major investments have come from Japan, Italy, and the USA 
followed by Mauritius and Netherlands. The industry manufactures a wide range 
of products to meet both domestic and international demands.
Table 1 shows the market share of different segments of the motor vehicles 
industry in 2015–2016. Irrespective of any policy regime, the two-wheelers seg-
ment has dominated the market share. Its share in production increased from 
around 54% in 1970–1971 to 80% in 1990–1991, close to 75% in the 1990s and 
80% now.9 Till the 1980s, the commercial vehicles were the second largest seg-
ment (after two- wheelers) holding around 20% share in production. After the 
3 Automotive Achievement Report 2016, Department of Heavy Industries. Available at http://www.
makeinindia.com/article/-/v/automotive-achievement-report
4 SIAM Statistics. Available at http://www.siamindia.com/statistics.aspx?mpgid=8&pgidtrail=10
5 Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India (ACMA) Statistics. Available at 
https://www.acma.in/industry-statistics.php
6 OICA is the acronym for “Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles,” the 
French name for International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
7 OICA statistics. Available at http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2017-statistics/
8 For details, see FDI in automobile industry, http://dipp.nic.in/sites/default/files/Chapter6.2.v_0.
pdf
9 Due to the size of lower middle-class population being very large in the country, the demand for 
two-wheelers has remained high because of its affordability and speed as a personal transport 
mode.





Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM) statistics
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mid-1980s, passenger vehicles emerged as the second dominant segment, increas-
ing its share from 7% in 1985–1986 to around 15% in 2011–2012 and 14% in 
2015–2016. Sales of passenger cars touched 1.2 million units in 2006 and 3 mil-
lion units in 2016–2017 to maintain the second largest market share in the 
industry.
Production in the sector is mainly concentrated around four large auto manufac-
turing hubs across the country: Delhi-Gurgaon-Faridabad in the north, Mumbai- 
Pune- Nashik-Aurangabad in the west, Chennai- Bengaluru-Hosur in the south, and 
Jamshedpur-Kolkata in the east of India.
3  Growth Path of the Indian Automotive Industry
3.1  From 1950 to 1980: Very Slow-Paced Growth
India’s indigenous passenger car industry was launched in the 1940s with the 
establishment of Hindustan Motors and Premier Automobiles Limited. The two 
companies together garnered most of the market share till the 1970s, along with 
Telco, Ashok Leyland, Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M), and Bajaj Auto. The mar-
ket for automobiles was not large given the low rate of economic growth in the 
country at this time, and thus the industry had a very slow-paced growth till the 
1980s.
Efforts to establish an integrated auto component industry were initiated in the 
1950s. The industry was protected by high import tariffs, and the production was 
catered to the demands of local automobile manufacturers. Manufacturing was 
licensed, and there existed quantitative restrictions on imports of automobiles and 
automotive components. However, a significant demand for passenger cars was 
emerging as the country’s population and per capita income began to grow. The 
government felt the need to introduce modern, fuel-efficient, and low-cost utility 
cars that could also be affordable for “the common man.”
3.2  First Wave of FDI from 1981 to 1991
FDI in automotive assembly was allowed in two major waves in 1983 and in 1993. 
This FDI was mainly “market-seeking” in nature.10 Government policies such as 
import barriers and local content requirements contributed to the influx of FDI and 
helped the industry to compete with international players.
In February 1981, an Indian company called the Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) 
was incorporated as a government company with Suzuki Motor Corporation as a 
10 The literature on FDI identifies three most common investment motivations: resource-seeking, 
market-seeking, and efficiency-seeking. For details, see Dunning, John H. (1993), “Multinational 
enterprises and the global economy.” Workingham: Addison Wesley.
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minor partner to make an efficient people’s car for middle-income class in the coun-
try. In October 1982, the company signed the license and joint venture agreement 
with Suzuki.11,12 Suzuki took up 26% equity in the company and made an invest-
ment of US$ 260 million. MUL created history by rolling out its first vehicle in 
13 months, the Maruti 800 in 1984. This was the first domestically produced car in 
the country with completely modern technology. MUL made significant strategic 
moves including building a very strong ancillary vendor network around it and 
achieved an installed capacity of one lakh unit garnering about 62% of market share 
in a decade.13 In 1989, Suzuki increased its equity stake to 40% and in 1992 to 
50%.14 However, private sector participation was still restricted in the passenger car 
segment with only three major players  – MUL, Hindustan Motors, and Premier 
Automobiles Limited.
India also allowed four Japanese firms – Toyota, Mitsubishi, Mazda, and Nissan – 
to enter the market for light commercial vehicles through joint ventures (JVs) with 
Indian companies and some sharing equity with state-level governments in the 1980s.
Around this time, the government also put in place a Phased Manufacturing 
Programme (PMP) for localization of components, under which domestic original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) had to increase the proportion of domestic inputs 
used in their output over a specific period. The Indian companies went ahead to have 
JV collaboration with several Japanese and foreign OEMs. This enabled Indian 
companies to benefit from equity inflows and technology transfers.15 This phase is 
widely regarded as the first wave of FDI in the sector.
3.3  Second Wave of FDI Since 1992
In the middle of 1991, the Indian Government made significant changes to its eco-
nomic and industrial policies leading to the liberalization of the markets. This pro-
vided the impetus for the Indian automobile industry to flourish further. A new 
automobile policy was launched in 1993, facilitating the entry of global assemblers. 
Auto licensing was abolished in 1991, and the weighted average tariff was lowered 
11 At the time there were five passenger car manufacturers in India – Maruti Udyog Ltd., Hindustan 
Motors Ltd., Premier Automobiles Ltd., Standard Motor Production of India Ltd., and Sipani 
Automobiles.
12 MUL was a venture of Sanjay Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi, set up in 1971 with the mission of 
developing an indigenously designed affordable, cost-effective, low-maintenance, and fuel-effi-
cient car. However, despite government support, the company had failed in its effort, and in 1980 
the Government of India took over the company.
13 MUL dominated the domestic passenger car market (with a market share of about 83%) till 
around 1996–1997.
14 Amann, Edmund and John Cantwell (2012) (Eds.), “Innovative firms in emerging market coun-
tries,” Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom
15 Foreign companies typically entered the market taking local players as JV partners to gain local 
market knowledge and smooth out other operations.
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from 87% to 20.3% in 1997. The PMP policy ended in 1992. The Indian Government 
introduced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) system that continued to 
emphasize localization of components, up to 50%, for approving financial collabo-
ration proposals on a case-by-case basis, which was raised to 70% later. Mass emis-
sion regulatory norms for vehicles were introduced, and a national highway policy 
was announced in this decade.
In 1997, automatic FDI approval of JVs with a 51% majority share for the for-
eign partner was allowed. Liberalized policies and the attraction of a huge unsatu-
rated market made many globally competitive automakers to enter the passenger car 
market.16 The most common route of entry was through JVs with Indian firms. 
Some manufacturers also left the market due to increased competition.17 Table 2 
illustrates the entry of major assemblers in the Indian market and their mode of 
entry for the period between 1983 and 2007.
Japanese participation in the Indian automobile industry brought significant 
changes to the structure of the passenger car market, including utility vehicles. 
Gradually, established players such as Telco entered the commercial passenger car 
segment capitalizing on their engineering capabilities, and economies of scale,18 
16 The major multinationals that entered the Indian market in the initial years of liberalization are 
Daewoo, Peugeot, General Motors, Mercedes-Benz, Honda, Hyundai, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, 
Volvo, Ford, and Fiat. For details, see Krishnaveni M. and R. Vidya (2015), “Growth of Indian 
Automobile Industry,” International Journal of Current Research and Academic Review, 3(2), 
110–118. February.
17 By the early 2000s, Daewoo, Fiat, PAL-Peugeot, and PAL had ceased their operations.
18 D’Costa, Anthony P. (1995), “The restructuring of the Indian automobile industry: Indian state 
and Japanese capital,” World Development, 23(3): 485–502.
Table 2 Mode of entry of selected companies, 1983–2007
Company Mode of entry Year
(a) Before 2000
  Suzuki JV with government (Maruti) 1983
  Mercedes-Benz JV with Telco 1995
  PAL-Peugeot JV with Premier Automobiles 1995
  Daewoo Motors JV with DCM 1995
  Honda Seil JV with Shriram 1995
  Ford Motors JV with M&M 1996
  General Motors JV with Hindustan Motors 1996
  Hyundai 100% subsidiary 1996
  Toyota Kirloskar Motors JV with Kirloskar 1997
(b) Post-2000
  Skoda (Volkswagen) 100% subsidiary 2001
  Renault JV with Mahindra 2005
  Nissan 100% subsidiary 2005
  BMW 100% subsidiary 2007




and domestic players in the commercial vehicle segment started developing pas-
senger cars on a limited scale. Indian companies such as Telco, M&M, Hindustan 
Motors, Premier Automobiles, and DCM entered into JVs with Ford, Mercedes, 
General Motors (GM), and Peugeot for assembly of medium-sized cars from 
knocked-down units. This increased the market competition and restructured pres-
sures on existing players.
The post-1992 period is widely regarded as the second wave of FDI in the sector, 
which played a crucial role in bringing dynamism, diversification, and intense com-
petition in the industry. Many companies started operating at a significant scale in 
the market and started operations in the midsize car segment. Indian companies 
such as Tata Motors introduced special purpose vehicles and platforms to enter the 
passenger car segment. This period saw creation of wide networks, as many compa-
nies had full technology and competence in producing state-of-the-art models of 
vehicles and had contractual arrangements with their component suppliers.
The role of foreign presence in the passenger vehicle segment grew much more 
than all the other segments of automobiles, followed by the multi-utility vehicle 
segment. Thus, foreign partners now hold all or a greater share of the equity in most 
of these cases even though most of them initially formed JV of equal sharing of 
equity.19 The inability of the Indian partners to contribute toward capacity expansion 
allowed foreign partners to increase their stake or take total control by buying out 
their Indian partners.20
In both the waves of FDI that occurred in 1983 and post-1992 period, a signifi-
cant amount of FDI by the multinational corporations (MNCs) flowed into the coun-
try to build modern plants. Maruti Suzuki’s investment in the early 1980s was made 
possible mainly due to its willingness to invest capital. Subsequently, various MNC 
manufacturers have made investments of millions of US dollars in the country.21
In the post-2000 period, Indian firms such as Maruti Suzuki slowly started moving 
toward building its own design and development capabilities. Tata Motors made rapid 
strides toward developing an advanced level of technological capability by launching 
the first indigenously developed Indian car, “Tata Indica” (1998). In 2002, M&M 
launched “Scorpio” as a sport utility vehicle (SUV) – a product of in- house design and 
development effort. In 2004, Tata Motors signed a JV with Daimler-Benz for manu-
facturing Mercedes-Benz passenger cars in India. The Mercedes-Benz India Limited 
plant assembled completely knocked-down units imported from abroad.
19 Mukherjee, Avinandan and Trilochan Sastry (1996), “Recent developments and future prospects 
in the Indian automotive industry,” IMVP Working Paper, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, USA.
20 Sagar, Ambuj D., and Pankaj Chandra (2004), “Technological Change in the Indian Passenger 
Car Industry,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2004–2005, Energy Technology Innovation Project, 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
21 For details, see FDI Statistics, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), 
Government of India, available at http://dipp.nic.in/publications/fdi-statistics; Ray, Saon and 
Smita Miglani (2016), “The role of FDI in fostering growth in the automobile sector in India,” Tech 
Monitor, April–June 2016, available at http://techmonitor.net/tm/images/7/75/16apr_jun_sf3.pdf
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Increased competition led to restructuring and cutting of costs, enhanced quality, 
and improved responsiveness to demand. MNC automakers such as Hyundai, 
Nissan, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Suzuki which had established production plants in 
India eventually started using India as an export platform for their overseas net-
works. The small car segment did particularly well, and India’s potential as a global 
hub for manufacturing small cars began to be recognized.
Between the years 2001 and 2010, passenger vehicle sales grew at a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15.67%. Of the total sales, roughly 10% were con-
tributed by exports. Between 2000 and 2015, the average year-on-year growth rate 
of export of vehicles from the country was approximately 23%.22 The industry is 
known for export of mini hatchbacks and an evolving export base for midsize cars 
and compact SUVs.23 As per the World Trade Organization’s World Trade Statistical 
Review 2017, India was the tenth largest exporter of automobile products world-
wide in 2016, accounting for US$ 13 billion worth of exports.24
3.4  Since 2001 Fully De-licensed, Free Imports and 100% FDI 
Allowed
In the last decade again, various trade and investment restrictions were removed to 
speed up momentum for large-scale production. As of today, the government 
encourages foreign investment and allows 100% FDI in the sector via the automatic 
route. The industry is fully de-licensed, and free imports of automotive components 
are allowed. India is the second fastest-growing market for automobiles and compo-
nents globally (after China).25
With an outward vision of component makers, and competitive pressures from 
international firms, the component industry had to upgrade process and product 
qualities and technology standards to gain and sustain capabilities.26 Many manu-
22 Computation using SIAM data.
23 Interestingly, India is evolving into one of the top global export bases of certain car models made 
by MNCs (e.g., Volkswagen’s Vento, Hyundai’s SUV Creta, GM’s Beat, and Ford’s EcoSport). 
This mix of export and local strategy is leading to better utilization in the industry. India has 
become a cost-competitive production base for these companies, and cars manufactured in India 
have found high levels of acceptance and are in demand in several markets.
24 WTO (2017), World Trade Statistical Review 2017, available at https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts17_toc_e.htm
25 Foreign companies, which had initially just outsourced manufacturing to local players, gradually 
made a shift from imports to indigenous production. Slowly, they also established technology 
development centers to meet their global requirements for single and multiple segments in some 
cases. More and more Tier 1 companies relocated whole and complex systems to India rather than 
building basic parts of processes. Continued inflow of foreign technological know-how and com-
petition with other Asian production centers like China helped local firms make improvements in 
quality, capacity, and productivity. For details, see Ray, Saon and Smita Miglani (2016), “Innovation 
(and upgrading) in the automobile industry: the case of India,” IC RIER Working Paper 320.
26 Global assemblers and large component producers set stringent operational requirements in 
terms of cost, quality, delivery, and flexibility for their suppliers. They also introduced new tech-
nology – more composite parts needing new capabilities to produce them. The focus of innovations 
was on process changes and gradually shifted from assembling units to auto component units.
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facturers now adhere to the global environmental norms regarding emission/techno-
logical standards and quality certifications. The industry grew by around 20% 
annually in the 1990s, and the average annual growth of exports was around 15% 
during that period.27,28 Over the years, it has been able to modernize its technology 
and improve quality and has developed capabilities to manufacture components for 
new-generation vehicles. Indian companies maintained their traditional strengths in 
casting, forging and precision machining, and fabricating (welding, grinding, and 
polishing) at technology levels matching the required scale of operations. They 
achieved significant success in garnering engineering capabilities and adapted to 
local requirements through local design.29 High growth has taken place in engine, 
drive transmission, and steering parts. Engine parts, being high value-added in its 
nature, have been contributing most to total production. Endowed with the potential 
of low-cost quality products, India edges over many other developing countries in 
component manufacturing.30
Table 3 provides the category-wise trends for automobile production, domestic 
sales, and exports (in numbers) from 2011–2012 to 2016–2017.31 Further, using 
estimates from the SIAM of India, it is calculated that between 2001 and 2018, the 
CAGR of export of all vehicles from India was 20.02%.32 The estimates for other 
parameters – production, domestic sales, and exports – as percentage of production 
are given under Table 4. Comparable data for the selected categories before 1995 is 
not available. However, calculations have been made by other authors for earlier 
periods and different segments.33
27 For details, see Tiwari Rajnish and Cornelius Herstatt (2014), Aiming Big with Small Cars: 
Emergence of a Lead Market in India. (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing).
28 The four companies in top ten list of India’s auto component segment are Motherson Sumi, 
Amtek Auto, Bharat Forge, and Mahindra CIE. These companies have grown due to their focus on 
international acquisitions and efficient management post acquisition. For details, see Edelweiss 
(2014), “Auto Components: The Future Mega Trends, Mega Factors.” Edel Invest Research.
29 The component industry manufactures a wide range of products to meet both domestic and inter-
national demands. Domestic sales are dominated by power train, while globally it is spread across 
power train systems and exterior and interior systems. Indian vehicles lag their global counterparts 
in power train technology, safety and infotainment content, electronic stability control, ABS, front 
and side airbags, etc. For details, see Edelweiss (2014), “Auto Components: The Future Mega 
Trends, Mega Factors.” Edel Invest Research.
30 Following the international trend, Indian OEMs are also outsourcing modules to global compo-
nent suppliers.
31 Ray, Saon and Smita Miglani (2018), “Upgrading in the Indian automobile sector: the role of 
lead firms,” ICRIER Working Paper 360, June; Tiwari Rajnish and Cornelius Herstatt (2014), 
“Aiming Big with Small Cars: Emergence of a Lead Market in India.” (Switzerland, Springer 
International Publishing); Innomantra (2011), “Patent portfolio of major Indian automobile com-
panies: An Indicative Measure of Innovation,” Innomantra Consulting P. Limited.
32 The share of exports in total output has been approximately 14–15% in the last 5 years.
33 For instance, see Parhi, Mamta (2008), “Indian Automotive Industry: Innovation and Growth.” 
India, Science and Technology: 2008, S&T and Industry. NISTADS.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There are many reasons for the impressive growth achieved by Indian manufac-
turers over the last two decades. These are discussed in detail in the next section. 
The main strengths have been a large unsaturated domestic market for small cars 
(and presence of a large middle economic class), low production costs (on account 
of availability of low-cost labor and other inputs), and skilled engineering talent. 
Global affiliations and tie-ups also enabled technology upgrading and expansion of 
scale of production in the industry.
In the passenger car segment, there are more than 30 international quality models 
in the market, some of which are now being exported to MNCs’ home markets. 
Leading Indian manufacturers are in the process of transforming from local players 
to global companies. India’s domestic carmakers, viz., Tata Motors, M&M, and 
Ashok Leyland, have developed manufacturing facilities, significant R&D, 
Table 4 Segment-wise estimates of CAGR
Production
Category 1995–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018 2001–2018
Passenger vehicles 6.82 15.01 3.53 11.10
Commercial vehicles −6.91 14.91 −0.54 10.55
Three-wheelers 1.62 12.60 2.17 9.67
Two-wheelers 7.18 10.53 5.97 10.45
Grand total 6.19 11.41 5.21 10.51
Domestic sales
Category 1995–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018 2001–2018
Passenger vehicles 9.80 12.52 3.31 9.76
Commercial vehicles −6.96 15.41 0.81 10.94
Three-wheelers 2.28 9.15 3.10 7.03
Two-wheelers 7.10 9.24 5.99 9.63
Grand total 6.57 9.91 5.32 9.60
Exports
Category 1995–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018 2001–2018
Passenger vehicles 27.50 5.65 17.23
Commercial vehicles 15.96 0.70 13.14
Three-wheelers 30.79 0.74 20.74
Two-wheelers 30.45 5.19 21.40
Grand total 29.06 4.66 20.02
Exports as percentage of production
Category 1995–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018 2001–2018
Passenger vehicles 10.87 2.04 5.52
Commercial vehicles 0.92 1.25 2.34
Three-wheelers 16.16 −1.40 10.10
Two-wheelers 18.03 −0.73 9.91
Grand total 15.85 −0.52 8.60
Source: Author’s calculations using SIAM Statistics
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technology development, and testing centers.34 In addition, Indian companies have 
bought capacity or made alliances with other manufacturers in East Asia, South 
America, Africa, and Europe.
Low cost of labor and economies of scale have made India an ideal export hub 
for small cars. The Indian auto industry is expected to be the world’s third largest 
automotive market by volume by 2026.35 Promotion of exports has been part of 
companies’ business strategies for better utilization of installed capacities.36 Low 
cost of manufacturing and economies of scale achieved as a result of catering to 
overseas markets have allowed vehicle makers to become competitive and offset 
weak demand in the domestic market. Companies which have had partnerships with 
foreign players or received FDI have benefited in terms of engagement in GVCs.
4  Role of the Government
The automobile industry has in many ways been shaped by the Indian Government’s 
policy and nurtured in microeconomic environment it helped to create. Apart from 
the direct impact through fiscal policy instruments, the industry policy even influ-
enced firm-level learning processes and shaped technological capability 
accumulation.37
Since 1970, the Indian Government gradually added the automotive industry to 
a list of its core or “pillar” industries, recognizing it as a significant driver to achieve 
economic growth since it had many forward and backward linkages.38 The industry 
began to be prioritized in the manufacturing sector for promotion and favorable 
policy support to promote productivity. In 1975, as a general industrial policy, the 
government permitted an automatic capacity expansion by 25% every 5 years and 
removed price controls.39
The share of commercial vehicles and passenger car segment also changed in 
response to policy changes. Indian policy had favored the development of the com-
mercial vehicles industry, i.e., light and heavy vehicles (for public transport of 
34 The largest carmaker is Maruti Suzuki India Limited with a market share close to 50%, followed 
by Hyundai Motor India Limited, with a share of around 17%, M&M (around 7%), Renault India 
Private. Limited and Toyota Kirloskar Motor Private Limited (approximately 5% each).
35 For details, see https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/automobile
36 For details, see Ray, Saon, and Smita Miglani (2018), “Upgrading in the Indian automobile sec-
tor: the role of lead firms,” ICRIER Working Paper 360, June. Innomantra (2011), “Patent portfolio 
of major indian automobile companies  - An Indicative Measure of Innovation,” Innomantra 
Consulting P. Limited.
37 Kale, Dinar (2017). “Sources of innovation and technology capability development in the Indian 
automobile industry.” Institutions and Economies, 121–150.
38 The reason for this is that an automobile is composed of more than 10,000 parts and components; 
and the industry has strong backward and forward linkages with many other industries such as 
metallurgy, petroleum, chemistry, coal, light industry, electronics, and textiles.
39 D’Costa, Anthony P. (1995), “The restructuring of the Indian automobile industry: Indian state 
and Japanese capital,” World Development, 23(3), 485–502.
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goods and passengers), as opposed to the development of passenger vehicles. Cars 
in particular were considered as luxury goods.40 By the early 1980s, the government 
had realized the need to develop the passenger vehicle segment and took decisions 
like permitting increased foreign capital and overseas collaborations and reduced 
production licenses on manufacturing operations. In 1981, the policy of “broad- 
banded” licenses was announced  – permitting vehicle manufacturers to produce 
different kinds of vehicles instead of just one kind decreed earlier. Firms were 
allowed greater flexibility in operations through policies such as minimum eco-
nomic scale requirements, exemption from detailed Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices (MRTP) Act41 notification procedures. The components sector was 
also de-licensed substantially.42
In the 1980s, government-funded training programs and cluster building also led 
to changes in supplier relations, enabling vendor development and effective supply 
chain management. More liberal import policies were introduced in 1986 when 
importers of capital equipment were allotted about 50% increase in their foreign 
exchange quota.
In July 1991, the New Industrial Policy was introduced which removed most of 
the constraints relating to investment, expansion, and foreign investment in the 
Indian industry. The system of industrial licensing was abolished for all (except 18) 
industries, and the passenger car industry was de-licensed in May 1993. Foreign 
investment was allowed on an automatic basis in 34 industries, including the auto-
motive industry. Liberal policies of the 1990s led to the entry of new competitors 
and spillover benefits, especially on the technology side, and to increased expendi-
ture on R&D and a desire to innovate to distinguish products in the market. The time 
span between productions of new products shortened rapidly. The policies remained 
tilted in favor of the domestic industry as MNCs were still required to make speci-
fied capital investments and meet export obligations. In 2001, the government 
removed auto import quotas and permitted 100% FDI in the sector. Excise duties 
were reduced to 24% on passenger cars.
High tariffs forced the OEMs to set up parts-manufacturing plants in India. 
Institutional support for developing supplier capabilities led to the establishment of 
flexible supplier relationships which further helped the industry in building 
40 D’Costa, Anthony P. (1995), “The restructuring of the Indian automobile industry: Indian state 
and Japanese capital,” World Development, 23(3), 485–502; Narayana, D. (1989), “The Motor 
Vehicle Industry in India (Growth within a regulatory policy environment),” New Delhi and 
Trivandrum: Oxford& IBH Publishing Co. Private Limited; Singh, Jatinder (2014). India’s auto-
mobile industry: Growth and export potential. Journal of Applied Economics & Business Research, 
4(4), 246–262; Kathuria, Sanjay (1996), “Competing through technology and manufacturing: A 
study of the Indian commercial vehicles industry.” Delhi: Oxford University Press
41 The MRTP Act was passed by the Parliament of India on 18 December 1969 and came into force 
from June 1, 1970. It aimed to prevent concentration of economic power to the common detriment; 
provide for control of monopolies and probation of monopolistic, restrictive, and unfair trade prac-
tices; and protect consumer interest. It was later revoked and replaced by Competition Act, 2002.
42 Kathuria, Sanjay (1996), “Competing through technology and manufacturing: A study of the 
Indian commercial vehicles industry.” Delhi: Oxford University Press.
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innovation capabilities as well.43 An initiative specifically targeted in this direction 
was the setting up of the National Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure 
Project (NATRIP) under the Automotive Mission Plan 2006–2016 (AMP 2016),44 
costing US$ 388.5  million to enable the industry achieve parity with global 
standards.
The Indian car industrial policy also protected the domestic market by setting up 
challenges for firms such as requirements for higher local content. This policy 
helped the development of basic capabilities in manufacturing and laid foundations 
of the auto component supplier industry.45 The protection policies of the 1980s and 
1990s encouraged acquisition of basic production capabilities.46 Local content 
requirements or indigenization47 of up to 70% forced OEMs and their suppliers to 
make significant capital investments and created a chain of world-class component 
suppliers.48,49 The process of indigenization has also been recognized as a key regu-
lation responsible for enhancing technological capabilities.50 This entailed collab-
orative effort between local suppliers and engineers from parent company and led 
Indian firms toward development of technological capabilities.
Key interventions undertaken by the government under this plan have been in 
areas of tariff policy, infrastructure (improved and expanded road network, develop-
ment of auto wagon rakes, creation of few specialized ports in the private sector), 
R&D (setting up of NATRIP, upgradation of existing centers), and promotion of 
electric and hybrid vehicles. Currently, the automobile manufacturing policy in 
43 Saripalle, Madhuri (2012), “Learning and Capability Acquisition: A Case Study of the Indian 
Automobile Industry,” Working Papers 2012–065, Madras School of Economics, Chennai, India.
44 The AMP 2016 was announced in 2007, as a vision document of the government and the industry 
for targets under all areas in the next 10 years. Available at https://dhi.nic.in/writereaddata/Content/
Automotive%20Mission%20Plan%20(2006-2016).pdf
45 Kale, Dinar (2012). “Sources of innovation and technology capability development in the Indian 
automobile industry.” Institutions and Economies, 121–150.
46 Saripalle, Madhuri (2012), “Learning and Capability Acquisition: A Case Study of the Indian 
Automobile Industry,” Working Papers 2012–065, Madras School of Economics, Chennai, India.
47 Indigenization required modifying design to local needs, sourcing components from local sup-
pliers, and validating all components and subsystems for Indian standards.
48 Maruti 800 model, the maiden output of MUL in 1984, had 97% import content initially, and 
only tires and batteries were sourced locally. The government set a target of 93% indigenization 
within 5  years, and the company started to develop local vendors from scratch. The company 
attracted entrepreneurs by offering them land at its complexes and supplied electricity from its own 
power station. In addition, Suzuki engineers helped the new manufacturers with automation and 
management practices such as just-in-time manufacturing. For details, see Amann, Edmund and 
John Cantwell. (eds.) (2012), “Innovative firms in emerging market countries.” Oxford University 
Press; and Kale, Dinar (2017), “Sources of innovation and technology capability development in 
the Indian automobile industry.” Institutions and Economies, 121–150.
49 By 1990, MUL had achieved around 95% local content. Tata Motors’ best-selling compact car 
Indica launched in 1998 also had about 95% local content. Local engineering design capabilities 
allowed Tata Motors and M&M to develop entirely new vehicle platforms locally.
50 Sagar, Ambuj D. and Pankaj Chandra (2004), “Technological Change in the Indian Passenger 
Car Industry,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2004–2005, Energy Technology Innovation Project, 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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India is being governed by the Automotive Mission Plan 2016–2026 (AMP 2026),51 
which lays down the achievements and targets of the industry by 2026.
5  Other Enabling Factors in the Growth of the Industry
Other enabling factors in the growth of the industry include domestic market 
demand, FDI, JVs, and corporations’ competitive strategies.
5.1  Role of Domestic Demand
A growing working population and an expanding middle-class have been the key 
demand drivers for automobiles in India. India has the second largest road network 
in the world at 4.7  million kilometers. Road development activity has gradually 
increased over the years with an improvement in connectivity between cities, towns, 
and villages in the country. The Government of India’s policy to set aside substan-
tial investment layout for infrastructure development in every 5-year plan has 
included the focus on the development of country’s roads. This has given a fillip to 
the demand for cars and other vehicles.
India is home to the second largest population in the world. The estimated popu-
lation is about 1.3 billion people. The GDP per capita has grown from approxi-
mately US$ 1432 in 2010 to US$ 1500 in 2012 and US$ 1939 in 2017.52 Factors like 
increasing disposable incomes in the rural agriculture sector, presence of a large 
pool of skilled and semiskilled workers, and a strong educational system will con-
tinue to increase vehicle demand in future.53 It is estimated that by 2020, migration 
on account of urbanization will be over 140 million.54 India is projected to add over 
68 million households to its already significant middle-class by 2030, which would 
drive an increased demand for automobiles. The number of registered motor vehi-
cles per 1000 population was only 167 in 2015.55 These facts point to a huge poten-
tial of increasing private vehicle ownership penetration in the future.
51 Automotive Mission Plan 2016–26, http://www.siamindia.com/uploads/filemanager/47AUTOM
OTIVEMISSIONPLAN.pdf
52 The World Bank Database. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
53 Make in India website, Government of India, http://www.makeinindia.com/sector/automobiles
54 Government of Andhra Pradesh, Automobile & Auto Components Policy 2015–2020, https://
www.apindustries.gov.in/APIndus/Data/Industry1/Andhra%20Pradesh%20Automobile%20
and%20Auto%20Components%20Policy%202015-20.pdf
55 Open Government Data Platform, https://community.data.gov.in/registered-motor-vehicles- 
per-1000-population-from-2001-to-2015/
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5.2  Impact of FDI
The impact of FDI can be seen in terms of output and productivity, technology, and 
better practices, all of which could make the industry more competitive.56 These 
aspects are discussed in detail below.
5.2.1  Output and Productivity
FDI has positive impact of output and productivity growth. In the period 1947–
1983, the output growth remained limited. The models of cars sold were unchanged 
for decades, and foreign models assembled in the country were primarily European. 
The number of models manufactured in the passenger car segment was 2 in 1982–
1983, which rose to 8 in 1994–1995 and 28 in 2001–2002.
The most prominent spillover impact of FDI was on the component industry, 
whose turnover more than tripled from 1992–1993 to 2001–2002. Supplier produc-
tivity increased as foreign firms co-located suppliers (i.e., put them in a common 
area) and required home-country suppliers to invest in India. Competition was also 
provided by international MNCs which entered the sector to serve international 
assemblers, resulting in increased quality and reliability. This led to the establish-
ment of a reliable component supplier industry, which encouraged more MNCs to 
enter the Indian market after the 1990s.
5.2.2  Technology
A significant infusion of global technology occurred with the entry of foreign firms. 
The first 192 cars to roll out of the Maruti Suzuki factory in December 1983 were 
almost entirely Japanese cars, with only tires and batteries sourced from MRF and 
Chloride India, respectively. Localization ambitions of Indian firms were facilitated 
through 40 JVs between Indian vendors and Japanese collaborators by the end of 
the century.57
56 The socioeconomic impact of FDI on a given host economy is examined through wealth creation, 
economic development, economic growth, improvement in standard of living, improvement in 
productivity, and supply chain connectivity. The literature indicates that while there are many 
benefits of FDI, certain preconditions seem necessary in host countries to enable them to reap the 
benefits. These preconditions range from infrastructure, to environment, which includes the nature 
of human capital, domestic fixed capital formation, government spending, trade orientation of the 
region, and the legal environment. In the case of innovation, public infrastructure such as educa-
tional institutions and publicly funded R&D also add to the absorptive capacity.
57 Tiwari, Rajnish and Cornelius Herstatt (2014), ‘Aiming Big with Small Cars: Emergence of a 
Lead Market in India.’ (Switzerland, Springer International Publishing); and Bhargava, R.C. and 
Seetha, (2010), ‘The Maruti Story’, New Delhi: Collins Business. There are two competing argu-
ments on the effect of FDI on innovation in an economy. One line of reasoning suggests that 
inward FDI leads to beneficial outcomes for local firms through knowledge spillovers and increased 
incentives to compete with the better-endowed foreign entrants. The other line of reasoning casts 
doubt on the ability of FDI to increase the level of innovation among local firms, suggesting that 
the increased competition that arises from the entry of new foreign firms relegates the domestic 
firms to less innovative market niches. Studies list four channels that allow for technological spill-
overs from FDI to the host country. These are: (1) Transmission of technology through imitation, 
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There were 50 greenfield investment projects58 in the sector between 2000 and 
2007.59 In some clusters such as Pune and Chennai, global OEMs played important 
or even dominant roles in technology diffusion and were responsible for develop-
ment of domestic innovation capability.60
5.3  Role of JVs
As mentioned before, JVs and technical collaboration played a vital role as a source 
of innovation for local auto component supplier firms in India. Some important 
partnerships in the Indian automobile industry are listed under Table 2.
Acquiring knowledge and skills through external collaboration is an efficient 
way to achieve innovation within automotive clusters. Collaborations result in 
frequent interactions, reflected in acquisition of knowledge, sharing, diffusing, 
and creation of it. Linkages among settings such as clusters result in learning 
through networking and interacting and are seen as important for innovative 
activities.61
There are a number of examples in India which have shown that the JV collabo-
ration has been an efficient way of achieving greater growth in the industry through 
benefits such as technology sharing, learning best practices, and training of workers. 
For instance, MUL’s first established plant was a close copy of Suzuki’s Kosai plant 
in Japan in terms of plant layout, equipment, the organization of production, and 
subject to the legal system, regulations, infrastructure and human capital endowments; (2) Positive 
spillovers generated through training of local workers by foreign-owned companies; (3) Increased 
competition due to the presence of foreign firms, subject to the size of the technology gap between 
the foreign owned and domestic company, as well as the ease of entry into, and exit from the mar-
ket; and (4) Vertical or backward spillovers resulting from increased demand for intermediate 
goods manufactured by foreign owned companies by domestic companies in the host nation. For 
details, see Saggi, Kamal (2002), ‘Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology 
Transfer: A Survey’, World Bank Research Observer, 17, 191–235.
58 These refer to a completely new investment projects, not building on anything already in 
existence.
59 The reallocation of resources that accompanies the entry of foreign firms may not be immediate. 
Resources released in this process may be put to better use by foreign firms with superior technolo-
gies, efficient new entrants (both domestic and foreign), or by other sectors. Studies indicate that 
positive spillovers in the host country will occur if there is an environment conducive to inflows of 
FDI. The conditions range from human capital, private and public infrastructure, legal protection, 
educational institutions, and publicly funded R&D.  The host country factors that are likely to 
attract export-oriented FDI involve the possibilities of fragmenting production geographically. 
Location factors that influence this type of FDI are labor costs, infrastructure, trade barriers, 
exchange restriction, and policies favorable to FDI. For details, see Ray Saon, Smita Miglani, and 
Neha Malik (2014), “Impact of American FDI in India.” Academic Foundation, New Delhi.
60 More, Rahul Z. and Karuna Jain (2013), “Innovation and competitiveness among the firms in the 
automobile cluster in Pune.” Knowledge Forum: Annual International Conference Paper. Pune.
61 Breschi, Stefano and Franco Malerba (2001), “Geography of innovation and economic cluster-
ing.” Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4), 817–33.
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operating principle.62 Also, it was the first firm to introduce a partial “just-in-time” 
and total quality management in India, which aimed to reduce inventory cost. MUL 
followed a strategy of massive investment in the program of vendor development, 
involving stable and close supplier relations with its first-tier suppliers (40 top sup-
pliers), equity participation in key suppliers, and promotion of technical collabora-
tion between its suppliers with Suzuki’s suppliers in Japan.
Other lead firms63 of Indian origin including the TVS Group, the Rane Group, and 
Ashok Leyland Limited have played critical role in the development of the Chennai 
automobile cluster. Ashok Leyland Limited, one of the largest manufacturer of com-
mercial vehicles, trucks, and buses in India and the world, entered into an agreement 
with Leyland Motors, UK, to manufacture Leyland vehicles way back in 1950. 
Brakes India Private Limited was founded in 1962 as a JV between TVS and Lucas 
Industries Limited of the UK (100% subsidiary of ZF TRW) and is the largest manu-
facturer of braking components and systems in India with an annual turnover of more 
than US$ 600 million. It exports products to 35 countries and caters to over 60% of 
the domestic OEM market. The Rane Group which plays a dominant role in the com-
ponent segment has had critical partnerships with foreign firms like ZF TRW (USA) 
and NSK and Nisshinbo (Japan) for a long time. Other group firms, such as Brakes 
India, Sundaram-Clayton Ltd., Sundram Fasteners Ltd., and Turbo Energy Ltd., were 
established in the 1960s, as JVs with British firms. M&M and Bajaj Tempo also 
operated through JVs and developed quality products over the years.64
5.4  Firm Strategies, Ownership, and Managerial Vision
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, an important role was played by firm strate-
gies, ownership, and managerial vision of diversified and big business groups such as 
the Tata Group and M&M in building technological capabilities in the sector.65 For 
instance, the ambition and vision of Tata’s head Ratan Tata to develop the first “Indian 
car” and then “people’s car” were the driving forces behind the development of Tata 
Indica and Tata Nano. The company’s diaspora connections and family-owned diver-
sified businesses also facilitated inter-sector learning and played a significant role.
62 Okada, Aya and N.S. Siddharthan (2007), “Industrial clusters in India: Evidence from Automobile 
clusters in Chennai and the National capital Region,” Discussion Paper No. 103, Institute of 
Developing Economies, JETRO.
63 Large MNCs are usually referred by the name of “lead firms” or “governor firms” that largely 
determine production parameters and wield power over other firms in global production networks 
or chains. These firms decide the location of high value activities and conditions under which firms 
participate in these networks and thus largely also affect the upgrading outcomes of other smaller 
firms.
64 More, Rahul Z. and Karuna Jain (2013), “Innovation and competitiveness among the firms in the 
automobile cluster in Pune.” Knowledge Forum: Annual International Conference Paper. Pune.
65 Kale, Dinar (2011), “Co-evolution of policies and firm level technological capabilities in the 
Indian automobile industry,” Atlanta Conference on Science and Innovation Policy, September 
13–17. Atlanta, GA, USA.
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Firms like Tata Motors and M&M had global aspirations, and their business 
models were focused on domestic as well as markets in other countries with similar 
characteristics such as those in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. In 2004, Tata 
Motors bought the Daewoo’s truck-manufacturing unit in South Korea. In 2005, 
Tata acquired 21% share in Hispano Carrocera, SA, a Spanish bus-manufacturing 
firm. In 2005, M&M acquired Stokes Group, a leading auto component manufac-
turer in the UK. In 2008, M&M acquired Jaguar and Rover and established plants 
in Malaysia, Kenya, Bangladesh, Spain, Ukraine, and Russia to assemble knocked- 
down units exported to these countries. The same model extended to Australia, 
South Africa, Italy, and Uruguay. In 2006, M&M formed a JV with Marco Polo, a 
Brazilian firm to manufacture and assemble fully built buses and coaches. In 
November 2017, M&M opened its new manufacturing plant with an investment of 
US$ 230 million in Detroit, USA.
The profitability of group-affiliated firms exceeded that of other companies due 
to advantages such as greater access to funds, diversified and skilled labor, and other 
resources. These business groups or conglomerates were often able to fill the insti-
tutional gaps typically found in developing countries by building institutions for the 
benefit of group members.66
6  Upgrading and Innovation
Indian lead firms have made significant efforts toward upgrading over the years, 
including the use of advanced modular platforms, new materials, and platform shar-
ing in India.67 The concept of upgrading refers to the capacity of firms to make bet-
ter products, more efficiently, and move into more skilled activities.68
The government has been encouraging R&D in this sector by offering tax cuts on 
such expenditure. The NATRIP project, initiated in 2005, was set up to enable the 
industry to adopt and implement global performance standards and provide low- 
cost manufacturing and product development solutions.
Among Indian companies, M&M and Ashok Leyland have made significant invest-
ment in R&D centers and technology development and testing centers and have ven-
tured abroad. Global firms have been putting up development centers in India, either on 
their own or in partnership with local players (for instance, GM, DaimlerChrysler AG, 
66 Khanna, Tarun and Krishna Palepu (2000), “Is group membership profitable in emerging mar-
kets? An analysis of diversified Indian Business groups,” Journal of Finance, 55, 867–891 and 
Kale, D. (2011), “Co-evolution of policies and firm level technological capabilities in the Indian 
automobile industry,” Atlanta Conference on Science and Innovation Policy, September 13–17. 
Atlanta, GA, USA.
67 For a detailed reference, see Ray, Saon, and Smita Miglani (2018), “Upgrading in the Indian 
automobile sector: the role of lead firms,” ICRIER Working Paper 360, June.
68 For details, see Kaplinsky, Raphael (2000), Spreading the Gains from Globalisation: What Can 
Be Learned from Value Chain Analysis? Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University, 
Brighton, and Giuliani, Elisa, Carlo Pietrobelli, and Roberta Rabellotti (2005), Upgrading in 
global value chains: lessons from Latin American clusters. World Development, 33(4), 549–573.
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Johnson Controls International Plc, Delphi and Bosch). These have helped their part-
ners acquire the global best technologies and standards in short period of time. Several 
global OEMs such as Ford, GM, Hyundai, Toyota, and Volvo India Pvt. Limited 
(Volvo) have established technology centers in India for doing R&D in automobile 
design.69 FDI in R&D and design in India has followed FDI in manufacturing. 
Collaborative R&D activities have opened avenues for material substitution, better 
vehicular design that are resource and energy efficient.70
With upgraded R&D, the innovative capacity goes up naturally. One outcome or 
measure of this is their intellectual property (IP) rights. Most leading automobile 
companies are actively engaged in filing for their IP in the country. The recent pat-
ent deployment strategies of established players demonstrate considerable improve-
ment in areas such as propulsion technology, telematics, vehicle safety, and 
security.
Statistical data published by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) and the Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks 
under the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry provide estimates related to 
patent applications filed by the automobile industry in India. Table 5 shows the 
number of patents granted to some leading Indian manufacturers in India between 
the period January 1, 1990 and July 31, 2018. It can be seen that the number of 
patent grants has increased in the last 10 years. Among Indian companies, TVS 
69 TIFAC (2006), FDI in the R&D Sector: Study for the pattern in 1998–2003, Report prepared by 
Academy of Business Studies, New Delhi. Tiwari Rajnish and Cornelius Herstatt (2014), Aiming 
Big with Small Cars: Emergence of a Lead Market in India. (Switzerland, Springer International 
Publishing)
70 For details, see ARAI (2013), Light Weighting in Automotive Industry  – Automotive 
Manufacturing Solutions India Conference. Shrikant R Marathe. Available at, https://automotive-
manufacturingsolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/AMSI_2013_Shrikant_Marathe.pdf
Table 5 Number of patents granted to some leading Indian manufacturers in India (January 1, 
1990–July 31, 2018)
S. no Name of company 1990–2000 2001–2010 2011–2018
1. Tata Motors – 10 57
2. M&M Limited – 16 29
3 TVS Motor Company Limiteda 87 161
4. Maruti Suzuki Limited – – 10
5. Bajaj Auto Limited – 13 14
6. Ashok Leyland – 4 11
7. Sona Koyo Steering Systems Limited – 4 2
Source: Author’s compilation using Indian Patent Advanced Search System Statistics, Office of 
Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks under the Indian Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, at https://ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch
Note: aFiled individually or in collaboration with WABCO Holdings. Additionally, 12 patents were 
granted to Sundaram-Clayton Limited, between 2001 and 2010, a TVS Group company
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Group, Tata Motors, and M&M have been among the top Indian applicants for 
patents.71
The majority of Indian patent applications filed by automobile companies fall 
under the categories of mechanical engineering, in areas like arrangement or mount-
ing of propulsion units, transmissions systems, instrumentation for vehicles, con-
joint control of drive units, arrangements in connection with cooling, air intake, gas 
exhaust, or fuel supply of propulsion units in vehicles.
However, suppliers or vendors are often small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
which do not have many opportunities or resources to upgrade. The major chal-
lenges faced by the indigenous component manufacturers are high cost of capital, 
nonavailability of skilled labor, and rising price of operational cost. Stiff competi-
tion from China and other Asian countries on the price front is also emerging. Under 
these pressures, converging toward international safety standards would encourage 
firms to adopt (and contribute to) international good practices. Adoption of automa-
tion and robotics in recent times has helped the industry to significantly improve 
quality, productivity, and delivery outcomes and reduce costs.72 To meet the needs 
of the future (including electrification of vehicles) and stay competitive, SME man-
ufacturers also need to rise up to the challenges of constant upgradation, digitiza-
tion, and automation. However, in the process, they may require support from lead 
firms and the government.
7  The Future Scenario
The current policy debate in India is around the issue of achieving greater competi-
tiveness, efficiency standards, and the need for introducing electric vehicles. The 
Draft National Automotive Policy 2018 formulated by the Department of Heavy 
Industries (Government of India) envisages increasing exports to 35–40% of the 
output and to make India one of the major automotive export hubs in the world. It 
also envisages long-term roadmap for emission standards beyond Bharat Stage VI 
and harmonization with the global standards by 2028.73
71 Also, see IPI (2017), Annual Report 2016–2017, Intellectual Property India, The Office of the 
Controller General of Patents, Designs, Trademarks, and Geographical Indications, available at 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAnnualReport/1_94_1_1_79_1_Annual_
Report-2016-17_English.pdf; “TVS, Tata Motors, Bosch, M&M top ‘innovators list’ in Motown,” 
Nandini Sen Gupta, April 17, 2017, The Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/busi-
ness/india-business/tvs-tata-motors-bosch-mm-top-innovators-list-in-motown/article-
show/58073182.cms
72 Ray, Saon, and Smita Miglani (2018), “Upgrading in the Indian automobile sector: the role of 
lead firms,” ICRIER Working Paper 360, June.
73 Bharat Stage emissions standards are emission standards instituted by the Government of India 
that regulate the output of certain major air pollutants by vehicles. They are comparable to the 
European emission standards and are upgraded from time to time. The India Ministry of Road 
Transport and Highways has mandated mass emission standard for BS-VI throughout the country 
with effect from April 1, 2020. See Press Information Bureau, Government of India. Available at 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=159611
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With a view to promoting electric mobility in the country, the Indian Government 
approved the National Mission on Electric Mobility (NMEM) in 2011, and subse-
quently a National Electric Mobility Mission Plan 2020 was unveiled in 2013. This 
Mission Plan was designed considering the fuel security and environmental pollu-
tion in the country. It aims for a cumulative fuel saving of about 9500 million liters 
equivalent resulting in reduction of pollution and greenhouse gas emission of 2 mil-
lion tonnes with targeted market penetration of 6–7 million vehicles by 2020. As 
part of this mission, the Department of Heavy Industries launched a scheme called 
Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid &) Electric Vehicles in India 
(FAME-India) in April 2015. The scheme is proposed to be implemented over a 
period of 6 years, i.e., 2020, wherein it is intended to support the hybrid electric 
vehicles market development and the manufacturing ecosystem to achieve self- 
sustenance. The scheme has four focus areas – technology development, demand 
creation, pilot projects, and charging infrastructure. Under this scheme, 148,275 
electric/hybrid vehicles have been given direct support by way of demand incentives 
amounting to approximately US$ 28 million since its launch on April 1, 2015 and 
till June 30, 2017.74
Another major initiative in this area has been the launch of the New Green Urban 
Transport Scheme in 2017. The objective of this scheme is to promote low-carbon 
sustainable public transport system in urban areas. The scheme is to be executed 
with the help of private sector including assistance from the central and state gov-
ernments under a 7-year mission with a total cost of US$ 10.76 billion. It pushes for 
promotion of non-motorized transport, public bike sharing, bus rapid transit sys-
tems, intelligent transport systems, and urban freight management.
With the plans of introducing electric vehicles, car manufacturers in India are 
gearing up to new production processes and machines. In 2017, the NITI Aayog75 
suggested that 40% of private vehicles in the country could go electric by 2030.76 
Currently, M&M is the only manufacturer of an electric car  – the e20, a micro 
vehicle at present. Mahindra Electric, a fully owned subsidiary of M&M, has 
announced its EV 2.0 platform roadmap for electric vehicles.
Maruti Suzuki has revealed plans to manufacture electric vehicles at a factory in 
Gujarat in 2017. Other companies like Volvo are also planning to expand their plug-
in hybrid and electric vehicle portfolio in India. The major reason for the push 
toward electric mobility has been to steer India away from its overdependence on 
imported oil. However, about 50% of electric cars currently built by domestic com-
panies are imported. This includes the batteries, the main part of the vehicle. Global 
74 PIB (2017), “Initiatives for production of electric Vehicles,” August 2, Press Information Bureau, 
Government of India, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, http://pib.nic.in/news-
ite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=169437
75 NITI Aayog, the acronym for National Institution for Transforming India, is a Government of 
India policy think tank, established to replace the Planning Commission.





companies like Suzuki and Toshiba have announced plans to set up battery plants in 
India. However, challenges like capital investment and large-scale infrastructure 
development remain to be addressed.77
8  Conclusion
With its buoyant economy, a large young population, and growing foreign direct 
investment, India has been an attractive investment destination for global automo-
bile and component manufacturers since the last two decades. Its growth story has 
been dominated by more homegrown lead firms. However, absorption of global best 
practices has been slower than in China. Strategies of firms in the Chinese auto 
industry provided a boost to technological learning more quickly and broadly than 
in India.78 Capable of end-to-end production, India has also become an assembly 
hub for large cars and manufacturing hub for small cars. Firms have started export-
ing to other countries. India-based manufacturers are engaged in global innovation 
networks and sourcing suitable technologies from all over the world to complement 
their own R&D efforts.
The AMP 2026 envisions that by the year 2026, the Indian automotive industry 
will be among the top three of the world in engineering, manufacture, and export of 
vehicles and auto components, growing in value to over 12% of India’s GDP and 
generating an additional 65 million jobs.
According to OICA statistics, the Indian industry accounted for just 5.38% of 
production in the cars segment and 3.48% of production in the commercial vehicle 
segment in 2017. It has also not created lead firms or MNCs of the scale that other 
more successful players like Japan, South Korea, and other western countries have 
created. In spite of the success of government policy in building auto supplier indus-
try, India continues to be a net importer of auto components with its trade deficit for 
auto components increasing from US$ 210 million in 2004–2005 to US$ 4.4 billion 
in 2009–2010 and US$ 13.8 billion in 2015–2016.
The current policy debate is around the issue of how greater resource efficiency 
can be achieved and the need for newer materials in light of the industry’s plans to 
produce electric vehicles in India. Innovation in new product development is lag-
ging behind and remains critical for the future of India to achieve competitive supe-
riority or at least maintain its low-cost advantage. Manufacturing technologies need 
to be upgraded continuously. Large investments for developing new indigenous 
technologies that are green and compliant with recognized high efficiency standards 
would help India move up the value chain.
77 For details, see NITI Aayog (2017), “India Leaps Ahead: Transformative mobility solutions for 
all.” May; and EY (2017), “Standing up India’s EV ecosystem – who will drive the charge?” Ernst 
and Young. Kolkata, India.
78 Sutton, John (2004), “The Auto-component Supply Chain in China and India - A Benchmarking 
Study.” London School of Economics, STICERD Research paper no. EI 34.
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With the growing Internet technology, mobile payment, logistics infrastructure, 
and huge demographic dividends, China’s sharing economy has been leaping 
forward in recent years, reshaping China’s economic pattern and becoming one 
of the priorities in China’s economic development in the future. However, with 
the expansion of the sharing economy and the continuous emergence of various 
business models, a series of legal risks and challenges are restricting the 
development of China’s sharing economy. This chapter starts with an analysis of 
the concepts, features, operating principles, and conditions of the sharing 
economy. In the second part, we introduce the development process of the 
internet economy, and the germination and status of the sharing economy in 
China. We then identify the main challenges that the sharing economy in China 
is now facing, and propose solutions before we end with a conclusion.
Keywords
Sharing economy · Intellectual property · Platform regulation · Platform liability 
· Platform monopoly
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1  Introduction
The sharing economy is mainly reflected in the new economic modes that utilize 
information network technology to optimize the allocation and utilization of idle 
social resources. The rapid development of the sharing economy globally has pro-
foundly changed the way of production and life, the consumption concept, and 
employment modes. Governmental support for the development of the sharing 
economy is commonplace. For example, a number of state governments in the 
United States have amended relevant laws and regulations to clarify the legality in 
the short-term lodging and for-hire transport sectors; the European Commission 
has published the European Agenda for the sharing economy1 to eliminate unnec-
essary barriers and promote long-term development of the sharing economy in the 
EU; the UK has announced its plan to build a global center for the sharing econ-
omy and to provide policy support.2 With the growing Internet technology, mobile 
payment, logistics infrastructure, and huge demographic dividends, China’s shar-
ing economy has been leaping forward in recent years, reshaping China’s eco-
nomic patterns.
In 2018, the Central Government Annual Work Report emphasizes the impor-
tance of “developing the platform economy and sharing economy, forming an 
innovation and entrepreneurship pattern, which combines the online and offline 
worlds, synergizes the industry with academic, research and application, and inte-
grates small, medium and big enterprises.”3 To develop the sharing economy has 
become one of the priorities in China’s economic development. This chapter first 
explores the concepts, features, operating principles, and conditions for the sharing 
economy. It then introduces the status and developmental process of the sharing 
economy in China. The third section focuses on the following prominent problems 
of the sharing economy in China and proposes suggestions to tackle them: repeated 
investment and vicious competition, conflicts between the sharing economy and 
old regulatory patterns and its coordination, transaction costs related to the super-
vision of opportunistic behavior, the problems of platforms, rights protection of 
laborers, protection of users’ information, and tax issues. The last section is the 
conclusion.
1 European Commission, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16881/attachments/2/translations, p3.
2 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and The Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Move to make 
UK global center for sharing economy, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
move-to-make-uk-global-centre-for-sharing-economy
3 Premier Li Keqiang, 2018 Report on the Work of the Central Government (in Chinese) March 5, 
2018 at the first session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress, available at http://www.gov.
cn/premier/2018-03/22/content_5276608.htm
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2  The Sharing Economy
2.1  The Concept and Characteristics
There is a wide-ranging debate over the exact meaning of the term “sharing econ-
omy.” Some commentators argue that the word “sharing” is a misnomer employed 
to mask the essentially commercial nature of the activity on these platforms.4 They 
feel the term misleadingly “frames technology-enabled transactions as if they were 
altruistic or community endeavors.”5 Others consider the term “sharing economy” 
vague, with a range of meanings.6 There are various other phrases used to refer to 
these platform-enabled activities, including “collaborative consumption,” “collab-
orative economy,” “gig economy,” “on-demand economy,” and the “peer-to-peer 
economy.”7
As defined by EC,8 this chapter uses the term “sharing economy” to refer to all 
business models facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open market-
place for the temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private indi-
viduals. The sharing economy involves three categories of actors: (i) service providers 
who share assets, resources, time, and skills — these can be private individuals offer-
ing services on an occasional basis (“peers”) or professional service providers; (ii) 
users of these services; (iii) platforms that connect providers with users and facilitate 
transactions between them, and ensure the quality of these transactions, e.g., through 
after-sale services (handling complaints), insurance services, etc. Platforms can also 
provide services and goods themselves to serve customers, e.g., the OFO and Mobike, 
the two dominant bicycle-sharing platforms in China.
Sharing transactions often do not involve a change of ownership and can be 
undertaken in a profitable or nonprofitable way. The essence of the phenomenon is 
twofold: Firstly, the internet platform reforms the mode of production, i.e., the 
resources and production factors (information, laborers, financial means, and 
materials) that used to belong to traditional organizations are traded directly and 
matched accurately in accordance with information in a larger range, thereby 
producing index-level incremental value and increasing productivity. Secondly, as a 
result of increasing efficiency and transparency, suppliers are enabled to rent or 
4 See Abbey Stemler, The Myth of Sharing Economy and Its Application for Regulating Innovation, 
67 Emory Law Journal. 199 (2017); Sarah O’Connor, The Gig Economy is Neither ‘Sharing’ nor 
‘Collaborative’, FIN. TIMES (June 14, 2016).
5 Natasha Singer, Twisting Words to Make ‘Sharing’ Apps Seem Selfless, N.Y. TIMES (August 8, 
2015).
6 See Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks A Shared Definition, available at http://www.
collaborativeconsumption.com/2013/11/22/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition/
7 See Gideon Lichfield, All the Names for the New Digital Economy, and Why None of Them Fits, 
available at http://qz.com/548137/all-the-names-for-the-new-digital-economy-and-why-none-of-
them-fits/; also see EC, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2001_en.htm, p3.
8 EC, A European agenda for the collaborative economy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
DocsRoom/documents/16881/attachments/2/translations, p3.
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employ their assets, such as cars or apartments, for use by others, thereby improving 
utilization of those assets. In this sense, the sharing economy transcends traditional 
production organizations and relies on the redistribution of existing resources.9
To sum up, the sharing economy has the following characteristics10:
It is a new economic form that emerged when the information revolution reached 
a certain stage. The rapid development of modern information technology and its 
innovative applications, such as the Internet (especially mobile Internet), broadband, 
cloud computing, big data, Internet of things, mobile payment, and location-based 
service (LBS), allow the sharing economy to become possible.
It is a way of optimal resource allocation by effectively linking supply and 
demand. The sharing economy can quickly integrate all kinds of scattered and idle 
resources, accurately locate diverse needs, achieve rapid matching between supply 
and demand, and greatly reduce transaction costs.
It embodies the collective reflection of the new concept of consumption and view 
of development, and adapts to the development of the information society. As 
opposed to the industrial society which emphasizes the maximization of production 
and income and advocates the possession of resources and wealth, the information 
society exemplified by the sharing economy emphasizes a people-oriented concep-
tion and sustainable development, and advocates the best experiences and use.
2.2  The Operating Principles
Alvin Roth proposed that a well-functioning market should meet three conditions: 
marketplaces have to provide “thickness,” i.e., they need to attract a large enough 
proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the 
“congestion” that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough 
alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it “safe” and 
sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of 
the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior.11 For the 
sharing economy, its development also requires guaranteeing the establishment of a 
market with sufficient supply and demand, an effective mechanism for search and 
matching, and a trust mechanism to ensure the security of the transaction.12
9 See Hu Ling: On Legal Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” (in Chinese), 4 Beijing Cultural 
Review 112–115 (2015).
10 Information Research Department of the National Information Center, Sharing Economy Work 
Committee of China Internet Association, China’s Report on Collaborative Economy Development 
2016 (in Chinese), pp. 6–7.
11 Alvin E. Roth, What Have We Learned from Market Design? 118 Economic Journal, 285–310 
(2008).
12 USFTC, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators, available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/collaborative-economy-issues-fac-
ing-platforms-participants-regulators, pp. 19–23.
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2.2.1  Creating Sufficient Supply and Demand
A successful platform for the sharing economy requires that both sides of the mar-
ket have sufficient market players. There are a large number of buyers and sellers on 
the platform, so each participant is able to correspond to a number of potential 
matches, thus increasing the chances of a successful match. In addition, increasing 
the number of buyers or sellers can prompt more counterparties to join the platform 
and participate in the transaction.
This leads to the common problem of a two-sided network effect (or indirect 
network effect) on the two sides of the platform market. According to a USFTC 
report,13 the platform not only needs a large number of buyers to attract the 
participation of sellers, but also requires a large number of sellers to attract buyers’ 
participation. In order to promote users’ participation at both ends of the platform, 
the platform must have information about the price paid by the participants on each 
side of the platform, and often needs to subsidize the users. Taking the car-hailing 
services for example, the platform company may reduce the fare sharply to attract 
passengers every time they enter a new city, and pay drivers the full fare and even a 
certain reward by relinquishing profit for the platform itself. When there are enough 
users on both sides of the platform, the platform company will return to the normal 
pricing behavior.
2.2.2  Creating an Effective Mechanism for Search and Matching
An active market enables the presence of enough potential customers on both sides 
of the sharing economy platform to ensure market liquidity. However, a large 
number of potential users alone cannot guarantee the success of the transaction, and 
the platforms must be able to search for potential counterparties, find matches, and 
complete the transaction. According to the above-mentioned USFTC report, the 
“friction” of search and matching will increase the transaction cost, and whether the 
transacting party is willing to bear the search cost depends on the value that the 
transaction will produce. Effective search and matching requires proper definition 
or standardization of products and services that are to be bought and sold on the 
platform. But consumers’ diverse demands for products and services make the 
platform face a certain degree of challenge when classifying products or services.14
The mechanism for platforms to define products, search, price, and match is 
dependent on the characteristics of the industry and the market, and the different 
needs of participants. For example, the platform for car-hailing services usually 
defines the service as “rapid transportation service from one location to another.” 
The platform for car-hailing services receives passengers’ requests, matches them 
with nearby drivers, and then establishes contacts between the two parties. 
Passengers have little chance to choose the drivers by themselves, and prices are 
usually determined according to the algorithm of the platform, which requires no 
further participation from either party. In contrast, the short-term apartment rental 
platform will show in detail the characteristics of accommodation services provided 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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by landlords. Customers can browse through lists, contact potential landlords, and 
negotiate further with regard to other transaction conditions. Compared to the low 
value and timeliness of the car-hailing services, and considering that the selection of 
a suitable residence can produce higher expected value, customers usually spend 
more time and participate more in searching and selecting a potential residence.
2.2.3  Creating the Trust Mechanism
If the platform does not establish mutual trust between the two parties, the partici-
pants will remain afraid that the other party may not perform properly. Such worries 
will undoubtedly discourage both parties from being involved in the transaction. 
Therefore, the platform must take measures to establish confidence of both parties. 
For example, the platform must check participants before allowing them to join, or 
set up a participant credit evaluation system based on previous transaction records, 
or provide security or insurance against bad results, or set up a prepayment mecha-
nism, etc. Unlike traditional business models, the credit evaluation system and other 
trust mechanisms (such as insurance, guarantee, and prior review of participants) of 
the sharing platforms can effectively reduce concerns caused by information asym-
metry on the two-sided market, thus reducing the demand for government 
regulation.15
3  The Development and Experiences of the Sharing 
Economy in China
In China, with the gradual popularization of smart mobile terminals, the Internet 
and mobile payment technology, and the social network ecology, the sharing 
economy is booming and has undergone a process from blind expansion to 
rationality. Many sharing websites have emerged rapidly. The sharing business 
models have penetrated various industries, from consumption to production, and 
account for a rapidly increasing share of the national economy.
3.1  Development of the Internet Economy and Third-Party 
Payment Platforms
In the late 1990s, with advancement in the construction of China’s telecommunica-
tion infrastructure, the Internet economy flourished. The early Internet economy 
originated from traditional cultural industries like news, books, music, and movies. 
It attracted a large number of users through free use in exchange for their attention 
and patronage, resulting in a business model of “free basic service plus fee-based 
value-added service/advertising.” After a decade or so of the Web 1.0 era, China’s 
internet development entered the Web 2.0 era. The service architecture of the 
Internet transitioned from a one-way communication portal to an interactive 
15 Ibid.
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communication service. Ordinary users could now become producers of information, 
and share their experiences and works with unspecified people. The formation of 
network effects has led to the rise of various platforms. Internet corporations have 
attracted users through partially free markets, and at the same time recovered costs 
and gained profit in the toll market, forming an ecosystem of various services. A 
large number of third-party service providers joined the platforms, shared the 
infrastructure, and conducted direct transactions with users.
In the early days of Web 2.0, the Internet provided fragmented information and 
services to consumers and was forced to abandon charges due to the lack of flexible 
and convenient payment methods, which also led to the limitation of knowledge 
sharing and expansion to other sharing areas. At that time, the construction of 
electronic banking by state-owned commercial banks had just commenced and was 
unable to accommodate many Internet companies. Big internet companies in China 
had to develop virtual currency by themselves that could be purchased by fiat 
currency to trade and exchange on platforms.16 It was only when Alibaba’s Alipay 
laid the foundation for online payment that the Chinese online payment system 
started to grow. The third-party payment platform not only solves the problem of 
payment inconvenience, but also that of trust among strangers in online transactions.17 
With a combination of other credit evaluation systems and real-name systems, third- 
party payment platforms provide a basic guarantee for online economic activities, 
which again gives rise to new practices surrounding sharing of physical assets.18
3.2  The Current Status of the Sharing Economy
In 2015, the size of the main sectors19 of China’s sharing market amounted to about 
RMB1,697.8  billion; in 2016, transactions amounted to RMB 3452  billion, an 
increase of 103% and accounting for GDP 4.6%. In 2016, over 600 million people 
participated in sharing economy activities in China. The number of participants in 
the service sector was approximately 60 million, with approximately 5.85 million 
16 One typical online payment tool at that time was the Q Coin, developed as a kind of virtual cur-
rency by Tencent. Q Coins can be purchased by telephone or credit card. Users can use the Q Coins 
to obtain related services or commodities on Tencent’s website, e.g., membership services, elec-
tronic game props, and virtual commodities. However, these virtual currencies can only be 
exchanged on limited websites or platforms
17 The basic model of Alipay is that the user pays first to the third-party payment platform, and the 
service provider delivers the goods. After the user confirms the receipt of goods, the third-party 
payment platform completes the payment to the service provider. The third-party payment plat-
form functions as a transaction guarantor.
18 See Hu Ling: On Legal Regulation of the“Sharing Economy” (in Chinese), 4 Beijing Cultural 
Review 112–115 (2015).
19 The main sectors include sharing of knowledge, apartments, transportation, daily services, health 
care, and finance.
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employees serving on the platforms. According to the State Information Center,20 
the sharing economy is expected to account for 10% of GDP by 2020, and 20% by 
2025.
At present, the sharing economy has expanded to and penetrated all spheres of 
social life, with the following major industries and business models: (i) Sharing of 
transportation. This model mainly includes sharing of cars (such as DiDi21), driving, 
bicycles, and parking spaces, etc. Such transportation sharing is the most popular 
and influential sharing economy model, and one of the most controversial areas in 
the world for the sharing economy. (ii) Sharing of apartments. There are three main 
modes: the C2C open platform (such as Mayi.com22), the B2C open platform, and 
the “property-sharing + swap-sharing” two-dimensional sharing model. (iii) Sharing 
of catering. There are three modes: private kitchen & distribution, home kitchen & 
eat-in, and recipes in community. (iv) Sharing of logistics (the realization of optimal 
allocation of the logistics system by sharing logistical resources, such as Joybuy 
Yuncang23). (v) Sharing of Finance. There are crowd-funding networks, P2P loans 
networks (such as Hongling Capital24), and so on; (vi) Sharing of knowledge (knowl-
edge and skills dispersed among individuals or institutions are shared between spe-
cific individuals or institutions), such as online Q&A (questions and answers), 
webcast, education, and services crowd-sourcing.25 (vii) Sharing of health care, 
including online medical consultation (such as Chunyu Doctor26), and sharing of 
medical facilities.
20 State Information Center, The sharing economy is expected to account for 10% of GDP in 2020, 
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-04-18/doc-ifyeimzx6886194.shtml
21 DiDi is the biggest sharing car platform in China. It provides vehicle rental information, user ride 
information, and driver service information between the car owners, users, and drivers to facilitate 
the transaction and profit from it.
22 Mayi.com is a short-term lodging platform like Airbnb. The business model is that landlords with 
idle apartments publish lodging information on the platform; users can search for and rent those 
apartments and reach a lodging contract with the landlords on the platform.
23 Joybuy Yuncang (http://jdyuncang.cn) is the logistics system, in which Joybuy puts other logis-
tics companies’ warehouses into its logistics system and shares them with third parties. As consid-
eration, Joybuy provides access to its online platform, data analysis, and delivery service to third 
parties.
24 Hongling Capital (https://www.my089.com) is one of the earliest P2P loan platforms in China. 
Users announce their need for a loan on the platform, third parties with funds bid for the opportu-
nity to provide the loan, and parties reach loan contracts after review by the platform.
25 The basic model of these crowdsourcing platforms is that users post rewards for custom services 
on the platform, which usually includes LOGO design, Flash design, website construction, pro-
gramming, translation, etc., and third-party companies and individuals provide online creative 
work services.
26 Chunyu Doctor (https://www.chunyuyisheng.com) is an online medical consultation platform 
where the users can consult on health issues, and doctors can answer their questions during their 
spare time and provide users with more convenient and professional medical advices and 
services.
Y. Ma and H. Zhang
475
3.3  Achievements of the Sharing Economy
Overall, the sharing economy in China has achieved the following: (1) the market 
structure has so far transformed from one of excessive dispersion to moderate 
concentration through horizontal mergers; (2) market competition has transformed 
from vicious competition to healthy competition as the market begins to mature and 
the competitive behavior of managers tends to be rational; (3) market emphasis has 
shifted from providing price subsidies to improving the consumer experience. 
Therefore, improvement in services and quality has become one of the main means 
of competition in the sharing market27; (4) activating the ideal resources in the 
market, especially making use of the ideal apartments in the real estate market; (5) 
the deindustrialization and decentralization of the sharing models allow more 
industry innovation, as everyone transforms from passive consumer to creator, and 
further releases individual creativity.28
4  The Challenges of the Sharing Economy in China 
and Their Solutions
The rapid growth of platforms has stirred considerable debate over the application 
of regulation to these platforms and their suppliers. On the one hand, regulatory 
measures may be needed to protect consumers, public safety, and legitimate 
governmental goals. On the other hand, regulation can chill incentives for innovation 
by increasing costs and thereby impede or prevent new entry and deprive consumers 
of the benefits of new product and service offerings. Lawmakers and regulators face 
a challenging task in balancing these concerns29 and have to deal with duplicated 
investment and vicious competition, as well as the issues of sustainability and 
negative externalities.
4.1  Duplicated Investment and Vicious Competition
4.1.1  The Problem
The development of the sharing economy is based on high market liquidity, real- 
time matching system of supply and demand between buyers and sellers, and trans-
actional security, which presupposes that platforms reach economy of scale and 
27 Wen Xueguo, Sharing Economy Faces the Problem of Monopolistic Platform, Restricted Access, 
etc. (in Chinese), available at http://money.163.com/17/0918/14/CUKE0H5L002598NV.
htmlpage.
28 Ding Yuanzhu. Several Thoughts to Promote the Development of Sharing Economy (in Chinese), 
2 Journal of Chinese Academy of Governance 106–111(2016).
29 USFTC, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators, available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/collaborative-economy-issues-fac-
ing-platforms-participants-regulators, pp. 19–23.
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possess certain market power. All of that imply that only a limited number of plat-
forms can be winners in a specific area of the sharing economy. All the dimensions 
to competition between platforms, such as bribes (which are transferred to third 
parties), prices charged to consumers, quality, pure rent dissipation (such as invest-
ment in capacity that is never used), and so on,30 may be used simultaneously by 
platforms. In China, duplicated investment and vicious competition become preva-
lent, which are diametrically opposite to the original intention of the sharing econ-
omy, namely optimal resource allocation.
The development of sharing bicycles can be a typical case. With the leading 
cycling companies OFO and Mobike successfully attracting financing, a huge 
amount of capital has flowed into the industry, and a large number of shareable 
bicycles were put into the market, and at the same time price wars were conducted 
in the form of free rides and “red envelopes” (subsidies in disguise) just for a larger 
market share, while neglecting all other efforts. Statistics show that by the end of 
June 2017, there were nearly 70 sharing bicycle companies in China, and more than 
16 million bicycles were put on the market. Excessive distribution of these bicycles 
has even become a form of negative equity for society. Normal traffic operations 
were affected in first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Shareable bicycles in 
Shanghai at one time reached more than 1.7 million, far exceeding the demand. 
After overinvestment and vicious competition, most companies withdrew from the 
market due to financing failures. Currently, OFO and Mobike take up about 95% of 
the market. Others, such as sharing of trips, live broadcast platforms, and power 
banks, are also undergoing a similar process.
4.1.2  The Solution
To design an environment in which competition results in surplus which will be 
transferred to consumers, rather than wasteful rent dissipation, is clearly an attractive 
policy goal. According to the theory of institutional economics, the granting of 
exclusive property rights can reduce rent dissipation.31 Therefore, creation and 
award of intellectual property rights for business models of the sharing economy 
have become the direction of exploration in China. As the “State Council’s Opinions 
on Accelerating the Construction of Powerful Intellectual Property Rights under the 
New Situation” state, the Chinese government is pursuing to “perfect the intellectual 
property protection system for business patterns and patent protection system for 
utility models, to strengthen the study of intellectual property protection rules 
regarding the Internet, e-commerce, big data and other areas, and to promote the 
development of relevant regulations.”32 As a matter of fact, China is now exploring 
30 Hal R. Varian, Joseph Farrell, and Carl Shapiro, The Economics of Information Technology, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007:30.
31 Steven Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 
Journal of Law and Economics, 49–70 (1970).
32 State Council, Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of Powerful Intellectual Property 
Rights under the New Situation, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-12/22/con-
tent_10468.htm
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ways to expand the range of patentable objects to protect new Internet business 
models, or to grant them short-term exclusivity through individual legislation, 
which will be revoked within 1  year. However, the ultimate question remains 
whether intellectual property rights should be given to Internet business models or 
not, and how to define the boundary between the exclusivity and the public domain 
to avoid hindering the development of the industry.
4.2  The Sustainability Issue
Unlike the efficiency in matching the supply and demand and the expansion of the 
market, which are greatly determined by technology advances, trust mechanisms 
can be easily destroyed by opportunistic behavior in practice, which would increase 
transaction costs, and make it difficult for the sharing economy to further develop.33 
Thus, opportunistic behavior, such as the infringement of consumer rights and the 
distortion of reputation evaluation systems, challenges the sustainability of the shar-
ing economy.
4.2.1  Cases of Infringement of Consumer Rights Grow Rapidly
Due to the lack of market entry certification and regulation, cases of consumer 
rights infringement have grown rapidly. According to statistics on the “Customer 
Network,”34 from January to August 2016, the website received a total of 736 
consumer complaints about sharing economy businesses such as “online taxi- 
hailing,” “online tourism,” and so on. The amount of complaints received by local 
governments is also increasing. For example, the data released by Hubei Province 
Administration for Industry and Commerce shows that in the first half of 2017, the 
number of complaints about “sharing bicycles” and “online taxi-hailing” increased 
by 121.8% compared to 2016.35
The cause for the rise in consumer complaints lies in the unclear division of 
responsibilities among participants of the platform and the platform. Platforms’ 
approach is to gain profits from participants’ transactions without taking on too 
much responsibility for any illegal actions which may occur. For example, DiDi 
provides in its “Special Vehicle Terms of Use” Section 1  – “Our Services” that 
“DiDi platform does not provide rental, car rental or driving services. All we provide 
is related information about rental vehicles and drivers. DiDi is just a platform 
between you and the suppliers.” Under the “Four-Party Agreement,” users assume 
33 Lu Xianxiang, Collaborative Economy: Transaction Cost Minimization, Institutional Change 
and Institutional Supply(in Chinese), 9 Social Science Front 51–61 (2016).
34 “Customer Network” (http://www.bjxf315.com) is a professional service platform for consumer 
rights protection supported by the Beijing Consumers Association. It accepts consumer’s com-
plaints and conveys that to the association, promotes communication between consumers and busi-
ness operators, and releases information on consumers’ right protection.
35 Wan Jing, Sharing economy platforms must respect the antitrust law (in Chinese), Legal Daily 
(November 9, 2017).
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primary legal responsibility as the renter of the vehicle and the employer of the 
driver. Thus, defining tort liability arising from sharing behavior becomes 
problematic.36 However, doesn’t a car hailing platform have to assume joint tort 
liability for the driver’s fault? Doesn’t an online platform have the obligation to 
guarantee the online shops’ quality? Isn’t it liable for contents searched? The 
absence of suitable regulation and clear rules on responsibility makes it difficult for 
users and consumers to safeguard their rights.
4.2.2  Distortion of the Reputation Evaluation System
The trust and reputation system is one of the important preconditions for the sharing 
economy market, which allows the parties to evaluate each other after the transaction 
is completed, serves as a reference for later decision making, and provides a reward 
and sanction mechanism for the provision of higher quality products and services. 
However, with the development of the sharing economy, false and malicious 
evaluation by paid users has distorted this credibility evaluation mechanism.
4.2.3  The Solution
An effective mechanism for consumer rights protection and defining responsibility 
needs to be clarified and improved expeditiously. The solution is to build a 
“government-enterprise-society” regulatory model of tripartite cooperation, to 
promote fair trading and self-discipline of trading subjects, mainly through the use 
of information regulatory tools.37 In comparison with government regulation, 
platforms are better equipped than the government for the purpose of running 
background checks on sharing service providers, and responding quickly to conflicts 
among participants. Furthermore, platforms have the monetary incentive to look 
after their communities, and to ensure consumer satisfaction and safety.38 At the 
level of business practice, some platforms like DiDi construct a platform credit 
evaluation system to guarantee the authenticity and credibility of the information of 
the transacting parties by ID verification, linking to mobile phone numbers and 
bank accounts, enhancing user experience by offering review and score functions, 
establishing a credit record of the transaction process and a “black list” system, and 
giving priority to those whose credit evaluation is excellent. Furthermore, some 
platforms cooperate with insurance companies to provide coverage for potential 
accidents of parties.39
36 See Hou Denghua, On Legal Status of Internet Platforms Under the Sharing Economy: the Study 
of Online Car-Hailing (in Chinese), 1 Tribune of Political Science and Law 157–164 (2017).
37 Ying Feihu and Tu Yongqian. The Information Tool in Public Regulation (in Chinese), 4 Social 
Sciences in China 122 (2010).
38 D. S. Evans, Governing bad behavior by users of multisided platforms. 2 Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 1201 (2012).
39 For example, Piggy Short-term Lodging cooperates with Zhongan Insurance(a Chinese insur-
ance company) to provide accommodation accident insurance for tenants and comprehensive 
insurance for landlords’ property. The “Home-to-Eat” company cooperates with the People’s 
Insurance Company of China to promote “safety plans” for food safety; see Information Research 
Department of the State Information Center, Sharing Economy Work Committee of China Internet 
Association, Report on China’s Collaborative Economy Development 2017, p. 15.
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In addition, legal measures for the protection of consumer rights in China’s 
online platforms is set by the “E-Commerce Law of the People’s Republic of 
China”,40 which stipulates that e-commerce platform operators have an obligation to 
verify the authenticity of e-commerce business operators’ identity information,41 
ensure network security,42 preserve transaction information,43 improve credit 
evaluation systems,44 and take responsibilities in some cases.45 However, whether it 
is to be established by the government, in which the government plays a more active 
role in regulation,46 or by a third-party neutral entity, as some have suggested,47 still 
requires further discussion.
40 The E-Commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at the 5th session of the 
Standing Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress on August 31, 2018, and 
became effective from January 1, 2019.
41 Article 27 of the E-Commerce Law prescribes: “An e-commerce platform business shall request 
a business applying for selling commodities or providing services on its platform to submit authen-
tic information including its identity, address, contact information, and administrative permits, 
make verification and registration, establish a register, and make regular updates and 
verification.”
42 Article 30 of the E-Commerce Law foresees:“(1)An e-commerce platform business shall take 
technological measures and other necessary measures to ensure its cybersecurity and stable opera-
tion, prevent online illegal and criminal activities, effectively tackle cybersecurity events, and 
guarantee e-commerce trading safety.(2)An e-commerce platform business shall make a contin-
gency plan for cybersecurity events and when a cybersecurity event occurs, it shall launch the 
contingency plan forthwith, take corresponding remedial measures, and make a report to the rele-
vant competent authorities.”
43 Article 31 of the E-Commerce Law reads: “An e-commerce platform business shall record and 
retain the information on the commodities and services released on the platform and transaction 
information and ensure the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the information. The infor-
mation on commodities, services, and transactions shall be retained at least for 3 years from the 
day of completion of the transaction, unless otherwise provided by any law or administrative 
regulations.”
44 Article 39 of the E-Commerce Law stipulates: “(1) An e-commerce platform business shall 
establish and improve a credit rating system, publish credit rating rules, and provide channels for 
consumers to make comments on the commodities sold or services provided in the platform.(2) An 
e-commerce platform owner may not delete any comment made by a consumer on the commodi-
ties or services sold or provided on its platform.”
45 Article 38 of the E-Commerce Law prescribes: “(1) Where an e-commerce platform business 
fails to take necessary measures, though it knows or should have known that an in-platform busi-
ness sells commodities, or provides services, inconsistent with the requirements for guaranteeing 
personal and property safety, or otherwise infringe the lawful rights and interests of consumers, the 
e-commerce platform business and the in-platform business shall be jointly liable. (2) If, in respect 
of commodities or services relative to the life and health of consumers, an e-commerce platform 
business causes damage to a consumer by its failure to perform the obligation of reviewing the 
qualifications of an in-platform business, or the obligation of guaranteeing the safety of consumers, 
the e-commerce platform business and the in-platform business shall be correspondingly liable in 
accordance with the law.”
46 Jiang Shengyang, The Legal Regulations of Information Tools, Reputation Incentives, and 
Sharing Economy (in Chinese), 3 Postgraduate Law Review 141–150 (2016).
47 Hong Zhisheng et al., Industrial Innovation and Economic Transformation Driven by the Concept 
of Sharing (in Chinese), Guangming Daily (May 11, 2016).
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4.3  The Negative Externalities Issue
The current dominant economic and social management system is based on indus-
trial mass production, which emphasizes regional and fragmented management, and 
requires prior approval. The network-based sharing economy is typically character-
ized by cross-regional and cross-industry networking, which brings a series of “neg-
ative externalities.”
4.3.1  Regulatory Fairness
Many new industries in the sharing economy are operating in the ambiguous zone 
of law and supervision, and are even suspected of being “illegal” under the current 
system. Clearly, “equal” regulation subject some innovative practices to unreasonable 
institutional requirements; for example, companies engaged in Internet education 
are asked to deploy offline classrooms in order to be approved, etc. However, 
innovative business patterns in the sharing economy will inevitably be in a 
competitive relationship with the existent ones. The sharing economy model is 
based on network platforms, and a large number of operators do not need to obtain 
administrative licenses, which can considerably reduce operating costs. The 
resultant prices are more attractive than those of the existent operators, from whom 
users and consumers are taken away, leading to the issue of fairness in regulation 
and conflict of interests, as demonstrated by the online taxi-hailing service and 
traditional cruising taxis. The development of the sharing economy is challenging 
the administrative law control systems for property use, market access, and 
professional qualification.48
In designing new supervision over the sharing economy, the innovation of the 
sharing economy should not be stifled by excessive supervision. Challenging, 
though, in the process of policy adjustment is how certain behavior of the sharing 
economy can be identified as “innovation” that is worthy of encouragement, how to 
judge whether the regulation for the new sharing economy model should be the 
same as or equal to the traditional ones, and how regulation can adapt to the essen-
tial needs of new economic patterns.49
4.3.2  Monopoly Issue
According to the estimate of the State Information Center, China’s sharing economy 
will maintain an average annual growth rate of 40% in the next few years, and there 
will be five to ten giant platform-oriented companies in the next 10 years.50 However, 
the emergence of such giants may further heighten the risk of monopoly, because of 
48 Zhang Xiaoyu, Challenges in Internet Sharing Economy to Administrative Regulations and 
Responses to Them (in Chinese), 5 Global Law Review 151–161 (2016).
49 Ranchordas, Sofia, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing 
Economy,16 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 413 (2015).
50 Information Research Department of the State Information Center, Sharing Economy Work 
Committee of China Internet Association, Report on China’s Collaborative Economy Development 
2016, p. 29.
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the dominant feature of the sharing economy, namely the two-sided network effect. 
This effect means that an increase in the number of users at either side of the two- 
sided economic platform will lead to more users at the other side. As a result, shar-
ing platforms have the chance to establish monopoly through subsidizing users at 
either side for free. Such effects may enable large platforms to accumulate huge 
numbers of users on both sides of platforms and thus have dominant market power. 
In contrast, smaller platforms are less attractive to users due to fewer participants, 
and fewer trading opportunities and options for buyers and sellers, and thus stand no 
chance in competing with large-scale platforms. Two-sided network effects may 
also lead to market entry barriers, as existing monopoly platforms can easily 
overwhelm new entrants.
The sharing platforms initially only served as intermediaries to match the supply 
and demand ends, and were themselves not direct suppliers of products or services. 
However, with gradual vertical integration, platforms are directly providing products 
and services to consumers through the employment of professional suppliers. 
Although such vertical integration can improve efficiency, once the vertically inte-
grated platform owns and controls a large amount of supply capacity, buyers may no 
longer be willing to switch to other platforms with insufficient supply capacity, thus 
creating an anticompetitive blocking effect. Therefore, one of the antitrust agencies 
of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, pledges in Article 8 
of the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Development of the Sharing Economy” 
“to encourage and guide the sharing enterprises to carry out effective and orderly 
competition, and to effectively strengthen the supervision and prevention of platform 
companies’ monopolistic behaviors in the sharing economy field.”51
However, due to concentration of immense market resources and nondisclosure 
of internal information on the sharing platforms, the limitations of traditional and 
governmental supervision means and capabilities are obvious. In the process of 
supervision, giving greater autonomy and rights to the market players on the sharing 
platforms, allowing stakeholders to engage in the governance of supervision, and 
constructing a “co-regulation” regulatory framework can be more effective.52
4.3.3  Protection of Laborers’ Rights
Peer-to-peer exchange moves jobs away from traditional manufacturing and ser-
vices to microservices.53 Statistics from the Ministry of Personnel and Social 
Security in 2014 show that 9.6247 million people were directly employed through 
online stores, but more than 70% of them did not have any social insurance, and 
their average monthly wage was only RMB 2115 Yuan. The employment created by 
the sharing economy platforms is not all high-quality employment. The labor 
51 Fa Gai Gao Ji〔2017〕No.1245 (发改高技〔2017〕1245号), published on 3 July 2017.
52 See Brhmie Balaram, How to Defeat Monopoly Power in the Sharing Economy, available at 
h t tps : / /b log.p2pfoundat ion.net /how-to-defeat-monopoly-power- in- the-shar ing- 
economy/2016/02/18
53 Arvind Malhotra and Marshall Van Alstyne, The Dark Side of the Sharing Economy and How to 
Lighten It. 11 Communications of the ACM 27 (2014).
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employment pattern under the sharing economy is very different from traditional 
industries. The most prominent feature is that workers have more freedom in terms 
of organizational attribution, economic independence, etc., which prevents them 
from receiving effective social security, which is deeply connected to the traditional 
labor employment relationship. Therefore, in the labor dispute of “Good Chef APP” 
and disputes between online drivers and platforms, some courts have ruled that “the 
relationship between laborers and platforms is not the traditional labor contract 
relationship but a cooperative relationship.”54 To provide corresponding labor and 
social security for new types of labor groups like network contract workers, the 
current labor law needs to expand the scope of protection to provide network 
contract workers with legal protection similar to that of traditional laborers,55 or the 
existing institutional frameworks should be reconstructed to provide a social welfare 
system that is not attached to labor relations.
4.3.4  Protection of Users’ Information
Sharing not only means sharing information or practical items between users and 
third-party service providers, but also often sharing users and data with platforms. 
Therefore, sensitive data, such as personal addresses, contact information, 
preferences and habits, and even the lifestyle of participants, are exposed to 
platforms. If there are no sound protection measures, once the information is leaked, 
the user’s personal privacy will be damaged. Moreover, it may also involve national 
security risks if massive amounts of data and information were leaked.56 The 
following questions need to be addressed for the sharing economy to continue to 
thrive: how broadly platforms can use information they have collected, whether they 
have a right to use them, whether they can transfer the right to third-party developers 
and advertisers, and how to ensure users’ personal data and personality rights will 
not be compromised.57
54 See for example Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court (2014) Yi Zhong Min Zhong Zi 
No.6355 Civil Judgment, (2015) Yi Zhong Min Zhong Zi No.176 Civil Judgment, and (2015) Yi 
Zhong Min Zhong Zi No.1359 Civil Judgment.
55 Ban Xiaohui, A Research on the Expansion of the Protection Scope of Labor Law in the Sharing 
Economy—From the Perspective of Hiring Cars by Internet Platform (in Chinese), 2 Journal of 
Sichuan University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), 154–161(2017).
56 Article 37 of Cybersecurity Law of China prescribes: “Personal information and important busi-
ness data collected and produced by critical information infrastructure operators during their activ-
ities within the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be stored within the territory; 
where due to business requirements it is truly necessary provide it outside the mainland, a security 
assessment shall be conducted according to the measures jointly formulated by the national cyber-
space administration and the relevant departments of the State Council. Where laws or administra-
tive regulations provide otherwise, those provisions apply.”
57 See Hu Ling. On Legal Regulation of “Sharing Economy” (in Chinese). 4 Beijing Cultural 
Review 112–115(2015).
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4.3.5  Tax Issues
The development of the sharing economy has caused two major regulatory difficul-
ties for tax regulation. First is difficulty in regulating tax opportunism, as transact-
ing subjects use the ambiguity of existing tax rules to evade taxes. An example in 
this context is the definition of the participants as “third-party settlement entity” to 
capitalize on the loopholes in regulatory systems to circumvent tax regulation. The 
second difficulty relates to supervising tax declarations. Many of the sharing econ-
omy participants are either microenterprises or traditional consumers who use their 
personal property for commercial purposes and gain relatively low income from 
each transaction, making supervision of tax filings difficult.58 Therefore, the frame-
work for tax declaration and regulation is in need of reform and restructuring to 
adapt to the revolution in business models.
5  Conclusion
In China, the sharing economy has experienced rapid expansion, is now covering 
many spheres of social life, and has become one of the priorities in China’s economic 
development. The sharing models have effectively activated idle resources, expanded 
employment, and promoted industrial innovation. However, there are also 
challenges, namely duplicated investment and vicious competition, as well as the 
issues of sustainability and negative externalities. For the government to effectively 
deal with these challenges, it would be advisable to build a “government-enterprise- 
society” regulatory model to promote self-discipline through the use of information 
regulatory tools, and to create an environment for fair competition and leave enough 
breathing space for constant innovation. Only then can the sharing economy main-
tain its high growth momentum in China and serve as a development model for 
other economies.
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This chapter argues for the recognition of knowledge sharing as an integral part 
of the sharing economy, by taking India as a case study. It analyses the attitudes 
and practices pertaining to knowledge sharing in India through a mixed meth-
ods approach. The quantitative data discussed in the chapter include data from 
two empirical studies – one on sharing practices of researchers in India and 
their attitudes towards openness, and the other on perceptions of Indian con-
sumers regarding film piracy and copyright protection. The quantitative find-
ings have been contextualised in an analysis of historical exclusionary 
structures in India which created intellectual monopolies for privileged sec-
tions of the society on lines of gender and caste. The chapter challenges domi-
nant narratives which suggest that knowledge sharing was a common practice 
in ancient India. Further, the chapter examines two prominent and recent Indian 
policies which have a bearing on shaping incentives for innovation and creativ-
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ity in the sharing economy, but fail to take balanced and inclusive approaches. 
Through these analyses, the chapter seeks to establish the need for all stake-
holders to recognise the need for  equitable knowledge sharing and take appro-
priate steps to challenge and change the status quo.
Keywords
Knowledge sharing · Sharing economy · Intellectual property · Open access · 
Open science
1  Knowledge and the Sharing Economy
‘Sharing economy’, much like many other evolving phenomena, does not have a 
shared or universally accepted definition. The World Economic Forum defines it as 
an economic model which ‘focus(es) on the sharing of underutilised assets, mone-
tised or not, in ways that improve efficiency, sustainability and community’.1 The 
Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘an economic system in which assets or services are 
shared between private individuals, either free or for a fee, typically by means of the 
Internet’.2 Despite the differences in the way various people understand this term, it 
may be fair to say that the sharing economy usually entails the sharing of resources 
for their optimum utilisation.
The rapidly expanding discourse surrounding this economic system has made 
certain companies such as Uber and AirBnB instantly associable with it. The argu-
ment supporting this association is the model used by such platforms, whereby the 
utilisation of resources such as vehicles and living spaces is maximised through 
online platforms. For example, in the case of Uber, the platform connects drivers 
and travellers, and ensures more optimal utilisation of cars. Similarly, in the case of 
AirBnB, the platform allows more optimal utilisation of under-utilised residential 
spaces by connecting those who possess such spaces and those who are seeking 
accommodation. While these and other similar examples can indeed give rise to 
exciting discussions on the relevant economic models and desirable changes in the 
regulatory frameworks, the current discourse on sharing economy has largely 
ignored the potential of sharing knowledge, one of the most important non-rivalrous 
resources.3
Many studies have broken the myth that innovations are novel ideas generated by 
individuals; there has been growing realisation that most innovations are incremen-
tal in character, thereby highlighting the importance of knowledge sharing for 
1 World Economic Forum (2018). https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/12/when-is-sharing-not- 
really-sharing/
2 English Oxford Dictionary (2018). https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sharing_ 
economy
3 ‘A resource is considered as non-rivalrous in consumption, when the use of the resource does not 
deplete the resource.’ Gillespie, T. (2007). Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture 
(p. 25). Cambridge: MIT Press.
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fuelling innovation.4 Even though developments in communication technologies 
have opened up enormous possibilities for sharing and collaboration, it is doubtful 
whether sufficient steps have been taken to ensure equitable access to knowledge 
and inclusiveness in knowledge creation. It is in this context that we need to broaden 
the discussions on the sharing economy to include knowledge resources, so that we 
can ensure that they, like cars and homes, are better utilised.
Knowledge is non-rivalrous in nature, but we cannot ignore the fact that some of 
the resources required to produce knowledge may be rivalrous in nature. Further, 
there may be many external factors that determine the extent to which people can 
participate in the knowledge creation process. For example, funds and research 
materials, which are necessary for a research project, may be rivalrous and also 
scarce, especially in developing economies. Similarly, factors like class, caste, gen-
der, geography, language, and other socio-economic factors may also determine 
whether a person can access, grow, and succeed in formal systems of knowledge 
creation. Further, most of the outputs of research and innovation are either captured 
in different forms of intellectual property (IP) or published in journals and made 
available only in databases which are paywalled, and thus inaccessible unless hefty 
fees are paid.5 All these factors, coupled with perceptions that trivialise knowledge 
produced outside mainstream processes, make knowledge production and con-
sumption accessible only to a privileged few in the current scenario. Moreover, the 
alienation of traditional or grassroots producers of knowledge from the mainstream 
hinders mutual communication of knowledge and possible collaborations. Hence, 
any discussion on sharing of knowledge resources in the sharing economy has to 
necessarily go beyond the resources themselves; it has to include the broader con-
text in which knowledge is produced and consumed.
Optimal utilisation of knowledge requires equitable access to existing knowl-
edge. Since the factors restricting access to knowledge have not been adequately 
challenged and addressed, we are yet to witness unencumbered knowledge sharing 
in any country. This has considerably restricted the scope and diversity of innova-
tion. The speed at which innovation can take place is also many a time retarded due 
to duplication of efforts, which can be prevented to a large extent by providing 
equitable access to existing knowledge resources. Hence it is important to realise 
that the discourse surrounding sharing economy is incomplete without studying 
how knowledge is shared in that economy, and devising mechanisms that can 
encourage knowledge sharing. This also necessitates broader discussions on sharing 
of rivalrous resources which underlie knowledge production.
This chapter takes a step in this direction by taking knowledge sharing in India 
as a case study. It critically analyses the history of knowledge sharing in India, 
4 For example, Mark Lemley has pointed out that innovation is merely an incremental step in an 
ongoing, widely known stage of research; see Lemley, M. (2012). The Myth of the Sole Inventor. 
Michigan Law Review, 110, 709.
5 For example, a recent study has revealed that 65 of the world’s 100 most cited articles are behind 
paywalls. The Authorea Team. 65 out of the 100 Most Cited Papers Are Paywalled. https://autho-
rea.com/users/8850/articles/125400/_show_article
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examines some empirical findings on attitude towards knowledge sharing and intel-
lectual property ownership in the contemporary Indian society, and, most impor-
tantly, explores whether due measures are being taken in India for fostering 
knowledge sharing in the sharing economy.
We have used the mixed methods approach for the underlying research.6 
Quantitative data used in the study include data from a survey conducted as part of 
the Open Science project of the Centre for Innovation, IP and Competition, National 
Law University, Delhi in 2017.7 The respondents in this survey were researchers 
across various disciplines working in institutions located in India.8 The data regard-
ing attitudes towards IP protection are from another empirical study conducted by 
one of the authors on perceptions of people in India regarding IP infringements.9 For 
the qualitative data used in the chapter, we have relied upon books and articles that 
examine the Indian attitudes and behaviour as regards knowledge sharing from a 
historical perspective. In order to infer whether appropriate efforts are being made 
in India for fostering knowledge sharing in the sharing economy, the chapter will 
critically analyse two of the recent innovation-related policies in the country – the 
National IP Policy, 2016 and the Startup India Action Plan, 2016.
2  Historical Perspectives on Knowledge Sharing in India
2.1  Perspectives on Knowledge Sharing in Ancient India
While not many scholars have engaged in a rigorous historical analysis of knowl-
edge sharing in India, dominant narratives surrounding this issue have portrayed 
India as a nation which has historically been morally opposed to restrictions on 
knowledge sharing.10 For example, Carl Malamud, prominent public domain activ-
ist and founder of PublicResource.org, has noted in his recent book, Code Swaraj, 
that he believes India is the ideal place for starting a global revolution in universal 
6 ‘The mixed methods approach in research generally refers to research that involves collecting, 
analyzing and interpreting quantitative as well as qualitative data in a single study or in a series of 
studies that investigate the same underlying phenomenon.’ See Leech, N.L. & Onwuegbuzie, A.J. 
(2009). A typology of mixed methods research designs. Quality & Quantity 43(2), 265. However, 
some scholars interpret the term broadly, to also include a mix of quantitative methods or a mix of 
qualitative methods. See, for example, Brannen, J. (2005). NCRM Methods Review Papers, 
NCRM/005. Mixed Methods Research: A discussion paper (p. 4). http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/89/
7 Open Science Survey – India (2017). https://osf.io/9c6af/
8 Centre for Innovation, Intellectual Property and Competition. Open Science Survey Methodology. 
http://ciipc.org/projects/open-science-for-an-innovative-india/open-science-survey/
open-science-survey-methodology/
9 Scaria, A.G. (2014). Piracy in the Indian Film Industry: Copyright and Cultural Consonance 
(pp. 103–137). Cambridge University Press.
10 See generally: Ganapathi, J. & Pulla, V. (2015). Intellectual Property Rights and the Ancient 
Indian Perspective. http://www.spaceandculture.in/index.php/spaceandculture/article/view/147
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access to knowledge as ‘[it]…is a principle that runs deep in the history of India’.11 
In order to justify this, he refers to translated excerpts from ancient Indian texts that 
say that knowledge can never be on sale, and that a teacher is bound to impart 
knowledge to a willing pupil.12
Similar views have also been expressed by Prabha Sridevan, a retired judge of the 
Madras High Court, and she too alludes to excerpts from different religious texts.13 In 
her work, she has highlighted the emphasis of the Upanishads, one of the ancient Hindu 
texts, on the public benefit aspect of knowledge. She has also quoted excerpts from 
other texts which say that noble thoughts should come from all sides, and that knowl-
edge alone can set one free.14 She argues that India has always recognised that intel-
lectual property rights are not natural rights.15 In this regard, she points out the lack of 
any tradition in India that allowed teachers to claim authorship or other rights over 
knowledge.16 She also highlights that most ancient texts indicate that taking monetary 
benefits for imparting knowledge was not a socially acceptable practice in ancient 
India.17 According to her, teachers were viewed as mere custodians of knowledge who 
had the responsibility of imparting education for the benefit of the public.18
While it may be true that such references to virtues of knowledge sharing can be 
seen in many of the ancient Indian texts, it is important to look beyond literal trans-
lations of selected excerpts from ancient texts, in order to understand social reali-
ties. Imposition of monetary restrictions is not the only way to obstruct access to 
knowledge; many other dimensions like gender and caste must be taken into consid-
eration for a more holistic view of the state of knowledge sharing in ancient India.
2.2  Gender-Based Restrictions to Knowledge
When one looks at the question of gender-based restrictions, it can be seen that like 
most of the rest of the world, such restrictions have been existing in the Indian soci-
ety too. It is nearly impossible to understand and encapsulate with certainty and 
11 Malamud, C. & Pitroda, S. (2018). Code Swaraj: Field Notes from the Standards Satyagraha 
(p. 167). https://archive.org/details/CodeSwaraj
12 Ibid., p. 168.
13 Sridevan, P. (2015). Intellectual Property in the Ancient Indian texts. In Irene Calboli, Srividya 





17 Ibid., p. 238. Some accounts suggest, however, that teachers used to collect non-monetary ‘guru-
dakshina’ or rewards from their students. See Shankar, S. (1994). The Thumb of Ekalavya: 
Postcolonial Studies and the ‘Third World’ Scholar in a Neocolonial World. World Literature 
Today, 68(3), p. 482.
18 Sridevan, P. (2015). Intellectual Property in the Ancient Indian Texts. In Irene Calboli, Srividya 
Raghavan (Ed.), Diversity in Intellectual Property: Identities, Interests, and Intersections 
(p. 235).Cambridge University Press.
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completeness the history of women’s education in India. There are many reasons 
behind this, including the lack of uniform documentation and the diversity of wom-
en’s experience on lines of caste, religion, class, and geography. Some historians are 
of the opinion that the Vedas, one of the oldest recognised scriptures of Hinduism, 
suggest that men and women should enjoy equal positions and freedoms in society 
with respect to education, religious sacrifice, and marriage.19 According to them, 
universal education, minimum standard of education for all, gender neutral 
‘Upanayana’ or initiation ceremonies for introduction to the process of learning, 
and knowledge of all known branches of culture, knowledge, and religion, were 
prescribed.20 The same was apparently observed in Islam, where religious books 
laid down that seeking of knowledge is as incumbent upon a male as upon a female.21
While the exact timing or reasons behind complete divergence from these texts 
are not clearly known, social evils such as child marriage, sati, and the purdah sys-
tem are considered possible ways in which the patriarchy sought to curb rights and 
freedoms of women. Child marriage forced prepubescent girls into marriage, often 
with much older men of higher social status. The practice of ‘sati’, followed by 
Hindus in some parts of the country, forced widows to give up their lives along with 
their dying or dead husbands. The purdah system, whose name originated from a 
Persian word meaning curtain, was prevalent in both Hindu and Muslim societies.22 
Women had to wear veils or pieces of clothing covering their heads, and were con-
fined behind walls or partitions, segregated from the outside world which could only 
be enjoyed by men. Most Christian nuns also had to wear pieces of clothing cover-
ing their heads. A combination of such practices and traditions cemented women’s 
roles in society as subservient and subordinate to those of men.
Owing to various social changes, women were denied entry to the study of sacred 
texts, Upanayana began being prescribed only for men, and gradually, right to all 
kinds of education were restricted.23 At tols or pathshalas, which were Hindu schools 
of higher learning, boys belonging to families enjoying higher social status were 
given free education through stipends and scholarship donations from kings or 
wealthy persons.24 Even elementary schools were attended only by boys belonging 
to upper castes, and sons of rich landlords and agriculturalists.25 Among Muslims, 
Maktab or elementary school, which focused on Quran studies, were attended by 
both boys and girls, where they learned to read and write.26 However, Madrasahs, 
which were Islamic institutions of higher learning, could only be attended by select 
19 Mathur, Y.B. (1973). Women’s Education in India 1813–1966 (p. 1). Asia Publishing House.
20 Ibid.
21 Bhattacharya, S., Bara, J., Yagati, C.R., Sankhdher, B.M. (Ed.) (2001). The Development of 
Women’s Education in India: A Collection of Documents 1850–1920 (p. 517). Kanishka Publishers.
22 WikiGender (2015). https://www.wikigender.org/wiki/purdah/
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groups of boys.27 There are not many documented references relating to denial of 
education for Christian women in India that can lead to concrete conclusions on this 
matter. However, the fact that Christian women were also facing discrimination on 
most other issues like property rights makes one reasonably assume that their situa-
tion was not much different.
In Buddhism, comparatively more inclusive practices were observed as regards 
education of men and women. Buddhist ideology included belief in kindness 
towards all living beings, and faith in the essential equality of man and woman in 
the journey towards salvation.28 Interestingly, while women were imparted educa-
tion, their teachers were their fathers, brothers, and uncles.29 Moreover, while 
women could enter monasteries and continue their education while being in the 
monastic order, there were different and discriminatory rules for men and women 
for entry into monasteries.30
Prohibition of women from education was motivated mainly by concerns regard-
ing the subversion of patriarchal power. It was believed that education would make 
girls ‘dushta’ (wicked or immoral) and less amenable to discipline and submission 
to their parents’ choice of husband.31 Since they were ‘too useful’ in the house, 
education was feared to make them forget and despise ordinary household duties if 
they learned how to read and write.32 Therefore, women’s enlightenment was con-
sidered to be dangerous due to the apprehensions regarding the prospect of ‘violent’ 
social upheaval, the idea of women earning their own livelihood apart from their 
families was considered repugnant, and superstitions regarding educated women 
made society believe in misconceptions about educated women.33 These supersti-
tions propagated beliefs that educated women are likely to be childless and their 
husbands are likely to die young.34
The prohibition of women from meaningful education and enforcement of child 
marriage also had other related effects on women’s education. For example, since 
women – particularly those from upper castes – were not allowed to have their own 
livelihood, and there was no tangible financial benefit arising out of their education, 
parents had no motivation to invest time in their education.35 Further, insufficiency 
of educated and working women resulted in low numbers of women teachers in 
27 Ibid.
28 Indian Woman Down The Ages (p.  45). http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bit-
stream/10603/226/6/06_chapter2.pdf
29 Indian Woman Down The Ages (p. 47).
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/226/6/06_chapter2.pdf
30 Ibid., pp. 45 and 47.
31 Mathur, Y.B. (1973). Women’s Education in India 1813–1966 (p. 40). Asia Publishing House.
32 Bhattacharya, S., Bara, J., Yagati, C.R., Sankhdher, B.M. (Ed.) (2001). The Development of 
Women’s Education in India: A Collection of Documents 1850–1920 (p. 206). Kanishka Publishers.
33 Ibid., p. 364.
34 Ibid.
35 Mathur, Y.B. (1973). Women’s Education in India 1813–1966 (pp.  40–41). Asia Publishing 
House.
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schools, which further discouraged parents from sending their daughters to school.36 
While some scholars argue that the purdah system impeded women’s education, 
some others suggest that parents’ insistence on separate schools for girls and boys, 
and women teachers in girls’ schools, benefitted girls’ education in places like 
Punjab.37
Even when educational reforms were sought to be introduced, the supporting 
reason had little to do with women’s rights and more to do with the advantages that 
could accrue to men as a result of women’s education. While it is not clear if reform-
ers cited such reasons as part of their strategy to convince men in power to remove 
prohibitions on women, it is interesting to note the glaring absence of women’s 
rights discourses in these historical accounts. It was often claimed that women’s 
education should be encouraged since the same has far greater impact on the educa-
tional and moral tone of the people than men’s education does.38 Apparently, impe-
tus for reforms in women’s education was given by educated men who wanted 
educated wives for their sons, and fathers who wanted to educate their daughters to 
increase their prospects of being viewed as superior wives and mothers.39
Moreover, some opinions suggest that the nationalist movements that arose in 
response to centuries of British rule in India subsumed the movement for women’s 
education into its larger agenda of strengthening and enlightenment of Indian soci-
ety.40 Therefore, one may conclude that even the reforms that were initiated to 
strengthen women’s education, reinforced the social roles prescribed by patriarchy 
or larger societal goals. It is thus no surprise to see that educational policies which 
were meant to be reformative, suggested that girls be taught ‘feminine’ subjects 
such as hygiene, domestic science, needlework, music, and home science; whereas 
subjects like physics, chemistry, and mathematics were considered as ‘masculine’ 
subjects.41 The 1913 Resolution on the Educational Policy of the Government of 
India, recommended that while designing the curricula, ‘practical bias’ with refer-
ence to the social position women occupy would be important.42 Books recom-
mended for girls were simpler in treatment and narrower in the range of subjects 
than those recommended for boys, as considered appropriate according to dominant 
public opinion.43 It may be safe to say that such restrictions and emphases on social 
36 Ibid.
37 Chanana, K. (2001). Interrogating Women’s Education- Bounded Visions, Expanding Horizons 
(pp. 101–102). Rawat Publications.
38 Indian Educational Policy, Calcutta, 1904, p. 27, referred to in Mathur, Y.B. (1973). Women’s 
Education in India 1813–1966 (p. 10). Asia Publishing House.
39 Mathur, Y.B. (1973). Women’s Education in India 1813–1966 (p. 62). Asia Publishing House.
40 Bhattacharya, S., Bara, J., Yagati, C.R., Sankhdher, B.M. (Ed.) (2001). The Development of 
Women’s Education in India: A Collection of Documents 1850–1920 (p. xxx, Introduction). 
Kanishka Publishers.
41 Education Commission of 1882, mentioned in Chanana, K. (2001). Interrogating Women’s 
Education- Bounded Visions, Expanding Horizons (p. 111). Rawat Publications.
42 Bhattacharya, S., Bara, J., Yagati, C.R., Sankhdher, B.M. (Ed.) (2001). The Development of 
Women’s Education in India: A Collection of Documents 1850–1920 (p. 368). Kanishka Publishers.
43 Ibid., p. 353.
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roles, which are based on patriarchal interests, still continue to hinder women from 
entering the knowledge production process, continuing in it, and breaking glass 
ceilings.
2.3  Caste-Based Restrictions to Knowledge
Apart from gender, it is impossible to provide any historical account of India without 
discussing the Chaturvarna system. It has impacted most aspects of social life in 
India, and has played a major role in preventing dissemination of knowledge. The 
Chaturvarna system divides the Hindu society into four groups called varnas, based 
on birth. Those who didn’t fall into any of these four groups, known as ‘Ati-shudras’ 
in some parts of the country, were the ‘avarnas’ who were considered ‘achhoot’ or 
untouchable.44 Although many texts use the terms ‘caste’ and ‘varna’ interchange-
ably, it must be clarified here that castes are sub-categories that may be classified 
under different varnas. Thus, a varna may encompass hundreds of castes as sub- 
categories.45 Rights and obligations based on varna were reinforced by penal sanc-
tions ordained in Manusmriti (‘Laws of Manu’), one of the most authoritative Hindu 
law texts.46
According to Manusmriti, the Brahmins are supposed to cultivate knowledge, 
the Kshatriya should bear arms, Vaishya should engage in trade, and the Shudra 
should serve, and strict adherence to this framework is expected from all.47 This 
hierarchical system based on birth has determined, and – in many contexts – con-
tinues to determine, many social rules and mores not just in the Hindu sections of 
India, but in Indian society as a whole. While Brahmins had the highest privileges 
ranging from access to temples to access to education and teaching, the Ati-
shudras were treated as ‘untouchables’ in the society, based on rigid notions of 
purity and pollution.48 Some significant legal efforts have been made in India to 
address many of the social evils which have their bases in the varna system, by 
incorporating specific provisions in the Constitution as well as through criminali-
sation of certain discriminatory acts with the help of special legislations.49 
44 Ambedkar, B.R. (2014). Who Were the Shudras? India: Ssoft Group. http://www.satnami.com/
WHO%20WERE%20THESUDRAS.pdf. The untouchables predominantly carry out menial jobs 
which were considered ‘impure’ or unclean, such as manual scavenging (removal of human excreta 
for disposal with bare hands), burning corpses, skinning dead animals, etc.
45 Galanter, M. (1969). Untouchability and the Law. Economic and Political Weekly, 4(1/2), 137.
46 Ambedkar, B.R. (2007). Annihilation of Caste (p. 32). Critical Quest.
47 Ibid., p. 33.
48 Ibid., pp. 16–18; Ambedkar, B.R. (2014). Who Were the Shudras? India: Ssoft Group. http://
www.satnami.com/WHO%20WERE%20THESUDRAS.pdf
49 For example, the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 
2013, prohibits caste-based practice of Manual Scavenging or cleaning of human excreta in dry 
latrines, and the employment of anyone as a ‘manual scavenger’ in India.
Knowledge Sharing and the Sharing Economy in India
494
However, such prejudices and discrimination continue to exist in various extents 
in different socio-economic contexts.50
While the politics and social impact of the system can be studied in a plethora of 
ways, in view of the focus area of this chapter, we restrict our discussion to the role 
played by the varna system in limiting access to education and knowledge. According 
to Manusmriti, three important aspects of life – teaching of Vedas, performing sac-
rifices, and receiving gifts – were restricted to Brahmins.51 Only when a Brahmin 
was unavailable for teaching was a person allowed to have a Kshatriya or Vaishya 
teacher.52 Although originally the varna of a person was determined by an indepen-
dent body and revised after every 4 years, the Gurukul system replaced this sys-
tem.53 The Purva Mimamsa, one of the most prominent ancient Hindu philosophical 
texts, said that as per this system, the Vedas could not be studied unless one under-
goes ‘Upanayana’.54 Upanayana is a ceremony which marks the acceptance of a 
pupil by a guru or teacher by giving the former a sacred thread that he is supposed 
to wear thereafter. In this Gurukul system, only the Acharya of the Gurukul, who 
was of course a Brahmin, was responsible for performing the ceremony. Although 
Brahmins had no express right to deny Upanayana to anyone, they had exclusive 
right to officiate Upanayana, could be penalised for performing unauthorised 
Upanayana, and were deemed to be unworthy to partake in rituals before God if 
they instructed or were instructed by Shudras.55 This effectively meant that Shudras 
and Ati-Shudras were continually denied Upanayana, and hence access to educa-
tion.56 By denying education to them, and restricting Kshatriyas and Vaishyas to 
military and trade, respectively, Brahmins assumed the power to become the only 
educated class which could control the entire society.57 Thus, birth became the most 
important determinant of one’s worth and rights.58
Apart from effectively deciding a person’s rights to basic dignity and resources, 
the Brahmins also monopolised knowledge by forcibly dominating literary 
50 Narula argues that the ‘Rule of Caste’ superposes itself on ‘Rule of Law’ in India, making the 
legal safeguards ineffective in practice. See Narula, S. (2008). Equal by Law, Unequal by Caste: 
The Untouchable Condition in Critical Race Perspective. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 
26, 287–289.
51 Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol 3 (p. 278). https://
archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAndSpeechespdfsAllVolumes
52 Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol 7 (p. 174). https://
archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAndSpeechespdfsAllVolumes
53 Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol 3 (p. 287). https://
archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAndSpeechespdfsAllVolumes




57 Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol 3 (p. 326). https://
archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAndSpeechespdfsAllVolumes
58 Ibid.
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narratives.59 Originally, the Puranas – which contained folk narratives – were writ-
ten by Sutas, a non-Brahmin literary class. Sutas had the hereditary and prescriptive 
right to retain monopoly over the Puranas. However, they were later ousted by the 
Brahmins, resulting in the addition of fresh chapters, substitution of old chapters, 
and substantial change in the content of the Puranas.60
It would be a misrepresentation of history, if one looks away from the varna sys-
tem and all its associated evils, while asserting that India has had an exemplary 
historical tradition in knowledge sharing. Interestingly, Malamud does mention in 
his book that Shamnad Basheer had reminded him about these institutionalised 
restrictions on knowledge flows.61 During our conversation with Basheer, he reiter-
ated his disagreement with Malamud on this issue.62 Further, although Sridevan has 
in her work asserted that India has a rich tradition in knowledge sharing, she herself 
has alluded to social conditions and instances that suggest otherwise. For example, 
she talks about how there was no open publication of knowledge, and how knowl-
edge was restrictively transmitted to prevent its abuse and dilution.63 She also dis-
cusses the direct link of knowledge with religion which automatically caused 
exclusion.64 Moreover, she discusses the perfect recitation, high qualification, and 
specific training or initiation required to access knowledge, apart from having to 
belong to a hereditary fraternity.65 The ability to fulfil these conditions in order to 
access knowledge was heavily dependent on one’s caste.
Although teaching for the sake of money or fee was prohibited, and the IP system 
as we know it now did not exist, it is important to acknowledge the ruthlessness, 
rigidity, and pervasiveness of the social systems which heavily restricted knowledge 
flows.66 In many ways, such measures to restrict knowledge flows also resemble the 
working of the existing trade secrets system. The consequences of a Shudra or Ati- 
Shudra trying to break the law were inhuman and heinous in nature. Some scholars 
point out that merely hearing the Vedas could result in their ears being filled with 
59 Ibid., p. 255.
60 Ibid., p. 255.
61 Malamud, C. & Pitroda, S. (2018). Code Swaraj: Field Notes from the Standards Satyagraha 
(p. 168), available at https://archive.org/details/CodeSwaraj
62 Telephonic Interview with Shamnad Basheer on 10 March 2018.
63 Prabha Sridevan (2015). Intellectual Property in the Ancient Indian texts. In Irene Calboli, 




66 Manu (III.150ff.): Classes of Brahmins deemed to be unworthy (to partake) of oblations to the 
gods and manes: ‘He who teaches for a stipulated fee and he who is taught on that condition, he 
who instructs Shudra pupils and he whose teacher is a Shudra, he who speaks rudely, the son of an 
adulteress, and the son of a widow.’ [Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings 
and Speeches, Vol 7 (p.  124). https://archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAnd 
SpeechespdfsAllVolumes]
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molten lead and lac.67 Pronunciation of the Vedas could result in slitting their tongue, 
and if they preserved the Vedas, their body was to be cut through.68
Even when some school reforms started being initiated in the nineteenth century, 
merely opening schools for all castes was not sufficient in breaking social barriers 
to education. The demands of upper caste Hindus refusing to study with lower caste 
students were prioritised over the rights of the lower caste students. The colonial 
government tried to reach a ‘resolution’ by forcing the few lower caste students who 
did attend school to sit in a verandah far away from their classroom and class-
mates.69 In some schools, lower caste students were made to sit in separate rooms 
and barred from accessing the common water supply.70 In a way, efforts for inclu-
sion of people belonging to lower castes actually highlighted the stigma and preju-
dice against them and the discrimination was perpetuated through social exclusionary 
practices.71 Given that most authorities reacted to the situation out of fear of boycott 
by upper caste Hindus, this interaction between students from various castes became 
cause for more direct humiliation and exclusion of lower caste students.72 Many of 
them were also subjected to persecution when they were permitted entry into ordi-
nary village schools – their stacks of hay were burnt down, arson was attempted on 
their houses, and they were physically assaulted.73 It needs to be specifically men-
tioned that even conversion of religion did not save people from such exclusion and 
prejudices, and they continued to face discrimination.74
All these aspects highlight how religion and social mores entrenched social prej-
udice and exclusion against people belonging to certain social strata, and systemi-
cally deprived them of rights including that of access to education.
Even today, these prejudices remain alive in various forms and extents, and com-
pensating for the socio-economic gap created by the caste system remains an uphill 
battle. A combination of socio-economic factors including caste, class, gender, loca-
tion, and language used to and continue to determine the extent and kind of access one 
has to knowledge in this country.75 One may have to examine present- day attitudes 
and practices with regard to knowledge sharing, in this socio- historical context.
67 Vatsa, R.S. (1912).The Depressed Classes of India- An Enquiry into their Conditions and 
Suggestions for their Uplift (p. 134). Gitanjali Prakashan.
68 Ibid.





73 Ambedkar, B.R. (2016). Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol 5 (p. 41). https://
archive.org/details/Dr.BabasahebAmbedkarWritingsAndSpeechespdfsAllVolumes
74 For example, even after conversion to Christianity, Dalits are often referred to as ‘Dalit 
Christians’. Pervasive caste hierarchies and prejudices continue even within the converted popula-
tion. See Bauman, C.M. (2008). Redeeming Indian “Christian” Womanhood? Missionaries, Dalits, 
and Agency in Colonial India. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 24(2), 5–27. http://www.
jstor.org/stable/20487924
75 Govind Guru observes the ‘ghettoisation into inferiorised manual spheres’ of persons belonging 
to lower castes, due to their generational exclusion from undertaking occupations which provide a 
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3  Perceptions Regarding Sharing of Knowledge 
Resources and Ownership of IP in the Contemporary 
Indian Society
While the previous section highlighted the socio-historical context of knowledge 
sharing in India, this section intends to provide some insight into the current status 
of knowledge sharing and perceptions regarding IP ownership in the contemporary 
Indian society. As mentioned earlier, this section relies primarily on empirical data 
from two different studies. The first one is an empirical study conducted by the 
authors with regard to knowledge sharing practices of academic researchers in 
India. Through this survey, the authors analysed – among other things – the extent 
to which, and the way in which, the researchers share their publications and data; 
their general attitudes towards openness and sharing; and the way they consume 
openly available knowledge. The second one is an empirical study conducted by 
one of the authors on attitude of consumers in India towards IP protection.76 The 
data from this study provides some insights on perceptions regarding IP ownership, 
and in particular, the perceptions in Indian society regarding morality of copyright 
infringement.
3.1  Survey on Knowledge Sharing Perceptions and Practices 
of Researchers
Our survey on knowledge sharing practices of researchers in India was conducted in 
two phases; in the first phase, researchers from leading institutions in five disci-
plines (Economics, Law, Mechanical Engineering, Medicine, and Physics) 
responded to the questionnaire; whereas in Phase II, the survey was opened to 
researchers working in any institution in India and belonging to any discipline.77
Among the respondents, 86.86%78 stated that they think openness is a core value 
of science. 84.71%79 felt that open access improves research, and 87.4%80 felt that 
it provides for more equitable distribution of information. In contrast, only 18.15%81 
room for innovation and imagination. According to him, this has led to lack of context and condi-
tions conducive to contribution to knowledge systems. [Guru, G. (2002). How Egalitarian Are the 
Social Sciences in India? Economic and Political Weekly, 37(50), 5004–5005].
76 Scaria, A.G. (2014). Piracy in the Indian Film Industry: Copyright and Cultural Consonance 
(pp. 103–137). Cambridge University Press.
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of the respondents felt that open access reduces the quality of research and 31.3%82 
felt that it leads to free-riding. These data suggest that in general most of the respon-
dents are in support of openness and sharing of knowledge. But is this support 
demonstrated in their practices?
In order to determine the nature and extent of their participation in the process of 
knowledge sharing, we inquired about their consumption of freely available publi-
cations and data, as well as their own sharing practices. As expected, a majority of 
the respondents have relied upon data (59.5%)83 or publications (78.76%)84 openly 
available on the internet for their research. However, when it comes to sharing their 
own publications, it was noticed that only 35.06%85 share their publications through 
open access repositories. With regard to sharing of data, it was noticed that only a 
mere 8.4% share through open access repositories.86 Similarly, only 9.72% share 
their publications through their personal website without restrictions, and 3.09% 
share their data this way.87
Interestingly, most of the respondents stated that they share their publications 
only upon request (56.6%).88 Sharing on request is certainly not the most optimal 
approach for knowledge sharing as the process – knowing the existence of a publi-
cation, locating it, approaching the author, and receiving a response from them – 
involves multiple uncertain steps. Apart from this, 34.03% respondents stated that 
they share their publications with close friends and trusted acquaintances, 47.22% 
share with researchers working in their team, and 31.6% share with researchers 
working in their institution.89 3.82% do not share their publications with anyone.90
If the data regarding sharing of publications do not seem promising, those regard-
ing data sharing are even less so. As many as 16.37% stated that they do not gener-
ally share data with anyone.91 37.17% share data with anyone who asks for them and 
as discussed above; this is not the most optimal approach with regard to sharing.92 
48.67% and 20.35% also mentioned that they share data with researchers working 
in their team and institution, respectively.93 25.22% respondents said that they share 
data with close friends or trusted acquaintances.94
Evidently, the results of the survey as regards sharing practices of researchers are 
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despite being in agreement with the importance of sharing? Are they seeing any 
benefits while sharing at all? Before we address these important questions, it may 
also be helpful to look at data from two other important dimensions of our survey.
In any society/country, academic/formally educated researchers are not the only 
producers of knowledge. Citizens outside of the formal system have always pro-
duced rich knowledge. However, those within the formal system are generally per-
ceived as the most prominent producers of knowledge, and their attitudes and 
practices as regards knowledge sharing have substantial impact on the sharing econ-
omy. In this context, it was important to explore how far researchers tried to make 
their knowledge resources accessible for the broader public. In the context of a 
multi-lingual country like India, we explored this in two dimensions. Firstly, we 
tried to explore how frequently the researchers tried to share simplified versions of 
their findings for laypersons. Secondly, we also explored how frequently research 
outputs are disseminated in regional languages. The findings on both the dimen-
sions are disappointing. As many as 30.63% of the respondents never shared any 
simplified versions of research findings, while 29.19% do so only rarely.95 Further, 
the vast majority of respondents (78.85%) never shared translated versions of their 
research in regional languages.96
All these data demonstrate a striking contrast between consumption and sharing 
habits of researchers in India. But why are Indian researchers reluctant to share their 
knowledge resources even today? While the socio-historical factors discussed in the 
previous section might be playing a role in influencing the norms in this regard, it is 
also important to note that not much effort has been made from the side of policy 
makers to undo the historical moulding of norms. The general incentive structure 
for academicians/ researchers today indicates that sharing of results and openness in 
research have not yet become a priority.
For example, if one looks at the Academic Performance Indicators (API), devel-
oped by the University Grants Commission (UGC) of India, it can be noticed that 
there has been inordinate focus on number of publications, impact factor of the 
journal they are published in, and whether the journal is ‘national’ or ‘international’.97 
There is no regard for quality of the publication or the journal, the social relevance 
of the underlying research, or sharing practices. As API system has played a key 
role in determining the appointment and promotion of academics, it could very well 
be argued that the current system is not incentivising sharing of knowledge, but may 
only be supporting elitist practices of limiting the sharing of knowledge resources.
Some of our data regarding the perceptions of the respondents regarding benefits 
they have received from sharing confirm our views on the problems with the 
95 N = 346.
96 N = 350.
97 University Grants Commission Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of 
Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance 
of Standards in Higher Education, 2018. https://www.ugc.ac.in/pdfnews/4033931_UGC-
Regulation_min_Qualification_Jul2018.pdf. Accessed 21 July 2018.
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existing incentive structure. For example, as many as 42.8%98 of the respondents 
stated that they have not received any benefits at all when they shared their publica-
tions. Similarly, 60.84%99 could not perceive any benefits from sharing their data.
The data also show that fear of plagiarism (15.22%) and fear of use by others for 
their professional benefits (9.42%) are some of the reasons cited by the researchers for 
not sharing their publications.100 In the case of data sharing too, the lack of incentives 
to share is reflected in the survey results. Most of the funding agencies and institutions 
in India do not have strong mandates with regard to sharing of data. The data show that 
lack of mandates from their funding agency and institution has discouraged 11.24% 
and 15.73% respondents, respectively, while lack of resources has discouraged 7.49% 
respondents.101 It is also important to note here that as many as 11.61% stated that they 
do not consider data sharing to be important.102 However, it is interesting to observe 
that the most prominent factor that discouraged data sharing is the reluctance to share 
data before having completed all possible research/ publications based on that data set 
(44.19%),103 which again illustrates that publication, and not knowledge sharing, is the 
primary incentive for researchers in most Indian institutions.
3.2  Study on Attitude of Film Consumers Towards IP 
Protection
As discussed at the introductory part of this section, one may read the data and find-
ings on sharing practices of researchers along with the data from another study on 
attitudes regarding IP protection, for a comprehensive understanding of the attitude 
towards sharing in the contemporary Indian society. This study was conducted in 
the context of piracy in the Indian film industry.104 The objective of the study was to 
explore, among other aspects, the film consumers’ engagement in piracy; and their 
perceptions regarding social costs, social benefits, legality, and morality of piracy.
While the study showed that the vast majority of respondents had consumed 
pirated movies through different channels, two dimensions of the study are impor-
tant in the context of the present discussion – perceptions regarding social costs of 







104 For a detailed discussion on the methodology used in the study as well as the questionnaire, see 
Scaria, A.G. (2014). Piracy in the Indian Film Industry: Copyright and Cultural Consonance 
(pp. 219–244). Cambridge University Press.
105 For a detailed discussion and data on the exposure of the respondents in this survey to different 
forms of pirated products, see Scaria, A.G. (2014). Piracy in the Indian Film Industry: Copyright 
and Cultural Consonance (pp. 104–111). Cambridge University Press.
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The perceptions of the respondents regarding social costs of piracy were mea-
sured at three levels – moving from macro to micro levels – perceptions regarding 
the effects piracy has on the economy, the movie industry, and individuals working 
in the movie industry. As many as 66.59%106 respondents stated that they thought 
pirated movies would hurt the Indian economy, 69.25%107 said that pirated movies 
would hurt the existence of the movies industry, and 71.11%108 felt that piracy 
would affect the livelihood of diverse persons involved in the creation of movies.
One may read the above data along with the data on the respondents’ perceptions 
regarding the morality of different acts which constitute piracy. Among the respon-
dents, 66.37%109 thought that it is immoral to stream pirated movies, and download-
ing of pirated movies was perceived to be immoral by 64.59%110 respondents. 
Similarly, uploading pirated movies was considered immoral by 64.96111; and buy-
ing pirated movie VCDs/DVDs was considered immoral by 64.67%112 respondents. 
Further, sharing of pirated movies with friends was considered immoral by a sub-
stantial percentage of respondents (57.43%).113
It needs to be specifically mentioned that similar to the findings from the knowl-
edge sharing survey, the results of this survey also paint a very interesting picture of 
the Indian society – one can see stark divergences between what respondents think 
about a particular act and how they actually behave. In other words, even though 
most respondents in this survey were found to be deeply conscious about the social 
costs of piracy and immorality of different acts perceived as piracy, they were also 
admittedly engaging in those acts.114
The fact that majority of the respondents considered it immoral to engage in dif-
ferent acts that may constitute copyright infringement illustrates a strong sense of 
acceptance of intellectual property rights over informational goods. This may be 
contrasted with the findings from many other countries in Asia, particularly China, 
wherein some scholars have shown that the concept of intellectual property rights 









114 For more detailed discussion and data on the exposure of the respondents in this survey to dif-
ferent forms of pirated products, see Scaria, A.G. (2014). Piracy in the Indian Film Industry: 
Copyright and Cultural Consonance (pp. 104–111). Cambridge University Press.
115 See, for example, Alford, W.P., (1995). To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual 
Property Law in Chinese Civilization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Some of the other 
Asian countries wherein scholars have tried to analyse IP infringements from a local/comparative 
cultural context include Indonesia and Thailand. See, for example, Arli, D., et  al. (2015). The 
Impact of Moral Equity, Relativism and Attitude on Individuals: Digital Piracy Behaviour in a 
Developing Country. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 33, 348 and Kini, R.B., et al. (2004). 
Shaping of Moral Intensity Regarding Software Piracy: A Comparison Between Thailand and 
U.S. Students. Journal of Business Ethics, 49, 91.
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have highlighted the importance given in the Chinese society to sharing as a tradi-
tional Chinese cultural value, and examined how such values may affect perceptions 
of morality with regard to copyright piracy.116 However, due to historical existence 
of restrictions to access to knowledge on lines of gender, caste, etc., restrictions 
based on IPR may not have come as a substantial culture shift in India. Hence, it 
may be reasonably hypothesised that the socio-cultural history of knowledge shar-
ing in India may be contributing to acceptance of intellectual monopolies in India, 
even though it is difficult to illustrate this empirically.
4  Knowledge Sharing and Some Recent Policies
The previous sections, which focused on historical and contemporary aspects of 
knowledge sharing and IP protection in India, present a bleak picture regarding 
knowledge sharing in India. In this context, it may be useful to examine whether any 
major policy changes are being adopted in India to encourage sharing of knowledge 
resources in light of the opportunities enabled by the sharing economy. While poli-
cies and plans are not enforceable in a court of law, they might be useful documents 
to better understand the direction policy makers are taking in a relevant area. In 
order to gauge the degree of importance given by policy makers to knowledge shar-
ing within the broader innovation policy framework, we would like to analyse two 
recent policies of the government of India  – the National Intellectual Property 
Rights Policy, 2016 and the Startup India Action Plan, 2016. These two policies 
were chosen for this analysis because they are recent policies which emphasise on 
innovation. It would be interesting to see the praxis they seek to use to reach that 
goal and whether the same is conducive to a sharing economy. This part of the chap-
ter provides a critical analysis of these policies from the perspective of a sharing 
economy which seeks to maximise and diversify innovation.
4.1  National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016
The introductory statements in the National Intellectual Property Rights Policy 
include phrases such as ‘holistic, conducive ecosystem’, ‘socio-cultural develop-
ment’, ‘public interest’, ‘knowledge economy’, and ‘benefit of all’.117 The vision 
116 See, for example, Swinyard, W. R., et al. (1990). The Morality of Software Piracy: A Cross-
Cultural Analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 9, 656 and Ang, S.  H., et  al. (2001). Spot the 
Difference: Consumer Responses Towards Counterfeits. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18, 221. 
On the other hand, some studies have also shown how different, presumably conflicting, traditional 
cultural values in China may be interacting when it comes to decision making like buying IP 
infringing products. See, for example, Wan, W.  W. N., et  al. (2009). Do Traditional Chinese 
Cultural Values Nourish a Market for Pirated CDs. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 187–194. 
However, it must be clarified that these studies should also be subjected to further analyses and 
verification.
117 National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016, p. 1.
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statement even indicates that the policy was introduced envisaging an India where 
‘knowledge owned is transformed into knowledge shared’.118 A superficial glance at 
these words and phrases may lead to the assumption that the policy seeks to draw 
attention to the importance of striking a balance between IPR and knowledge 
sharing.
However, a closer look at the policy document makes it clear that the provisions 
neither seek to nor end up achieving that. On the contrary, one of the most worri-
some aspects of the policy is its singular and inordinate focus on strict IP protection 
for fostering creativity and innovation.119 While IP protection may incentivise inno-
vation and creativity in certain cases, it is merely one of the many potential incen-
tives. As many empirical studies have shown, innovations and creativity also thrive 
in the so-called ‘negative spaces of IPR’, where IP protection either does not exist 
or IP protection is not enforced by right holders.120 Moreover, in many ways, strin-
gent IP restrictions may also limit knowledge flows in a way that further innovations 
that could have been made on the basis of the protected IP are hindered. In order to 
have a truly innovative society, educational, social, economic, and legal conditions 
need to work in harmony to ensure that the appropriate rights are prioritised depend-
ing on the context.
The introduction to the policy states that the perception that IP protection may 
not be required must be changed through awareness creation.121 As one may recall 
from the discussions in the earlier section on historical aspects of knowledge shar-
ing in India, the generalisation in this statement is based on the faulty presumption 
that IP protection is alien to Indian society, and that strict exercise of IPR is neces-
sarily better for an innovator or creator.122
Objective 1 of the policy deals with IPR awareness, and emphasises the need to 
conduct outreach and promotion to make citizens from all sections of the society 
aware of the economic, social, and cultural benefits of IPRs.123 While it might be 
important to make citizens aware of their legal and constitutional rights, portraying 
IPRs as the panacea that can magically transform the innovation landscape may be 
particularly harmful for the innovation ecosystem in a sharing economy. The policy 
even talks about high quality and cost-effective innovation in this context, although 
there is no clarity as to how increased awareness about IPRs would aid that.
Objective 2 focuses on stimulation of IP generation which is envisaged as an end 
in itself. IP should never be an end, but just one of the many tools which can be used 
118 National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016, p. 1.
119 Basheer, S. & Agarwal, P. (2017). India’s New IP Policy: A Bare Act? The Indian Journal of 
Law and Technology, 13(2), pp. 6–13.
120 See, generally, Raustiala, K. & Sprigman, C. (2012). The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation 
Sparks Innovation. Oxford University Press.
121 National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016, p. 3.
122 See, also, Basheer, S. & Agarwal, P. (2017). India’s New IP Policy: A Bare Act? The Indian 
Journal of Law and Technology, 13, p. 7.
123 National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016, p. 5.
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to reach the goal of innovation.124 Here, the policy talks about conducting IP audits, 
promoting IP registration, and using registered IPRs as a metric to evaluate one’s 
performance. In the absence of any provision urging innovators to share their IP in 
certain contexts, this again indicates a narrow perception of innovation and may 
further prevent researchers from sharing their knowledge resources for the broader 
benefit of the society. Interestingly, the policy gives a cursory nod to ‘open source- 
based research’ such as Open Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) in this part, but does 
not provide any explanations or roadmaps.125 While finer details of implementation 
of open source-based research may not be expected or desirable in this policy, more 
in-depth discussions on such initiatives would have better highlighted their impor-
tance. This is in contrast to many other parts of the IP policy wherein it has provided 
detailed guidance on how to increase IP awareness, registrations, and enforcement.
Objective 3 deals with the need to have strong and effective IP laws which bal-
ance the interests of the IPR holder with the public interest. Among other things, 
this section talks about the need to update outdated laws; consult stakeholders; enter 
into treaties; protect traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and 
genetic resources; simplify and streamline legal processes; make the legal processes 
efficient and transparent, and fill in gaps in the existing legal system. However, the 
lack of clarity as to how to strike the balance of interests leaves much to be desired 
as regards this policy objective.126
Objective 5 talks about the commercialisation of IPRs. The policy says that ‘[t]
he value and economic reward for the owners of IP rights comes only from their 
commercialization’. We must reiterate that this assertion is unsubstantiated and mis-
leading, since value should be decided by the individual in question, and the system 
should provide, or at least refrain from denying, non-monetary incentives for inno-
vators and creators.127 This part of the policy also mentions that free and open source 
software should be promoted and open standards should be adopted, but – in the 
124 Basheer, S. & Agarwal, P. (2017). India’s New IP Policy: A Bare Act? The Indian Journal of 
Law and Technology, 13, p. 6.
125 Open Science Drug Discovery is an initiative led by Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR), India which aims to provide a platform for global partnership and collaboration 
to evolve solutions to complex health issues and develop affordable healthcare. See Open Source 
Drug Discovery. http://www.osdd.net/home. Accessed 25 July 2018.
126 Ibid., p. 15.
127 Contrary to the perception that patents are primary drivers of innovation, numerous ‘important’ 
inventions such as penicillin, x-ray machine, and many life-saving vaccines were never patented by 
the respective innovators. See Fontana, R., Nuvolari, A., Shimizu, H., & Vezzulli, A. (2013). 
Reassessing patent propensity: Evidence from a dataset of R&D awards, 1977–2004. Research 
Policy, 42(10), 1780–1792. This is in sharp contrast to innovators like Thomas Alva Edison, who 
had as many as 1093 patents. See Rutgers School of Arts and Sciences. Edison’s patents. Thomas 
A. Edison Papers. https://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm. Similarly, unlike The Gillette Company, 
which is (in)famous for its huge number of patents and closed innovation model, Tesla has shifted 
to an open innovation model and has promised not to initiate lawsuit against anyone who uses their 
patented technologies ‘in good faith’. See Sansonetti, A., & Purificato, M. (2014). The Open 
Innovation Paradigm in Electric Vehicle Industry: A case study of Tesla Motors. LUISS Guido 
Carli, 73. https://tesi.luiss.it/13496/1/purificato-marco-tesi-2014.pdf, and Rivette, K.G., & Kline, 
D. (2000). Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property. Harvard Business Review, January–
February, 58. http://secure.com.sg/courses/ICI/Grab/Reading_Articles/L07_A02_Rivette.pdf
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absence of further explanation – we are not sure how exactly this relates to com-
mercialisation of IPRs. Interestingly, although government bodies such as Cell for 
IPR Promotion and Management (CIPAM) have been given certain responsibilities 
here to help IPR holders commercialise their IP, no mention has been made of 
knowledge sharing, even by publicly funded institutions. In fact, the policy encour-
ages publicly funded research laboratories, academia, and other institutions to com-
mercialise their research outputs.
Objective 6 deals with the strengthening of enforcement and adjudication in case 
of IP infringement, and emphasises on creating awareness about the harm caused by 
IP infringement. As indicated in the earlier section of this chapter, data from our 
study show that most respondents were of the view that copyright piracy has social 
costs at both micro and macro levels. The emphasis on awareness regarding IP pro-
tection, in the absence of equal emphasis on knowledge sharing, may further 
strengthen such perceptions and adversely affect innovation and creativity.
Finally, Objective 7 deals with the strengthening and expansion of ‘human 
resources, institutions and capacities for teaching, training, research and skill 
building in IPR’. The prominent way in which this has been envisaged in the pol-
icy – introducing and strengthening IP courses in institutions at different levels, but 
without emphasising on the need for also educating the public about the exceptions 
provided under different IP legislation  – is not likely to encourage creativity or 
innovation.
Interestingly, at a time when the unlimited potential of sharing and openness in 
innovation is being explored across the world, the term ‘open’ has been mentioned in 
only four sections of the policy, that too in an extremely vague manner.128 The term 
‘share’ also makes an appearance just once in this document - in the vision state-
ment - clearly indicating the extent of importance policymakers in India attach to 
openness and sharing of knowledge resources. While the chances of this IP policy 
adding any value to the IP system and the innovation ecosystem are low, the extent 
128 The four sections of the National IPR Policy 2016, wherein the term ‘open’ appear are:
2.10 – Encourage R&D including open source based research such as Open Source Drug Discovery 
(OSDD) by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) for new inventions for 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of diseases, especially those that are life threatening and 
those that have high incidence in India;
2.17 – Promote ‘infusion of funds to public R&D units’ as a part of Corporate Social Responsibility 
to foster a culture of open innovation;
5.12 – Promote use of Free and Open Source Software along with adoption of open standards; 
possibility of creating Indian standard operating environments will be examined;
7.9 – Develop distance learning and on-line courses on IP for all categories of users; strengthen IP 
teaching in open universities and centres of skill development.
This is in contrast with the policy framework adopted in some other parts of the world. For exam-
ple, the European Union has adopted ‘Horizon 2020’ to foster open access and open innovation for 
‘excellent science’ and ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’. See The EU Framework 
Programme for Research & Innovation. (2014). HORIZON 2020  in Brief (p.  5). European 
Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/sites/horizon2020/files/H2020_
inBrief_EN_FinalBAT.pdf
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of damage it may cause to innovations and creativity in a sharing economy could be 
substantial due to the high emphasis it provides on IP ownership.
4.2  Startup India Action Plan, 2016
Startup India, a flagship initiative of the Government of India, seeks to build an 
ecosystem that nurtures startups and innovations, and believes that this can drive 
sustainable economic growth and create employment opportunities.129 In this con-
text, it seeks to expand the ‘startup movement’ sectorally and geographically; and 
the Startup India Action Plan, 2016 came with the objective of supporting this 
expansion. For the purpose of this chapter, it would be useful to critically analyse 
the provisions of the Plan that are meant to foster innovation and collaboration. We 
would like to highlight four aspects of the policy in this regard and raise some key 
questions.
Firstly, the Plan introduces a scheme for Startup Intellectual Property Protection 
(SIPP), which is aimed at facilitating the filing of patents, trademarks, and designs 
by innovative startups. The scheme mainly entails promotion of awareness about 
and adoption of IPRs; and provision of IPR services and resources, including fee 
rebates and fast-tracking of patent applications. The entire facilitation fee is sup-
posed to be borne by the central government, and the startup would only be expected 
to pay statutory fees. But interestingly, no part of the document appears to give any 
indication that the policy makers asked the most fundamental question – are Indian 
startups IP consumers or IP producers, or a mix of both? The emphasis provided in 
the plan for IP protection clearly gives the impression that the policy makers drafted 
the action plan with the presumption that all startups in India are solely IP produc-
ers. If Indian startups are at least partly IP consumers, the Plan should have at least 
given equal emphasis on facilitating more access to protected IP, including acquisi-
tion of IP by the government and open access to such acquired IP.
Secondly, the Plan proposes organisation of fests for showcasing innovation by 
startups, and for providing platforms for collaboration.130 While this is a laudable 
step, a closer look at the provisions makes one realise that these initiatives are more 
in the nature of networking platforms for the startups to connect with other stake-
holders from the industry and the academia. The policy has completely missed the 
importance of building open collaborative platforms.
Thirdly, the Plan envisages the setting up of infrastructure and awards for foster-
ing research and innovation. Importantly, it talks about ‘Grand Innovation Challenge’ 
awards to fund innovations concerning ultra low-cost solutions to local problems. It 
also lists various measures that the government is supposed to implement for pro-
moting research and innovation among young students. These measures include 
129 This Plan defines Startup, for the purpose of government schemes, as an ‘entity, incorporated or 
registered in India not prior to 5 years, with annual turnover not exceeding INR 25 crore in any 
preceding financial year, working towards innovation, development, deployment or commercial-
ization of new products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property’. See 
Startup India Action Plan, 2016, p. 28.
130 Startup India Action Plan, 2016, p. 19.
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programmes for providing prototyping support for school children, and supporting 
student innovations and research. As regards research infrastructure, the Plan dis-
cusses the setting up of 31 ‘innovation centres’ and 7 ‘research parks’. The innova-
tion centres will be set up at certain national institutes to augment incubation and 
R&D efforts, by, inter alia, encouraging student-driven startups from host institutes 
and providing smooth approvals for incubators. The proposed research parks are 
expected to allow industry-academia collaborations by enabling research-focused 
companies to set up base in the park and utilise the hosts’ expertise. The proposed 
research parks are supposed to have self-sustaining and world-class research infra-
structure, and foster meaningful collaboration between startups and the academia. 
But would these parks be open for all or would it be limited to specific people? 
When public funds are used for creating infrastructure, it is also important to ensure 
that such infrastructure can be used by all people, including those from outside the 
host institutions. Unfortunately, the Plan has not given due importance to creating 
such open and shared infrastructure.
Finally, like the National IPR Policy, the Startup Plan has also failed to provide 
sufficient measures that can foster meaningful knowledge sharing and equitable 
opportunities for innovation. It would have enabled a far more optimal startup eco-
system in India if it had taken into consideration all the potentials of a sharing 
economy in the innovation process.
5  Challenging the Status Quo: The Way Forward?
The preceding parts of this chapter illustrate that the culture of sharing knowledge 
in India has historically been riddled by various socio-economic and legal restric-
tions. Despite the recognition of the need to create and innovate, and the introduc-
tion of policies and plans to foster the same, there is a lack of holistic analysis and 
insightful policymaking. As highlighted previously, inequitable access to knowl-
edge hinders diversity and extent of participation in innovation. It is therefore 
important to challenge the status quo, and initiate and implement changes that can 
lead to sharing of both non-rivalrous knowledge, and rivalrous and scarce resources 
that are required to produce knowledge.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to highlight the specific legal and policy 
recommendations for making significant changes to the status quo. However, we 
hope that the discussions in this chapter will trigger debates that can lead to changes 
in the attitude towards knowledge sharing. In this context, it is important to high-
light that apart from providing access to non-rivalrous and rivalrous resources 
required for knowledge creation, it is necessary to address the social gaps that hin-
der participation in the sharing economy. It is therefore crucial to devise and imple-
ment meaningful measures to reduce socio-economic gaps based on caste, class, 
gender, geography, etc. Efforts should also be made to address language gaps and 
prejudices against knowledge creators from outside the formal research/innovation 
ecosystem. Only through such an inclusive approach in knowledge creation, can 
India explore the full potential of a sharing economy.
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